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 ABSTRACT 
 
On 30 November 2006, the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) 
released International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 8 Operating Segments which 
replaced the revised International Accounting Standard (IAS) 14 Segmental reporting.  
This study consists of four main projects covering the empirical analysis of the non-
financial FTSE 350 constituents’ first segmental disclosures under IFRS 8. 
The new standard is a result of the joint short term project between the IASB and 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and it is almost identical to its US 
counterpart.  The first part of this study analyses the level of compliance (measured by 
compliance indices) with the requirements of IFRS 8 and examines the factors that might 
provide some explanation of the variances in the compliance levels of the companies.  
The results suggest that there is substantial non-compliance with the entity-wide 
disclosure requirements of IFRS 8.  There is evidence that the companies are withholding 
sensitive information (such as reliance on major customers; non-current assets and 
external revenue attributed to the entity’s country of domicile and material foreign 
countries) which provides support for the proprietary cost theory.  The results also 
indicate that the extent of compliance varies significantly.  The evidences suggest that the 
identity of the auditor is one of the most important company characteristics in explaining 
the overall level of compliance with the segmental reporting requirements of IFRS 8.  
Thus, the audit quality provided by the BIG 4 audit companies seems to be different.  
Additionally, the findings reveal that the overall level of compliance and the level of 
compliance with the entity-wide requirements of the standard is significantly greater for 
companies organised around different products and services (business reportable 
segments) or a combination of different products, services and geographical areas (mixed 
reportable segments) compared to companies organised around different geographic areas 
(geographic reportable segments).  It raises the question whether the companies use their 
organisational structure to conceal / reveal information.  The relatively high level of non-
compliance with the entity-wide requirements of the standard and the considerable 
variance between the levels of compliance of the individual companies questions the 
success of the convergence of the accounting standards and the quality and the 
comparability of the financial statements. 
It is no doubt that geographic disclosures provide useful information on assessing 
internationally diversified companies’ risks and prospects and on making economic 
decisions.  The second part of this study analyses the impact of IFRS 8 on the quality of 
the geographic disclosures of the sample companies and tries to provide some explanation 
for better understanding the diversity of the preparers’ geographic disclosure practice and 
their possible incentives to conceal / reveal geographic information.  The findings suggest 
that the introduction of IFRS 8 has both positive and negative impacts on the geographic 
disclosure quality of the companies.  The results reinforce previous research findings and 
indicate that the companies’ geographic disclosure quality cannot be described by only 
one quality measure.  Considerable variation was found in the companies’ geographic 
disclosure quality.  However, none of the studied company characteristics had significant 
effect on all of the quality measures.  Additionally, the research results seem to indicate 
that it is not in the interest of a relatively high percentage of the sample companies to 
change their geographic disclosure practice.  The companies stick with their disclosure 
practice even under the new standard.  
Geographic information disaggregated to country-level results in greater 
accountability and transparency and provides financial information that is more useful 
and relevant for financial statement users than information provided for geographic 
regions.  However, IFRS 8 only requires the separate disclosure of individually material 
countries and it does not provide guidance on how to set the materiality level.  The third 
 part of the study provides some insight into (1) how the companies apply the materiality 
concept in defining their individually material countries and (2) how different company 
characteristics affect the companies’ materiality decisions.  The quantitative materiality 
threshold applied by the sample companies (estimated by the method developed by 
Doupnik and Seese, 2001) varies considerably which indicates that the companies do not 
follow a general quantitative benchmark.  However, with the exception of early adoption 
none of the studied company characteristics had significant effect on the materiality 
threshold applied by the companies.  The results suggest that there could be both 
quantitative and qualitative factors, not studied in this research that might be more 
important in the preparers’ materiality decisions.  However, only the preparers know what 
is behind their materiality decision.  Only a few companies disclosed information about 
the quantitative materiality threshold applied and none of them disclosed information 
about the qualitative factors considered in assessing the materiality of an individual 
country.  The empirical findings provide evidence that the companies use both the 
flexibility provided by IFRS 8 and the shield of the materiality concept when they make 
materiality decisions about their individually material, therefore reportable countries.  
Greater transparency and detail about the companies’ materiality decision would reduce 
the uncertainty and could enhance the understandability of the companies’ segmental 
notes.  The IASB has recently announced plans to consider a project on materiality (IASB, 
2013a).  The findings of this study could present relevant information to the IASB’s work 
on providing guidance on the application of the materiality concept.  
 In the last decade there have been calls from civil societies, regulatory bodies and 
international economic organisations to require multinational companies (MNCs) to 
disclose information about their activities in those countries where they have operation.  
The fourth part of the study provides a summary of the impact of the introduction of IFRS 
8 on the sample UK listed companies’ country-level disclosures and critically evaluates 
whether the existing geographic disclosure requirements through IFRS 8 provide 
sufficient financial information and transparency for the different financial statement 
users.  The results indicate that (1) the fact that IFRS 8 only requires the disclosure of the 
revenue and non-current assets for the country of domicile and for the material foreign 
countries, (2) the way the MNCs apply the materiality concept to define countries that 
need to be individually disclosed and (3) the companies preference to keep geographic 
information at minimum level result in a relatively poor level of audited country-level 
information even among the largest listed companies.  Therefore, what is disclosed in the 
companies’ audited financial statements is very far from the idea of full country-by-
country reporting (CBCR).  The IASB decided not to undertake proactive work in this 
area and preparers argue that enough information and transparency is provided under the 
requirements of IFRS 8.  However, the findings of this study and the fact that legislative 
bodies in the US and in the EU had to bypass the IASB and issue CBCR related new 
regulations indicate that the country-level requirements of IFRS 8 and the country-level 
information provided by the companies in their segmental notes are not sufficient and 
transparent enough.  To ensure the same reporting requirement for entities worldwide and 
to increase transparency and the availability of important geographic financial 
information, to enhance consistency and to help the comparison CBCR should be 
considered by the IASB and addressed in international accounting standard(s).  
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1.1 Introduction and justification of the study 
 
“Segment information is one of the most vital aspects of financial reporting for investors 
and other users. As mots listed companies are complex, heterogeneous groups, segment 
information provide users the key to understanding corporate business models and 
economic dynamics. It allows external observers to understand the respective risks and 
value potentials of different lines of business, the synergies or inefficiencies that may 
make a group more or less than the sum of its parts, and the underlying corporate 
strategy.” (Véron, 2007, p3) 
 
As a result of the rapid globalisation during the past decades most listed companies are 
complex, heterogeneous groups. Users of financial statements are interested in assessing 
the risks and prospects (e.g. growth opportunities, profit potentials) of the different 
business lines and the geographical markets in which these companies operate. Beside 
other forms (e.g. press releases, media, company’s website, presentations for analysts) 
companies provide information through their mandatory and audited financial reports. 
However, consolidated financial data (aggregated to group level) cannot provide users 
with the information they need in order to make correct assessment of the company. 
Segment reporting in a company’s financial reports is an important (and in many cases 
the only available) source for users to better understand and evaluate the performance of 
a company’s activities. Academic research generally suggest that segment data convey 
useful information to the market, improves the users’ ability to better predict the 
company’s future earnings and reduces the company’s market riskiness. (Section 3) 
Therefore, insight into the reporting practice of the companies with respect to segmental 
disclosure is highly relevant for users of financial statements and standard setters.  
 
On 30 November 2006, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) released 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 8 Operating Segments which replaced 
the revised (R) International Accounting Standard (IAS) 14 Segment reporting and almost 
identical to its United States (US) counterpart, Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standard (SFAS) 131. To date, however, scarce empirical evidence is available about the 
impacts of IFRS 8 on the companies’ segmental reporting practice.  
 
IFRS 8 is the result of “the process of convergence and influence of US practice” 
(Crawford et al, 2013, p15). The adoption of this “alien” American standard was subject 
to debate during the IASB’ due process and during the European Union (EU) endorsement 
of the standard. Opponents of the new standard argued that the convergence of accounting 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
3 
standards should not be a simple copying activity. (Section 2.2) To be useful for its users 
financial information needs to be comparable. However, prior research documented 
considerable level of non-compliance with the requirements of IAS 14 and IAS 14R. 
(Section 5.2) Thus, what the companies actually do in practice is not always the same as 
what the companies should do. It can be argued that if the companies do not comply with 
the accounting standard the convergence of these standards and the quality and 
comparability of the financial statements are questionable.  
 
Therefore, the first objective of this research (RO1) is to assess the extent of compliance 
with the requirements of the new segmental reporting standard and examine the factors 
that might provide some explanation of the variances in the compliance levels of the 
companies. (Chapter 5) 
 
It is generally accepted that geographic disclosures provide useful information on 
assessing internationally diversified companies’ risks and prospects and on making 
economic decisions. (Section 2.4.5)  The potential loss of geographic information as an 
impact of the new standard was one of the major concerns expressed during the discussion 
process of the standard. (Section 2.2)  The introduction of SFAS 131 in the US had some 
negative effect on the companies’ disclosures. (Section 2.4.2)  Additionally, prior 
research found a relatively high level of non-compliance with the geographic information 
related requirements of IFRS 8. (Section 5.2)  Furthermore, during the Post 
Implementation Review (PIR) of IFRS 8 some investors questioned the usefulness of the 
geographic information disclosed under IFRS 8. (Section 6.1)   
 
Therefore, the second objective of the research (RO2) is to analyse the impact of IFRS 8 
on the sample companies’ geographic disclosures and to provide and explanation for 
better understanding the diversity of the preparers’ geographic disclosure practices and 
their possible incentives to conceal or reveal geographic information by analysing the 
relationship between different company characteristics and the quality of the company’s 
geographic disclosure. (Chapter 6)  
 
Geographic information disaggregated to country-level results in greater accountability 
and transparency and provides financial information that is more useful and relevant for 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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financial statement users than information provided for geographic regions1. (Section 
2.4.2, Section 2.4.5 and Section 8.2)  However, IFRS 8 only requires the separate 
disclosure of the country of domicile and individually material countries and it does not 
provide guidance how to set the materiality level. (Section 2.2 and Section 7.2.1)  The 
materiality decision made by preparers affects the number of countries identified and 
reported individually and impacts on the aggregation and fineness of the geographic 
disclosures of the companies.  The IASB has recently announced plans to consider a 
project on materiality (IASB, 2013a), as a follow on to its survey (2012) and public 
discussion forum (2013) on financial reporting disclosures and evidence gathered from 
other professional body publications (e.g. Financial Reporting Council, FRC; European 
Financial Reporting Advisory Group, EFRAG; International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board, IAASB; Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, ICAS; New 
Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants, NZICA; European Securities and Markets 
Authority, ESMA).  Insight into how the companies apply the materiality concept in 
defining their individually material countries can present relevant information to the 
IASB’s work on providing guidance on the application of the materiality concept.  
 
Therefore, the third objective (RO3) of this study is to provide empirical evidence and 
demonstrate how the sample UK listed companies have applied the materiality concept 
in defining their individually material countries and how different company 
characteristics affect the companies’ materiality decision. (Chapter 7)   
 
In the last decade there have been calls from civil societies (e.g. Richard Murphy and the 
Tax Justice Network, TJN; the Publish What You Pay coalition, PWYP), regulatory 
bodies (e.g. US Congress, 2010: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act.; US Congress, 
2013: proposal of the Cut the Unjustified Tax Loopholes Act.; European Parliament, EP, 
2013: Transparency, Accounting and Capital Requirements Directives) and from 
international economic organisations (e.g. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, OECD, 2013: Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) to require 
multinational companies (MNCs) to disclose information about their activities in those 
countries where they have operations.  It is an ongoing issue whether MNCs should 
provide detailed country-by-country reporting (CBCR) in their financial statements.  
However, to date with the exception of the IFRS 8 requirement to disclose external 
                                                 
1 any grouping of individual countries such as sub-continent, continent, multi-continent, emerging markets, 
foreign, Rest of the World (ROW) etc. 
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revenues and non-current assets (NCAs) for individually material foreign countries and 
for the country of incorporation MNCs are not required to disclose financial information 
on a country-by-country (CBC) basis in their audited financial statements.  The IASB 
decided not to undertake proactive work in this area and preparers argue that enough 
information and transparency is provided under the requirements of IFRS 8.  However, 
legislative bodies in the US and EU had to bypass the IASB and issue CBCR related new 
regulations. (Section 8.1 and Section 8.2)   
 
Table 1.1 Research Objectives (RO), Research Questions (RQ) and Thesis Chapters 
Research 
Objective 
Research Question Thesis 
Chapter 
RO1 RQ1.1: What is the level of compliance with the segmental reporting 
requirements of IFRS 8? 
Chapter 5 
RQ1.2: What company characteristics are associated with the extent 
of compliance with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8?  
RO2 RQ2.1: Did the quality of geographic disclosures improve under 
IFRS 8? 
Chapter 6 
RQ2.2: What company characteristics drive secrecy and support 
openness? 
RO3 RQ3.1: To what extent do companies disclose information about 
their materiality judgment (how and why is an individual country 
determined to be material)? 
Chapter 7 
RQ3.2: What quantitative and qualitative thresholds are used to 
determine the materiality of individual countries? 
RQ3.3: What company characteristics affect the companies’ 
materiality decision? 
RO4 RQ4.1: Can individual country disclosure under IFRS 8 provide 
sufficient information and transparency?  
Chapter 8 
 
Therefore, the fourth objective (RO4) of this study is to provide a summary of the impacts 
of the introduction of IFRS 8 on the sample UK (United Kingdom) listed companies’ 
country-level disclosures and critically evaluate whether the existing geographic 
disclosure requirement through IFRS 8 provide sufficient financial information and 
transparency for the different financial statement users. (Chapter 8)   
 
In order to address the above mentioned research objectives the study seeks answers to 
the research questions listed in Table 1.1. 
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1.2 Research Methods and Sample 
 
The “outsider” financing system, the strong equity market, legal protection of investors, 
enforcement of accounting rules, and the influence of the large and strong accounting 
profession and their professional bodies (Nobes, 1998; La Porta et al., 1997; Brown and 
Tarca, 2005) makes the UK a suitable financial reporting environment to analyse the 
companies’ segmental disclosure quality under IFRS 8.  This background should provide 
(1) a smooth transition from IAS 14R to IFRS 8 and (2) high quality disclosures and 
compliance level with relatively little variances between the listed companies.  The 
analysis of the variances helps to shed light on the different factors and management 
incentives that can affect the company’s segmental disclosure policy and practice. 
 
The Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 350 constituent (as at 22 June 2011) non-
financial companies represent the sample for this study.  Segmental data were hand 
collected from the companies’ Annual Reports and analysed by different statistical 
methods. (Chapter 4) 
 
1.3 Expected contribution of the study 
 
Providing answers to the research questions (Section 1.1 and Section 3.2) will result in 
contributions to the relevant literature. In broad terms, this study intends to complement 
and extend the existing research on the implementation of IFRSs.  In more specific terms, 
the objectives of this study are to make contribution to the relevant academic literature 
with regards to (1) the compliance with the requirement of IFRS 8; (2) the impact of the 
introduction of IFRS 8 on the quality of the companies’ geographic disclosure; (3) the 
application of the materiality concept in defining the company’s individually material 
countries; (4) the sufficiency and transparency of the companies’ existing country-level 
disclosures and (5) the corporate disclosure theories via the investigation of the effect of 
different company characteristics on (a) the level of compliance with the requirement of 
IFRS 8, (b) the quality of geographic disclosures and (c) the materiality threshold applied 
by the companies in defining the company’s individually material countries.   
 
Extensive research was carried out in the US after the introduction (1997) of SFAS 131. 
IFRS 8 became mandatory for periods beginning on or after 1 January 2009.  To date, 
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scarce empirical evidence is available regarding the application and impacts of IFRS 8 on 
the companies’ segmental disclosures. However, one might argue that these empirical 
studies have already analysed the impacts of IFRS 8 on the companies’ segmental 
disclosures. For example Crawford et al. (2012) studied a sample of UK listed companies, 
Nichols et al. (2012) studied a sample of Western-European listed companies and 
analysed the impacts of IFRS 8 on the segmental disclosures of these companies. The 
present research differs from both studies mentioned above, as well as from other studies 
published on the impacts of IFRS 8, in many ways.  
 
First, to facilitate a better understanding this study provides a deeper analysis on the 
impacts of the introduction of IFRS 8 on listed companies’ segmental disclosure practice. 
The study includes disclosures measures (e.g. compliance with the requirements of IFRS 
8 measured by disclosure indices; fineness of geographic information measured by 
fineness score; homogeneity of geographic disclosures; quantitative materiality level 
applied by the companies) and company characteristics (e.g. the identity of the company’s 
auditor to study the role of the auditor; effective tax rate to proxy for the companies tax 
avoidance) that have not been considered in prior studies to explain the differences in the 
companies’ segmental disclosure practice.  
 
Second, while both Nichols et al. (2012) and Crawford et al. (2012) used descriptive 
statistics to analyse the effects of the introduction of IFRS 8 this research uses other 
inferential statistical methods (e.g. regression analysis – OLS, rank regression, Tobit 
model -; correlation; parametric and non-parametric tests to compare means) as well to 
analyse the possible effects of different company characteristics on (1) the companies’ 
compliance with the requirements of IFRS 8, (2) their geographic disclosure practice and 
(3) the application of the materiality concept in defining the individually material 
countries.  
 
Third, this research (1) introduces the company’s organisational structure as a new 
company characteristic and (2) differentiate between the BIG 4 audit companies when 
studying the quality of the companies’ segmental disclosures.  The use of these new 
company characteristics could provide useful findings for researchers and academics with 
an interest in corporate disclosure in general and segmental reporting and audit quality in 
particular.  
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Fourth, by answering the research questions (Section 1.1 and Section 3.2) this study will 
try 1) to fill research gaps identified by the researcher and also 2) address calls for research 
on (a) the compliance with the requirements of IFRS 8; (b) the effectiveness of auditors 
in enforcing IFRS 8 compliance; (c) the possible incentives (to hide / to reveal) behind 
the geographic disclosure decisions of the preparers; (d) the application of the materiality 
concept (in defining the individually material countries) (Nichols et al., 2013) and (e) the 
connection between the company’s financial reporting practice and their tax reporting 
behaviour (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
 
The findings of this thesis are expected to be of particular relevance (by providing 
potentially useful input) to (1) the work of different enforcement bodies, (2) the IASB’s 
present work on financial reporting disclosure and materiality, (3) different civil societies 
(e.g. TJN, PWYP), governmental (e.g. EU, UK) and non-governmental bodies (e.g. 
OECD) in their fight for country-level disclosures and against profit shifting and tax 
avoidance and (4) investors when they evaluate the risks and rewards associated with 
diversified companies and make informed economic decisions. 
 
Furthermore, the study intends to offer a critical analysis of (1) the companies’ country 
level disclosures under IFRS 8 and (2) the role of the IASB in improving the companies 
country by country reporting. The findings could help to facilitate informed debate on the 
subject by increasing the understanding of how the standard’s requirements are applied 
by the sample companies.  
 
Lastly, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first academic study which intends 
to (1) provide insight into how the companies apply the materiality concept in defining 
their individually material countries under IFRS 8 and (2) try to identify different 
company characteristics that might help to explain the diversity of the companies’ 
materiality decisions.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis organised into 9 Chapters, including this introductory Chapter. (Figure 1.1) 
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Figure 1.1 The structure of the study 
Introduction 
(Chapter 1) 
 
 
Regulatory Background, Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
(Chapter 2) 
 
 
Research Objectives and Research Questions 
(Chapter 3) 
 
 
Research Methodology and Methods and Data collection 
(Chapter 4) 
 
 
Analysis and Findings 
Compliance with the 
requirements of IFRS 8 
(Chapter 5) 
Geographic disclosure under IFRS 8 
Geographic disclosure 
quality 
(Chapter 6) 
Application of the 
materiality concept 
(Chapter 7) 
Country-level reporting 
(Chapter 8) 
 
 
Conclusions, Limitations and Further Research 
(Chapter 9) 
 
Chapter 1 contains an introduction to the thesis. The motivation for / justification of the 
study, the research objectives and questions, a summary of the research methods followed 
and the main findings and contribution of the study are included. Finally, Chapter 1 
outlines the structure of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the regulatory background of segmental reporting along with 
ongoing debates / issues and existing literature on the subject. The chapter also discusses 
the relevant theories and provides a theoretical framework for the study.  
 
Chapter 3 outlines the research objectives and research questions of the study.  
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Chapter 4 describes the research methodology and methods followed by the researcher to 
answer the research questions and it also discusses the sample selection and data 
collection process.  
 
Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 present the results of the data analysis and 
assess (1) the companies’ compliance with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8 
(Chapter 5), (2) the quality of the geographic disclosures provided under the companies’ 
segmental notes (Chapter 6), (3) the application of the materiality concept (Chapter 7), 
(4) the companies’ country-level reporting (Chapter 8) and (5) the effect of different 
company characteristics on the companies’ segment disclosure practice (Chapter 5, 
Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8). Additionally, Chapter 5, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 
provide a summary and discussion of the related regulatory background, ongoing debates 
/ issues and literature (Chapter 5 → compliance; Chapter 7 → the application of the 
materiality concept; Chapter 8 → country-level disclosure).  
 
Chapter 9 provides a summary of the study. Conclusions, limitations of the study and 
suggestions for further research are also presented.  
 11 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the regulatory background of segmental 
reporting and the debates surrounded the introduction of IFRS 8 (Section 2.2), to discuss 
the theoretical framework that is used in this study (Section 2.3) and to review previous 
research on segmental reporting (Section 2.4).  The chapter provides a foundation and a 
framework for the development of the research questions (Chapter 3).  
 
2.2 Regulatory background  
 
On 30 November 2006, the IASB released IFRS 8 Operating Segments, which replaced 
the revised (R) IAS 14 Segment Reporting.  IFRS 8 is mandatory for annual financial 
statements for periods beginning on or after 1 January 2009 (although earlier application 
was permitted).  The new standard is a result of the joint short-term project between the 
IASB and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in order to reduce differences 
between IFRS and US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).  With the 
exception of some minor differences (Table 2.1) IFRS 8 replicates the FASB’s SFAS 
1312 and is substantially different from the precursor (IAS 14R) in requirement of the 
identification, measurement and disclosure of segment information. (Table 2.2) (Deloitte, 
2006; IASB 2006; Crawford et al., 2013)  
 
Table 2.1  Differences between IFRS 8 and SFAS 131 
Differences IFRS 8 SFAS 131 
Non-current assets vs. long-
lived assets 
Non-current assets include 
intangible assets. 
Long-lived assets (hard, tangible 
assets) do not include intangible 
assets. 
Segment liabilities If the information regularly 
provided to the CODM they 
should be disclosed. 
The disclosure is not required. 
Entities with matrix form of 
organisation 
The operating segments are 
determined based on the core 
principle of IFRS 8.  
Segments are determined based on 
products and services.  
Source: Roberts, 2010, Chapter 19; Nichols et al., 2012 
                                                 
2 On 1 July 2009 the FASB issued Statement No. 168, The FASB Accounting Standard Codification (ASC). 
The ASC is now the source of authoritative generally accepted accounting principles. (SFAS 131 → ASC 
280 Segment Reporting)  
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Under IAS 14R entities identified and disclosed their segments by both line of business 
and geographical regions (two-tier approach, Nichols et al., 2012).  IAS 14R required the 
entities to choose between line of business and geographical segments for primary 
segmental disclosures.  The entities used a combination of the management approach and 
the risk and reward approach to identify their primary segments.  Each primary segment 
determined under the management approach needed to have similar risks and rewards 
characteristics, otherwise the entity had to modify its segments based on the risks and 
reward approach.  (IAS 14R: 26-27) IFRS 8, however, adopted the pure management 
approach.  Under the new standard operating segments are identified as components of 
an entity (line of business, geographical areas or the mixture of these two) that engages 
in business activities from which it may earn revenues and incur expenses and whose 
operating results are regularly reviewed by the entity’s chief operating decision maker 
(CODM) in order to allocate resources to the segments and assess their performance. 
(IFRS 8: 5) Operating segments may be aggregated if the segments have similar economic 
characteristics (based on the nature of the product and services, the nature of the 
production processes, the type or class of customer for their product of services, the 
methods used to distribute their products or provide their services and the nature of the 
regulatory environment). (IFRS 8: 12) Additionally, individually immaterial segments 
(segment’s revenue, profit and loss, assets are all less than 10% of the entity’s total 
revenue, profit and loss, asset) can be aggregated into an “all other” segment. (IFRS 8: 
13) 
 
For the purpose of identifying reportable segments there is no distinction between 
revenues and expenses relating to transactions with external parties and revenues and 
expenses relating to transactions with other parts of the entity under IFRS 8.  Thus, no 
distinction is made between external and internal revenues (expenses) of the entity. 
However, under IAS 14R a segment only qualified to be reportable if the majority of its 
revenues were earned from external customers.  
 
A measure of profit or loss for each reportable segment must be disclosed under IFRS 8. 
Additional line items (such as external and internal revenues; assets; liabilities; interest 
revenue and interest expense; depreciation and amortisation; other material items of 
income and expense; interest in profit or loss of associates and joint ventures accounted 
for by the equity method; income taxes; material non-cash items other than depreciation 
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and amortisation; investment in associates and joint ventures accounted for by the equity 
method; additions to non-current assets) are only required to be disclosed if they are 
included in the calculation of segment profit or loss or are regularly provided to the 
CODM. (IFRS 8: 23) Thus, these items become “quasi voluntary” under IFRS 8. IAS 
14R, in contrast, listed the reportable items for each reportable segments (such as segment 
profit or loss, assets, liabilities, revenues from external customers, revenues from 
transactions with other operating segments, depreciation and amortisation, interest in 
profit or loss of associates and joint ventures accounted for by the equity method, material 
non-cash items other than depreciation and amortisation, addition to non-current assets 
for primary segments; and revenues from external customers, assets, capital expenditure 
for secondary segments; IAS 14R: 51-67 and 69-72).  
 
IFRS 8 does not require the measurement of segment amounts to be based on an entity’s 
IFRS accounting policies. Thus, it permits the use of non IFRS measures used for internal 
reporting purposes. The measurement basis for each item separately reported should be 
the one used in the information provided to the CODM. (IFRS 8: 25) The entity must 
disclose additional explanation of the basis on which the disclosed amounts have been 
measured and the nature of any differences (e.g. accounting policies, policies for 
allocation) between the measurement of the reportable segments’ profit or losses (assets, 
liabilities) and the entity’s profit or loss (assets, liabilities). (IFRS 8: 27) The disclosures 
also include reconciliations of the totals of segment amounts for profit or loss (assets; 
liabilities; other material items) to the corresponding entity amounts reported in the IFRS 
financial statements of the entity. (IFRS 8: 28) IAS 14 required the segmental information 
to be prepared in line with the entity’s accounting policies for preparing the IFRS 
financial statements and provided definition of segment revenues, expenses, result, assets 
and liabilities. (IAS 14R:16)  
 
To help to understand diversified businesses and enhance the comparability between 
entities (Roberts, 2010), preparers must disclose “entity-wide disclosures” about their 
business and geographical segments and major customers.  Entity-wide disclosures need 
to be provided even when an entity has only a single operating segment (IFRS 8: 31) and 
the amounts reported need to be based on the financial information that is used to produce 
the entity’s IFRS financial statements (IFRS 8: 33).  
  
Chapter 2 Regulatory background, Theoretical framework and Literature Review 
15 
Table 2.2  Disclosure requirements under IAS 14R and under IFRS8 
 
 
Disclosure 
 
 
IAS 14R 
IFRS 8 
must be 
disclosed 
disclosed if they 
are included in 
the measures of 
segment 
profit/loss and 
assets or are 
regularly 
provided to the 
CODM 
Primary Segment / Reportable segment  
Segment profit or loss X X - 
Segment assets X - X* 
Segment liabilities X - X 
Revenues from external customers X X** - 
Revenues from transactions with other operating 
segments of the same entity 
X - X 
Interest revenue - - X 
Interest expense - - X 
Depreciation and amortisation X - X 
Other material items of income and expense - - X 
Interest in profit or loss of associates and joint ventures 
accounted for by the equity method 
X - X 
Income tax expense or income - - X 
Material non-cash items other than depreciation and 
amortisation 
X - X  
Investment in associates and joint ventures accounted 
for by the equity method 
- - X 
Addition to non-current assets*** (capital expenditure) X - X 
Measurement  
Explanation of the measurements of  
 Segment profit or loss - X - 
 Segment assets - - X 
 Segment liabilities - - X 
Basis of accounting for any transactions between 
reportable segments 
X X - 
The nature of any differences between the measures of 
the reportable segment numbers and the entity’s amount 
for 
 
 Profit or loss - X - 
 Assets - - X 
 Liabilities - - X 
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Table 2.2 (continued) Disclosure requirements under IAS 14R and under IFRS8 
 
 
 
Disclosure 
 
 
IAS 14R 
IFRS 8 
must be 
disclosed 
disclosed if they 
are included in 
the measures of 
segment 
profit/loss and 
assets or are 
regularly 
provided to the 
CODM 
The nature of any changes from prior periods in the 
measurement method used to determine reportable 
segment profit or loss 
- X - 
The nature and effect of any asymmetrical allocation to 
reportable segments 
- X - 
Reconciliation of the total of the reportable segments 
to the entity’s amount for 
 
 Revenue X X** - 
 Profit or loss X X - 
 Assets X - X 
 Liabilities X - X 
 Other material items - - X 
Secondary segment  
Revenues from external customers X - - 
Segment assets X - - 
Capital expenditure X - - 
Entity-wide disclosures****  
Revenue from external customers for each (group of) 
product / service 
- X***** - 
Revenues from external customers (i) attributed to the 
entity’s country of domicile and (ii) attributed to all 
foreign countries in total from which the entity derives 
revenues. 
- X***** - 
Basis for attributing revenues from external customers 
to individual countries 
 X  
Non-current assets*** (i) located in the entity’s country 
of domicile and (ii) located in all foreign countries in 
total in which the entity holds assets. 
- X***** - 
Extent of reliance on major customers - X - 
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Table 2.2 (continued) Disclosure requirements under IAS 14R and under IFRS8 
 
 
 
Disclosure 
 
 
IAS 14R 
IFRS 8 
must be 
disclosed 
disclosed if they 
are included in 
the measures of 
segment 
profit/loss and 
assets or are 
regularly 
provided to the 
CODM 
If revenues from transactions with a single external 
customer amount to 10% or more of an entity’s revenues 
the entity shall disclose 
 
 that fact  X  
 the total amount of revenues from each such 
customer 
 X  
 the identity of the segment or segments reporting the 
revenues 
 X  
 
*: IFRS 8.23 was amended in April 2009. The amendment was mandatory for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2010 but 
earlier application was permitted.; **: based on IFRS 8.23(a) revenues from external customers shall be disclosed if the amounts are 
included in the measure of segment profit or loss reviewed by the CODM, or are otherwise regularly provided to the chief operating 
decision maker; since non of the profit measures can be calculated without the revenue information this information is treated as “must 
be disclosed” by the researcher; ***: other than financial instruments, deferred tax assets, post-employment benefit assets, and rights 
arising under insurance contracts; ****: required to be provided only if it is not provided as part of the reportable segment information 
(IFRS 8.31); *****: if the necessary information is not available and the cost to develop it would be excessive, that fact shall be disclosed 
(IFRS 8.33), the amounts reported shall be based on the financial information that is used to produce the entity’s financial statements 
(IFRS 8.32 and 8.33) 
Source: IAS 14R (IASB, 1997) and IFRS 8 (IASB, 2006a)  
 
Unless the necessary information is disclosed as part of the reportable segment 
information (IFRS 8: 31) or the cost to develop the information would be excessive3 
(IFRS 8: 32; IFS 8: 33) IFRS 8 requires entities to provide information about their 
revenues from external customers on a geographical (attributed to the country of domicile 
and attributed to all foreign countries in total; IFRS 8: 33) and “class of business” (for 
each product and service, or each group of similar products and services; IFRS 8: 32) 
basis. Entities also need to provide information on non-current assets on a geographical 
basis (located in the country of domicile and located in all foreign countries in total; IFRS 
8: 33), but not on a “class of business” basis. (IFRS 8: 33) Additionally, if revenues from 
                                                 
3 in which case that fact need to be disclosed 
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external customers attributed to (assets in) an individual foreign country are material, 
those revenues (assets) need to be disclosed separately (IFRS 8: 33 (a) and (b)) 
 
Under IFRS 8 disclosures are required about the extent of the entity’s reliance on its major 
customers. When an entity receives more than 10% of its revenues from a single external 
customer (major customer) the entity must disclose this fact (no need to identify the major 
customer), the total amount of revenues earned from each customer, and the name of the 
operating segment that reports the revenues (no need to disclose the amount of revenues 
from major customer). (IFRS 8: 34) Thus, under the entity-wide-disclosure requirements 
introduced by IFRS 8 preparers have to disclose commercially potentially harmful 
information (such as revenue and non-current assets by material foreign countries; 
information about the entity’s major customers). (Table 2.2 summarises the differences 
between the disclosure requirements of IAS 14R and IFRS 8.) 
 
The key differences between IFRS 8 and IAS 14R and the convergence with the US 
segmental reporting standard sparkled ongoing debates regarding the costs and benefits 
of applying the new standard.  During the comment period the IASB received diverse 
views about the advantages (benefits) and disadvantages of the proposed new standard 
(Exposure Draft, ED 8).  However, the IASB and the European Commission (EC) argued 
that the introduction of IFRS 8 improves the segment information and the benefits 
associated with the new standard (e.g. convergence with US GAAP; the new approach 
improves the users’ ability to predict future results and cash flows; increase in interim 
reporting etc.) would outweigh the cost and disadvantages (e.g. the loss of geographical 
information; the use of non-IFRS measures; inconsistent segments reported by the entities 
etc.). (EC, 2007; IASB, 2006a)  However, others (e.g. Véron, 2007) thought that the new 
standard might result in lower quality segment information.  
 
Concerns were expressed with certain features of IFRS 8.  First, IFRS 8 does not provide 
clear definition of segments and elements included and does not provide guidance on how 
to set the materiality limit and how to identify segments.  This provides leeway to 
management manipulation and could lead to less objective information and unnecessary 
instability or inconsistency. (EC, 2007; Véron, 2007; Crawford et al., 2012a; Crawford et 
al., 2013) 
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Second, IFRS 8 is based on internal management information and measurement 
approaches (non-GAAP measures) for external purposes and only requires entity level 
reconciliation to IFRS.  This could result in sizeable reconciling items and could harm 
comparability and also provides opportunity to managers to hide, manipulate 
information.4 (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2007; Véron, 2007; EC, 2007; Crawford et al., 
2010; Crawford et al., 2012a; Crawford et al., 2013; Nichols et al., 2013)   
 
Third, by using the management approach the new standard discloses information that 
was prepared to internal decision making (resource allocation within the company) and 
not for use by external users to make economic decisions about providing resources to 
the different entities (resource allocation between companies).  There seems to be a 
conflict between the management approach and the objective of financial reporting as it 
stated in the IASB’s conceptual framework. (Véron, 2007; Crawford et al., 2013) 
 
“OB2 The objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial 
information about the reporting entity that is useful to existing and potential investors, 
lenders and other creditors in making decisions about providing resources to the entity. 
Those decisions involve buying, selling or holding equity and debt instruments, and 
providing or settling loans and other forms of credit.” (IASB, 2010d, p9) 
 
The two dissenting IASB Board members and some EFRAG members also argued that 
“proper external reporting of segment information should not permit the use of non-
GAAP measures because they might mislead users”. (IFRS 8, D04) 
 
Fourth, in US context the term of CODM have a specific meaning but it is not used and 
defined within IFRSs5. (EP, 2007; Crawford et al., 2010; Crawford et al., 2012a; 
Crawford et al., 2013)  It is argued that identifying the company’s CODM could be 
difficult in many EU countries where the unitary board model is the pre-dominant 
governance structure. (EC, 2007) 
 
Fifth, geographical segment information is relevant for different stakeholder groups.  
When geographical segments are not considered as operating segments the disclosure of 
                                                 
4 e.g. different management structures of entities could result in inconsistent segment disclosures; key 
segment items which are not regularly reported to the chief operating decision maker (CODM) can be 
omitted; reconciliations between segment totals and IFRS consolidated numbers could reduce 
understanding etc.  
5 Instead of CODM the Conceptual Framework uses “governing board” and IAS 24 Related Party 
Disclosures uses “key management personnel”. 
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geographical segment information is voluntary under IFRS 8. (see more in Section 2.4.2) 
(EP, 2007; EC, 2007; Crawford et al., 2010) 
 
Sixth, smaller listed companies, which possibly report a single segment under IAS 14R, 
criticised the new standard due to the potential release of commercially sensitive 
information to the market. (Katselas et al., 2011; EC, 2007) 
 
Seventh, segment reporting is one of those matters on which preparers and users may 
have significantly different viewpoints.  It is argued that views of users have not been 
taken into account properly in the consultation process. (EC, 2007; EP, 2007; Crawford 
et al., 2010) 
 
“... the IASB appears to have deferred to the goal of its convergence with the US 
FASB, rather than meet the objectives of its own conceptual framework.” 
(Crawford et al., 2012b, p34) 
“However, rather than the two standard setting bodies coming together to agree 
a new common approach, the IASB just seemed to adopt the US standard; 
indeed, IFRS 8 was substantially identical to SFAS 131 which supported the 
arguments of those who suggested that the harmonisation process was leading 
to the “Americanisation” of IAS / IFRS.” (Crawford et al., 2013, p15) 
 
Eighth, the IASB achieved convergence by accepting the US practice.  Véron (2007) 
suggests that “the IASB has generally been effective in producing high-quality 
standards”. (p14)  However, in the case of IFRS 8 they might give precedence to short-
term convergence with US GAAP over standard quality. (Véron, 2007; EP, 2007; 
Crawford et al., 2010; Crawford et al., 2013)  Even the EP emphasized in its resolution 
(14 November 2007) that the convergence of accounting rules should not be a simple 
copying activity. (EP, 2007) 
 
Ninth, it is also argued that to adopt a US standard without an economic impact 
assessment is inappropriate when the conceptual frameworks, economic and legal 
environments, cultures are different. (EP, 2007; Elliott and Elliott, 2013) 
 
The concerns listed above were also expressed by the different stakeholders groups in 
comment letters to ED8.  Based on its analysis of the comment letters to ED8 the IASB 
concluded that there was an overall support for the adoption of IFRS 8 and decided to 
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adopt the new segmental reporting standard as it was proposed in ED8.  However, by 
analysing the comment letters and using semi-structured interviews before the 
introduction of the standard, Crawford et al. (2012b) found that the different stakeholders 
had different views about IFRS 8 (supporters mainly consist of preparers and opponents 
mainly consist of investors) and the concerns expressed in comment letters (e.g. the 
concept of CODM, the use of non-IFRS measures) and the resulting difficulties (e.g. the 
question of comparability, transparency, consistency) “do not appear to have been fully 
assimilated by the IASB in light of its own conceptual framework.” (Crawford et al., 
2012b, p31) 
 
Although two of the IASB members voted against the new standard and some EFRAG 
members and both the European and UK Parliament raised concerns with the EU 
endorsement6 of IFRS 8 it is argued by the IASB, EFRAG and EC that the “adoption of 
IFRS 8 would be in the interest of the vast majority of persons and bodies with interest in 
financial reporting in Europe”. (EC, 2007, p9) 
 
Extensive research has been carried out in the US after the introduction of SFAS 131.  
(see more in Section 2.4) The IASB decision to converge with SFAS 131 was based on 
the results of these studies. (IASB, 2006a; EC, 2007)  US research provides useful input 
in terms of the expected impacts of IFRS 8 implementation.  However, IAS 14R had a 
more extensive disclosure requirement than SFAS 14 which was replaced by SFAS 131 
(Crawford et al., 2013), there are some minor differences between IFRS 8 and SFAS 131 
(Table 2.1) and research carried out on the US market can only indicate the possible 
effects on other financial markets (different economical and legal environment, culture 
etc. of non-US companies). (Roberts, 2010)  Therefore the IASB scheduled IFRS 8 for a 
post-implementation review and the EC “emphasise that a broad ex-post evaluation 
analysing the effects of the standard would be welcome”. (EC, 2007, p17)  
 
The Trustees added PIR to the IASB’s due process in 2007.  A PIR is carried out two 
years after the introduction of a major new standard, or a significant amendment to an 
existing standard has been applied.  The first PIR focused on IFRS 8 with a timeline 
introduced in Figure 2.1.  The concerns expressed during the public consultation of ED 8 
and the endorsement of IFRS 8 by the EP increased the importance of the PIR of IFRS 8.  
                                                 
6 The EP asked for separate impact assessment by the EC, and concerns were expressed by the EP in its 
resolution to endorse IFRS 8.  
Chapter 2 Regulatory background, Theoretical framework and Literature Review 
22 
In July 2013 the IASB finished the review of IFRS 8 and published a Report and Feedback 
Statement.  During the review process the IASB carried out a public consultation through 
a Request for Information (RIF), members and staff of IASB took part in outreach events 
and a literature review was also conducted. (IASB, 2013b)  
 
Figure 2.1 Timeline for the post-implementation review of IFRS 8 
 
     source: IASB, 2013b, p4  
 
“Our conclusion is that the benefits of applying the Standard were largely as expected 
and that overall the Standard achieved its objectives and has improved financial 
reporting.” (IASB, 2013b, p6) 
 
The PIR confirmed that IFRS 8 has achieved most of the expected benefits (e.g. 
convergence with SFAS 131 at low cost; low cost of implementation; easier 
communication between preparers and investors; improved financial reporting).  
Preparers generally think that the new standard works well.  Auditors, accounting 
companies, regulators and standard-setters generally support the standard but they also 
made some suggestions how to improve the application of the standard.  However, 
investors had mixed opinion and some of them expressed concerns about the segmental 
information provided under IFRS 8 (e.g. segments are not comparable among entities; 
loss of trend data on reorganisation; confusing and not well explained non-IFRS 
measures; reduction in line items about the segments such as depreciation, gross margin, 
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capital expenditure, segment liabilities, cash flows; inconsistent application of entity-
wide disclosures; lack of comparability in segment performance etc.). (IASB, 2013b) 
 
The IASB does not “think that these concerns warrant a revision of the principles on 
which the Standard is based...”. (IASB, 2013b, p6)  However, some suggestions of the 
participants (more guidance on the use of CODM or replacement of CODM with another 
term; application guidance with examples how the reconciliations should be presented; 
disclosure of 3-5 years’ comparative information in the event of reorganisation and 
guidance on the aggregation of operating segments) will be further studied by the IASB 
staff.  
 
The Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) in the US has also carried out a PIR on 
SFAS 131.  The PIR report on SFAS 131 was published in December 2012. (FAF, 2012)  
The PIR report concluded that SFAS 131 is working effectively and provides more 
segmental information than the previous standard with enhanced relevance (e.g. less 
aggregated segment information; more information about each segment; more 
consistency between segment information and information presented elsewhere in the 
company’s Annual Report).  However, some guidance could further improve the quality 
of the segment information (e.g. on the identification and aggregation of operating 
segments). (FAF, 2012) 
 
“We will discuss the Report’s findings in detail ... with the IASB staff to coordinate an 
evaluation of the issues in an attempt to maintain a converged approach to segment 
reporting.” (FASB, 2013, p6) 
 
Since IFRS 8 is substantially converged with SFAS 131 the IASB and FASB is going to 
work together on the issues raised. (FASB, 2013; IASB, 2013b)  
 
The issues raised during the PIR review of IFRS 8 are in line with the concerns expressed 
before the introduction of the standard.  A few of the issues might be addressed by the 
IASB (and FASB) later with guidance on the application of the standard’s requirements.  
However, it seems that some ongoing issues (e.g. the use of non-IFRS measures; the 
disclosure of geographic information) are not going to be addressed in the near future. 
(see more in Section 6.1)  
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2.3 Theoretical framework 
 
Information asymmetry (between managers and investors; between different types of 
investors) raises the demand for corporate information which is critical for the efficient 
allocation of available resources therefore for the functioning of an efficient capital 
market.  Companies provide information thorough several forms such as regulated 
financial reports (mandatory and audited), voluntary communications and disclosures 
(e.g. press releases, media, company’s website, and presentations for analysts).  In 
addition financial intermediaries (e.g. financial press, analyst, experts) also provide 
information about companies. (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Bushman and Smith, 2001; 
Figure 2.2)  
 
Figure 2.2: Financial and information flows in a capital market economy 
 
source: Healy and Palepu, 2001, p408 
 
Thus, beside other forms, companies provide information thorough their mandatory and 
audited financial reports. (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Bushman and Smith, 2001)  However, 
considerable managerial discretion and a great deal of professional judgement was / is 
allowed how the accounting standards were / are applied by the companies in generating 
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financial reports.  Companies with different characteristics apply different accounting 
policies. (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976)  
 
IFRS 8 sets out disclosure requirements for the companies.  However, the application of 
the standard, the compliance with its requirements and the disclosure of any voluntary 
segment information (together the company’s disclosure practice) depend on the 
companies’ disclosure policy.  The managers’ perceptions of advantages / benefits and 
disadvantages / costs associated with segment disclosure influence their interpretation of 
segment disclosure standards and the level of segment disclosure (quality, compliance) 
they provide.    
 
“…a single universally accepted basic accounting theory does not exist at this time. 
Instead, a multiplicity of theories has been – and continues to be – proposed” (AAA, 
1977, p3) 
 “Disclosure is inherently a complex phenomenon, and a single theory can only give a 
partial explanation”. (Hope, 2003a, p220) 
 
Disclosure studies suggested several theories to explain the motivations behind the 
companies’ disclosure practice.  Agency, signalling, capital need, political cost, 
proprietary and regulation theories are the most common theories to explain the 
differences in disclosure practice of companies and in their level of compliance with 
IFRSs. (Figure 2.3)  These theories and findings of previous empirical studies (Section 
2.4) are used to develop hypotheses in this thesis as well. (Section 5.4  and Section 6.2.)  
A brief summary of the above mentioned theories is provided in the following part of this 
section.   
 
Agency theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define “an agency relationship as a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authorities 
to the agent”. (p5)  They argue if the parties are utility maximisers the agents (managers) 
do not always act in the best interest (maximise the welfare) of the principals (owners, 
creditors).  Agency costs incur to solve this “agency problem”.  However, these costs can 
be reduced by audited accounting reports and information disclosed in these reports.  
Financial accounting information provides input to both internal (e.g. managerial 
incentive plans) and external (e.g. shareholder and debt holder monitoring, competition, 
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laws protecting outside investors) control mechanisms. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Bushman and Smith, 2001) It can be argued that increased disclosures reduce agency 
costs (negative relationship).  
 
Figure 2.3: Theories to explain the motivation behind the companies’ disclosure 
practice 
 
 
Segmental reporting is an important source for users to better understand and evaluate the 
performance of diversified companies.  However, managers have both the incentives (the 
importance of segment disclosures to investors, lower cost of capital, reduced market 
riskiness, better prediction of future earnings etc.; Section 2.4.5) to disclose better quality 
segmental disclosure7 and the opportunity to hide (segment definition, materiality level, 
cost allocation between segments etc.) unresolved agency problems (e.g. poorly 
performing business or geographical segments, managerial empire building).  (Section 
2.4.3) Research found evidence that managers use segment aggregation (Berger and 
Hann, 2002 and 2007; Wang et al., 2011) and segment level earning management (Hann 
and Lu, 2009) when disclosing segment information. More disaggregated information can 
                                                 
7 e.g. more disaggregated, more items by segments, higher level of compliance etc.  
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attract greater external monitoring by revealing a company’s diversification strategy, 
resource allocation between segments, and underperforming segments. (Berger and Hann, 
2002 and 2003) Earning management of segment profits (by e.g. allocating overhead cost 
between segments, Hann and Lu, 2009; cross-segment resource transfers, Wang and 
Ettredge, 2014) could limit the monitoring usefulness of segment disclosures by 
concealing information from users. It can be argued that when segmental disclosure 
quality is reduced the shareholders ability to monitor managers and their actions decreases 
as well. (Hope and Thomas, 2008)  
 
Proprietary theory 
The purpose of disclosure is to reduce information asymmetry.  Agency, signalling, 
capital need and political cost theories generally suggest that companies are motivated to 
disclose more information in their financial statements and to comply with mandatory 
disclosure requirements of accounting standards.  However, disclosures to external users 
may also include proprietary information (“information whose disclosure reduces the 
present value of cash flows of the firm endowed with the information”; Dye, 1986, p331) 
which could be also observed and used by the company’s current and potential 
competitors or any other party (e.g. dissident shareholders, employees, tax authority) to 
the disadvantage of the disclosing company.  Therefore, when deciding how much 
information to disclose, companies face a trade-off between the benefits of disclosing 
information to capital markets (incentives to reveal) and the cost of revealing proprietary 
information (incentives to conceal). (Dye, 1986; Hayes and Lundholm, 1996; Leuz, 2004)   
 
However, capital market benefits and proprietary costs depend on whether the 
information is available elsewhere or not.  Information on segments usually is not 
available elsewhere than in the companies’ financial statements. (Leuz, 2004)  
 
Segment disclosure provided by companies is affected by the managers’ incentive to 
avoid potential harm and maintain competitive advantages.  Segment disclosure studies 
indicate that the level / quality of segment disclosure is limited by the proprietary cost 
associated with the disclosure of more detailed information to the market.  Companies 
use less detailed and lower quality segment disclosures (e.g. greater segment aggregation, 
Berger and Hann, 2002, Botosan and Stanford, 2005; less item per segment, Pisano and 
Landriana, 2012; smaller cross-segment variability of reported profits, Ettredge et at., 
2006; smaller cross-segment variability of segment earnings growth rate, Wang et al., 
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2011; greater difference between aggregated segment earnings and corporate level 
income, Wang and Ettredge, 2014; smaller percentage of revenues disclosed by 
individual foreign countries, Tsakumis et al., 2006; non-disclosure of information about 
major customers, Ellis et al, 2012) to protect proprietary information and deter entry by 
competitors (Nagarajan and Sridhar, 1996; Schneider and Scholze, 2011). Additionally, 
there seems to be a positive relationship between the levels of competition on the market 
and the level / quality of segmental information disclosed by the companies. Thus, 
companies operating in more (less) competitive industries more likely to provide more 
(less) segmental information because the higher (lower) level of competition may 
decrease (increase) the competitive harm associated with segment disclosure (e.g. Hayes 
and Lundholm, 1996; Harris, 1998; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Birt et al., 2006; Pisano 
and Landriana, 2012) (Section 2.4.4) 
 
Regulation and Enforcement  
Accounting and accounting profession are subject to many regulations such as 
Accounting Standards, Companies Act, Stock Exchange regulations, EU Regulations etc.. 
Since 01 January 2005 all group financial statements of listed companies in member states 
of the EU must comply with the IASs / IFRSs set by the IASB and endorsed by the EU.  
The IASB adopted a principles based approach where the basic question is whether the 
accounting policy applied by a company complies with the intention behind the regulation 
or not. (Gaffikin, 2005)  The regulatory requirements will not result in quality financial 
reporting if the companies do not comply with the rules.  Thus, de facto compliance with 
the requirements of an accounting standard is just as important as the accounting standard 
itself.   
 
Researchers suggested that the monitoring and enforcing mechanism (effective company 
control systems, independent auditor, oversight body) of IFRSs requirements are 
important components of the implementation of accounting standards. (e.g. Brown and 
Tarca, 2005; Street and Bryant, 2000; Glaum and Street, 2003; Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 
2004; Hodgdon et al., 2009)  However, the question is how effective is the enforcement 
of the regulations?  
 
It is well documented by research that there is considerable non-compliance with IASs / 
IFRSs requirements. The results from these studies also indicated that the compliance 
with IASs / IFRSs requiring the disclosure of more proprietary information was usually 
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below the average level of compliance. (Street and Bryant, 2000; Al-Shammari et al., 
2008; Tsalavoutas, 2011) Segmental reporting is one of the areas of particular concern. 
(Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and Gray, 2001 and 2002; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; 
Tsalavoutas, 2011; Crawford et al., 2012a; Nichols et al., 2012; Pisano and Landriana, 
2012; Pardal and Morais, 2011; Mardini, 2012) Thus, the implementation of high quality 
global standards many not necessarily lead to high quality, comparable reporting.  
 
Political cost theory 
Along with other theories political cost hypothesis is suggested to explain the financial 
disclosures of the companies.  Watts and Zimmerman (1978) argue that politicians have 
the power / authority to affect the wealth re-distribution of the companies by taxes, 
regulations, contributions etc. (political costs).  The authors argued that politicians and 
government bureacrats are responsible for regulating financial reporting and they are 
influenced by the likelihood of being blamed for any future crisis.  Many crises have led 
to changes in corporate regulation and, in particular, to increased regulation in financial 
reporting (e.g. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 in the US was a reaction to a number of high 
profile corporate and accounting scandals including e.g. Enron and WorldCom).  
Additionally, certain groups of people have incentives to lobby for the “nationalisation, 
expropriation, break-up regulation of an industry or corporation”. (p115)  This provides 
incentives to politicians to suggest these actions in order to reduce the pressure.  The 
expected degree of political costs is subject to a company’s size, profitability and its 
industry.  It is argued that larger, more profitable companies and companies belonging to 
special industries (e.g. oil and gas companies) are more politically visible and are subject 
to potentially greater wealth transfers from government interventions.  Therefore, to 
reduce the expected political costs, the managers of these companies (among other things 
such as social responsibility campaign in the media, lobbying, selection of accounting 
policies etc.) have greater motivation to disclose more information than the managers of 
smaller, less profitable companies and companies in other industries. (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978, 1986, 1990)  This suggests a positive relationship between political 
costs and disclosure quality.   
 
However, Wallace et al. (1994) and Wallace and Naser (1995) argued that comprehensive 
disclosure may trigger political action.  Additionally, it can be argued that the preparer’s 
desire to conceal the companies’ tax avoidance can also negatively influence the 
companies’ disclosure quality. (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Hope et al., 2013)  Thus, 
Chapter 2 Regulatory background, Theoretical framework and Literature Review 
30 
companies may disclose less information to limit political interest and actions.  It makes 
difficult to predict the sign of the relationship between the company’s disclosure quality 
and political costs.  
 
Signalling theory (Legitimacy theory) 
Signalling theory shows how information asymmetry can be reduced by the party with 
more information providing it to others. (Morris, 1987)  Signalling through Financial 
Statements can be used by managers to signal their expectations and intentions, to 
reassure the market and to distinguish themselves from lower quality firms (Hughes, 
1986, Lev and Penman, 1990, Watson et al., 2002).  Companies may disclose information 
to sustain and legitimise corporate actions and relationships by presenting themselves as 
responsible corporate citizens (legitimacy theory). (Adams and Roberts, 1995)  Watson 
et al. (2002) argue that “signalling theory can borrow from legitimacy theory the notion 
of signalling legitimacy”. (Watson et al., 2002, p293)  Thus, in this study legitimacy 
theory is not considered as a separate theoretical background to explain the companies’ 
disclosure quality. 
 
Capital need theory 
Companies compete in the capital market to raise capital (equity or debt instruments) as 
cheaply as possible.  Capital need theory suggests that one of the main motives of 
financial disclosure is to address the information needs of the capital market users 
(shareholders, debt providers, financial analysts etc.) and reduce their uncertainty with 
respect to the company’s present and future.  Research suggests that the precision, the 
quality, the quantity and the timeliness of disclosed financial information reduces the cost 
of equity capital by reducing information asymmetry (reduced information risk, 
estimation risk, transaction costs and enhanced stock market liquidity). (Choi, 1973 and 
1974; Dhaliwal, 1979; Dhaliwal et al., 1979; Elliott and Jacobson, 1994; Botosan, 1997; 
Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; 
Botosan, 2006; Cheng et al., 2006; Lambert et al., 2007; Saini and Herrmann, 2011) 
Companies disclose more information to reduce investor’s uncertainty with respect to the 
company’s present and future.  
 
Theories, and the findings of prior literature, can help to  derive possible factors 
associated with the companies’ segment disclosure practice and their compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of IFRS 8 and from testable hypotheses (Section 5.4 and 6.2).  
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The theories summarised in this section were used by most of the researchers to study the 
companies’ segmental disclosure practice and to explain variation in segmental reporting 
disclosures.  However, in these studies generally more emphasis is given to agency 
(Section 2.4.3), proprietary (2.4.4) and regulation (5.2)  theories than to signalling, capital 
need and political cost theories.   The studies and their findings are introduced in the next 
section. (Section 2.4) 
 
2.4 Literature Review 
 
Studies related to segment disclosure and the impacts of the changes in segment 
disclosure standards follow at least three lines of research. 
1. Studies primarily focusing on the quality and fineness of the segment information 
disclosed in financial statements. (Section 2.4.1 and Section 2.4.2) 
2. Studies examining preparers’ decisions and the possible reasons (e.g. proprietary 
and agency costs) behind their decisions. (Section 2.4.3 and Section 2.4.4) 
3. Studies examining the usefulness of segment disclosures (e.g. users’ decision 
making, forecast accuracy and predictive ability, market reactions). (Section 
2.4.5) (Aleksanyan, 2004; Roberts, 2010) 
 
These Sections provide an overview of the research findings.  Studies are grouped 
together and introduced in relation to the above mentioned main lines of research.  The 
first and second lines of research are directly related to this study.  Therefore, they are 
disclosed in detail. For the third line of research a summary is provided.  
 
Most of the studies introduced in the Literature Review (Section 2.4) were carried out on 
US samples after the introduction of SFAS 131.  A few studies on the impact of IFRS 8 
have already been published but most of the studies are unpublished working papers.  
 
2.4.1 Quality of the segment information _ Operating segment disclosure 
 
There is a large body of research which focuses on the changes in disclosure quality 
associated with the adoption of new segment disclosure standards (SFAS 14 → SFAS 
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131; IAS 14 → IAS 14R; IAS 14R → IFRS 8). These studies are introduced in Section 
2.4.1 and in Section 2.4.2. 
 
In 1997 FASB issued SFAS 131 to address the critics of SFAS 14 (e.g. lack of segment 
definition; broad, artificial aggregated segments; segment disclosure did not reflect the 
companies organisational structure etc.)  The new disclosure standard changed the 
previous “risk and reward approach” to the “management approach”. (Roberts, 2010)  
Several articles examined the impact of the new regulation on the US companies’ segment 
disclosures.  
 
Two articles (Herrmann and Thomas, 2000; Street et al., 2000) comparing the US 
companies segment disclosure under SFAS 131 and SFAS 14 were published in the same 
Accounting Horizons issue in 2000 (Volume 14, No. 3).  Herrmann and Thomas (2000) 
analysed the business (operating segments based on product and services) as well as the 
geographic segment disclosure changes.  Whereas Street et al. (2000) primarily 
concentrated on the business segments.  Additionally, Street et al. (2000) studied the 
change in consistency between the companies’ segment disclosures and their other annual 
report disclosures.  
 
Under SFAS 131 the majority of the companies determined reportable operating 
segments based on products and services.  The number of firms providing segment 
disclosure increased.  Thus, SFAS 131 effectively reduced the number of single-segment 
companies.  The companies reported a greater number of segments under the new 
approach.  The average number of reported operating segments increased significantly. 
As a result of the additional requirements of SFAS 131 (such as interest income and 
expense; income tax expense / benefit; other non-cash items included in net profit / loss; 
unusual items) the number of reported items for each operating segments increased.  
Herrmann and Thomas (2000) found a significant increase in the average number of items 
(from 5.5 to 6.3).  On the other hand, only a relatively low percentage of the companies 
disclosed voluntarily items such as liabilities, segment cash flow, R&D. (Herrmann and 
Thomas, 2000; Street et al., 2000)  This is in line with Nagarajan and Sridhars’ (1996) 
theory that increasing disclosure requirement can decrease the companies’ value relevant 
disclosure. 
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Additionally, Street et al. (2000) found that the level of inconsistency of segment 
information with other parts of annual report reduced significantly under SFAS 131 
(Introductory Annual Report Information: from 43% to 14%; Management Discussion 
and Analysis, MD&A: from 25% to 8%).  
 
In summary, the two studies found that operating segment reporting improved under 
SFAS 131 (number of segments reported, number of items reported, decreased number 
of single-segment companies).  However, the limited voluntary disclosure of operating 
segment items and inconsistent reporting by a significant minority of companies are of 
some concern. (Herrmann and Thomas, 2000; Street et al., 2000) 
 
When researchers investigated whether the introduction of the new segment disclosure 
standard improved companies’ segment disclosure they usually compared the number of 
reported segments before and after the introduction of the new segment disclosure 
standard.  These studies interpreted the increase in reported segment number as an 
improvement in segment disclosure. (Herrman and Thomas, 2000b; Street et al., 2000; 
Street and Nichols, 2002; Berger and Hann, 2003; Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004)  
 
However, Berger and Hann (2003) admit that the change in the number of reported 
segments is not the best measure of segment disclosure but a good starting point.  
Therefore they examined additional measures of segment disaggregation (1. the ratio of 
the number of reported segments to the number of business activities; 2. revenue-based 
Herfindahl index) which also indicated significant increase in disaggregation under SFAS 
131.  
 
Furthermore, Ettredge et al. (2006) argue that comparing the segment numbers under the 
old and the new regulation “is appropriate for firms that were managed as multiple 
segment firms before SFAS No. 131 but were not reported as such until after SFAS No. 
131. (e.g., single to multiple segment reporters)”. (p92)  They found that the number of 
reported segments increased from one to three for previously single segment companies 
but predominantly did not change for multi-segment companies.  For companies which 
were managed and reported as multiple segment companies before and after SFAS 131 
the effect of the new regulation could be an increase, decrease or no change in the reported 
segment number.  Therefore, instead of comparing the reported segment numbers 
researchers used two alternative measures: (1) the cross-segment variability of reported 
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profit (the range of the reported segment profits) (Ettredge et al., 2006), and (2) the cross-
segment differences in earnings growth (Wang et al., 2011). SFAS 131 allows the 
aggregation of segments with similar economic characteristics (e.g. profitability).  The 
authors argue that the implementation of SFAS 131 should have resulted in an increased 
cross-segment variability of reported segment profit and earnings growth.  Further 
analysis of multi-segment companies revealed that the introduction of SFAS 131 
increased the cross-segment variability of reported profit and earnings growth. (Ettredge 
et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2011)  The results indicate that the new management approach 
increased transparency of segment profit disclosures.  
 
A major difference between SFAS 14 and SFAS 131 was the adoption of the management 
approach.  This new approach intended to address the users concern that the segment 
disclosure under SFAS 14 did not faithfully represented the companies’ internal 
organisation of business activities.  Botosan et al. (2009) found that after the adoption of 
SFAS 131 companies changed their segment definition to increase the alignment of their 
segment reporting with their internal organisational structure.  
 
Under SFAS 131 firms are allowed to choose their own definition of segment profit.  
Researchers argue that it makes difficult to assess profitability and complicates 
comparisons (different profit definition, difficulty to identify the profit definition 
employed). (Street et al., 2000; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Berger and Hann, 2007)  
 
Furthermore, the management approach allows managers to measure segment earning 
differently (non-GAAP numbers) than is required for the entity level corporate earnings 
(accordance with GAAP).  This means that the sum of the company’s segment earnings 
does not need to be equal to corporate level earnings. (Wang and Ettredge, 2014)  
 
Wang and Ettredge (2014) studied a large sample of US multiple segment companies 
segment reporting practice and found that 78% of their sample firm-year observations 
had gaps (defined as the difference between the summed segment earnings and the 
company’s consolidated earnings).  Interestingly, Wang and Ettredge (2014) found that 
aggregated segment earnings (“pro-forma” or “core” earnings: earnings without 
transitory and non-cash components such as corporate intangibles, special or unusual 
items, existence of merger or acquisition) are more persistent (measured by its association 
with the future aggregated segment earnings) and more informative (measured by its 
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association with current stock returns) than corporate earnings.  However, the incomplete 
allocation also can be a management tool to mislead investors if it is motivated by 
proprietary and / or agency costs.  
 
While standard setters in the US and Canada worked on SFAS 131 the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) revised IAS 14 and issued IAS 14R in 1997.  
The new standard provided clearer guidance for segment definition and introduced some 
additional disclosure requirements (such as liabilities, capital additions, depreciation, 
equity method income, other non-cash items for the primary segments and capital 
addition for the secondary segments).  Just like SFAS 131 IAS 14R introduced the 
“management approach” but it kept the former “risk and reward approach” as well.  If 
primary segment determined under the management approach did not have similar risk 
and reward characteristics, the primary segments needed to be defined on the basis of risk 
and reward approach. (Street and Nichols, 2002; Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004; 
Roberts, 2010) 
 
Street and Nichols (2002) examined the disclosure practice of a global sample of 210 
companies, referring to the use of IASs, before and after the introduction of IAS 14R.  
They found that the percentage of the single segment companies decreased under IAS 
14R but a third of the sample companies still claimed to operate in one segment.  Further 
analysis of the annual reports revealed that many of these companies probably had more 
than one segment. IAS 14R increased the number of items to be disclosed for primary 
segments which resulted in a significant increase in the number of items reported by 
segments.  The research findings also suggest that the level of consistency between the 
segment information and the other parts of the annual report increased significantly after 
the introduction of IAS 14R (Introductory annual reporting information: from 74% to 
81%; Management discussion8: from 76% to 86%).  However, a significant minority of 
the companies continued to disclose segment information that was inconsistent with other 
parts of the annual report. 
 
In a later study Prather-Kinsey and Meek (2004) complemented Street and Nichols (2002) 
research.  In line with Street and Nichols’s (2002) results the authors found that the 
                                                 
8 Management Report / Financial Review 
Chapter 2 Regulatory background, Theoretical framework and Literature Review 
36 
introduction of IAS 14R resulted in more segment information disclosure (number of 
segments and items reported).  
 
Research reveals that the changeover from SFAS 14 to SFAS 131 and from IAS 14 to 
IAS 14R has led to more segment information.  It is argued that by increasing information 
disaggregation the new standard induced firms to reveal previously hidden information.  
Companies which reported a single segment under SFAS 14 and under IAS 14 tend to 
report multiple segments under SFAS 131 and under IAS 14R. (Street and Nichols, 2002; 
Berger and Hann, 2003; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Botosan et al., 2009)  The number 
of segments has increased and more elements per segment have been disclosed. (Street et 
al., 2000; Herrmann and Thomas, 2000; Street and Nichols, 2002; Berger and Hann, 
2003; Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004; Paul and Largay, 2005)  Research results suggest 
that external reporting is now more aligned with companies’ organisation structure. 
(Botosan et al., 2009)  Furthermore, the introduction of SFAS 131 increased the 
consistency of segment report with other annual report disclosures. (Street et al., 2000; 
Nichols et al., 2000; Street and Nichols, 2002) 
 
The IASB and the EC expected that the impact of IFRS 8 would be similar to the impact 
of SFAS 131. (EC, 2007)  However, research found evidence that the introduction of IAS 
14R9 has already resulted in a significant increase in the number of segments and items 
disclosed for each segment and a decline in the number of single-segment companies. 
(Street and Nichols, 2002; Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004)  Additionally, while the 
introduction of SFAS 131 was a “full move to the management approach” the 
introduction of IFRS 8 “reflects a shift to the pure management approach, without the 
IAS 14R risks and rewards qualification.” (Nichols et al., 2013, p265)  Thus, the impact 
of IFRS 8 might be less significant.  Furthermore, different economical and legal 
environment, culture etc. of non-US companies may result in a different response to the 
new regulation. (Roberts, 2010)  
 
IFRS8 is effective from financial years starting on or after 1 January 2009.  The standard 
moved the international segment disclosure regulation into line with SFAS 131.  The 
IFRS 8 related studies mostly focused on the first adoption of the management approach.  
Research on the longer-term impacts of IFRS 8 currently is not available. 
                                                 
9 effective from 1998 
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Literature on the impacts of the introduction of SFAS 131 and IFRS 8 was recently 
reviewed by Nichols et al. (2013).  Additionally, a document that reviews the findings of 
academic literature on the effect of the application of IFRS 8 made by the IASB during 
the PIR of IFRS 8 is also available. (IASB, 2013b)  These reviews (1) report on the 
advantages and disadvantages of the application of the management approach and (2) 
identify areas for further research.  
 
Based on interviews with key stakeholders (preparer, regulator, legislator, auditor, 
institutional investor, user) Crawford et al. (2012a) found that the interviewees were not 
very concerned about the changes introduced by the new standard and they had positive 
expectation that the management approach might provide information how the companies 
are actually managed.  The interviewees expressed some concerns about the disclosure of 
non-GAPP information and the identity of CODM.  
 
Heem and Valenza (2010) examined the impacts of IFRS 8 on the half-yearly report of a 
sample of French companies.  The authors found that the mean number of operating 
segments disclosed did not change and majority of the companies used the same business 
report segmentation under IAS 14R and IFRS 8.  The authors concluded that the 
companies’ already defined and reported segments aligned with their internal reporting.  
Furthermore, there was only a little effect (decrease) on the number of items reported 
(mean: IAS 14R: 2.06 → IFRS 8: 1.94) 
 
Crawford et al. (2012a) analysed the segmental notes10 (last under IAS 14R and first under 
IFRS 8) of 150 UK (99 FTSE 100 and 51 FTSE 250) listed companies to find out whether 
the introduction of IFRS 8 changed the segmental disclosure of the sample companies.  
Additionally, they interviewed preparers (6), auditors (7) and users (7) about the 
usefulness of information provided under the new standard.  Crawford et al. (2012a) 
found that although the number of reported segments has not been changed by more than 
half of the companies, the average number of segment disclosed increased (e.g. for 
business segments from 3.30 to 3.56) under IFRS 8.  However, the key items disclosed 
by the companies for each segments decreased because many companies stop providing 
                                                 
10 The rest of the annual reports were also looked through for evidence of segments (consistency). 
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information on important segment items such as liabilities, total assets and capital 
expenditures.  
 
Crawford et al. (2012a) recommended for the IASB to provide some guidance on issues 
raised during the interviews such as (1) the materiality threshold for defining and 
aggregating segments, (2) the purpose and nature of entity-wide disclosures.  They also 
suggested that the IASB should consider changing IFRS 8 to require (1) the disclosure of 
the CODM’s identity and (2) an explanation of the differences between the number of 
segments reported in the segment notes and the number of business / geographic units 
mentioned elsewhere in the entity’s annual report.  
 
Nichols et al. (2012) examined the impact of adopting IFRS 8 on the segmental 
disclosures of 335 European11 blue chip companies.  The authors excluded UK companies 
from their sample because Crawford et al. (2012a) had already studied the impact of IFRS 
8 on the disclosure practice of UK listed companies.  The research focused on the benefits 
anticipated by the IASB when issuing the new standard and the concerns expressed by 
different stakeholders and regulators.  Just like Crawford et al. (2012a) they found that 
(1) the majority of the companies reported the same number of segments and on average 
the sample companies reported significantly more segments under IFRS 8 than under 
IASB 14R and (2) many companies stopped providing key items by segments (e.g. 
segment liabilities, capital expenditures) therefore the average number of items disclosed 
for each segment decreased significantly.  
 
The findings of Crawford et al. (2012a) and Nichols et al. (2012) are in line (e.g. increased 
number of segments, decrease in reported items by segments, disclosure of finer 
geographic information12 etc.).  However, their results on (1) the use of non-IFRS 
measures and (2) inconsistency between segment notes and other parts of the companies’ 
annual report are partially different.  Nichols et al. (2012) found a lack of comparability 
in segment profitability measures and extensive use of non-IFRS profitability measures.  
However, Crawford et al. (2012a) found that only 6% of the sample companies referred 
to the use of non-IFRS measures under IFRS 8.  Street and Nichols (2002) found that the 
consistency between the companies’ segmental notes and the other parts of their annual 
                                                 
11 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland 
12 see in Section 2.4.2 
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report increased with the introduction of IAS 14R.  Thus, Nichols et al. (2012) did not 
expect significant increase in consistency after the adoption of the management approach.  
The authors found that only 4% of the sample companies had inconsistent reporting 
(single segment companies were the most problematic ones).  The authors conducted, the 
sample companies had already had consistent reporting under IAS 14R.  However, 
Crawford et al. (2012a) found that “there appears to be some inconsistency in the annual 
reports between the segmental note and the narrative sections of the annual report for 
both FTSE100 and FTSE250 companies.” (p27)  
 
IFRS 8 introduced the management approach but the standard does not require the 
disclosure of the identity of the CODM.  Research found that a relatively high percentage 
of the companies do not voluntarily identify the CODM in the segmental disclosures. 
(Crawford et al., 2012a → 31%; Nichols et al., 2012 → 64%; Kang and Gray, 2013 → 
18%; Mardini et al., 2012 → 38%)  Crawford et al. (2012) and Mardini et al. (2012) argue 
that the non-disclosure of the identity of CODM could negatively affect the usefulness of 
segment information and “appears to be a lost opportunity for companies to provide 
useful information to their stakeholders.” (Crawford et al., 2012a, p22) 
 
The introduction of IAS 14R had already increased the number of items disclosed for 
each segments. (Street and Nichols, 2002; Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004)  Under IAS 
14R items required by the standard always needed to be reported.  However, under IFRS 
8 most items only need to be disclosed if regularly reported to the CODM.  Thus, the 
disclosure of most items is voluntary.  A company could have used the freedom provided 
by IFRS 8 and could have reduces the number of items disclosed by claiming that its 
CODM does not use certain items for assessing the business.  On the other hand, a 
company could have increased the number of items disclosed for each operating segments 
if its CODM uses more information than was required under IAS 14R. (Pisano and 
Landriana, 2012)  The majority of the studies found that the average number of reported 
segment items decreased under IFRs 8. (Nichols et al., 2012; Crawford et al., 2012a; 
Heem and Valenza, 2010; Bugeja et al, 2012)  However, Mardini et al. (2012) and Pisano 
and Landriana (2012) found increase in the average number of reported segment items 
for a sample of companies from Jordan and Spain.  Nichols et al. (2013) suggest that the 
introduction of IFRS 8 might have greater impact in countries where the level of 
disclosure and / or compliance was lower under IAS 14R.  
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Table 2.3 Studies on the impacts of the management approach on the quality of the 
reportable segment disclosure 
 
Impact of the new regulation 
Accounting Standard 
SFAS 131 IFRS 8 
Panel A: Positive Impact 
the number of single-segment companies 
reduced 
Herrmann & Thomas, 2000b 
Street et al., 2000 
Berger & Hann, 2003 
Botosan & Stanford, 2005 
Ettredge et al., 2006 
Botosan et al., 2009 
Nichols et al., 2012 
 
the average number of reported segments 
increased 
Herrmann & Thomas, 2000b 
Street et al., 2000 
Berger & Hann, 2003 
Paul & Largay, 2005 
Nichols et al., 2012 
Crawford et al., 2012a 
Pisano & Landriana, 2012 
Kang & Gray, 2013 
Mardini et al., 2012 
Bugeja et al., 2012 
the average number of reported segment 
items increased 
Herrmann & Thomas, 2000b 
Street et al., 2000 
Berger & Hann, 2003 
Paul & Largay, 2005 
Mardini et al., 2012 
Pisano & Landriana, 2012 
the alignment of the segment reporting with 
the company’s organisational structure 
increased  
Botosan et al., 2009  
inconsistency of segment information with 
other parts of the annual report reduced 
Street et al., 2000 
Nichols et al., 2000 
 
segment disaggregation increased Berger & Hann, 2003  
cross segment variability of reported profit / 
differences in earning growth increased 
Ettredge et al., 2006 
Wang et al., 2011 
 
Panel B: Neutral Impact 
majority of the companies determined 
reportable operating segments based on 
products and services 
Herrmann & Thomas, 2000b 
Street et al., 2000 
Berger & Hann, 2003 
Ettredge et al., 2006 
Nichols et al., 2012 
Pisano & Landriana, 2012 
Pardal & Morais, 2011 
Kang & Gray, 2013 
no change in the number of reported 
segments for the majority of the companies 
Ettredge et al., 2006 Heem and Valenza, 2010 
Bugeja  et al., 2012 
Crawford et al., 2012a 
Nichols et al., 2012 
Pisano & Landriana, 2012 
Kang & Gray, 2013 
companies use non-IFRS earning measures  Nichols, et al., 2012 
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Table 2.3 (continued) Studies on the impacts of the management approach on the 
quality of the reportable segment disclosure 
 
Impact of the new regulation 
Accounting Standard 
SFAS 131 IFRS 8 
Panel C: Negative Impact 
the average number of reported segment 
items decreased 
 Nichols et al., 2012 
Crawford et al., 2012a 
Heem and Valenza, 2010 
Bugeja et al., 2012 
decline in disclosure of segment assets and 
liabilities 
 Nichols et al., 2012 
Crawford et al., 2012a 
inconsistency of segment disclosure with 
other Sections of the annual report 
 Crawford et al., 2012a 
difficulty to assess profitability and compare 
companies earnings increased (different 
definitions of segment profit) 
Street et al., 2000 
Botosan & Stanford, 2005 
Berger & Hann, 2007 
Nichols et al., 2012 
difference between total segment (non-
GAAP measures) and consolidated data 
(GAAP measures) 
Wang & Ettredge, 2014  
relatively high proportion of the companies 
do not disclose the identity of the CODM 
 Crawford et al., 2012a 
Nichols et al., 2012 
Kang and Gray, 2012 
Mardini et al., 2012 
lack of comparability in segment 
profitability 
Street at al., 2000 
Botosan & Stanford, 2005 
Berger & Hann, 2007 
Nichols et al., 2012 
 
The general decrease in the number of reported items indicates that although the content 
of SFAS 131 and IFRS 8 is almost exactly the same, their impacts on the segmental 
disclosure practice of the companies are not. (Table 2.3) 
 
2.4.2 Quality of the segment information _ Geographic information disclosure 
 
The globalisation and the rise of multinational companies increase the importance of 
geographic information.  Different geographical areas exhibit different risk and return 
profiles due to differences in their culture, legal and tax environment, fiscal and monetary 
policies, economic development, governmental regimes etc..  Therefore, information 
about different geographic segments can help the users to understand different risks, 
growth prospects and economic conditions associated with different geographic areas.  
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Geographic segment information provided under SFAS 14 was criticised by both the 
academic and financial community (e.g. broad classification, limited number of 
geographic segments, non-comparable and highly aggregated geographic information 
etc.). (Herrmann and Thomas, 1997 and 2000; Nichols, et al., 2000) 
 
Herrmann and Thomas (1997) demonstrated that although there is theoretical support 
(Fineness Theorem, Earnings Capitalisation Model, Signalling and Portfolio Model) for 
the usefulness of geographic segment information, empirical research result only provides 
some support that geographic disclosure result in greater usefulness under SFAS 14.  
Based on the theories and previous empirical findings they analysed the potential impacts 
of the proposed SFAS 131 on the usefulness of geographic segment disclosures.  
Herrmann and Thomas (1997) argued that the impact of the proposed new regulation on 
the quality of segment disclosure will depend on how companies define their operating 
segments under the management approach.  The proposed new standard should increase 
the quality of geographic disclosure for companies defining their operating segments on 
geographic basis.  However, if companies decide operating segments other than 
geographic areas, the new approach may not improve the geographic information 
disclosure.  These companies only have to provide limited geographic disclosures under 
the proposed new standard.  Additionally, the new regulation removes the 10% 
materiality threshold and leaves the materiality judgement to the management which 
likely to result in an increased level of aggregation. 
 
In their later study Herrmann and Thomas (2000) analysed the actual impact of SFAS 
131 on the segment disclosure practice of 100 large US companies.  They found that the 
proportion of companies providing country-level geographic segment disclosure under 
the new regulation increased and there was a decrease in the use of broader geographic 
area segments.  Thus, the fineness of geographic information improved.  However, the 
mean (median) number of items disclosed by geographic segments decreased from 3.3 
(3) to 2.2 (2).  Most of the companies reported only the revenues and assets required by 
SFAS 131 and the disclosure of geographic segment earnings decreased significantly (this 
is not required any more so it is voluntary).  The authors argue that the fineness of 
geographic disclosure may increase under SFAS 131 (country-level disclosure) but the 
provided information might be less useful for the users (in terms of items disclosed).  
Furthermore, broad geographic area disclosures still continued under SFAS 131.  
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Consistent with Herrmann and Thomas (2000) Nichols et al. (2000) found that although 
the introduction of SFAS 131 resulted in many improvements, several concerns remained.  
They found that under SFAS 131 the percentage of companies reporting on a country-
level basis significantly increased (from 4% to 28%) and the average number of reported 
geographic locations increased significantly (from 3.0 to 3.5).  On the other hand, a 
significant group of companies continue to use broad geographic groupings and provided 
highly aggregated information.  Thus, the new regulation did not solve the aggregation 
problem.  Furthermore, SFAS 131 resulted in a loss of information about geographic 
earnings (only 15% of the companies reported voluntarily).  
 
Additionally, Nichols et al. (2000) studied whether the management approach introduced 
in SFAS 131 improved the consistency within the annual report.  Although the 
inconsistency between the geographic segment disclosure and the other parts of the 
annual report decreased significantly (Introductory Annual Report Information: from 
38% to 8%; MD&A: from 23% to 15%) a small minority of the companies still reported 
inconsistent information within their Annual Report.  
 
Doupnik and Seese (2001) studied the Fortune 500 companies’ geographical disclosure 
before and after the introduction of SFAS 131.  In line with previous results they found 
that the percentage of the companies providing country-level geographic disclosure 
increased significantly from 23.1% (under SFAS 14) to 45.3% (under SFAS 131).  
However, more than half of the sample companies did not disclose country-level 
geographical information under SFAS 131.  Furthermore, a significant minority of the 
companies still disclosed mixed (country and continent level) and vague (e.g. Pacific; 
Europe/Middle East/Africa) geographic areas.  In line with previous research results the 
authors found that 28.8% of their sample companies increased the number of areas 
reported.  However, there was no change for the majority of the companies.  Doupnik and 
Seese (2001) argue that the comparison of the number of the reported geographical areas 
under SFAS 131 and under SFAS 14 cannot measure perfectly the change in the 
disclosure fineness.  Therefore, they combined “the level of aggregation13 represented by 
each area, and the percentage of foreign operation in that area” (p124) to calculate a 
measure of fineness.  The authors found that the fineness score increased for 
approximately 40% of the sample companies after the introduction of SFAS 131.  On the 
                                                 
13 Foreing/Other → Multi-continents → Continents → Countries 
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other hand, the fineness score decreased for more than 25% of the sample companies 
under the new disclosure requirement. 
 
In contrast to SFAS 131 IAS 14R did not require country-level geographic disclosure.  
Street and Nichols (2002) found that after the introduction of IAS 14R the majority of 
their sample companies (55%) used broad, vague geographic grouping.  Furthermore, 
IAS 14R no longer required the disclosure of profitability measures.  As a result only less 
than a quarter of the sample companies disclosed earnings measures voluntarily under 
IAS 14R. 
 
Crawford et al. (2012b) used content analysis of the comment letters to ED8 and 15 semi-
structured interviews with key stakeholders (preparer, regulator, legislator, auditor, 
institutional investor, user) to study the potential impacts of the proposed new segmental 
reporting standards.  The results of the comment letter analysis show that all stakeholders 
(preparer, user, standard setter, accountancy body/firm, other) were concerned about the 
potential negative impacts of ED8 proposals on the companies’ geographic information 
disclosures.  However, the authors found that the interviewees had little concern about 
the possible negative effect (disappearance of the geographic disclosures) of the 
implementation of IFRS 8.  They believed, that companies will continue to provide both 
geographic as well as business segment information under the new regulation. (Crawford 
et al., 2010; Crawford et al., 2012b)  
 
Aleksanyan and Danbolt (2012) analysed the segmental reporting practice of a sample of 
127 non-financial listed14 UK companies under SSAP 25, IAS 14R and IFRS 8.  Their 
results indicate that the introduction of IAS 14R had limited effect on the number of 
segments reported by the sample companies. However, there was a significant increase 
in the number of reported segments under IFRS 8.  Companies organised around 
geographical areas (business areas) reported higher (lower) number of geographical 
segments (LOB) under all three requirements.  Across all regimes, more than a quarter of 
the reported segments based on heterogeneous geographical regions (broadly aggregated 
geographical areas).  The findings also indicate that under IFRS 8 there was a substantial 
increase in the disclosure of single-country segments (SSAP 25 and IAS 14R: 30% → 
IFRS 8: 43%).  However, this increase was driven exclusively by companies organised 
                                                 
14 constituents of the FTSE 100 index 
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around business areas.  Whereas, the percentage of single-country segments reported by 
companies organised around geographical areas decreased (SSAP 25: about 30% → IAS 
14R and IFRS 8: less than 20%).  The authors argue that companies organised around 
business areas can afford to provide more single-country disclosure because under IAS 
14R and IFRS 8 they did / do not have to disclose any profitability measures.  Thus, no 
additional proprietary cost associated with the more detailed information.  However, there 
might be reputational benefits from disclosing (more) country related data.  The authors 
also found significant decrease in the volume of profitability data (from 85% under SSAP 
25 to 25% under IAS 14R and IFRS 8) which makes them question the effectiveness of 
IAS 14R and IFRS 8.  
 
For a sample of 150 listed UK companies Crawford et al. (2012a) found that the 
companies disclosed more individual countries (finer geographic information).  However, 
the authors also warn that “it is possible that any countries not individually identified are 
being allocated to the rest of the world group.” (p24)  The authors found that most of the 
companies stopped providing capital expenditure and total assets information by 
geographic locations.  They argue, that although there has been an increase in disclosure 
of NCA information and most of the companies disclosed external revenues by 
geographic locations, the usefulness of the geographic segment disclosure might have 
reduced (no capital expenditure information, no current asset information within total 
assets). 
 
Research results of Nichols et al. (2012) also indicate significant improvement in the 
fineness of geographic information disclosed under IFRS 8 by a sample of 335 European 
blue chip companies.  On one hand, the companies started to provide country specific 
information, the use of broad, vague grouping decreased and on average, the number of 
geographic areas reported under entity-wide information increased significantly.  On the 
other hand, the number of companies disclosing capital expenditure information for the 
reported geographic areas decreased. 
 
The number of countries disclosed individually and therefore the aggregation and 
fineness of geographic information in the segmental notes depends on the preparers’ 
materiality decision.  Research on the companies’ materiality judgements with regard to 
individual countries is introduced in Section 7.2.6. 
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Table 2.4 Studies on the quality of entity-wide information provided under the 
management approach  
 
Impact of the new regulation 
Accounting Standard 
SFAS 131 IFRS 8 
Panel A: Positive Impact 
county-level geographic segment disclosure 
increased 
Herrmann & Thomas, 2000b 
Nichols et al., 2000 
Doupnik & Seese, 2001 
Hope, 2008 
Nichols et al., 2012 
Crawford et al., 2012a 
Mardini et al., 2012 
Aleksanyan & Danbolt, 2012 
Pardal and Morais, 2011 
the average number of reported geographic 
locations increased 
Doupnik & Seese, 2001 
Nichols et al., 2000 
Herrmann & Thomas, 2000b 
Crawford et al., 2012a 
Nichols et al., 2012 
Mardini et al., 2012 
the fineness of geographic information 
increased 
Herrmann & Thomas, 2000b 
Doupnik & Seese, 2001 
Nichols et al., 2012 
Crawford, et al., 2012 
the inconsistency between the geographic 
segment disclosure and the other parts of the 
annual report decreased 
Nichols et al., 2000  
Panel B: Neutral impact 
no change in the number of reported 
geographic areas for the majority of the 
companies 
Doupnik & Seese, 2001  
Panel C: Negative impact 
high percentage of the sample companies did 
not disclose country-level geographic 
information 
Doupnik & Seese, 2001  
broad, mixed, vague geographic area 
disclosures decrease but still exists 
Herrmann & Thomas, 2000 
Nichols, et al., 2000 
Doupnik and Seese, 2001 
Nichols et al., 2012 
Aleksanyan & Danbolt, 2012 
the number of items disclosed by geographic 
areas decreased 
Herrmann & Thomas, 2000 Nichols et al., 2012 
Crawford et al., 2012a 
loss of information about geographic earnings Herrmann & Thomas, 2000 
Nichols et al., 2000 
Hope & Thomas, 2008 
Hope, 2008 
Hope et al., 2013 
Aleksanyan & Danbolt, 2012  
loss of information about capital expenditure 
by geographic areas 
 Nichols et al., 2012 
Crawford et al., 2012a 
Mardini et al., 2012 
 
The implementation of SFAS 131 and IFRS 8 resulted in more disaggregation because 
the proportion of country-level geographical segment disclosures has increased. 
(Herrmann and Thomas, 2000; Nichols et al., 2000; Doupnik and Seese, 2001; Hope, 
2008; Aleksanyan and Danbolt, 2012; Nichols et al., 2012; Crawford et al., 2012a; 
Mardini et al., 2012; Pardal and Morais, 2011)  On the other hand, the use of broad, vague 
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geographic grouping still continued under SFAS 131, under IAS 14R and under IFRS 8. 
(Herrmann and Thomas, 2000; Nichols, et al., 2000; Doupnik and Seese, 2001; Street and 
Nichols, 2002; Aleksanyan and Danbolt, 2012; Nichols et al., 2012)  Additionally, the 
number of items disclosed by geographic areas and the number of firms reporting earnings 
by geographical segments has declined following the adoption of SFAS 131, IAS 14R 
and IFRS 8. (Herrmann and Thomas, 2000; Nichols et al., 2000; Street and Nichols, 2002; 
Hope and Thomas; 2008, Hope, 2008; Aleksanyan and Danbolt, 2012; Hope et al., 2013; 
Nichols et al., 2012; Crawford et al., 2012a)  This may result in losing relevant 
information for monitoring managers (see more in Section 2.4.3) and competitors (see 
more in Section 2.4.4) and making economic decisions (see more in Section 2.4.5).  
Overall, research results indicate that the introduction of SFAS 131 and IFRS 8 had the 
same effects on the companies’ geographic disclosures.  
 
2.4.3 Preparers’ segment decision _ External monitoring / Agency cost 
 
Considerable managerial discretion was / is allowed in the application of the accounting 
standards.  The managers’ perception of advantages/benefits (Section 2.4.5) and 
disadvantages/costs (Section 2.4.3 and Section 2.4.4) associated with segment disclosure 
influences their interpretation of segment disclosure standards and the level of segment 
disclosure they provide.  The following Sections introduce the literature that investigates 
what motivates managers to withhold segment information.  
 
Managers have both the incentives (the importance of segment disclosure to investors) 
and the opportunity (e.g. segment definition, materiality level, overhead cost allocation 
between segments are based on managerial judgement) to hide unresolved agency 
problems (e.g. reporting poorly performing segments).  Research found evidence that 
managers use segment aggregation (Berger and Hann, 2002 and 2007; Wang et al., 2011) 
and segment level earnings management (Hann and Lu, 2009) to manipulate segment 
profit.  
 
Aggregated information 
More disaggregated information can attract greater external monitoring by revealing a 
company’s diversification strategy, resource allocation between divisions, and 
underperforming divisions. (Berger and Hann, 2002, 2003)  
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Wysocki (1998) studied the informativeness of segment disclosures.  He argued that 
disaggregated information is useful not only because of its firm valuation aspects (see 
more in Section 2.4.5) but also because it plays an important role in monitoring how firm 
management exercises real expansion and adaptation options.  
 
Berger and Hann (2002) examined whether managers tried to use more aggregated 
segments to conceal information that could increase the likelihood of takeover.  The 
results indicated that the more disaggregated information provided under the new 
regulation (SFAS 131) increased the likelihood of takeovers.  This result suggests that the 
newly revealed information increased “monitoring pressure from the market for 
corporate control” (p41).  
 
Later the segment disclosure literature was further extended by the same authors (Berger 
and Hann, 2007).  They hypothesised that “when agency cost motive dominates, 
managers reporting under SFAS No. 14 tend to withhold the segments with relatively low 
abnormal profit”. (p874)  They found that the new segments (under SFAS 131) were 
associated with lower abnormal profit than the old segments.  Thus, managers tried to 
conceal poorly performing segment information.  
 
Recently Wang et al. (2011) found that managers disclose smaller segment earnings 
growth differences if their company has more free cash flows and more abnormal accruals 
(both free cash flows and discretionary accruals were used as proxies for agency costs)  
They also found that SFAS 131 did not stop managers from concealing accurate 
information about segment earnings growth. 
 
Earnings management and empire building 
Givoly et al. (1999), based on a large sample of US companies’ segment disclosure 
practice under SFAS 14, found measurement errors (proxied by the correlation between 
the segments measures of performance and those of its industry) in segment sales and 
segment earning and they also found that these errors are considerably different. Further 
analysis of this result indicated that beside the characteristics of segments, reporting 
factors such as management interventions (shift income / earning between segments to 
conceal, manipulate the segments real result) also effect companies’ segment reporting.  
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In a later study Hann and Lu (2009) also found evidence that managers manipulated 
segment profit by earnings management (allocation of overhead cost between segments) 
to conceal reporting segment losses under SFAS 14.  However, after the introduction of 
SFAS 131 the segment level earnings management declined.  The authors explain this by 
the increased transparency (through the new reconciliation requirement) and by the 
increased consistency between external and internal reporting under the new regulation. 
 
More recently Wang and Ettredge (2014) found that under SFAS 131 managers use cross-
segment resource transfers to conceal information and limit the monitoring usefulness of 
segment disclosure.  The cross-segment transfers have a positive association with the 
difference between the aggregated segment earnings and the corporate level earnings.  
Based on this result the authors argue that managers faced with high agency costs tend to 
disclose more and larger differences.  
 
SFAS 14 required companies to disclose geographic segment data but under SFAS 131 
the disclosure of geographic segments is optional when operating segments are not 
defined as geographic areas.  A relatively high percentage of the reporting companies 
decided not to provide geographic segment data after the introduction of SFAS 131. (see 
more in Section 2.4.2)  However, when disclosure quality is reduced the shareholders 
ability to monitor managerial actions also decreases.  This might result in managers 
making self-maximising decisions such as “empire building”. (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976)  Hope and Thomas (2008) studied a large number of companies (502) prior and 
after the adoption of SFAS 131 to test the agency cost hypothesis in the context of 
geographic disclosures. 74% of their sample companies stopped providing geographic 
earnings after the introduction of SFAS 131.  They found that higher foreign sales growth 
and lower foreign profit margin is associated with the nondisclosure.  The research results 
are consistent with the agency cost hypothesis.  
 
2.4.4 Preparers’ segment decision _ Proprietary cost 
 
Providing disaggregated segment information (e.g. segment level profitability, asset) is 
competitively sensitive.  Both theoretical and empirical research demonstrated that the 
companies’ segment disclosure is affected by the managers’ incentive to avoid potential 
harm.  Hayes and Lundholm (1996) developed a theoretical model in which firms (to 
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avoid adverse selection in capital market) are more likely to report aggregated segments 
when activities’ results are considerably different.  Nagarajan and Sridhar (1996) also 
argue that companies use segment aggregation to protect proprietary information and to 
deter entry by competitors.  However, aggregation not only prevents the competitor from 
entering the market but also helps to reduce the intensity of competition. (Schneider and 
Scholze, 2011)  Feltham et al. (1992) found that the type of competition and the nature of 
the uncertainty in the economy affect the companies’ disclosure and segment aggregation 
decision.  Furthermore, if multi-segment companies try to reveal particularly favourable 
information in one segment that inevitably also reveals unfavourable information in 
another segment. (Arya et al., 2008)  Therefore, companies use aggregation to hide 
proprietary information and to maintain competitive advantages. 
 
Proprietary cost and firm lobbying position 
The analysis of response letters submitted to the standard setters (FASB, IASB) on EDs 
(SFAS 131, IFRS 8) can help to reveal the motivations behind the companies’ lobbying 
positions towards the EDs.  Managers expressed concerns that more detailed segment 
disclosure (greater disaggregation, more items etc.) would force them to provide 
potentially harmful proprietary information to competitors. (Ettredge, et al., 2002; 
Katselas et al., 2011)  For example, 87% of the industrial firms were against the proposed 
SFAS 131 on the ground that the new regulation “put them at competitive disadvantage”. 
(Ettredge, et al., 2002a, p98) 
 
Two studies (Ettredge, et al., 2002; Katselas et al., 2011) examined companies’ position 
on EDs and tested the relationship between company characteristics and their view 
regarding the new segment reporting regulation.  The researchers found that expected 
proprietary costs are important in evaluating the new segment disclosure rules.  
 
Ettredge et al. (2002) analysed companies’ lobbying position on the ED of SFAS 131.  
The authors used a combined sample of response letters against the new segment 
reporting rule submitted to the FASB (“against group”) and a stratified random sample of 
198 companies that did not respond to the FASB invitation to comment (“not against 
group”).  Based on their results the authors argue that the companies’ lobbying positions 
on the FASB ED were motivated by the expected increase in segment disclosure, and by 
self-interest related to the potential competitive harm imposed on them by the proposed 
new segment disclosure standard.  
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Katselas et al. (2011) carried out a form oriented15 content analysis to investigate whether 
factors such as information asymmetry, agency costs, proprietary cost and political costs 
affect financial statement preparers lobbying position choices on IFRS 8.  29 out of the 
182 comment letters on the ED of the IFRS 8 were made by publicly listed companies.  
The analysis of these comment letters indicated that single segment firms were less likely 
to support IFRS 8 possibly because of the potential disclosure of proprietary information.  
The results also suggested that larger firms are more likely to lobby in favour of IFRS 8.  
However, other firm characteristics (inside ownership, profitability and leverage) 
included in the regression model were not significantly associated with preparers’ choices 
in lobbying on IFRS 8.  
 
Proprietary costs and operating (business) segment reporting 
Edwards and Smith (1996) found that before segment disclosure become mandatory 
(SSAP 25) in the UK the fear of competitive harm was one of the three most important 
reasons for not providing voluntary segment information.  Even after the introduction of 
mandatory segment disclosure rules competitive harm remained a concern for 32% of the 
surveyed companies (questionnaire based survey).  In addition, face-to-face interviews 
revealed that the disclosure of geographic rather than business segments information can 
cause competitive disadvantage for the interviewed companies.  
 
Leuz (2004) studied a sample of 109 non-financial German companies’ voluntary 
segment reporting and cash flow statement disclosure.  Consistent with the proprietary 
cost hypothesis he found that firms are less likely to provide voluntary segment data when 
segment profitability is more heterogeneous and therefore more revealing than their 
average profitability in the income statement.  Whereas cash flow disclosures which are 
less competitively sensitive (e.g. can be calculated from the companies’ balance sheet and 
income statement; firm-level information not disaggregated) seemed to be governed by 
managers’ capital-market considerations (such as cost savings in private information 
acquisition, high analyst following, lower cost of capital etc.).  The research findings 
support that when managers make their disclosure choices they trade off capital-market 
benefits and proprietary costs.  
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However, Harris (1998) argues that managers’ choices in defining segments differ from 
their voluntary disclosure decisions.  Voluntary disclosure decision models “often assume 
that managers condition their disclosure decisions on the observed values of certain 
information signals” (p114).  Whereas accounting regulations require consistency in 
segment definition from one period to another.  Therefore, voluntary disclosure models 
may not apply to segment definitions.  
 
Harris (1998) used a logit model to investigate the relationship between the business 
segment decisions of managers and the level of industry competition.  She studied a 
sample of 929 US firms business segment reporting practice under SFAS 14 during 1987 
to 1991.  The results indicated that firms are less likely to report operations as industry 
segments in less competitive industries (measured by the higher industry concentration 
ratio and the slower speed of abnormal profit adjustment).  Harris (1998) concluded that 
managers try to protect abnormal profit from their competitors by not reporting less 
competitive operations as business segments.  
 
Previous research (Hayes and Lundholm, 1996; Harris, 1998) findings suggested that 
higher level competition may decrease the competitive harm associated with segment 
disclosure.  Based on these findings Botosan and Harris (2000) hypothesised that firms 
that experience increase in competition are more likely to start quarterly segment 
disclosure.  The results did not support the hypothesis.  
 
Berger and Hann (2002) focused on the mandatory adoption of SFAS 131 and studied 
whether the new segment disclosure rule resulted in more disaggregated segment 
information.  They argue that “managers could have voluntarily disclosed more 
disaggregated information with little data collection cost under the old regime” (p1) 
because the information required by the management approach of the new regulation was 
available for them.  Thus, increased segment reporting under SFAS 131 indicates that 
managers concealed information under SFAS 14.  The authors found that companies that 
reported more disaggregated information (disclosed proprietary information) after the 
adoption of SFAS 131 had higher abnormal profitability (compared to industry average) 
and more variation in segment profitability (difference between the highest and the lowest 
segment Return on Assets and Return on Sales).  However, the more disaggregated 
information did not have adverse effect (competitive harm) on the companies’ abnormal 
profit. 
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Botosan and Stanford (2005) used retroactive disclosures required by SFAS 131 to 
examine managers’ incentives for hiding segment information under SFAS 14.  They 
used a sample of 615 firms that initiated segment reporting under SFAS 131 (previously 
reported as single-segment firm).  In line with previous research results they found that 
to protect profit in less competitive industries firms concealed profitable segments 
operated in less competitive industries than their primary operations.  
 
Berger and Hann (2007) argue that neither industry-level profit (Harris, 1998; Botosan 
and Stanford, 2005, Nichols and Street, 2007) nor firm-level profit (Piotroski, 2003 in 
Berger and Hann, 2007) can capture potential proprietary cost.  Both industry-level and 
firm-level profit information are publicly available to the market. Therefore, there is no 
proprietary cost of disclosing such information.  The authors argue that it is a segment’s 
performance relative to its industry that managers might try to hide by aggregation.  
However, they did not find evidence consistent with the proprietary cost hypothesis.  
 
Birt et al. (2006) studied the voluntary segment disclosures reported by a sample (N=825, 
for 2001, 2002 and 2003) of Australian companies and found that voluntary disclosures 
and companies in highly competitive industries are positively associated.  
 
Segment disclosure research uses publicly available financial statement information.  
However, data used by managers when making segment reporting choices are not 
available to researchers.  Bens et al. (2009) argue that this is a limitation of the previous 
research approach.  The authors used a detailed confidential database to analyse what 
motivates managers to withhold segment information.  The research result indicated that 
both agency and proprietary cost motivated multiple segment companies’ managers to 
aggregate operations.  On the other hand, the nondisclosure choice made by single 
segment companies’ managers was motivated only by proprietary costs but not agency 
cost.  
 
Ettredge et al. (2006) found that the introduction of SFAS 131 resulted in a greater cross-
segment variability of reported profit and therefore in an improved more transparent 
segment disclosure.  They also found that under the new regulation managers still can 
conceal competitively harmful segment profitability differences.  
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In a more recent study Wang et al. (2011) also studied cross-segment differences.  But 
instead of focusing on differences between segment profits they studied the differences 
between segment earnings growth rates.  They argue that the greater the differences 
between the segment earnings growth the more informative the segment disclosure.  
Although the managers have incentives to reveal differences in segment growth rates to 
capital providers they are also motivated to conceal these differences to reduce 
competitive harm and protect self-interest.  The authors found that proxies for proprietary 
costs (abnormal profitability and the Herfindahl industry concentration index) are 
negatively associated with the segment earnings growth variability.  Companies earning 
abnormally high profit, operating in highly concentrated industries tend to report smaller 
cross-segment earning differences.  On the other hand, companies which are protected by 
entry barriers (higher capital intensity, used as an inverse measure of proprietary costs) 
are more willing to reveal greater cross-segment earning differences.  The results also 
indicated that the introduction of SFAS 131 did not influence the managers’ ability to 
reveal / conceal cross-segment earning differences.  
 
Wang and Ettredge (2014) examined the determinants of the difference between 
aggregated segment earnings and corporate level income (Gap).  The authors found 
evidence that under SFAS 131 companies with high proprietary costs (proxied by the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) Index to measure the industry level concentration) tend to 
disclose more and larger Gaps. 
 
The majority of the studies analysed the disclosure practice of US companies under SFAS 
14 and SFAS 131.  However, Nichols and Street (2007) analysed a sample of 160 
companies using IASs between 1999 and 2002 to study whether managers withhold 
segment information under IAS 14R based on segment profitability.  The authors utilised 
Harris’s model (1998) with some modification which addressed differences between the 
samples (Harris: US firms, SFAS 14; Nichols and Street: multinational sample, IAS 14R).  
In line with Harris’s (1998) research results the model revealed a significant negative 
relationship between disclosure and company Return on Assets compared to global 
industry Return on Assets.  This result indicate that IAS 14R provided flexibility to 
managers to aggregate industry segments to protect excess return.  Furthermore, the 
results confirmed “that the larger the company, the greater the probability of disclosure”. 
(p64) 
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Pisano and Landriana (2012) studied the number of items disclosed for each operating 
segments by 124 listed, non-financial Italian companies in both 2008 (last use of IAS 
14R) and 2009 (first use of IFRS 8).  They found a positive relationship between the level 
of industry competition (proxied by HHI and four-firm concentration ratio) and segment 
disclosure (measured by the number of items disclosed for each operating segments and 
by the change in the number of items).  The results of Pisano and Landriana (2012) 
indicate that higher levels of industry competition (concentration) are associated with 
higher (lower) level of segment disclosure.  The authors also found that companies 
operating in less competitive industries decreased the number of items disclosed for each 
operating segments under IFRS 8.  Their findings are in line with the results of previous 
studies that companies tend to provide more (less) information in more (less) competitive 
industries.  
 
Proprietary costs and enterprise-wide reporting 
The majority of the competitive harm literature focuses on business (industry) segments.  
Tsakumis et al. (2006) extended the literature by studying the impact of competitive harm 
on firms’ geographic area disclosures.  To provide more relevant information for investors 
both IFRS 8 and SFAS 131 require the disclosure of the revenue from individual countries 
if material.  However, other financial statement users, such as competitors also benefit 
from the improved, more detailed disclosure.  Tsakumis et al. (2006) argue that firms 
might feel that the country-level disclosure could result in competitive harm.  Therefore, 
they may change their materiality level to minimise country-level disclosure.  The authors 
found (based on a sample of 115 Fortune 500 US firms’ disclosure practice under SFAS 
131) that competitive harm associated with country specific disclosures provides an 
incentive for managers to avoid making these disclosures.  Firms exposed to greater 
proprietary costs (proxied by the ratio of foreign revenues to total revenues) disclose a 
smaller percentage of their foreign operation by individual country.  The results also 
indicate that firms that have greater number of subsidiaries in foreign countries report a 
lower percentage of foreign revenues by country.  Furthermore, larger firms provide a 
higher percentage of their foreign revenues by individual country and the percentage of 
foreign revenues disclosed by individual country under SFAS 14 is positively associated 
with the percentage of foreign revenues disclosed by individual country under SFAS 131. 
 
Ellis et al. (2012) studied US companies’ entity-wide disclosure about their major 
customers (between 1976 and 2006).  The authors found that proprietary costs are 
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important factors in managements’ choices to disclose information about the company’s 
customers.  
 
In summary, the finding of previous studies indicate that the level / quality of segmental 
disclosure of companies is limited by the proprietary cost (competitive harm) associated 
with the disclosure of more detailed information to the market.  Additionally, there seems 
to be a positive relationship between the level of competition on the market and segmental 
information disclosed16 by the companies.  Thus, companies operating in more (less) 
competitive industries more likely to provide more (less) segmental information. (e.g. 
Hayes and Lundholm, 1996; Harris, 1998; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Birt et al., 2006; 
Pisano and Landriana, 2012)  
 
There are concerns regarding proprietary and/or agency cost issues resulting from 
increases in segment disclosure.  Research found evidence that the economic 
consequences of disclosure such as proprietary and/or agency costs influence managers’ 
segment decisions. (Berger and Hann, 2003; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Berger and 
Hann, 2007; Bens et al., 2009) Some results indicate that both proprietary and agency 
motives are important determinants of firms segment disclosure decisions. (Botosan et 
al., 2005; Bens et al., 2009; Wang and Ettredge, 2014; Wang et al., 2010)  However, 
Berger and Hann (2007) found mixed evidence with regard to the proprietary cost motive.  
Even the IASB’s PIR report on IFRS 8 and FAF’s PIR report on SFAS 131 indicate that 
some entities might use segment aggregation to reduce transparency either because of 
competitive harm concerns or because they try to hide their underperforming businesses. 
(IASB, 2013b; FAF, 2012) 
 
Companies used SFAS 14 and IAS 14R to hide important segment information. (Harris, 
1998; Givoly et al., 1999; Berger and Hann, 2002; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Ettredge 
et al., 2006; Berger and Hann, 2007; Hann and Lu, 2009; Wang et al., 2011)  However, 
the results also indicate that the introduction of IAS 14R and SFAS 131 did not stop 
managers concealing segment information. (Nichols and Street, 2007; Ettredge et al., 
2006; Tsakumis et al., 2006; Hope and Thomas, 2008; Wang et al., 2011; Wang and 
Ettredge, 2014; Ellis, et al., 2012)  
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2.4.5 Benefits and decision usefulness of segment disclosure 
 
Beside other forms (e.g. press releases, media, company’s website and presentations for 
analysts) companies provide information through their mandatory and audited financial 
reports to reduce information asymmetry. (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Bushman and Smith, 
2001)  This Section is a summary of the findings of the studies examining the usefulness 
/ benefits of segment information disclosed by firms in their annual reports.  
 
Predictive ability of segment disclosure 
Risk, growth, and profitability among diversified company’s segments can differ 
substantially.  This makes it difficult to forecast the consolidated numbers (e.g. sales, 
earnings) of diversified firms.  
 
Table 2.5 Studies on the predicative ability of segment disclosures 
Studied segments Researchers forecast models Financial analysts forecast 
accuracy 
Business segments Kinney, 1971 
Collins, 1976 
Emmanuel & Pick, 1980 
Silhan, 1982 & 1983 
Baldwin, 1984 
Swaminathan, 1991 
Lobo et al., 1998 
Mande & Ortman, 2002 
Birt and Shailer, 2011 
Geographic segments Roberts, 1989 
Balakrishnan et al., 1990 
Ahadiat, 1993 
Nichols et al., 1996 
Herrmann, 1996 
Behn et al., 2002 
Nichols et al, 1995 
Hope et al., 2006 
Kou & Hussain, 2007 
 
Empirical studies investigated the relationship between the firms’ disclosure practice and 
(1) the analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and (2) the number of analysts following the 
firm.  Research found evidence that segment-level disclosure is positively related to 
forecast accuracy (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Hope, 2003b) and negatively related to 
forecast dispersion among individual analysts’ forecasts (Lang and Lundholm, 1996).  In 
addition, firms with more informative disclosure practice have a larger analyst following. 
(Lang and Lundholm, 1996)  Additionally, Duru and Reeb (2002) found that greater level 
international diversification is associated with less accurate analyst earning forecast.  
Thus, as firms become more geographically diversified, making their earnings forecast 
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becomes more complex.  Therefore, the authors argue that more information on 
multinational firms’ international operations would help the market participant.  
 
Several empirical studies investigated whether segment disclosure and increased 
disaggregation of segments can be used to improve the accuracy of forecasts (researchers’ 
forecast models address the question whether financial statement users should be able to 
improve their forecast accuracy by using segment disclosures) or whether financial 
analysts forecast accuracy improved by using the segment information provided in 
financial reports (focus on the impacts of segment disclosure on the actual analyst forecast 
accuracy). (Table 2.5) 
 
Overall, researchers generally found that forecasts using segment data are more accurate 
than forecasts using consolidated data. (Kinney, 1971; Collins, 1976; Emmanuel and 
Pick, 1980; Silhan, 1983; Baldwin, 1984; Swaminathan, 1991; Lobo et al., 1998; Mande 
and Ortman, 2002; Birt and Shailer, 201117; Blanco et al., 2013; Roberts, 1989; 
Balakrishan et al., 1990; Ahadiat, 1993; Nichols et al., 1995; Nichols et al., 1996; 
Herrmann, 1996; Behn et al., 2002; Kou and Hussain, 2007)  Thus, segment disclosures 
provide useful information to financial statement users to forecast diversified companies 
future performance.  The research results indicate that segment sales should be disclosed, 
but the addition of segment earnings might lead to little or no additional improvement in 
forecast accuracy. (Kinney, 1971; Collins, 1976; Silhan, 1982; Emmanuel and Pick, 1980; 
Roberts, 1989; Behn, et al., 2002; Mande and Ortman, 2002; Hope et al., 2006)  
Furthermore, researchers found evidence that the predictive ability of geographic segment 
data increases when more disaggregated geographic segment information is provided. 
(Ahadiat, 1993; Herrmann, 1996, Behn et al., 2002)  
 
In brief, empirical studies provide evidence of the predictive gains (increased forecast 
accuracy, decreased forecast dispersion) of companies’ segment disclosures.  
 
Valuation of business and geographical diversification 
Several empirical studies used segment disclosures of firms to investigate the influence 
of international and / or industrial diversification on firm value.  Research has not reached 
a conclusion regarding the benefits of diversification.  Some studies found that 
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diversification is rewarded with high firm value (Bodnar and Weintrop, 1997; Bodnar et 
al., 2003; Olibe, 2006) whereas other studies found that firm value and diversification are 
negatively related (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Denis et al., 2002).  
Researchers argue (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Olibe, 2006) that the results are influenced by 
the measures used. Studies indicate, that investors’ valuation can depend on the operating 
environment (e.g. the probability of recovery of assets located in different jurisdictions, 
Olibe, 2006) and the size of the firm (Olibe, 2006; Bodnar et al., 2003), the industry(ies) 
in which the firm operates (Lang and Stulz, 1994) and it can vary over time (Bodnar et 
al., 2003; Aleksanyan and Danbolt, 2005).  
 
Although several studies used segment data, only a few of them focused directly on the 
importance and the impacts of the segment disclosures.  Different studies provided mixed 
evidence on the value-relevance of segment information.  However, most of the studies 
argue that segment disclosure has incremental value-relevance compared to firm-level 
accounting information (Bodnar and Weintrop, 1997; Wysocki, 1998; Thomas, 2000; 
Chen and Zhang, 2003; Bodnar et al., 2003; Bens and Monahan, 2004; Aleksanyan and 
Danbolt, 2005; Olibe and Kinney; 2007)  
 
Markets reaction to segment disclosure 
Researchers examined the benefits / usefulness of segment information by studying the 
stock markets reactions to segment disclosure.  
 
Research focused on the question whether and how disclosed financial information 
affects a firm’s cost of equity capital.  Disclosure theories and empirical research suggests 
that the higher level of information disclosure reduces the cost of equity capital by 
reducing information asymmetry (reduced information risk, estimation risk, transaction 
costs and enhanced stock market liquidity). (Dhaliwal, 1979; Dhaliwal et al., 1979; Elliott 
and Jacobson, 1994; Botosan, 1997; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Botosan and Plumlee, 
2002; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Botosan, 2006; Cheng et al., 2006; Lambert et al., 2007; 
Saini and Herrmann, 2011; Blanco et al., 2013)  
 
Empirical studies provide mixed evidence but they generally suggest that firms can 
influence their cost of equity capital by the precision, the quality, the quantity (Dhaliwal, 
1979; Dhaliwal et al., 1979; Botosan, 1997; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Botosan et al., 2004; Cheng et al., 2006; 
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Lambert et al., 2007; Saini and Herrmann, 2013; Blanco et al., 2013) and the timeliness 
(Botosan and Plumlee, 2002) of financial information disclosed to investors.  Although 
segment reporting is considered to be important, literature has not focused on the link 
between the cost of equity capital and the level of segment disclosure.  Only three of these 
studies tested and proved the theoretical negative relationship between the level of 
segment disclosure and the cost of equity capital. (Dhaliwal et al., 1979; Saini and 
Herrmann, 2013; Blanco et al., 2013)  
 
Several studies examined the impact of segment disclosures on different market measures 
(e.g. market risk, cumulative abnormal returns, share prices etc.).  In summary the results 
of the academic research generally suggest that segment data convey useful information 
to the market because it (1) reduces companies’ market riskiness (e.g. Kinney, 1972; 
Simonds and Collins, 1978; Collins and Simonds, 1979; Prodhan, 1986; Prodhan and 
Harris, 1989); (2) improves markets ability to predict future earnings (e.g Kochanek, 
1974; Collins, 1975; Ettredge et al., 2005) and (3) reduces the mispricing of foreign 
earnings (e.g. Hope et al., 2008a and 2008b). 
 
2.5 Identification of research gaps 
 
“Research on the impact of the IFRS 8 management approach is in its infancy because 
the standard was mandatory from 2009, thus, data are limited.” (Nichols et al., 2012, 
p302) 
“After the introduction of any new Standard it takes time to develop research on the effect 
of its applications” (IASB, 2013b, p15) 
 
Although some research reported on the advantages and disadvantages of the introduction 
of IFRS 8 and tried to answer the question whether the concerns of IFRS 8 application 
held merit “numerous questions about IFRS 8 application remain to be addressed by 
future research”. (Nichols, et al., 2013, p306)  
 
The researcher started to work on this research thesis in 2010. At that time literature on 
the application and impacts of IFRS 8 was scarce.  The research gaps and objectives have 
been identified at an early stage of this research.  The quotations in this section are used 
to reinforce (1) the research gaps identified and (2) the importance of the research 
objectives and questions of this study. 
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“Extending the views discussed above regarding comparability, issues relating to the role 
and effectiveness of auditors and market regulators in enforcing IFRS 8 compliance 
should be explored.  Research addressing compliance with segment disclosures is also 
relevant to overarching issues about use of a company’s business model or management 
intent in other IFRSs (…).” (Nichols et al., 2013, p306)  
 
IFRS 8 is the result of “the process of convergence and influence of US practice” 
(Crawford et al., 2013, p15) and “represents Anglo-American values” (Crawford et al., 
2013, p16).  The adoption of this “alien” American standard was subject to debate during 
the IASB’s due process and during the EU endorsement of the standard.  Although, critics 
raised concerns that the convergence of accounting rules should not be a simple copying 
activity the IASB introduced IFRS 8 and the standard is almost identical to its US 
counterpart, SFAS 131. (Section 2.2)  However, it can be argued that if companies do not 
comply with the accounting standards the convergence of these standards and the quality 
and comparability of the financial statements are questionable.  Therefore, research 
addresses compliance with the segmental reporting requirements of IFRS 8 and analyses 
the effect of different company characteristics (e.g. the role of auditor, the market 
competition, the organisational structure of the company etc.) on the level of compliance 
with the requirements of IFRS 8 can help to evaluate whether the application of IFRS 8 
rise any concerns about the quality and comparability of segmental disclosures under the 
new standard. (Chapter 5; RO1) 
 
“The IFRS 8 PIR reveals that the IASB has received mixed messages about disclosure of 
geographic information.  The Board noted that many entities provide geographic 
disclosure voluntarily or because they are managed on a geographic basis (IASB, 2013d).  
Investigation of incentives for, and consequences of, these disclosures would assist in 
resolving present uncertainties about the adequacy of IFRS 8 disclosures.” (Nichols, et 
al., 2013, pp303-304) 
 
It is in no doubt that geographic disclosures provide useful information on assessing 
internationally diversified companies’ risks and prospects and on making economic 
decisions. (Section 2.4.5)  The potential loss of geographic information as an impact of 
the new standard was one of the major concerns expressed during the discussion process 
of the standard. (Section 2.2)  The introduction of SFAS 131 in the US had some negative 
effect on the companies’ disclosures. (Section 2.4.2)  Additionally, during the PIR of 
IFRS 8 some investors questioned the usefulness of the geographic information disclosed 
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under IFRS 8. However, the IASB argues that there is no need for further actions. (Section 
6.1)  The question is whether the IASB was / is right or the concerns expressed before the 
introduction of IFRS 8 and during the PIR review of the standard can be justified.  
Additionally, research into the relationship between different company characteristics 
(proxies for the different disclosure theories; Section 2.3, Section 5.4 and Table 5.5 
Summary of the possible links between the different company characteristics and the 
theoretical framework of corporate disclosure) and the quality of the company’s 
geographic disclosures can provide an explanation to better understand the managements’ 
geographic disclosure policies, their incentives to conceal or reveal geographic 
information. (Chapter 6; RO2)  
 
“Research providing evidence to inform the Board’s work on a disclosure framework 
would be useful to the IASB. Additionally, research relevant to the IASB’s development 
of further guidance on materiality could contribute to promoting the quality of financial 
reporting and avoiding boilerplate, irrelevant disclosures.” (Nichols, et al., 2013, p303)  
“On a report to be delivered by 21 July 2018 by the Commission, it will have to be 
considered the possibility of introducing an obligation requiring large undertakings to 
produce, on an annual basis, a country-by-country report for each member state and third 
country in which they operate, containing information on profits made, taxes paid on 
profits and public subsidies received.  The report will take into account developments to 
increase transparency in financial reporting carried out at international level.” (Council 
of The European Union, 2014, p2) 
 
Geographic information disaggregated to country-level results in greater accountability 
and transparency and provides financial information that is more useful and relevant for 
financial statement user than information provided for geographic regions. (Section 2.4.2, 
Section 2.4.5 and Section 8.2)  However, IFRS 8 only requires the separate disclosure of 
the country of domicile and individually material countries and it does not provide 
guidance how to set the materiality level. (Section 2.2 and Section 7.2)  Insight into how 
the companies apply the materiality concept in defining their individually material 
countries can present relevant information to the IASB’s work on providing guidance on 
the application of the materiality concept. (Chapter 7; RO3)  Additionally, it is an ongoing 
issue whether MNCs should provide detailed CBCR in their financial statements.  The 
IASB decided not to undertake proactive work in this area and preparers argue that 
enough information and transparency is provided under the requirements of IFRS 8.  
However, legislative bodies in the US and EU had to bypass the IASB and issue CBCR 
related new regulations. (Section 8.1 and Section 8.2)  Therefore, an examination of the 
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companies’ country-level disclosures can help to address the question whether the 
companies’ geographic disclosures in their financial statements can provide enough 
transparency about their geographic activities.  It also can provide input to the EU’s policy 
making process. (Chapter 8; RO4) 
 
This chapter provided a summary of (1) the regulatory background of IFRS 8 (Section 
2.2), (2) the theoretical framework of corporate disclosures (Section 2.3) and (3) prior 
literature on segmental reporting (Section 2.4).  The chapter also attempted to highlight 
existing research gaps. (Section 2.5)  The purpose of the next chapters is to fill these gaps 
by answering the research questions presented in Chapter 3. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the research objectives and the research questions that need to be 
answered in order to help to fill the research gaps identified in Section 2.5.  
 
3.2 Research objectives and Research Questions 
 
First research objective (RO1) 
The first objective of the study is to assess the extent of compliance with the requirements 
of IFRS 8 and examine the factors that might provide some explanation why some 
companies have greater / lower compliance level than others.  In order to address this 
research objective the following specific research questions will be answered.  
 
RQ1.1: What is the level of compliance with the segmental reporting requirements of 
IFRS 8? 
RQ1.2: What company characteristics are associated with the extent of compliance with 
the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8?  
 
Second research objective (RO2) 
The research explores the impacts of IFRS 8 on the sample companies’ geographic 
disclosure and provides an understanding of the factors / reasons that might help to 
explain the diversity of the companies’ geographic disclosure practice.  The study seeks 
answers to the following research questions:  
 
RQ2.1: Did the quality of geographic disclosures improve under IFRS 8? 
RQ2.2: What company characteristics drive secrecy and support openness? 
 
Third research objective (RO3) 
The study aims to find out how the sample UK listed companies applied the materiality 
concept in defining their individually material countries and to understand the different 
company characteristics that might have an effect on the companies’ materiality decision.  
To achieve this research objective the following research questions have been formulated. 
 
RQ3.1: To what extent do companies disclose information about their materiality 
judgment (how and why is an individual country determined to be material)? 
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RQ3.2: What quantitative and qualitative thresholds are used to determine the materiality 
of individual countries? 
RQ3.3: What company characteristics affect the companies’ materiality decision? 
 
Fourth research objective (RO4) 
The study also explores whether the existing geographic disclosure requirements through 
IFRS 8 provide sufficient financial information and transparency for the different 
financial statement users.  The following research question is formed to address this 
research objective.  
 
RQ4.1: Can individual country disclosure under IFRS 8 provide sufficient information and 
transparency? 
 
3.3 Summary 
 
The objectives of the research and the research questions were introduced in this chapter.  
Chapter 4 introduces the research methodology and methods used in this study in order 
to achieve the research objectives and answer the research questions.  Chapter 5, Chapter 
6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 provide the answers to the research questions. (Table 1.1) 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the research methodology (Section 4.2) and methods 
(Section 4.3) followed in the study in order to achieve the research objectives and answer 
the research questions covered in Chapter 3.  This chapter also describes the sample and 
how the data were collected.  
 
4.2 Research methodology18  
 
Research “methodology is concerned with the process of doing research”. (Ryan et.al., 
2007, p36)  It has both ontological (researchers’ assumptions about the nature of the 
phenomenon’s reality) and epistemological (the nature of knowledge: what forms it takes 
and how it can be obtained and transmitted) dimensions. (Ryan et al., 2007) 
 
Hopper and Powell (1985) classified the previous accounting literature19 according to its 
principal theoretical and philosophical assumptions.  They divided accounting studies 
into three main categories: functional studies (mainstream accounting research), 
interpretive studies (interpretive research), and radical studies (critical accounting 
research).  The authors argue that much of accounting research can be placed in the most 
objective and regulatory region in the functional paradigm (→ objectivism). (Figure 4.1) 
 
Additionally, Chua (1986) argues that mainstream accounting thought, which is used by 
the majority of accounting researchers, is grounded in a set of common assumptions about 
knowledge and the empirical world (common beliefs, values, and techniques).  He also 
summarises these common assumptions.  Mainstream accounting researchers “claim that 
there is a world of objective reality that exists independently of human beings”. (p606)  
These researchers also believe in the empirical testing of their theory (hypothetico-
deductive model) and favour the use of quantitative methods of data analysis and 
collection which allow generalisation.  
 
                                                 
18 This Section is based on Section 3.1.1 Research Methodology of the researcher’s MsC dissertation (The 
impact of constructive operating lease capitalisation on financial statement figures and financial ratios of 
listed Hungarian companies, 2009, Heriot-Watt University) 
19 management accounting 
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This study belongs to the mainstream of accounting research and could be placed in the 
bottom-right quadrant of Hopper and Powell’s taxonomy of accounting research. (Figure 
4.1) 
 
Figure 4.1 Hopper and Powell’s taxonomy of accounting research 
 
Source: Ryan et.al., 2007, p40 
 
4.3 Research method 
 
Research methods are the particular techniques used in the research. Scientific method is 
widely accepted in mainstream accounting research.  This method is based on abstraction, 
reductionism and statistical methods. (Ryan et. al., 2007)  The scientific method was 
followed by the researcher.  
 
The following part of this chapter is a summary of the different statistical methods used 
in this study to examine the data and to analyse the relationship between different 
variables. 
 
Radical humanism
Subjectivism
Interpretive Functionalism
Regulation
Ho  nd Powell's taxonomy of accounting research
Radical change
Radical structuralism
Objectivism
Critical accounting 
research
Interpretive
 research
Mainstream accounting 
research
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4.3.1 Analysing categorical data 
 
Pearson’s chi-square was calculated to test whether there is any relationship between two 
categorical variables.  Additionally, Cramer’s V was also calculated to test the strength 
of association between two categorical variables.  The assumptions of these tests that 1) 
each item can only be in one cell of the contingency table and 2) the expected frequencies 
in each cell should be greater than 520 were checked.  In most of the cases the second 
assumption was violated which could result in a loss of statistical power of the tests.  
Although, the increase of the sample size might solve this problem (Field, 2009) this 
cannot be a solution in this case.  Therefore, the results of the tests and the basic data 
(frequencies and percentages in the contingency tables) always were analysed together. 
 
The statistical methods mentioned in this Section are used in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.  
 
4.3.2 Parametric tests & Regression 
 
Univariate Analysis 
Parametric independent t-tests and analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) were conducted 
to test the association between the dependent and the categorical independent variables. 
ANOVA is used to test for significant differences between two or more means.  However, 
when there are only two groups the independent t-test also can be used to compare the 
means of the groups.  In these cases the independent t-test and ANOVA F test will 
produce the same results21.  Both ANOVA F and independent-t were used in this study to 
test the null hypothesis (alternative hypothesis) that there is no difference in the means of 
the groups (that one or more of the differences between means is significant).  Where 
ANOVA indicates that more than two means are significantly different pair wise 
comparisons (post hoc tests: Hochberg`s GT2 test where population variances were equal 
and Games-Howell procedure where population variances were different) were also used 
to identify where the differences between the groups are. (Hunyadi and Vita, 1991; Field, 
2009) 
 
                                                 
20 in larger contingency tables at least 80% of the expected frequencies should be over 5% 
21 equal variances assumed 
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Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients (bivariate correlation) were calculated 
to measure the strength of the association between two continuous variables.  The Pearson 
correlation coefficient ranges from -1 to +1.  A correlation of +1 (-1) indicates that there 
is a perfect positive (negative) relationship between variables.  A value of 0 indicates no 
linear relationship. (Hunyadi and Vita, 1991; Field, 2009) 
 
The assumptions of parametric tests (normally distributed data; homogeneity of 
variances; the dependent variable measured at least at the interval level; independent 
observations; linear relationship between the variables in case of Pearson’s r) were 
checked. (Hunyadi and Vita, 1991; Field, 2009)  The dependent variable(s) are continuous 
variables and the independence of the data collected about the different FTSE350 
companies is highly likely.  
 
There are different options available to decide whether the distribution derives from 
normal distribution or not (e.g. histogram and normal curve, skewness and kurtosis, 
formal tests of normality).  In this study Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests 
were used.  However, if the sample size per groups is sufficiently large, then the sample 
distribution of any statistics will follow the normal distribution regardless the distribution 
of the variable in the population (Central Limit Theorem).  The practical question is that 
how large the sample should be.  It is suggested that sample size larger than 30 (Hunyadi 
and Vita, 1991; Field, 2009) is sufficiently large for symmetric or near symmetric (light-
tailed) distributions.  However, larger sample size is required for heavily-tailed 
distributions. (Hunyadi and Vita, 1991; Wilcox, 2012)  
 
Levene’s test was carried out to test the homogeneity of variances. Significant Levene’s 
test result indicates that the homogeneity of variances assumption is violated.  In these 
cases the more robust Brown-Forsythe F and Welch’s F were calculated instead of 
ANOVA F.  
 
Univariate analysis is used in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
Standard multiple regression models (forced entry) were used in this study.  Most of the 
included independent variables were based upon past theoretical and empirical research 
findings.  
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The multivariate linear regression model has several underlying assumptions which need 
to be assessed.  These assumptions are the following: 
1) the independent variables are categorical or quantitative and the dependent 
variable is “quantitative, continuous and unbounded” (Field, 2009, p220); 
2) the model is specified properly (all relevant variables included, irrelevant 
excluded); 
3) the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable is 
linear (linearity); 
4) the residuals in the model are normally distributed (normality); 
5) the residuals at each level of the independent variables are constants 
(homoscedasticity) and 
6) the residuals are independent from one another (no autocorrelation). 
 
Additionally, other issues such as outliers (influential cases) and highly correlated 
independent variables (multicollinearity) can cause problems in estimating the regression 
model.  Thus, they are of great concern to regression analysis. (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2007; Field, 2009) 
 
Outliers (univariate and multivariate) and influential cases were tested (graphical 
methods: histogram and normal curve, scatterplot; large residuals; Cook’s distance) 
because these observations can have a large influence on the overall model and on the 
estimated parameters.  Incorrect data entry could be one of the reasons for the presence 
of an outlier.  Therefore, data entry for outliers was double checked.  The detected outliers 
(univariate: e.g. Tesco, BP, Shell; multivariate: e.g. W H Smith, Babcock International 
Group etc.) are important members of the sample, therefore deleting them was not an 
option.  However, variable transformation (see later in Section 4.3.3) was considered to 
address their impact. 
 
Multicollinearity is present when two or more explanatory variables in a multiple 
regression model are highly (but not necessarily perfectly) correlated.  There is perfect 
multicollinearity when the correlation coefficient between two independent variables is 
equal to 1 or -1.  However, in practice perfect multicollinerarity is rare.  If the independent 
variables are highly correlated it is difficult to distinguish the individual effects of the 
variables.  In the best regression models independent variables correlate highly with the 
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dependent variable but they correlate minimally with each other.  From the several 
warning signals which can help to detect multicollinearity the correlation matrix and 
collinearity statistics (tolerances and Variance Inflation Factors, VIFs) were analysed.  
VIF greater (tolerance22 smaller) than 10 (0.1) indicates that multicollinearity effects are 
present.  When multicollinearity is detected its consequences need to be considered.  The 
greater the multicollinearity the greater the standard errors are (wider confidence intervals 
for coefficients, small t-statistics).  However, multicollinearity does not violate OLS 
(Ordinary Least Squares) and does not bias results. (Hunyadi and Vita, 1991; Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2007; Field, 2009) 
 
Table 4.1 Methods applied in the study to check the outliers, the multicollinearity 
and the assumptions of multivariate regression 
 
 
 
The assumptions of linearity, normality, homoscedasticity and the independence of 
residuals can be checked by graphical methods and by different statistics.  Most of these 
concentrate on the examination of the residuals. Table 4.1 is a summary of the methods 
applied in this study to check the outliers, the multicollinarity and the assumptions of the 
multivariate regression model. 
 
Multivariate analysis is used in Chapter 5.  
 
                                                 
22 reciprocal of VIF 
Linearity Normality Homoscedasticity No autocorrelation
Graphical methods
Standardised residuals against the standardised predicted
values. √ √
Histogram of the standardised residuals (with normal
curve) √
Normal probability plot (observed cumulated probability
against the expected cumulated probability) √
Partial plots (scatterplots of the residuals and each of the
the predictors) √ √
Bivariate scatterplots between pairs of variables √ √ √
Statistics
Skewness √
Kurtosis √
Kolmogorov-Smirnov & Shapiro-Wilk tests √
Cook`s distance √
Tolerance & VIF √
Durbin-Watson statistics √
Correlation matrix √
based on Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, Chapter 4 & 5 and Field, 2009, Chapter 7
Assumptions
Outliers MulticollinearityMethod
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4.3.3 Non-parametric tests & Rank Regression 
 
In most of the cases the normality assumption has been violated and not all of the related 
samples have large sample sizes.  Based on the Levene’s test the assumption of 
homogeneity of variances also has been violated in some cases.  Different graphical 
methods (e.g. histogram and normal curve, scatterplots) indicate the presence of outliers.  
Furthermore, the dependent variable in Chapter 5 is bounded and its value lies between 
0.00 - 100.00%.23  Using bounded dependent variable in an OLS regression model might 
result in predictions outside the acceptable range of the bounded dependent variable. 
(Cook, 1998; Field, 2009)  More importantly, the use of bounded dependent variable is a 
major violation of one of the underlying assumptions of the multivariate linear regression 
models, that the dependent variable is a continuous, unbounded variable. (see Section 5.6)  
 
Data transformation can help to deal with outliers and to correct violations of assumptions 
such as non-normality, non-linearity, heterogenity of variances and the use of bounded 
dependent variable in OLS.  Several kinds of transformations can be used to correct the 
problems (e.g. log, power, square root, reciprocal, reverse score transformations; 
dichotomising the variable; transform the variable after reflecting it). (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2007; Field, 2009)  Trial and error was used to decide which transformation is the 
best. 
 
However, when the assumptions of parametric tests are violated and none of the above 
mentioned transformations correct the basic problem non-parametric tests (do not rely on 
the assumption of normally distributed data) and robust methods (e.g. trimmed means, 
bootstrap) still can be used. (Field, 2009; Wilcox, 2012)  
 
Most of the non-parametric tests work on ranked data rather than the actual data.  There 
are many ways in which observations can be ranked (see e.g. in Conover and Iman, 1981; 
p124).  In this study the data were ranked from smallest to largest (from 1 to n). In case 
of ties average ranks were assigned.  
 
                                                 
23 The lower boundary means that the companies can have compliance index that is zero or greater than 
zero, but not less than zero. The upper boundary means that the companies can have compliance index that 
is 100.00% or less than 100.00%, but not more than 100.00%. 
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Beside the parametric independent t-test and ANOVA, their non-parametric alternatives 
the Mann-Whitney U test and Kruskal-Wallis test (respectively) were calculated on 
ranked data to test the relationship between the dependent and categorical independent 
variables. 
 
When assumptions (linearity, normal distribution) of the Pearson r are violated non-
parametric correlation measures (Spearman’s and Kendall’s correlation coefficient) can 
be calculated.  In this study both Spearman’s (Spearman’s rho) and Kendall’s rank 
correlation coefficients (Kendall`s tau) were calculated.24  
 
Several theoretical (e.g. Iman and Conover, 1979; Conover and Iman, 1981; Cooke, 1998) 
and empirical studies (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1993, 1996; Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace 
and Naser, 1995; Al-Ulis, 2006; Tsalavoutas, 2009) argue that rank transformation is a 
useful method in multiple regression as well.  After transforming both the dependent and 
independent variables the usual OLS regression analysis can be performed on the ranks.  
Iman and Conover (1979) argue that rank regression “can be used to great advantage on 
monotone data, whether that monotonicity be linear on non-linear”. (p509) Additionally, 
the use of normal-scores as an alternative to ranks is also recommended by Cooke (1998). 
 
However, the question is whether data transformation is necessary or / and helpful.  
Researchers mention several disadvantages of the data transformation such as (i) 
sometimes it is harder to interpret transformed variables (ii) data transformation changes 
the hypothesis being tested etc. (Field, 2009; Cooke, 1998).  On the other hand, 
transformation might improves analysis by reducing the impact of outliers, correcting the 
problems with assumptions (e.g. non-normality, bounded dependent variable) etc. 
Therefore, Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) recommend “to consider transformation of 
variables in all situation unless there is some reason not to”. (p86).  Furthermore, both 
Iman and Conover (1979) and Cooke (1998) emphasise the importance of the use of 
multiple approaches to ensure that the same conclusions can be reached across different 
methods.  Thus, “the results are not method-driven”. (Cooke, 1998; p210)  Therefore, 
both parametric and non-parametric tests were used and OLS regression models with 
unranked data, ranked data and normal-scores were estimated.  
 
                                                 
24 Kendall’s rank correlation coefficients were used in the compliance part of the study because of the 
relatively large number of tied ranks. 
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Non-parametric tests are used in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 and rank regression 
is used in Chapter 5.  
 
4.4 Sample Selection and Data collection 
 
The FTSE 350 constituents (as at 22 June 2011) listed on the London Stock Exchange 
represent the sample for this study.  In line with prior research (e.g. Street and Bryant, 
2000; Street and Gray, 2002; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Glaum and Street, 2003; 
Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004; Hodgdon et al., 2009; Aleksanyan and Danbolt, 2012; 
etc.) 113 financial companies (ICB25 Financials: Banks, Insurance, Financial Services) 
were excluded from the sample.  An additional 15 companies were excluded from the 
non-financial companies because of data unavailability (mainly because they were 
formed in or listed from 2010 or 2011).  Thus, the number of the companies in the sample 
is 222.  
 
However, the number of the companies analysed in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 
can be less. (see more in Section 5.5, Section 6.3 and Section 7.4; Appendix A. 1) 
 
Whilst the mandatory adoption of IFRS 8 is effective for financial years starting on or 
after 1 January 2009, a number of companies adopted the new standard earlier (starting 
from 31.12.2007)26.  Additionally, the companies reported their financial statement at 
different year-ends27.  Although, it can be argued that companies with later reporting date 
can learn from the disclosure practice of the earlier reporting companies (Tsalavoutas, 
2009), all first adoptions of IFRS 8 have been analysed regardless of the financial year-
end.  
 
Data needed for this study were (1) collected manually from Annual Reports downloaded 
from the company websites or (2) downloaded from OSIRIS database.  The collected data 
was transferred onto Microsoft Excel sheets containing company characteristics (e.g. size, 
industry, auditor etc.) and the requirements of IFRS 8.  The company reports are presented 
                                                 
25 Industry Classification Benchmark 
26 29 from the 200 
27 32 different year-end dates for the remaining 171 companies; 90 companies reported at 31.12.2009 and 
26 reported at 31.03.2010 
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in GBP, US dollar and Euro.  The year-end financial numbers were converted to GBP at 
year-end exchange rates28. 
 
4.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has outlined the researcher’s approach (Section 4.2) and the methods 
(Sections 4.3) used to reach the objectives of the study and answer the research questions.  
The sample, along with the type of data and data sources has been presented and discussed 
(Section 4.4). 
 
The research methods explained in this chapter are used in the following chapters. 
(Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) 
 
                                                 
28 Bank of England spot exchange rates 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Beside other quality measures such as the number of reported segments, the number of 
items reported by segments, the fineness of geographic information, the level of 
aggregation etc. compliance with the requirements of IFRS 8 also indicates the quality of 
the segment information provided by the companies.  Prior research documented 
considerable level of non-compliance with the requirements of IAS 14 and IAS 14R. 
(Table 5.2, Table 5.1)  Thus, what the companies actually do in practice is not always the 
same as what the companies should do.  To be useful for its users, financial information 
needs to be comparable.  However, if companies do not comply with the accounting 
standards the convergence of these standards and the quality and comparability of the 
financial statements are questionable.  
 
The “outsider” financing system, the strong equity market, legal protection of investors, 
enforcement of accounting rules, and the influence of the large and strong accounting 
profession and their professional bodies (Nobes, 1998; La Porta et al., 1997 and 1998; 
Brown and Tarca, 2005) makes the UK a suitable financial reporting environment to 
analyse compliance with the new segment reporting standard.  This background should 
result in high compliance with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8 with little variances 
between the compliance levels of the listed UK companies.  Any non-compliance should 
be analysed and explained.  
 
This part of the thesis is intended to examine the level of compliance of the FTSE 350 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange with the disclosure requirements of 
IFRS 8.  Additionally, the study investigates whether the segment disclosure practice of 
the companies is affected by selected company characteristics. In particular, Nichols et 
al. (2013) called for research studying the effectiveness of auditors in compliance with 
segmental disclosure requirements.  This part of the study (Chapter 5) is a respond to this 
call as well. 
 
The study contributes to the existing research on compliance, segmental disclosure and 
audit quality.  It provides evidence regarding the compliance of UK FTSE 350 companies 
with IFRS 8 requirements and it examines the factors influencing their compliance with 
the disclosure requirements of the new segmental reporting standard.  The current 
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research complements and extends prior compliance literature by investigating the impact 
of audit quality difference among the BIG 4 audit companies.  The research provides 
evidence of the importance of the preparer’s auditor choice on the IFRS compliance of 
the company.  The results also highlights that the BIG 4 audit companies should not be 
treated as homogenous group in accounting research.  
 
The remainder of this chapter organized as follows.  The next Section reviews prior 
research on compliance29 and on the determinants of compliance. (Section 5.2)  The data 
analysis and the results (Section 5.7) are presented after a brief discussion of the research 
objective and research questions (Section 5.3), hypothesis development (Section 5.4) and 
the sample selection (Section 5.5).  The final Section summarises and concludes the 
chapter (Section 5.8).  The compliance requirements of IFRS 8 are measured by 
compliance scores.  Their calculation is introduced in Section 5.6. 
 
5.2 Literature review of compliance studies 
 
The purpose of this Section is to place the study in context.  The literature on segmental 
reporting was discussed in Chapter 2.  This Section focuses primarily on research 
assessing (1) the extent of compliance with the requirements of the relevant segmental 
reporting standards (Section 5.2.1) and (2) the relationship between different company 
characteristics and the companies’ level of compliance (Section 5.2.2) 
 
5.2.1 Compliance with IASs / IFRSs 
 
Compliance with IASs / IFRSs has been a continuous issue in the last two decades.  Prior 
research assessed the extent of compliance with the disclosure requirements of IASs / 
IFRSs and documented considerable level of non-compliance in many areas. (Rahman, 
1998; Street et al., 1999; Tower et al., 1999; El-Gazzar et al., 1999; Street and Bryant, 
2000; Street and Gray, 2001 and 2002; Taplin et al., 2002; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; 
Glaum and Street, 2003; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003 and 2007; Chatham, 2004 and 
2008; Al-Ulis, 2006; Hodgdon et al., 2008; Fekete et al., 2008; Al-Jabri, 2008; Hodgdon, 
                                                 
29 with a focus on compliance with the segmental reporting requirements of IAS 14, IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
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et al., 2009; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Tsalavoutas, 2009 and 2011; Mechelli, 2009; 
Carlin and Finch, 2011; De Vicente Lama, 2011; Bova and Pereira, 2012). 
 
Despite obvious non-compliance with IAS requirements companies frequently noted full 
compliance with IASs in their annual reports.  Concerned about the problem the IASC 
tried to reduce non-compliance by requiring companies to report any material departure 
from IASs and not to report full compliance with IASs unless they comply with all the 
requirements of each applicable standard (IAS 1, 1.20). (IAS 1R, effective from 1998)  
Research results suggest that non-compliance remained a problem. (see later in this 
section)  Thus, what the companies actually do in practice (de facto) is not always the 
same as what the companies should do (de jure).  To be useful for its users financial 
information needs to be comparable.  However, if companies do not comply with the 
accounting standards the convergence of these standards may not result in the 
convergence of accounting practices.  Therefore, the quality and comparability of the 
financial statements remain a concern.  
 
Evidences from compliance studies revealed that the level of compliance varied across 
standards.  The results also indicated that the compliance with IASs / IFRSs requiring the 
disclosure of more proprietary information such as IAS14 and IAS 14R was usually below 
the average level of compliance. (Street and Bryant, 2000; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; 
Tsalavoutas, 2011) (Table 5.2)  Thus, segmental reporting is one of the areas of particular 
concern.  Rahman (1998) found that the overall level of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of IAS 14 was between 7% - 30% for the sample companies.  Later Taplin 
et al. (2002) found about the same compliance level when they used more strict 
compliance indices.  Both studies focused on the Asia-Pacific area.  Al-Shammari et al. 
(2008) investigated the Gulf Co-Operation Council member states and found less than 
50% compliance with IAS 14 and with IAS 14R.  Street and Bryant (2000) and Street and 
Gray (2001, 2002) studied international samples.  Although, they found a higher level of 
average compliance, their results still indicate considerable non-compliance with IAS 14.  
For example, Street and Bryant (2000) found that the average level of compliance in 
regard to geographic disclosures is only 60%.  Street and Gray (2001, 2002) found that 
the average level of compliance with IAS 14 was 76% for the whole sample.  However, 
the more detailed results revealed that the compliance by country varies within a wide 
range (from 66% in China to 85% in Germany). (Table 5.1)  
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Table 5.1 Compliance with mandatory segmental reporting disclosures in prior studies 
Author Country Year30  Standard Sample  Compliance level  
Rahman (1998) Korea 
Thailand 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
1997 IAS 14 90 Segment information checklist & overall compliance (Source: Rahman, 1998; table 5.2, p26): 
Industry segments described 30% 
Geographic segments described 7% 
Sales revenue of each of the segments, amount disclosed 30% 
Operating result of each of the segments, amount disclosed 30% 
Segment assets employed, amount disclosed 27% 
Intersegment sales, amount disclosed 11% 
Taplin et al. (2002) Australia 
Hong Kong 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Thailand 
1997 IAS 14 60 NDV compliance index (“... the proportion of occasions where 
a company complies with the IAS after items where compliance 
is not discernible or not applicable have been removed.” P180) 
Disclosure 97% 
Measurement 100% 
 
Combined 
 
99% 
DNI index (“... the proportion of items where compliance was 
discernible – either compliance or non-compliance was clear –
“ p181) 
Disclosure 36% 
Measurement 20% 
Combined 32% 
Street and Bryant (2000) International 1998 IAS 14 82 the average level of compliance in regard to geographic disclosures is 60% 
Street and Gray (2001 & 2002) International 1998 
 
IAS 14 279 the average level of compliance is 76%; 
compliance by country: China: 66%; Switzerland: 83%; Germany: 85%; France: 62%; Other 
Western Europe: 75% 
                                                 
30 examined 
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Table 5.1 (continued) Compliance with mandatory segmental reporting disclosures in prior studies 
Author Country Year  Standard Sample  Compliance level 
Street and Nichols, 2002 International 1999 IAS 14R 210 “The research ... identified several instances where it appears companies may not be fully complying 
with all the ... disclosure guidelines.” (p91) 
Compliance by segmentation (Source: Street and Nichols, 2002, table 6&9, p102 & 107): 
Required item Primary segment Secondary segment 
External revenue 100% 95% 
Profitability measure 99% - 
Assets 93% 65% 
Liabilities 76% - 
Capital addition 81% 57% 
Depreciation 77% - 
Other non-cash items 20% - 
Equity method income 26% - 
Prather-Kinsey & Meek (2004) International 1997-99 IAS 14R 120 “There is substantial non-compliance with IAS 14R.” (p229) 
Compliance by segmentation (Source: Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004, table 7, p225): 
Required item Primary segment Secondary segment 
External revenue 93% 70% 
Internal revenue 34% - 
Results 76% - 
Assets 74% 47% 
Liabilities 65% - 
Capital expenditures 54% 33% 
Depreciation and amortisation 68%  
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Table 5.1 (continued) Compliance with mandatory segmental reporting disclosures in prior studies 
Author Country Year  Standard Sample  Compliance level 
Al-Shammari et al. (2008) Gulf Co-
Operation 
Council 
Members 
1996-2002 IAS 14 
IAS 14R 
137 the average level of compliance for all years is less than 50% 
Tsalavoutas (2011) Greece 2004-05 IAS 14R 95 the average level of compliance is 71% 
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Research documented non-compliance with IAS 14.  Therefore, it is of interest to know 
whether modification to the standard (IAS 14R) resulted in a greater compliance.  Street 
and Nichols (2002) and Prather-Kinsey and Meek (2004) found that companies responded 
to the new regulatory requirements (increased number of segments, increased number of 
segment items) but the compliance with the standard remained a concern.  Both studies 
found that a substantial minority of the companies failed to disclose items required by 
IAS 14R.  In a more recent research Tsalavoutas (2009 and 2011) examined the 
compliance of Greek listed companies’ disclosure practice with mandatory disclosure 
requirements of selected IASs / IFRSs.  The author found approximately 80% overall 
level of compliance (for all the IASs / IFRSs he studied).  However, the average level of 
compliance with IAS 14R was lower, only 71% with considerable variation between the 
compliance levels of individual companies (25% standard deviation). (Table 5.2) 
 
Table 5.2 Average level of compliance with IAS / IFRS requirements 
Author(s) Average level of compliance 
with IAS 14 / IAS 14R 
Overall level of compliance 
Street & Bryant (2000) for geographic disclosure → 60% with US listing 84.3% 
without US listing 77.4% 
Street & Gray (2001, 
2002) 
 overall sample: 76% 
 China: 66% 
 Switzerland: 83% 
 France: 62% 
 Germany: 85% 
 Other W. Europe: 75% 
each IAS weighted equally 72% 
each item of disclosure 
weighted equally 
74% 
Al-Shammari et al. 
(2008) 
average for all years less than 50% 1996 68% 
2002 82% 
Tsalavoutas (2011) 71% approximately 80% 
 
More recently studies examined the effects of the introduction of IFRS 8 and found that 
relatively high percentage of the sample companies failed to provide the mandatory 
entity-wide disclosures. (e.g. Pardal and Morais, 2011; Crawford et al., 2012a; Nichols et 
al., 2012)  Crawford et al. (2012a) analysed the first adoption of IFRS 8 of a sample of 
150 UK listed companies and found that 85% (55%) of the sample companies provided 
revenue from external customers (non-current assets) by geographic areas.  Furthermore, 
only 38% of the companies disclosed information about their major customers. (Table 
5.3) 
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Studies analysing the items disclosed for each reportable segment under IFRS 8 also 
found that a proportion of the sample companies failed to provide segment profit / loss 
information. (e.g. Pisano and Landriana, 2012 → 6%31; Crawford et al., 2012a → 11%32) 
(Table 5.3) 
 
Table 5.3 Summary of the findings of studies on IFRS 8: Percentage of companies 
providing information on selected disclosure requirements of IFRS 8 
 
 
Compliance with IFRS 8 
Crawford 
et al., 
2012a 
Nichols et 
al., 2012 
Pisano & 
Landriana, 
2012 
Pardal & 
Morais, 
2011 
Mardini, 
2012 
Country UK inter- 
national 
Italy Spain Jordan 
Sample size 150 335 124 131 109 
      
Segment results 89.00 100.00 94.00 100.00 68.90 
Revenue from external 
customers by product and 
services 
80.00 17.00 - 13.70 - 
Revenue from external 
customers by geographic area 
85.00 77.00 - 55.00 - 
Non-current assets by 
geographic area 
53.00 67.00 - - - 
Information about major 
customer 
38.00 6.00 - 19.10 - 
 
5.2.2 Company characteristics and compliance 
 
Research found evidence that certain company characteristics are associated with the 
companies’ disclosure practice and their level of compliance with IASs / IFRSs.  The 
factors considered in prior studies include structure related (e.g. size, gearing), 
performance related (e.g. profitability, liquidity), and market related (e.g. industry type, 
auditor type) characteristics. (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Wallace et al., 1994; 
Wallace and Naser, 1995; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Tsalavoutas, 2009 and 2011)  
Findings of these studies indicate that size, cross listing, and being audited by one of the 
big international audit firms are significantly positively associated with the level of 
                                                 
31 percentage of non-disclosing companies = 100% - 94% = 6% 
32 percentage of non-disclosing companies = 100% - 89% = 11% 
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compliance.  However, research found mixed or no relationship between the level of 
compliance and other company characteristics (e.g. gearing, liquidity, profitability etc.). 
 
Pardal and Morais (2011) (for a sample of 99 non-financial Spanish companies) and 
Pisano and Landriana (2012) (for a sample of 124 listed non-financial Italian companies) 
analysed the effect of different company characteristics on the number of items disclosed 
by the companies for each operating segments.  The studies found that the bigger the 
company, the more item is disclosed for each operating segments.  Pardal and Morais 
(2011) calculated a disclosure index by dividing the total number of items reported by the 
total number of items required by IFRS 8 and treated it as a compliance score.  However, 
most of the items required by IFRS 8 for each operating segments only need to be 
disclosed if they are included in the calculation of segment profit / loss or are regularly 
reported to the CODM. (Table 2.1)  Therefore, many of the items listed in IFRS 8 become 
voluntary.  Thus, the disclosure score calculated by Pardal and Morais (2011) is rather a 
kind of quality measure than a measure of compliance.  
 
Prior research related to compliance with IASs / IFRSs (in general) and with IAS 14, IAS 
14R and IFRS 8 (in particular) have been reviewed in this Section.  Research provides 
evidences of non-compliance with the segmental reporting requirements of the relevant 
international standards.  Thus, although segment information disclosure is mandatory the 
actual segment information provided by the companies may vary considerably in quality.  
 
5.3 Research Objective and Research Questions 
 
The objective of this part of the thesis is (1) to carry out an empirical investigation into 
the extent of compliance with the requirements of IFRS 8 and (2) to attempt to explain 
varying levels of compliance amongst the sample of companies.  
 
Building on prior research and its findings (Section 5.2) this study assesses the 
compliance with IFRS 8 and examines the factors that may be associated with non-
compliance. (RO1) In order to address this research objective the following specific 
research questions will be answered. 
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RQ1.1: What is the level of compliance with the segmental reporting requirements of 
IFRS 8? 
RQ1.2: What company characteristics are associated with the extent of compliance with 
the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8?  
 
5.4 Hypothesis development 
 
The purpose of this Section is to develop hypotheses about the relationship between a 
company’s compliance with the requirements of IFRS 8 and its different company 
characteristics.  
 
Prior literature suggests that numerous factors could affect compliance with financial 
reporting requirements.  Different compliance studies used more than 20 different factors 
/ independent variables to explain the extent of compliance with the requirements of 
IFRSs. (Table 5.4)  Findings of these studies (Section 5.2) and the theories introduced 
earlier (Section 2.3) are used to develop hypotheses (stated in alternative form) to answer 
the research questions. (Section 5.3) 
 
Enforcement – The auditor  
Independent audit and audit quality plays an important role to influence companies to 
comply with the requirements of the accounting standards.  Wallace et al. (1994) argue 
“that the contents of annual reports and accounts are not only audited but also influenced 
by auditors” (p47) (Regulation and enforcement)  Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Watts 
and Zimmermann (1983) argued that large audit companies act as a mechanism to reduce 
agency cost by limiting managers’ opportunistic behaviour. (Agency theory)  The choice 
of an external auditor (e.g. BIG 4) can also signal to investors that the annual reports of 
the company are audited with high quality. (Signalling theory) Additionally, theories in 
audit quality (such as large auditors 1) have better reputation and brand name; 2) are more 
concerned to maintain their reputation; 3) have more to lose in the event of litigation; 4) 
have greater expertise and knowledge; 5) provide more monitoring and knowledge etc.) 
suggest that audit quality and therefore the quality of accounting information is positively 
associated with audit firms size.  Empirical studies used audit firm size (generally the 
dichotomous BIG N / non-BIG N variable) to capture audit quality (measured by e.g. 
financial restatements, abnormal accruals, disclosure quality, compliance) differences.  
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Consistent with the theoretical background empirical research shows that larger audit 
firms provide higher quality audit services. (Francis, 2004 and 2011; Carlin et al., 2007, 
2009, 2011)  Several studies analysed the effect of audit company choice on compliance 
with IFRS requirements by categorising audit firms whether an auditor was one of the big 
international audit companies or not.  Most of the studies found positive relationship 
between the size of auditor and the level of compliance with IAS requirements. (Abd-
Elsalam and Weetman, 2003 and 2007; Al-Jabri, 2008; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; 
Glaum & Street, 2003; Hodgdon et al., 2009; Prather-Kinsey & Meek, 2004; Street and 
Gray, 2001 and 2002; Tsalavoutas, 2009 and 2011)  Thus, being audited by big 
international audit firms is associated with increased level of compliance compared to 
being audited by smaller audit firms. Employing a big international audit company acts 
as one of the monitoring mechanisms and leads to a reduction of agency costs. 
(Tsalavoutas, 2009 and 2011) 
 
The audit market for listed companies is dominated by the BIG 4 audit companies. 
(Macey and Eisenberg, 2004; Francis, 2011; Carlin et al., 2007, 2009)  With the exception 
of 6 companies (3%), the sample companies of this study were audited by one of the BIG 
4 international audit firms (PWC, Deloitte, KPMG, Ernst & Young).  Therefore, this 
study will not compare the compliance of companies audited by one of the BIG 4 audit 
firms with the compliance of companies audited by other audit firms.  Managers may 
intentionally employ big international audit companies to signal the high quality audit. 
However, the assumption of the homogenous audit quality across the BIG N audit 
companies has been questioned in more recent audit quality research (e.g. Glaum and 
Street, 2003; Macey and Eisenber, 2004; Tilis, 2005; Carlin et al., 2007, 2009)  There is 
some evidence to support the hypothesis that the audit quality significantly varies among 
BIG N audit companies.  Glaum and Street (2003) found significant differences between 
the average compliance levels of the companies audited by the different BIG 5 audit 
companies.  However, they used one dichotomous variable in their regression model to 
differentiate between companies audited by one of the BIG 5 audit companies and 
companies audited by other audit companies.  Carlin et al. (2007) (Carlin et al, 2009) 
found that the identity of the audit companies seems to explain a substantial proportion 
of the variation in disclosure quality and compliance levels of the goodwill impairment 
testing disclosures made by a sample of 50 (34) Australian (Malaysian) listed companies 
audited by the BIG 4 audit companies.  They used descriptive statistics to investigate the 
audit quality difference across BIG 4 audit companies.  
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This study distinguishes between the BIG 4 audit service providers (with the code A, B, 
C and D to preserve aninomity) to examine the effect of auditor choice on the level of 
compliance with the requirements of IFRS 8.  
 
Ha1: The degree of compliance with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8 is 
associated with the identity of the auditor.  
 
Market competition 
Prior research (Hayes and Lundholm, 1996; Harris, 1998; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; 
Birt et al., 2006; Pisano and Landriana, 2012) suggests that a higher level of competition 
may decrease the competitive harm associated with segment disclosure.  Thus, companies 
operating in more competitive industries might have greater incentive to disclose more 
segmental information, because it is less likely that the disclosure will harm their 
competitive position in the market. (Proprietary theory)  “In fact, the release of additional 
information could benefit the firm by reducing information asymmetries between 
management and shareholders.” (Birt, et al., 2006, p236) (see more in Section 2.4.4) 
 
In this study two variables (the HHI and capital intensity) are used to proxy for market 
competition. The four-firm (eight-firm) concentration ratio and / or Herfindahl-
Hirschamn Index (HHI) (Equation 5.1) is widely used to proxy the level of industry 
competition. (Ettredge et al., 2002; Harris, 1998; Berger and Hann, 2002, 2003 and 2007; 
Ettredge et al., 2006; Birt et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2011; Wang and Ettredge, 2014; Bens 
et al., 2011) In this study the HHI index is used to proxy for market competition because 
it takes into account both the relative size and the distribution of the companies in a 
market.  The higher the index, the higher (lower) the concentration (competition) in the 
market. (Equation 5.1) 
 
(Equation 5.1) 
        
Where  
 si = sales of company i 
 S =  the sum of sales for all companies in the industry 
 = market share of company i 
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 n =  the number of companies in the industry 
 
Capital intensity is an indicator of the barriers to entry in a market.  Therefore, it can be 
used as a negative proxy for market competition. (Givoly et al., 1999; Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000; Wang et al., 2011)  The higher the capital intensity the more difficult 
to enter to the market.  Thus, the higher the capital intensity, the lower the market 
competition.  Capital intensity is measured as net PPE divided by total assets.  
 
This study measures the competition of each industry sector by using the HHI and the 
capital intensity of the companies. 
 
Ha2: The market competition is positively associated with the level of compliance 
with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8. 
 
Early adoption 
The study focused on the first adoption of the new segmental reporting requirements.  
There are companies within the sample that adopted the new standard earlier than its 
effective date.  Early adoption enables other companies to learn from the disclosure 
practice of the early adopters (Tsalavoutas, 2009 and 2011) and prepare themselves for 
the new requirements.  On the other hand, companies might choose to adopt the new 
standard earlier, because they were already prepared for the requirements of the new 
regulation (e.g. because of their US listing, because the managements approach did not 
result in change in reporting segments etc.).  Additionally, early adopter companies might 
choose to adopt an IFRS earlier than its effective date to (1) signal to the market and to 
the different stakeholders and (2) differentiate themselves from their competitors. 
(Signalling theory, Agency theory)  It is therefore of interest to examine whether the date 
of adoption (early adoption or not) of the new regulation has any effect on the level of 
compliance of the sample companies.  
 
Ha3: Early adoption is associated with the extent of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of IFRS 8. 
 
Size 
Large firms more likely have lower information production cost, sufficient resources and 
expertise to produce and provide more information. (Cooke, 1989; Ali et al., 2004)  
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Additionally, larger companies are more likely followed by financial analyst and 
investors and disclose more information to (1) reduce risk associated with information 
asymmetry, (2) increase investors’ and debt providers’ confidence, (3) reduce their cost 
of capital and (4) facilitate investors’ better resource allocation. (Botosan, 1997; Lang 
and Lundholm, 1996; Elliott and Jacokbson, 1994)  (Capital need theory)  However, 
political, agency, proprietary cost and competition (e.g. entry barriers) on the market also 
can motivate companies to disclose more (less) information (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978 and 1990; Dye, 1986; Hayes and Lundholm, 1996; 
Nagarajan and Sridhar, 1996) when complying with the requirements of accounting 
regulations.  Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argued that larger companies are more 
politically visible and are more likely to be subject to wealth transfer as a result of 
government intervention. Therefore, a company may disclose more, better quality 
information in order to reduce its political cost (Political cost theory) and enhance the 
company’s public image (Signalling theory).  The authors also argued that politicians and 
government bureaucrats who are responsible for regulating financial reporting are 
influenced by the likelihood of any future crisis blamed on them. (Regulation and 
enforcement)  It can be argued that detailed segmental information is more likely 
commercially harmful for smaller companies than for bigger ones. (Katselas et al., 2011; 
Bens et al., 2009) (Proprietary theory)  The larger the company it is more likely that it 
operates in more business and / or geographical areas.  The management of these 
companies might consider to provide more (less), better (worse) quality information about 
the company’s activities in different business and / or geographical areas to help financial 
statement users to evaluate risks and prospects related to these areas (to hide earning 
management between the different segments or conceal the management’ empire building 
plans). (Hann and Lu, 2009; Wang and Ettredge, 2014) (Agency theory)  Cooke (1998) 
argues that “the theoretical relationship is somewhat uncertain” (p218) between the 
company size and the level of disclosure.  
 
Several previous empirical studies found significant positive association between 
company size and the extent of compliance with IASs. (Al-Jabri, 2008; Al-Ulis, 2006; 
Bova and Pereira, 2012; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Chatham, 2004; De Vicente 
Lama et al., 2011; Fekete et al., 2008; Hodgdon et al., 2009; Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 
2004; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Tsalavoutas, 2009; Pisano and Landriana, 2012)  Thus, 
larger companies have higher level of IASs compliance than smaller companies.  On the 
other hand, Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003), Glaum and Street (2003), Street and 
Chapter 5: Compliance with the requirements of IFRS 8 
93 
Bryant (2000), Street and Gray (2001 and 2002), Taplin et al. (2002) and Tower et al. 
(1999) did not find significant relationship between company size and compliance level.  
 
Company size can be represented in different ways.  Prior compliance studies used total 
assets (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Taplin et al., 
2002; Tower et al., 1999; Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and Gray, 2001 and 2002; 
Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004; Al-Ulis, 2006; Al-Jabri, 2008; Bova and Pereira, 2012; 
Fekete et al., 2008; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; De Vicente Lama et al., 2011; Pisano and 
Landriana, 2012), total sales (Street and Gray, 2001 and 2002; Hodgdon et al., 2009; 
Fekete et al., 2008), market capitalisation (Chatham, 2004 and 2008; Street and Gray, 
2001 and 2002; Al-Jabri, 2008), firm value (Glaum and Street, 2003; Tsalavoutas, 2009) 
and number of employees (Chatham, 2004 and 2008) to proxy company size.  However, 
Cooke (1989, 1992) indicated that “there is no overwhelming theoretical reason to prefer 
one size variable to another”. (Cooke, 1992, p232)  
 
Additionally, Crawford et al. (2012a) found differences between the segmental disclosure 
practice of the FTSE 100 (bigger) and the FTSE 250 (smaller) companies.  The FTSE 
250 companies reported fewer reportable segments, they provided generally lower level 
entity-wide information and used fewer words in their segmental note. On the other hand 
FTSE 250 companies provided greater disclosure about major customers, and disclosed 
finer geographic information than the FTSE 100 companies. The authors argue that 
“some of this difference may be due to the fact that these are smaller companies” that 
“more likely to have major customers to meet the threshold requirements of IFRS 8” and 
they “may not operate in very many regions”. (p26) 
 
In this study total sales and FTSE 100 /250 listing status are used as the measure of 
company size.  Since prior research produced mixed results no direction is predicted 
regarding the effect of company size on the level of IFRS 8 compliance. 
 
Ha4: Company size is associated with the extent of compliance with the disclosure 
requirement of IFRS 8. 
 
The company’s capital structure - Gearing 
Gearing is considered as a proxy for the financial risk of a company.  Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) suggest that companies with higher gearing (more debt in their capital structure) 
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can be expected to have higher agency cost.  Thus, the more highly geared the company 
is, the greater the necessity to ensure an efficient monitoring (e.g. through the company’s 
annual reports) of the agency relationship between the managers and creditors and / or 
managers and shareholders. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Dumontier and Raffournier, 
1998)  Therefore, it is likely that highly geared companies provide more disclosure and 
comply with the requirements of IASs / IFRSs to mitigate agency cost and signal to the 
market (both to investors and debt providers) that they are capable to meet their 
obligations.  The opposite can also be argued.  Companies with low gearing depend on 
equity financing which might result in an increased interest in information from the 
current and potential shareholders. (e.g. Zarzeski, 1996)  Additionally, companies with 
higher level of gearing might provide less information in their annual reports in order to 
conceal the level of financial risk associated with the higher proportion of debt financing 
in the companies’ capital structure. (e.g. Hossain, 1999) (Agency theory and Signalling 
theory) 
 
Some empirical studies found that the level of compliance is associated with gearing 
(positive association: Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Al-Shammari et al., 2008; De 
Vicente Lama et al., 2011; Bova and Pereira, 2012; negative association: El-Gazzar et al., 
1999; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003 and 2007; Pisano and Landriana, 2012).  
However, other studies could not find any significant connection between the level of 
compliance and the company’s capital structure (Tower et al., 1999; Taplin et al., 2002; 
Al-Jabri, 2008; Fekete et al., 2008; Hodgdon et al., 2009; Tsalavoutas, 2011).  Thus, the 
relationship between the company’s capital structure and its level of disclosure / 
compliance is unclear.  However, both theoretical and empirical research indicate that 
there might be an association between them.  
 
Ha5: Gearing is associated with the extent of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of IFRS 8. 
 
Liquidity 
A company’s ability to meet its short-term financial obligations is one of the important 
factors in evaluating of a company by users of financial statements.  It can be argued that 
the better the liquidity position of the company, the greater the incentive to signal this 
condition to the market.  Thus, companies with higher liquidity ratio will present more 
disclosure and have greater compliance. (Signalling theory)  On the other hand, it may 
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also be argued that a company with a low liquidity ratio might be keen on disclosing 
additional information and complying with IASs / IFRSs in order (1) to reduce agency 
cost and (2) to inform its financial statement users (especially its shareholders and 
lenders) that necessary actions have been taken and the company is a going concern. 
(Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Al-Shammari et al., 2008) 
(Agency theory)  Thus, the direction of the relationship (if there is any) can be either 
positive or negative.  
 
Previous empirical studies also show inconsistent results regarding the relationship 
between the level of compliance with IASs / IFRSs and the company’s liquidity position. 
(Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2007; Al-Shammari et al., 
2008; Tsalavoutas, 2011)  
 
Ha6: The extent of compliance with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8 is 
associated with the company’s liquidity. 
 
Profitability 
Watts and Zimmermann (1986) argued that companies with larger profits could be more 
interested in disclosing more detailed information in their annual reports in order to 
reduce political cost and justify their performance. (Political cost theory)  It is also likely 
that these companies wish to signal to the different market participants 1) their success 
and strength (Signalling theory) and 2) that they act as a good agent (Agency theory).   
 
Profitability is a popular variable in compliance studies.  Several prior studies examined 
the association between profitability and level of compliance with IAS requirements.  
However, with the exception of a few studies the researchers found that profitability did 
not have significant effect on the companies’ level of compliance. (Table 5.4)  Taplin et 
al. (2002) found that the more profitable companies tend to have higher level compliance.  
On the other hand, Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Hodgdon et al. (2009) found negative 
association between profitability and IAS compliance.  Interestingly, De Vicente Lama 
et al. (2011) found both significant positive (for 2005) and significant negative (for 2008) 
association within one study.  The authors explained the different sign by the change in 
the economic situation in which the companies operated.  In summary, the empirical 
results suggest that the level of compliance with IAS could be either higher or lower, 
significant or not in relation to company profitability.   
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Table 5.4 Independent variables used in prior research investigating determinants 
of compliance with IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures 
Variable Significant Not significant 
+ - 
Size Al-Jabri, 2008;  
Al-Ulis, 2006;  
Bova & Pereira, 2012; 
Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; 
Chatham, 2004; 
De Vicente Lama et al., 2011; 
Fekete et al., 2008; 
Hodgdon et al., 2009; 
Prather-Kinsey & Meek, 2004; 
Al-Shammari et al., 2008 
Tsalavoutas, 2011;  
Pisano and Landiana, 2012 
 Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; 
Glaum & Street, 2003; 
Street & Bryant, 2000; 
Street & Gray, 2001, 2002; 
Taplin et al., 2002; 
Tower et al., 1999; 
Gearing / Leverage Bova & Pereira, 2012; 
Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; 
Al-Shammari et al., 2008 
De Vicente Lama et al., 2011; 
Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 
2003; 
Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 
2007; 
El-Gazzar et al., 1999; 
Pisano and Landriana, 2012 
Al-Jabri, 2008; 
Fekete, et al., 2008; 
Hodgdon et al., 2009; 
Taplin et al., 2002; 
Tower et al., 1999; 
Tsalavoutas, 2011; 
De Vicente Lama et al., 2011; 
Profitability De Vicente Lama et al., 2011; 
Taplin et al., 2002; 
Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; 
De Vicente Lama et al., 2011; 
Hodgdon et al., 2009; 
Pisano and Landriana, 2012 
 
Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; 
Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2007; 
Al-Jabri, 2008; 
Al-Ulis, 2006;  
Bova & Pereira, 2012; 
Fekete, et al., 2008; 
Glaum & Street, 2003; 
Street & Bryant, 2000; 
Street & Gray, 2001, 2002; 
Tower et al., 1999; 
Tsalavoutas, 2011; 
Industry Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003, 2007; Al-Jabri, 2008; 
Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Fekete, et al., 2008; 
Prather-Kinsey & Meek, 2004; Street & Gray, 2001, 2002; 
Taplin et al., 2002; Al-Shammari et al., 2008 
Tsalavoutas, 2011; 
Al-Ulis, 2006;  
De Vicente Lama et al., 2011; 
Glaum & Street, 2003; 
Street & Bryant, 2000; 
Tower et al., 1999; 
Al-Shammari et al., 2008 
Auditor type (big 
international) 
Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003 
and 2007; 
Al-Jabri, 2008; 
Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; 
Glaum & Street, 2003; 
Hodgdon et al., 2009; 
Prather-Kinsey & Meek, 2004; 
Street & Gray, 2001, 2002; 
Tsalavoutas, 2011; 
 Al-Ulis, 2006;  
De Vicente Lama et al., 2011; 
Fekete, et al., 2008; 
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Table 5.4 (continued) Independent variables used in prior research investigating 
determinants of compliance with IAS/IFRS mandatory disclosures 
Variable Significant Not significant 
+ - 
Liquidity Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 
2007; 
Tsalavoutas, 2011; 
Al-Shammari et al., 2008 
International visibility 
(internationality) 
El-Gazzar et al., 1999; 
Al-Shammari et al., 2008 
 Fekete, et al., 2008; 
Glaum & Street, 2003; 
Street & Gray, 2001, 2002; 
Compliance note (the 
company refers to IAS) 
Street & Gray, 2001, 2002; 
 
 Street & Bryant, 2000; 
 
Audit opinion (refers to 
compliance with IASs) 
Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 
2003; 
Chatham, 2004 & 2008 
Street & Bryant, 2000; 
 Street & Gray, 2001, 2002; 
 
Audit standards (auditor 
follows ISAs) 
Street & Bryant, 2000;  Abd-Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; 
Hodgdon et al., 2009; 
Street & Gray, 2001, 2002; 
Country of domicile Chatham, 2004 & 2008; Prather-Kinsey & Meek, 2004;  
Street & Gray, 2001, 2002; Taplin et al., 2002; 
Tower et al., 1999; Al-Shammari et al., 2008 
De Vicente Lama et al., 2011; 
Glaum & Street, 2003; 
 
Listing status El-Gazzar et al., 1999; 
Glaum & Street, 2003; 
Prather-Kinsey & Meek, 2004; 
Street & Bryant, 2000; 
Street & Gray, 2001, 2002; 
 Fekete, et al., 2008; 
Hodgdon et al., 2009; 
Level of foreign direct 
investment 
Al-Ulis, 2006;  
Bova & Pereira, 2012; 
 Al-Jabri, 2008; 
 
Capital intensity   Al-Jabri, 2008; 
Growth   Glaum & Street, 2003; 
Growth optins   Bova & Pereira, 2012; 
Glaum & Street, 2003; 
Ownership structure  Al-Ulis, 2006;  Al-Jabri, 2008; 
Glaum & Street, 2003; 
Al-Shammari et al., 2008; 
Age of maturity Al-Shammari et al., 2008;  Glaum & Street, 2003; 
Activity on capital market   Al-Ulis, 2006; 
Length of time to report Tower et al., 1999;  Taplin et al., 2002; 
International diversification   Hodgdon et al., 2009; 
Analyst following Chatham, 2004 & 2008   
Market competition Pisano and Landriana, 2012  Bova & Pereira, 2012; 
Enforcement  Al-Shammari et al., 2008;  
 
Prior studies used return on capital employed (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2007), net 
income / profit before tax to sale (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Tsalavoutas, 2009), 
return on equity (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and Gray, 
2001 and 2002; Hodgdon et al., 2009; Glaum and Street, 2003; Al-Jabri, 2008; Al-Ulis, 
2006; Fekete, et al., 2008) and return on total assets (Taplin et al., 2002; Tower et al., 
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1999; Al-Jabri, 2008; De Vicente Lama et al., 2011; Pisano and Landrina, 2012) to 
measure profitability.  
 
In this study, profitability measured by the return on shareholders’ funds.  No prediction 
regarding the direction of relationship is made because of the mixed findings of the 
previous studies. 
 
Ha7: Profitability is associated with the degree of compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of IFRS 8. 
 
Growth rate 
Glaum and Street (2003) argue that the higher a company’s growth rate the higher its 
future funding requirements.  These higher future funding requirements can encourage 
the company to provide financial statement users with better quality information (more 
disclosure, greater level of compliance etc.) (Capital need theory and Signalling theory)  
However, high growth rates could also be an indication of the empire building activity of 
the company’s management (greater company size → greater status, power, prestige etc.).  
Thus, it is also can be argued that companies with higher growth rate might have lower 
level of compliance and disclosure quality in their annual report to disguise the 
management’s empire building. (Hope and Thomas, 2008) (Agency theory) 
 
Glaum and Street (2003) did not find any significant relationship between the level of 
compliance and the company’s growth.  However, Hope and Thomas (2008) found that 
the nondisclosure of geographic earnings is associated with a significant increase in 
foreign sales growth.  They concluded, that this is an indication that the managers try to 
reduce the shareholder’s ability (by reducing the disclosure quality) to monitor their 
expanding international operations. (Agency theory)  Additionally, one can argue that this 
result could be due to proprietary reasons as well.  The preparers might try to reduce the 
competitors’ ability to monitor their activities in different geographic locations. 
(Proprietary cost theory) 
 
Ha8: The degree of compliance with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8 is 
associated with the company’s growth rate.  
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Organisational structure – Type of reporting segment 
Herrmann and Thomas (1997) analysed the potential impacts of the proposed SFAS 131 
and argued that the impact of the new regulation on the quality of geographic segment 
disclosure will depend on how companies define their operating segments under the 
management approach.  Companies decide operating segments other than geographic 
areas might provide limited geographic information under the new standard.  Empirical 
studies analysed the actual impact of SFAS 131 on the segmental disclosure practice of 
US companies.  However, these studies did not compare the disclosure practice of the 
companies with different type of reporting segments.  
 
In a more recent study Aleksanyan and Danbolt (2012) found that companies organised 
around business areas substantially increased the disclosure of single-country segments.  
Whereas, the proportion of single-country segments disclosed by companies organised 
around geographical areas decreased under IFRS 8.  The authors argue that companies 
organised around business areas can afford to disclose more single-country information 
because they do not have to disclose profitability measures for the disclosed countries.  
 
Thus, it can be argued that the companies might use their “organisational structure” to 
hide information from investors and debt providers (Agency theory), form competitors 
(Proprietary theory) and from governments and their agencies (Political cost theory). 
 
Thus, how management organises the entity (around products, services, geographic areas, 
combination of them) is expected to have an impact on the companies’ disclosure quality 
and on the level of their compliance. 
 
Ha9: The degree of compliance with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8 is 
associated with the type of reporting segment. 
 
Industry 
Different sectors of the economy might have different reporting practice (because of e.g. 
the different competition, political cost) and therefore different level of compliance. 
(Cooke, 1992; Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004) (Agency theory, Signalling theory, 
Political cost theory and Proprietary cost theory)   
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Different studies used different industry categorisation.  Many of them (Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman, 2003, 2007; Al-Jabri, 2008; Street and Bryant, 2000; Tsalavoutas, 2011) used 
a dichotomous variable to differentiate manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries.  
Others used more than one variable to introduce industry into their analysis.  For example 
Glaum and Street (2003) used 6 dummy variables for 7 industry classes. 
 
Previous studies show mixed results regarding the relationship between the level of 
compliance with IASs and industry.  Some of the studies indicate that companies in the 
manufacturing (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003, 2007; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; 
Tsalavoutas, 2011), IT and communication (Fekete et al., 2008; Street and Gray, 2001, 
2002), transportation (Street and Gray, 2001, 2002), capital equipment (Prather-Kinsey 
and Meek, 2004) industries tend to have higher level of IAS compliance.  However, Al-
Ulis (2006), Glaum and Street (2003), Street and Bryant (2000), Tower et al. (1999) and 
De Vicente Lama et al. (2011) did not find significant association between the compliance 
level and industry type.  
 
Despite the mixed empirical results it can be argued that the industry a company belongs 
to may affect the company’s level of compliance with the IFRS 8 requirements.  
 
Ha10:  The industry a company belongs to is associated with the level of 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8. 
 
Internationality – International visibility 
Companies with international activities have diverse stakeholder groups (e.g. different 
tax authorities and stock exchange regulators; more foreign suppliers, customers, finance 
providers, employees etc.) (Agency theory, Regulation and enforcement)  On the one 
hand we can assume that the more internationally visible the company, the greater the 
quality of the disclosure it provides to fulfil the information needs of its stakeholders.  For 
example, those companies whose shares are multiple listed face greater capital market 
exposure and pressure for disclosure compared to domestically listed companies. (Capital 
need theory)  On the other hand an internationally more visible company might prefer to 
hold back certain information (e.g. geographic details) to reduce its proprietary and / or 
political costs and / or hide some information from its shareholders and debt providers. 
(Agency theory, Proprietary theory and Political cost theory) 
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Prior research revealed significant association between listing status and compliance with 
IAS requirements.  El-Gazzar et al. (1999) and Prather-Kinsey and Meek (2004) found 
that the higher the number of stock exchanges on which the company listed the greater 
the level of compliance with IASs.  Furthermore, studies provide evidence that the level 
of compliance with IASs is significantly higher for companies cross listed in the US. 
(Street and Bryant, 2000; Glaum and Street, 2003; Street and Gray, 2001 and 2002) 
 
Cross listing / US listing could be one of the company characteristics in explaining the 
differences in the extent of compliance with IFRS 8.  Therefore, a higher level of 
compliance is expected for cross listed / US listed companies.  
 
In summary, it can be argued that the international visibility of the company affects the 
quality of the company’s disclosure.  Different measures (e.g. listing status, number of 
foreign subsidiaries, foreign sales, foreign assets etc.) can be used to proxy international 
visibility.  In this study the company’s international visibility is proxied by its listing 
status (cross listed / US listed), the number of foreign subsidiaries33 of the company and 
the number of foreign countries where the company has subsidiary34.  
 
Ha11: International visibility is associated with the degree of compliance with the 
disclosure requirements of IFRS 8. 
 
Other company characteristics 
Prior research found significant relationship between compliance level and (1) the type 
of audit standard used by the auditor (the auditor follows ISAs or not) (Street and Bryant, 
2000), (2) compliance with the IASs as stated (2a) in the audit report (Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman, 2003; Chatham, 2004 and 2008; Street and Bryant, 2000) and (2b) in the 
company’s compliance note (Street and Gray, 2001 and 2002). (Table 5.4)  However, 
these compliance factors are not considered in the current study because the audit reports 
of the sample companies stated that the companies followed IASs and the sample 
companies also made IAS compliance note.  With the exception of 1 company (where the 
auditor followed Australian Audit Standards) the auditors stated in their audit report that 
they followed ISAs during the audit.  
  
                                                 
33 principal subsidiaries reported in the company’s annual report 
34 in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 the % of foreign revenues is also used as a proxy 
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Table 5.5 Summary of the possible links between the different company characteristics35 and the theoretical framework of corporate 
disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 see Ha12 in Section 6.2 
Agency Signalling Capital need Proprietary Political cost Regulation
Ha1 Enforcement _ The auditor X X X
Ha2 Market competition X
Ha3 Early adoption X X X
Ha4 Size X X X X X X
Ha5 Gearing X X
Ha6 Liquidity X X
Ha7 Profitability X X X
Ha8 Growth rate X X X X
Ha9 Organisational structure X X X
Ha10 Industry X X X X
Ha11 International visibility X X X X X
Ha12 Tax avoidance X X
Theory
Hypothesis Factor
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Company characteristics are only included in this study if (1) the association between the 
company characteristic and the company’s compliance with IASs/IFRSs could be 
justified both theoretically and empirically36, (2) the company characteristics can be 
measured reliably and (3) data is available for the company characteristic to be measured.  
 
Table 5.5 attempts to summarise the possible links between the different company 
characteristics and the theoretical framework of corporate disclosure introduced in 
Section 2.3. 
 
This Section developed several hypotheses to answer the research questions (Section 5.3).  
The next Sections (5.6 and 5.7) discuss how these hypotheses are tested. Sample selection 
is introduced in Section 5.5.  
 
5.5 Sample selection 
 
From the 222 non-financial FTSE 350 companies (see more in Section 4.4) 22 were single 
segment companies which are only required to disclose entity-wide segmental 
information.  These companies were excluded from the sample companies analysed in 
this chapter.  Thus, the number of companies included in the final sample of this part of 
the study is 200. (Table 5.6) 
 
Table 5.6 Sample selection process 
FTSE350 (as at 22 June 2011) 350 
Less: ICB Financials (Banks, Insurance, Financial services) 113 
Less: Missing data 15 
Less: Single segment 22 
Sample size 200 
 
5.6 Dependent variable, the compliance score 
 
Prior studies used two methods for measuring compliance.  Earlier studies (e.g. El-Gazzar 
et al., 1999) treated compliance with IASs as a dichotomous variable (full compliance or 
                                                 
36Table 1.1 attempts to link the different company characteristics (hypotheses) used in this study with the 
theoretical framework of corporate disclosure introduced in Section 2.3 
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non-compliance).  Later researchers started to use more sophisticated methods.  Most of 
the studies used one or more, weighted or un-weighted self-constructed disclosure indices 
as a proxy of compliance.  Marston and Shrives (1991) argued that a well-constructed 
disclosure index can be used as a reliable measurement device for compliance with 
regulations. 
 
Disclosure (compliance) indices are used to measure the level of compliance with IFRS 
8 in this study as well.  Beside the primary compliance index (CI1) an alternative index 
(CI2) was developed for robustness test.  The indices are based on the disclosure index 
used by Cooke (1989, 1992), and later several other researchers (e.g. Street and Bryant, 
2000, Street and Gray 2001 and 2002; Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004; Al-Shammari et 
al., 2008; Fekete et al., 2008; Tsalavoutas, 2009 and 2011).  
 
A checklist, which includes 28 mandatory items required by IFRS 8, was developed.  To 
ensure the content validity of the checklist, it was compared with the checklists used by 
the BIG 4 auditors. (Deloitte, 2009; KPMG, 2009; Ernst & Young, 2009a, PWC, 2009)  
Additionally the validity and comprehensiveness of the research instrument was reviewed 
by an independent researcher.  On the checklist each required item is coded as disclosed 
(1), not disclosed (0), not applicable (NA) or not known (NK). (Appendix B.  1 and Figure 
5.1) 
 
One can argue that users of Financial Statements (especially Financial Analysts) use 
every information available for them no matter where and in what form the information 
is provided by the companies.  The checklist is based on items which should be disclosed 
in the audited Financial Statements and notes.  Therefore, any other part of the Annual 
Report was only considered if it was referred as the information source in the segmental 
notes.  
 
Measuring compliance with the requirements of IFRS 8 potentially involves a high level 
of subjectivity.  Since IFRS disclosure requirements do not need to be applied to 
immaterial information and materiality is an entity-specific aspect, it is not always 
obvious whether disclosure is omitted or whether the item is immaterial (irrelevant) and 
therefore there is no information to disclose. (Crawford et al., 2012a; Al-Shammari et al., 
2008; Tsalavoutas, 2011)  For example, if a company does not provide information about 
its (a) basis of accounting for transactions between reportable segments, (b) major 
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customers, (c) revenues attributed to foreign countries, (d) non-current assets located in 
foreign countries it might be simply because the company does not have anything material 
to disclose.  However, without access to additional company information, it is impossible 
to decide whether the non-disclosure of this information is due to non-compliance with 
the segment reporting requirements or the immateriality of these items.  The undisclosed 
immateriality is marked as “NK” on the checklist in this study.  
 
Figure 5.1 Coding process 
 
 
Most of the researchers preferred to calculate un-weighted index which gives the same 
importance to each disclosure item.  Un-weighted indices avoid the additional subjectivity 
of using weights to express the importance of the individual disclosure items.  “The 
unweighted approach concentrates on the extent of disclosure rather than on particular 
items.” (Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003, p71)  Therefore, the current research adopts 
an un-weighted approach for calculating the compliance index. 
 
Six un-weighted compliance indices were calculated for each company.  The primary 
compliance indices (CI1) exclude “NA” items but include “NK” items and treat them as 
non-compliance.  Thus, the companies were penalised for not providing enough 
information of the applicability of an item.  The secondary indices (CI2) exclude both 
“NA” and “NK” items.  Thus, the companies were not penalised if it was obvious that the 
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item did not apply to the company or if the company did not provide enough information 
to decide the applicability of the item. (Al-Shammari et al., 2008)  The indices measure 
the degree of compliance by reportable segments (R), by entity-wide disclosures (EWI), 
and (3) by all of the segment disclosures required by IFRS 8 (T). (Table 5.7, Appendix 
B.  6) 
 
Table 5.7 Compliance indices calculated in the study 
Type of segment disclosure Number of items 
required by IFRS 8 
Compliance index 
Primary Secondary 
Reportable segment 18 CI1_R CI2_R 
Entity-wide information 10 CI1_EWI CI2_EWI 
Total 28 CI1_T CI2_T 
 
The compliance indices were calculated by dividing the total number of required 
disclosures provided by the company by the number of applicable disclosures.  (Equation 
5.2), (Equation 5.3)  The indices were expressed as a percentage ranging from 0.00 to 
100.00. 
 
(Equation 5.2) 
      
 
(Equation 5.3) 
      
 
Where  
 D = 1 if the item is disclosed and 0 otherwise 
 R = the number of required items included in the check list 
 NA = the number of not applicable items for the company 
 NK = the number of not known items for the company 
 
To ensure the reliability of the research data a randomly selected 5% of the sample 
companies were double scored by a second researcher.  There were no significant 
differences between the compliance scores calculated by the researchers.  
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5.7 Results and Analysis 
 
The purpose of this Section is to report and analyse the results of the different statistical 
methods applied to study the sample companies’ compliance with the requirements of 
IFRS 8.  
 
5.7.1 Descriptive Results  
 
Table 5.8 reports frequency distribution and descriptive statistics for the primary (and 
secondary) compliance indices described in Section 5.6.  The compliance indices 
(Appendix B.  6, Table 5.8) pile-up on the right of the distribution (high compliance 
indices) with a heavy-tail on the left (low compliance indices).  72.50%37 (75.50%38) of 
the companies have compliance score higher than 90% for the reportable segments.  On 
the other hand, only less than a quarter (less than a half) of the companies achieved the 
same compliance level for the entity-wide information.  Half (almost 70.00%) of the 
companies have greater than 90% overall compliance level.  More than two (three) fifths 
of the companies provided all the necessary information about their reportable segments.  
However, only less than a quarter (half) of the sample companies fully complied with the 
entity-wide information requirements of the standard.  In most of the cases those 
companies who had 100.00% compliance index for the reportable segment (entity-wide) 
requirements of the standard did not provided all the entity-wide (reportable segments) 
information required by the standard.  Therefore, it is interesting to note that only 13.50% 
(34.50%) of the companies fully complied with all IFRS 8 requirements. 
 
The compliance level for reportable segments range from 29.41% (29.41%) to 100.00% 
(100.00%), with a relatively high average of 91.28% (92.99%).  However, the results 
reveal a considerable level of non-compliance with the entity-wide disclosure 
requirements of IFRS 8.  The extent of compliance with the entity-wide disclosure 
requirements range from 0.00% (0.00%) to 100.00% (100.00%), with an average of 
76.02% (85.91%).  These two parts of the disclosure requirements make the total 
compliance level range from 40.00% (42.86%) to 100.00% (100.00%), with an average 
of 86.91% (91.28%). (Table 5.8 and Table 5.10, Appendix B.  6) 
                                                 
37 primary compliance index 
38 secondary compliance index 
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Table 5.8 Compliance indices _ Frequency distribution and descriptive statistics 
 
 
Although, the results show a relatively high level of compliance on average, there is still 
substantial non-compliance especially with the entity-wide segmental information 
requirements of IFRS 8.  Furthermore, there is considerable variation between the 
compliance levels of individual companies (see high std. deviation in Table 5.8 and Table 
5.10, Appendix B.  6).  
 
The study focuses on the first year of the implementation of IFRS 8 (mandatory or 
voluntary early adoption).  The preparers’ and auditors’ unfamiliarity with the 
requirements of the new segment reporting standard can be one of the reasons for the 
relatively low level compliance with the entity-wide requirements of IFRS 8.  Crawford 
et al. (2012a) interviewed preparers, users and auditors of financial statements and found 
that the interviewees had difficulties understanding the concept of the new entity-wide 
disclosure requirements.  Many of them (even a number of the auditors) linked the entity-
wide disclosures required by IFRS 8 to the geographical information required by IAS 
14R. 
 
“..., there appeared to be a great deal of confusion among the respondents about the new 
category of entity-wide disclosures which were mandated under IFRS 8.  Users, in 
particular, either did not know what these were or equated them with geographic 
disclosures which had previously been provided as segment data under IAS 14R.  Even a 
number % number % number % number % number % number %
   0.00   -   10.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 4 2.00 4 2.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
10.01   -   20.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 2 1.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
20.01   -   30.00 1 0.50 1 0.50 0 0.00 1 0.50 0 0.00 0 0.00
30.01   -   40.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 10 5.00 3 1.50 1 0.50 0 0.00
40.01   -   50.00 3 1.50 1 0.50 9 4.50 8 4.00 2 1.00 3 1.50
50.01   -   60.00 3 1.50 5 2.50 22 11.00 3 1.50 4 2.00 2 1.00
60.01   -   70.00 10 5.00 7 3.50 18 9.00 17 8.50 14 7.00 6 3.00
70.01   -   80.00 10 5.00 12 6.00 36 18.00 17 8.50 19 9.50 16 8.00
80.01   -   90.00 28 14.00 23 11.50 52 26.00 49 24.50 60 30.00 36 18.00
90.01   - 100.00 145 72.50 151 75.50 47 23.50 98 49.00 100 50.00 137 68.50
Total 200 100.00 200 100.00 200 100.00 200.00 100.00 200 100.00 200 100.00
100.00 87 43.50 121 60.50 47 23.50 98 49.00 27 13.50 69 34.50
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Std. Deviation
100.00
20.05 11.82
91.28
95.00
42.86
100.00
57.14
10.80
86.91
90.24
40.00
100.00
60.0070.59
12.52 12.26
76.02
80.00
0.00
100.00
100.00
21.75
92.99
100.00
29.41
100.00
70.59
Compliance index %
%
94.12
29.41
100.00
90.00
0.00
100.00
91.28 85.91
Reportable segments Entity-wide information Segmental information (total)
CI1_R CI2_R CI1_EWI CI2_EWI CI1_T CI2_T
Company Company Company
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number of the auditors did not seem to recognise that this category of information 
included more than geographic disclosures.” (Crawford et al., 2012a, p7) 
 
However, previous research (e.g. Al-Shammari et al., 2008; Hodgdon et al., 2009) proved 
that compliance improved over time.  Thus, the compliance with the entity-wide 
requirements of the standard may increase as the preparers and auditors become more 
familiar with the requirement of the new standard.  
 
“IFRS 8 does not include an exemption from disclosure on the ground of commercial 
sensitivity.  Although, we are sympathetic to the specific concerns raised, we think that a 
competitive-harm exemption is inappropriate because it would provide a means for broad 
non-compliance with the Standard.” (IASB, 2013b, p19) 
 
After the IASB issued ED 8 for public comments (19 January 2006) some respondents 
argued that competitive harm might be associated with the introduction of the new 
segment disclosure standard.  The respondents to the ED 8 suggested that a competitive 
harm exemption should be in the standard.  However, IASB argued that such a general 
exemption would provide too much opportunity for non-compliance.  Later even the 
Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) called the companies “attention to the fact 
that no exemption is given from any aspect of IFRS 8 on the grounds that disclosure would 
be commercially prejudicial”. (FRRP, 2010, p2; Roberts, 2010)  Furthermore, Katselas 
et al. (2011) analysed the comment letters on the ED 8 and found that single segment 
firms were less likely to support IFRS 8.  The authors explained it with the potential 
release of proprietary information.  As part of the PIR of IFRS 8 the IASB carried out a 
public consultation through a Request for Information (RIF). (see more in Section 2.2)  
Many respondents expressed concerns about the disclosure of commercially harmful 
information once again.  Thus, it would not be surprising if beside the unfamiliarity with 
the new standard preparers intentionally kept back potentially harmful proprietary 
information from competitors.  
 
A more detailed analysis of the compliance scores reveals that the companies withhold 
some more sensitive entity-wide information. (Table 5.9, Appendix B.  2)  Only 48.50% 
of the sample companies disclosed information about the extent of their reliance on their 
major customers.  Both SFAS 131 and IFRS 8 require disclosures about major customers.  
However, research found that only a very low % of the companies discloses information 
about their major customers. (Crawford et al., 2012a; Nichols et al., 2012) (Table 5.3)  
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Many companies may not have major customers because of the services, products they 
provide (e.g. companies in consumer services, customer good industries such as 
transportation, hotel and restaurant services, retailers).  However, it is also likely that 
companies hold back information about their major customers because of the 
commercially sensitive nature of the information. (Table 5.9) 
 
Although 74.00% of the companies disclosed information about their external revenues 
attributed to the entity’s country of domicile and to all foreign countries only 55.00% of 
them disclosed information about their non-current assets in the same detail.  
Additionally, almost a quarter (24%) of the companies omitted to disclose the basis of 
how they attribute (e.g. based on the location of the customer, the origin, the destination, 
the service provided etc.) the external revenues to individual countries.  This makes it 
difficult to analyse the provided revenue information and questions its comparability. 
(Table 5.9) 
 
Table 5.9 Compliance with selected disclosure requirements of IFRS 8 (% of the 
companies) 
 
 
Revenue from external customers should be reported for each (group of) product and 
services “unless the necessary information is not available and the cost to develop it 
Reference
IFRS 8 Disclosure requirement YES NO NA NK Total NO + NK
8.34
An entity shall provide information about the extent of its
reliance on its major customers. 48.50 0.00 0.00 51.50 100.00 51.50
8.27 (a)
An entity shall disclose the basis of accounting for any
transactions between reportable segments . 38.00 12.50 22.00 27.50 100.00 40.00
8.33 (b)
An entity shall report the following geographical 
information unless the necessary information is not available 
and the cost to develop it would be excessive (in which case
that fact should be disclosed): (b) Non-current assets 
other than financial instruments, deferred tax assets, post-
employment benefit assets, and rights arising under insurance
contracts (i) located in the entity’s country of domicile and
(ii) located in all foreign countries in total in which the entity
holds assets. 55.00 23.50 8.50 13.00 100.00 36.50
8.33 (a)
An entity shall disclose the basis for attributing revenues
from external customers to individual countries 64.50 24.00 11.50 0.00 100.00 24.00
8.33 (a)
An entity shall report the following geographical 
information unless the necessary information is not available 
and the cost to develop it would be excessive (in which case
that fact should be disclosed):(a) Revenues from external
customers (i) attributed to the entity’s country of domicile
and (ii) attributed to all foreign countries in total from which
the entity derives revenues. 74.00 6.50 7.50 12.00 100.00 18.50
8.22 (b)
The entity shall disclose the types of products and
services from which each reportable segment generates
revenues. 86.00 14.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 14.00
8.32
An entity shall report the revenues from external
customer for each product and service, or each group of
similar product and services, unless the necessary
information is not available and the cost to develop it would
be excessive (in which case that fact shall be disclosed). 80.50 13.50 5.50 0.50 100.00 14.00
Disclosure 
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would be excessive, in which case that fact shall be disclosed” (IFRS 8, 8.32).  The 
companies can use the same excuse when they have difficulties to provide the revenues 
from external customers attributed to and non-current assets located in the company’s 
country of domicile and all foreign countries. (IFRS 8, 8.33)  14% (NO=13.50%, 
NK=0.50%) of the companies did not disclose their external revenue by (group of) 
products and services and 18.50% (NO=6.50%, NK=12.00%) of the companies did not 
disclose their external revenues attributed to the country of domicile and to all foreign 
country.  However, none of these companies disclosed that the company lacked the 
necessary information and its cost of production would have been excessive.  
Furthermore, 36.5% (NO=23.50%, NK=13.00%) of the companies did not disclose their 
non-current assets located in the country of domicile and in all foreign countries.  
However, only one company (Carnival) provided an excuse.  “Our ships move between 
geographic regions and, therefore, it is not meaningful to allocate these ship assets and 
ship capital expenditures to particular regions.” (Carnival, 2010 Financial Statements, 
p16) (Table 5.9) 
 
With two exceptions the companies are highly compliant with the reportable segment 
disclosure requirements of IFRS 8.  40.00% (NO=12.50%, NK=27.50%) of the 
companies did not mention the basis of accounting for the transactions between their 
reportable segments and 14.00% (NO=14.00%, NK=0.00%) of the companies did not 
provide information about the types of revenue generating products and services of the 
company’s reportable segments. (Table 5.9) 
 
“In prior years, costs were reported on a geographic basis.  Resources are now managed 
on a global basis and accordingly the Executive Committee does not measure costs or 
operating profit by segment and therefore the Group no longer reports operating profit 
by segment.” (Micro Focus International plc., Annual Reports and Accounts 2010, p51 
and p57) 
“Operating costs, financial income, financial expenses and income taxes in relation to 
the Agency, New Homes and the Other segment are managed on a centralised basis at a 
Righmove Group Limited level and as there are no internal measures of individual 
segment profitability relevant disclosures have been shown under the heading of Central 
...” (Rightmove plc, Annual Report 2009, p62) 
 
An additional interesting fact is that two companies (Micro Focus International plc, 
Rightmove plc) claimed that their costs and profit are managed on a corporate level.  
Therefore, they do not have segment cost and segment profit measures to disclose.  
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Table 5.10 Compliance indices (and std. deviations) by adoption, ICB industry sector, type of auditor, type of reporting segment, US 
and cross listing status and FTSE listing 
 
number % CI1_R CI2_R CI1_EWI CI2_EWI CI1_T CI2_T number % CI1_R CI2_R CI1_EWI CI2_EWI CI1_T CI2_T
FTSE Type of reporting segment
FTSE 100 69 34.50 92.15 92.90 76.86 87.26 87.23 91.13 Business 119 59.50 91.89 93.26 80.77 91.56 88.69 92.85
(12.59) (12.79) (17.97) (16.90) (11.50) (11.17) (12.73) (12.76) (20.19) (16.77) (11.88) (11.14)
FTSE 250 131 65.50 90.83 93.03 75.57 85.19 86.74 91.36 Geographic 38 19.00 88.58 91.35 65.06 74.54 81.94 87.51
(12.51) (12.01) (23.54) (21.55) (12.02) (10.65) (11.75) (11.13) (23.39) (22.92) (10.59) (9.62)
Total 200 100.00 91.28 92.99 76.02 85.91 86.91 91.28 Mixed 43 21.50 91.99 93.68 72.54 80.31 86.37 90.27
(12.52) (12.26) (21.75) (20.05) (11.82) (10.80) (12.57) (11.94) (20.66) (20.28) (11.62) (10.09)
Total 200 100.00 91.28 92.99 76.02 85.91 86.91 91.28
Adoption (12.52) (12.26) (21.75) (20.05) (11.82) (10.80)
Early adoption 29 14.50 95.82 97.78 74.47 88.87 89.52 95.19
(6.36) (5.63) (17.15) (14.74) (7.15) (6.41) Auditor
Not early adoption 171 85.50 90.51 92.17 76.28 85.41 86.47 90.62 Big4_A 63 31.50 92.42 94.06 71.22 80.28 86.64 91.05
(13.15) (12.89) (22.46) (20.81) (12.40) 11.26) (11.66) (11.38) (25.14) (25.51) (11.53) (10.61)
Total 200 100.00 91.28 92.99 76.02 85.91 86.91 91.28 Big4_B 53 26.50 86.45 88.85 72.61 83.39 82.49 87.45
(12.52) (12.26) (21.75) (20.05) (11.82) (10.80) (14.31) (14.37) (21.92) (20.77) (13.53) (12.51)
Big4_C 45 22.50 92.94 94.16 81.54 91.41 89.64 93.52
Industry (10.43) (9.84) (18.45) (12.59) (9.87) (7.93)
Basic Materials 22 11.00 86.46 87.31 77.50 88.40 83.07 86.95 Big4_D 33 16.50 96.25 97.31 83.07 93.25 92.29 96.04
(18.03) (18.52) (16.55) (13.06) (14.38) (14.07) (5.95) (5.33) (15.78) (11.11) (6.52) (5.87)
Consumer Services 49 24.50 92.52 94.52 68.43 80.15 85.94 91.19 BIG4 194 97.00 91.56 93.21 76.01 85.92 87.16 91.49
(12.24) (12.21) (24.19) (25.15) (12.64) (11.97) (11.88) (11.51) (21.86) (20.25) (11.54) (10.36)
Customer Goods 19 9.50 90.54 92.08 78.69 86.62 87.01 91.15 Not BIG4 6 3.00 82.31 85.67 76.19 85.56 78.69 84.57
(13.47) (13.07) (23.93) (24.01) (13.45) (11.87) (26.37) (28.24) (19.52) (12.77) (18.26) (21.09)
Health Care 6 3.00 91.42 94.44 88.73 92.62 90.25 93.65 Total 200 100.00 91.28 92.99 76.02 85.91 86.91 91.28
(11.60) (10.68) (12.27) (8.69) (11.32) (9.39) (12.52) (12.26) (21.75) (20.05) (11.82) (10.80)
Industrials 60 30.00 92.08 93.39 80.42 88.37 88.62 91.88
(11.24) (10.75) (17.75) (14.78) (10.71) (9.94) Listing
Oil & Gas 16 8.00 90.79 92.97 70.59 83.74 84.68 90.95 Cross listed 182 91.00 91.55 93.24 76.77 86.84 87.26 91.61
(9.35) (9.00) (23.62) (19.71) (9.08) (6.57) (12.33) (12.12) (20.36) (18.27) (11.29) (10.43)
Technology 15 7.50 89.06 92.40 83.62 91.33 87.73 92.43 Not cross listed 18 9.00 88.55 90.45 68.41 76.48 83.42 87.98
(14.11) (12.11) (20.92) (17.67) (12.85) (10.27) (14.45) (13.69) (32.47) (32.35) (16.19) (13.97)
Telecommunication 5 2.50 91.62 94.12 84.57 100.00 89.19 95.24 Total 200 100.00 91.28 92.99 76.02 85.91 86.91 91.28
(12.16) (13.15) (17.68) (0.00) (12.60) (10.65) (12.52) (12.26) (21.75) (20.05) (11.82) (10.80)
Utilities 8 4.00 97.59 97.59 60.71 74.55 89.30 93.81
(3.32) (3.32) (29.56) (32.16) (4.96) (5.06) US listing
Total 200 100.00 91.28 92.99 76.02 85.91 86.91 91.28 US listed 116 58.00 91.08 92.94 77.08 87.48 86.88 91.45
(12.52) (12.26) (21.75) (20.05) (11.82) (10.80) (12.18) (11.83) (19.78) (17.99) (11.30) (10.47)
Not US listed 84 42.00 91.56 93.05 74.54 83.74 86.95 91.04
(13.05) (12.89) (24.24) (22.52) (12.57) (11.31)
Total 200 100.00 91.28 92.99 76.02 85.91 86.91 91.28
(12.52) (12.26) (21.75) (20.05) (11.82) (10.80)
reportable segments entity wide information segmental information (total)
Compliance score (%) for
(Std. Deviation)
reportable segments entity wide information segmental information (total)
Company CompanyCompliance score (%) for
(Std. Deviation)
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Several items only need to be disclosed for each reportable segment if they are regularly 
provided to the CODM or the items are included in the calculation of segment profit or 
loss.  However, all companies must disclose a measure of profit or loss for each reportable 
segment. (IFRS 8, 8.23) 
 
The results in this Section indicate that there is a considerable variation between the 
individual companies’ level of compliance.  The next Section (Section 5.7.2) tests the 
hypotheses developed in Section 5.4 and investigates whether the differences in the level 
of compliance with the requirements of IFRS 8 are associated with different company 
characteristics.  
 
5.7.2 Determinants of compliance with the segmental reporting disclosure 
requirements 
 
This Section reports the results of different statistical methods which were used to test the 
relationship between the level of compliance with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8 
and several company characteristics.  
 
Univariate analysis 
Table 5.10 provides the main values of the compliance indices with reference to the 
different categorical company characteristics.  The information suggests that companies 
in the Health Care, Telecommunication and Utilities (Basic Materials and Oil & Gas) 
industry, audited by Big4_D and Big4_C (Not Big4 and Big4_B), cross listed and early 
adopters comply, on average, most (less) with the IFRS 8 disclosure requirements 
(CI1_T, CI2_T).  
 
Both the normality and the homogeneity of variances assumptions have been violated in 
many cases. However, it is argued that ANOVA can be robust to violation of its 
assumptions (Field, 2009; Wilcox, 2012) The results of ANOVAs (and independent t-
tests) indicate that the categorical variables FTSE 100 and US listing do not have 
significant effect on the dependent variables.  The industry type only has significant effect 
on the primary entity-wide compliance index (CI1_EWI).  The cross listing only has 
significant effect on the secondary entity-wide compliance index. (CI2_EWI)  While, the 
adoption categorical variable has significant effect on the compliance indices for 
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reportable segments (CI1_R, CI2_R) and on the secondary compliance index for the total 
segmental information (CI2_T).  The effect of the type of the reporting segment is 
significant on the entity-wide and total compliance indices (CI1_EWI, CI2_EWI, CI1_T 
and CI2_T) but not on the compliance indices for the reportable segments (CI1_R, 
CI2_R).  The results also indicate that the identity of auditor has significant effect on all 
compliance indices. (Table 5.11) 
 
For all six compliance indices follow-up pair wise comparisons found significant 
differences between the means of the different auditors39. 
 
The pair wise comparisons show some significant differences between the means of 
compliance indices for entity-wide information40 and for total segment information41  for 
companies with different reportable segments (geo, business, mixed).   
 
However, the pair wise comparisons did not find significant differences between the 
means for the different industry categories. 
 
The non-parametric tests results are in line with the results of ANOVAs (and independent 
t-tests) and indicate the same association between the dependent and categorical 
independent variables.  There are only two differences. While ANOVA (and independent 
t-tests) shows that the time of adoption (early adopter or not) has significant effect on 
both the primary and secondary compliance indices for reportable segment (CI1_R, 
CI2_R) and on the secondary index for the total segmental information (CI2_T) the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U test does not show significant effect on the primary 
compliance index for reportable segment (CI1_R).  Additionally, based on the results of 
the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test the cross listing does not have significant effect 
on any compliance indices. (Table 5.11) 
 
Product-moment correlation coefficients were calculated to investigate the relationship 
between the dependent variable(s) and the continuous variables. (Appendix B.  3)  The 
correlation coefficients indicate significant relationship between the compliance indices 
                                                 
39 CI1_R: Big4_D and Big4_B; CI2_R: Big4_D and Big4_B; CI1_EWI: Big4_D and Big4_A; CI2_EWI: 
Big4D and Big4_A, Big4_C and Big4_A; .CI1_T: Big4_D and Big4_B, Big4_B and Big4_C; CI2_T: 
Big4_D and Big4_B, Big4_B and Big4_C 
40 CI1_EWI: geo and business; CI2_EWI: business and geo, business and mixed 
41 CI1_T: geo and business; CI2_T: geo and business 
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and some continues variables (e.g. CI1_R and gearing, current ratio, growth rate r= -
0.199, r= -0.155, r= -0.169; CI2_R and gearing, growth rate, r= -0.181, r= -0.152; 
CI1_EWI and capital intensity, r= 0.195; CI2_EWI and capital intensity, r= -0.144).  
Additionally, some of the correlation coefficient indicates that multicollinarity might be 
a problem (e.g. significant correlation between independent variables: current ratio and 
gearing, r=0.622; number of subsidiaries in foreign countries and total sales, r=0.496; 
concentration and capital intensity, r= 0.222) in the regression models.  
 
Table 5.11 Parametric and non-parametric test results for categorical company 
characteristics 
 
 
Pearson correlation coefficient and Kendall’s tau was calculated on the ranked variables.  
They show exactly the same correlation between the ranked variables.  Both statistics 
indicate that the rank of primary compliance index for the reportable segments (CI1_R) 
is significantly correlated with the rank of gearing ratio.  This is the only significant 
correlation between the dependent variables and the independent variables.  However, 
most of the ranked independent variables are significantly correlated with other ranked 
independent variables. (Appendix B.  4 and Appendix B.  5) 
 
The results of the above mentioned tests can help to (1) test hypotheses (Section 5.4) and 
(2) optimally specify the variables in the regression model.  
Categorical variables / Test CI1_R CI2_R CI1_EWI CI2_EWI CI1_T CI2_T
Identity of the auditor
parametric test YES YES YES YES YES YES
non-parametric test YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry type
parametric test NO NO YES NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO YES NO NO NO
Early adoption
parametric test YES YES NO NO NO YES
non-parametric test NO YES NO NO NO YES
Cross listing
parametric test NO NO NO YES NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
US listing
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
Type of reportable segment
parametric test NO NO YES YES YES YES
non-parametric test NO NO YES YES YES YES
FTSE 100 / 250
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
Reportable segment Entity wide information Total
Significant effect on dependent variable
Compliance index
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Multivariate analysis 
The multivariate regression model 
Based on the hypotheses (Section 5.4) and the results mentioned earlier in this Section 
the following regression model has been defined:  
 
 
(Equation 5.4) 
 
 
 
Where 
   each sample company’s compliance index 
   the constant 
   regression coefficients 
 X1=  identity of the auditor _ Big4_A 
 X2=  identity of the auditor _ Big4_B 
 X3=  identity of the auditor _ Big4_C 
 X4=  identity of the auditor _ Not Big4 
 X5=  market concentration 
 X6=  capital intensity 
 X7=  early adoption 
 X8=  size 
 X9=  gearing 
 X10=  liquidity 
 X11=  profitability 
 X12=  type of reporting segments _ Business 
 X13=  type of reporting segments _ Mixed 
 X14=  international visibility 
 X15=  growth 
   error term. 
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Tests carried out on categorical variables (see earlier in this Section) indicate that the 
identity of the company’s auditor has significant effect on the compliance indices.  
Additionally, the time of adoption (early adoption or not) and the type of the reportable 
segments have significant effect on most of the compliance indices.  Therefore, they were 
built into the regression model.   
 
Categorical variables that have the same means across categories (US listing, Cross 
listing, FTSE 100, ICB industry type) have been added to the model (one by one) to test 
whether their addition can significantly improve the unranked regression model 
(significant increase in R2) and to make sure that none of the important categorical 
variables are left out from the model.  Change statistics are presented in Table 5.12.  These 
statistics are the differences made by introducing new independent variables to the model.  
None of the tested categorical variables improved significantly the regression model(s).  
Therefore, none of them were added to the independent variables of the regression model.  
 
Table 5.12 Change statistics for US listing, cross listing, adoption and industry type 
 
Std. Error
of the R Square F df1 df2 Sig. F 
estimate change change change
CI1_R Compliance index for reportable segments
1
Original model 0.431 0.186 0.119 11.753 0.186 2.795 15 184 0.001
Included new independent variable
US listing (1=US listed, 0 otherwise) 0.431 0.186 0.115 11.781 0.001 0.123 1 183 0.727
Cross listing  (1=cross listed, 0 otherwise) 0.439 0.193 0.122 11.733 0.007 1.614 1 183 0.206
FTSE 100 (1=FTSE 100 company, 0 otherwise) 0.431 0.186 0.115 11.783 0.000 0.070 1 183 0.792
Industry  (1=Industrials, 0 otherwise) 0.434 0.188 0.117 11.766 0.003 0.571 1 183 0.451
CI2_R Compliance index for reportable segments
Original model 0.403 0.162 0.094 11.669 0.162 2.374 15 184 0.004
Included new independent variable
US listing (1=US listed, 0 otherwise) 0.405 0.164 0.091 11.688 0.002 0.407 1 183 0.524
Cross listing  (1=cross listed, 0 otherwise) 0.410 0.168 0.096 11.657 0.006 1.375 1 183 0.243
FTSE 100 (1=FTSE 100 company, 0 otherwise) 0.404 0.163 0.090 11.696 0.001 0.158 1 183 0.691
Industry  (1=Industrials, 0 otherwise) 0.404 0.163 0.090 11.696 0.001 0.176 1 183 0.676
CI1_EWI Compliance index for entity wide information
Original model 0.485 0.235 0.173 19.781 0.235 3.766 15 184 0.000
Included new independent variable
US listing (1=US listed, 0 otherwise) 0.458 0.235 0.169 19.828 0.001 0.127 1 183 0.722
Cross listing  (1=cross listed, 0 otherwise) 0.492 0.242 0.176 19.741 0.007 1.743 1 183 0.188
FTSE 100 (1=FTSE 100 company, 0 otherwise) 0.487 0.237 0.171 19.804 0.002 0.577 1 183 0.449
Industry  (1=Industrials, 0 otherwise) 0.493 0.243 0.177 19.726 0.008 2.024 1 183 0.156
CI2_EWI Compliance index for entity wide information
Original model 0.504 0.254 0.193 18.008 0.254 4.175 15 184 0.000
Included new independent variable
US listing (1=US listed, 0 otherwise) 0.506 0.256 0.191 18.030 0.002 0.551 1 183 0.459
Cross listing  (1=cross listed, 0 otherwise) 0.516 0.266 0.202 17.906 0.012 3.106 1 183 0.080
FTSE 100 (1=FTSE 100 company, 0 otherwise) 0.504 0.254 0.189 18.051 0.001 0.127 1 183 0.722
Industry  (1=Industrials, 0 otherwise) 0.506 0.256 0.191 18.029 0.002 0.563 1 183 0.454
CI1_T Compliance index for segmental information _ total
Original model 0.441 0.194 0.129 11.034 0.194 2.956 15 184 0.000
Included new independent variable
US listing (1=US listed, 0 otherwise) 0.441 0.194 0.124 11.063 0.000 0.029 1 183 0.864
Cross listing  (1=cross listed, 0 otherwise) 0.451 0.203 0.133 11.003 0.009 2.052 1 183 0.154
FTSE 100 (1=FTSE 100 company, 0 otherwise) 0.441 0.194 0.124 11.064 0.000 0.003 1 183 0.953
Industry  (1=Industrials, 0 otherwise) 0.447 0.200 0.130 11.023 0.006 1.367 1 183 0.244
CI2_T Compliance index for segmental information _ total
Original model 0.421 0.177 0.110 10.189 0.177 2.644 15 184 0.001
Included new independent variable
US listing (1=US listed, 0 otherwise) 0.423 0.179 0.107 10.209 0.001 0.281 1 183 0.597
Cross listing  (1=cross listed, 0 otherwise) 0.431 0.186 0.115 10.165 0.008 1.894 1 183 0.170
FTSE 100 (1=FTSE 100 company, 0 otherwise) 0.423 0.179 0.107 10.205 0.002 0.430 1 183 0.513
Industry  (1=Industrials, 0 otherwise) 0.423 0.179 0.107 10.209 0.001 0.285 1 183 0.594
1
unranked data
R R Square Adj R Square
Change Statistics
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The description of the independent variables is presented in Table 5.13.  Descriptive 
statistics relating to these continuous variables are in Appendix B.  6. 
 
Table 5.13 Description of the independent variables, their measurement and the 
source of the information 
Independent variable Measurement Source of information 
Identity of the auditor42  Dichotomous variables Annual Report 
X1 Big4_D_A (1=Big4_A, 0 otherwise) 
X2 Big4_D_B (1=Big4_B, 0 otherwise) 
X3 Big4_D_C (1=Big4_C, 0 otherwise) 
X4 Big4_D_Not Big4 (1=Not Big4, 0 
otherwise) 
Market concentration X5 HHI (based on sales) OSIRIS 
Capital intensity X6 Total PPE to total Assets Annual Report 
Early adoption X7 Dichotomous variable (1=early adopter, 0 
otherwise) 
Annual Report 
Size X8 Total sales Annual Report 
Gearing X9 Shareholder’s funds to total liabilities OSIRIS 
Liquidity X10 Current ratio (Current Assets to Current 
Liabilities) 
OSIRIS 
Profitability X11 ROE (Net income to Shareholder’s funds) OSIRIS 
Type of reporting 
segment 
 Dichotomous variables Annual Report 
X12 Business (1=Business, 0 otherwise) 
X13 Mixed (1=Mixed, 0 otherwise) 
International visibility X14 Number of subsidiaries in foreign 
countries 
Annual Report 
Growth X15 Growth rate of sales revenue Annual Report 
 
Checking outliers, multicollinearity and assumptions of the multivariate regression 
model 
The Pearson correlation coefficients indicate that some of the independent variables are 
significantly correlated (e.g. HHI and capital intensity, HHI and total sales, total sales and 
number of subsidiaries in foreign countries, operating and current ratio).  Thus, 
correlation coefficients do suggest that there might be problems associated with 
multicollinearity. (Appendix B.  3)  The potential effect of multicollinearity was further 
assessed by using the VIF (tolerance). Collinearity is considered to be a problem if the 
VIFs (tolerances) exceed 10 (below 0.1).  Additionally, the regression may be biased if 
the average VIF is substantially greater than 1 or / and there is (are) tolerance(s) below 
0.2. (Field, 2009)  The maximum (minimum) VIF (tolerance) of the models was 2.184 
(0.458).  The highest average VIF of the models was 1.543. (Panel D in Appendix B.  7, 
Appendix B.  8, Appendix B.  9, Appendix B.  10, Appendix B.  11 and Appendix B.  12)  
Thus, collinearity is not a serious problem in the models.  
  
                                                 
42 where Big4_D had the highest level of compliance 
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Durbin-Watson statistics were very close to 2 for each model.  Thus, the residuals in the 
models are independent (no autocorrelation). (Panel B in Appendix B.  7, Appendix B.  
8, Appendix B.  9, Appendix B.  10, Appendix B.  11 and Appendix B.  12) 
 
Univariate outliers (“case with an extreme value on one variable”) (Tabachnik and 
Fidell, 2007, p73) were checked before running the multivariate regression.  Several 
outliers were spotted on the bivariate scatterplots.  Data entry was checked and the cases 
were kept in the sample.  Since extreme cases can have too much impact on the 
multivariate regression multivariate, outliers (“cases with an unusual combination of 
scores on two or more variables”) (Tabachnik and Fidell, 2007, p73) were also checked 
through the residual statistics.  Most of the standardised residuals were within ±2 (±2.5) 
range where 95% (99%) of the cases should be.  However, in the unranked models for 
same cases the standardised residuals were outside the ±3 range (e.g. W H Smith, 
Babcock International Group, PZ Cussons).  These cases were further investigated. None 
of the cases had Cooks distance greater than 1. (Panel E in Appendix B.  7, Appendix B.  
8, Appendix B.  9, Appendix B.  10, Appendix B.  11 and Appendix B.  12)  Thus, there 
were no influential cases in the multivariate regression models.  
 
The histogram and the normal probability curve of standardised residuals and the normal 
probability plots were checked to test the normality of residuals.  Additionally, skewness, 
kurtosis was calculated and formal normality tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov) were carried 
out.  The results indicate that in the unranked models normality assumption was violated. 
(Panel F – Panel H in Appendix B.  7, Appendix B.  8, Appendix B.  9, Appendix B.  10, 
Appendix B.  11 and Appendix B.  12) (see more in Section 4.3) 
 
The scatterplots of standardised residuals against the standardised predicted values do not 
indicate violation of the linearity assumption (the dots do not have e.g. curved shape).  
However, they indicate the presence of some heterocsedasticity in the unranked model of 
total and entity-wide compliance scores.  None of the partial plots for these models shows 
severe violation of the assumption of homoscedasticity. (Panel H in Appendix B.  7, 
Appendix B.  8, Appendix B.  9, Appendix B.  10, Appendix B.  11 and Appendix B.  12) 
 
Cook (1998) argues that “... given the assumptions of the classical linear regression 
model, a normally distributed dependent variable implies that the distribution of the 
errors will also be normal.  In most disclosure studies prediction is not the purpose of the 
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study, but rather an explanation of the variability of the disclosure scores is sought and 
so the problem is of limited importance.” (p215)  Additionally, Field (2009) suggest that 
“you can have a perfectly good model for your data (no outliers, influential cases, etc.) 
and you can use that model to draw conclusion about your sample, even if your 
assumptions are violated.  However, it’s much more interesting to generalize your 
regression model and this is where assumptions become important.  If they have been 
violated then you cannot generalize your findings beyond your sample.” (p251)  Because 
the sample (FTSE 350) is not representative of the IFRS user companies, it was not the 
intention of the researcher to generalise from the findings of the study anyway. 
 
Empirical findings 
Main outputs for the regression models are reported in Panel A, B and C in Appendix B.  
7, Appendix B.  8, Appendix B.  9, Appendix B.  10, Appendix B.  11 and Appendix B.  
12 and in Table 5.14.  The regression models are significant at the 5% level43, indicating 
that the models are well specified.  The unranked (ranked) models have greater R2(adj) 
and F values both for the total and entity-wide primary (secondary) compliance scores.  
This result suggests that the unranked (ranked) models predicts better the primary 
(secondary) compliance score than the ranked (unranked) models as they have more 
explanatory power.  R2(adj) indicates that the company characteristics in the regression 
model explain a reasonable part of the variability in the compliance score(s).  For 
example, 12.9% (17.3%) of the variability in the total (entity-wide) primary compliance 
score can be explained by the selected company characteristics in the unranked models.  
However, these numbers also indicate that there are other influencing factors not included 
in the model.44 (Panel B in Appendix B.  7, Appendix B.  8, Appendix B.  9, Appendix 
B.  10, Appendix B.  11 and Appendix B.  12)  
 
The level of total compliance is significantly higher for companies organised around 
different business areas compared to companies organised around geographical areas.  
However, the level of total compliance is significantly lower for companies being audited 
by Big4A, Big4B and NotBig4 auditors compared to the compliance of the companies 
                                                 
43 models for the primary and secondary compliance scores for the entity-wide requirements and for the 
segmental information (total) are significant at the 1% level 
44 Regression models in compliance studies usually have higher R2(ajd) values (e.g. Street and Bryant, 2000 
→ 0.3388, 0.4121; Street and Gray, 2002 → 0.2344 – 0.2849; Glaum and Street, 2003 → 0.296 – 0.306; 
Hodgdon et al., 2009 → 0.24, 0.25; Tsalavoutas, 2011 → 0.35 – 0.41). However, there are studies with 
relatively low R2(ajd) as well (e.g. Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004 → 0.09 – 0.14; Camfferman and Cooke, 
2002 → 0.193, 0.231). 
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audited by Big4D.  The identity of the auditor and the type of reporting segment 
significantly affects the company’s entity-wide compliance as well. (Appendix B.  7, 
Appendix B.  8, Appendix B.  9, Appendix B.  10, Appendix B.  11 and Appendix B.  12 
and Table 5.14) 
 
In this study market competition is proxied by HHI and capital intensity.  The results 
indicate that there is no significant association between the industry competition 
measured by the HHI index and the levels of compliance.  However, the results suggests 
that lower levels of capital intensity (lower entry barrier, higher levels of market 
competition) is associated with higher levels of entity-wide compliance.  Thus, companies 
in more (less) competitive environment reveal (hide) more commercially sensitive 
information. (Appendix B.  7, Appendix B.  8, Appendix B.  9, Appendix B.  10, Appendix 
B.  11 and Appendix B.  12 and Table 5.14) 
 
Since the results indicate that the way the company is organised significantly affects the 
companies’ compliance with the entity-wide requirements of IFRS 8, a further analysis 
was carried out.  Table 5.15 shows the companies’ compliance with the entity-wide 
requirements of IFRS 8 by the type of their reporting segments.  It is clear from the details 
that the levels of non-compliance is much higher for companies organised around 
geographic areas than for companies organised around business areas. (Table 5.15) (see 
possible explanation in Section 5.4 and 5.7.1) 
 
Robustness Tests 
This part of the Section discusses the sensitivity tests conducted to test the robustness of 
the results.  
 
Although the regression models control for 15 independent variables there is always the 
question whether omitted variable(s) can be responsible for the findings and can further 
explain the companies’ compliance with IFRS 8.  Therefore, additional company 
characteristics, such as US listing, cross listing, FTSE 100/250, industry type, were added 
to the original model.  None of these additional variables improved the regression model 
significantly. (Table 5.1245)  
 
                                                 
45 results of the estimations for the unranked models 
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Table 5.14 Results of the regression models  
 
 
 
 
  
Compliance index
Constant &
Independent variables unranked ranked NS1 unranked ranked NS unranked ranked NS unranked ranked NS unranked ranked NS unranked ranked NS
Constant YES(+)*** YES(+)*** NO YES(+)*** YES(+)*** NO YES(+)*** YES(+)*** NO YES(+)*** YES(+)*** NO YES(+)*** YES(+)*** NO YES(+)*** YES(+)*** NO
Identity of the auditor
Big4_D_A NO YES (-)* YES (-)* NO NO NO YES (-)*** YES (-)** YES (-)** YES (-)*** YES (-)*** YES (-)*** YES (-)** YES (-)** YES (-)** YES (-)** YES (-)** YES (-)**
Big4_D_B YES (-)*** YES (-)*** YES (-)*** YES (-)*** YES (-)*** YES (-)*** YES (-)** YES (-)** YES (-)** YES (-)** YES (-)** YES (-)** YES (-)*** YES (-)*** YES (-)*** YES (-)*** YES (-)*** YES (-)***
Big4_D_C NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Big4_D_Not Big4 YES (-)** YES (-)** YES (-)** YES (-)* NO NO YES (-)** YES (-)* NO YES (-)** YES (-)*** YES (-)** YES (-)*** YES (-)*** YES (-)*** YES (-)** YES (-)*** YES (-)***
Market concentration NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Capital intensity NO NO NO NO NO NO YES (-)*** YES (-)** YES (-)** YES (-)** YES (-)* YES (-)** YES (-)* YES (-)* NO NO YES (-)* NO
Early adoption YES (+)** YES (+)** YES (+)** YES (+)** YES (+)** YES (+)** NO YES (-)* NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES (+)** YES (+)* YES (+)**
Size NO NO NO NO NO NO YES (-)** NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Gearing NO YES (-)* NO NO NO NO YES (+)** NO NO YES (+)* NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Liquidity NO NO NO NO NO NO YES (-)** NO NO NO NO NO YES (-)* NO NO NO NO NO
Profitability NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES (-)** YES (-)** NO NO YES (-)* NO NO NO NO NO NO
Type of reportable segments
Business NO NO NO NO NO NO YES (+)*** YES (+)*** YES (+)*** YES (+)*** YES (+)*** YES (+)*** YES (+)*** YES (+)*** YES (+)*** YES (+)** YES (+)*** YES (+)***
Mixed NO NO NO NO NO NO YES (+)** NO NO YES (+)* NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
International visibility YES (-)* NO NO YES (-)* NO NO YES (+)** NO NO YES (+)* NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Growth YES (-)** NO NO YES (-)* NO NO NO YES (+)** YES (+)** YES (+)* YES (+)* YES (+)* NO NO NO NO NO NO
1
normal score
*
significant at the 0.10 level (two-tailed)
**
significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed)
***
significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed)
CI2_T
Significant effect on dependent variable (direction) Significant effect on dependent variable (direction)
Reportable segment Entity wide information Segmental information _ total
Significant effect on dependent variable (direction)
CI1_R CI2_R CI1_EWI CI2_EWI CI1_T
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Table 5.15 Compliance with the entity-wide requirements of IFRS 8 by reportable segment type (% of the companies) 
 
 
 
 
YES NO NA NK Total NO+NK YES NO NA NK Total NO+NK YES NO NA NK Total NO+NK
8.32
An entity shall report the revenues from external
customer for each product and service, or each
group of similar product and services, unless the
necessary information is not available and the cost
to develop it would be excessive (in which case that
fact shall be disclosed). 91.60 7.60 0.80 0.00 100.00 7.60 52.63 21.05 23.72 2.60 100.00 23.65 74.42 23.25 2.33 0.00 100.00 23.25
8.33 (a)
An entity shall report the following geographical 
information unless the necessary information is not
available and the cost to develop it would be
excessive (in which case that fact should be
disclosed): (a) Revenues from external customers  (i) 
attributed to the entity’s country of domicile and (ii)
attributed to all foreign countries in total from which
the entity derives revenues. 73.95 3.36 12.60 10.09 100.00 13.45 65.79 10.49 0.00 23.72 100.00 34.21 81.39 11.63 6.98 0.00 100.00 11.63
8.33 (a)
An entity shall disclose the basis for attributing
revenues from external customers to individual
countries 68.91 15.13 15.96 0.00 100.00 15.13 47.37 50.03 2.60 0.00 100.00 50.03 67.44 25.58 6.98 0.00 100.00 25.58
8.33 (b)
An entity shall report the following geographical 
information unless the necessary information is not
available and the cost to develop it would be
excessive (in which case that fact should be
disclosed): (b) Non-current assets other than
financial instruments, deferred tax assets, post-
employment benefit assets, and rights arising under
insurance contracts (i) located in the entity’s country 
of domicile and (ii) located in all foreign countries in
total in which the entity holds assets. 58.78 10.92 14.34 15.96 100.00 26.88 50.03 39.48 0.00 10.49 100.00 49.97 48.84 44.18 6.98 0.00 100.00 44.18
8.34
An entity shall provide information about the extent
of its reliance on its major customers 51.26 0.00 0.00 48.74 100.00 48.74 42.11 0.00 0.00 57.89 100.00 57.89 46.51 0.00 0.00 53.49 100.00 53.49
Ref IFRS 8
BUSINESS GEO MIXED
Reportable segment
Disclosure requirement
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Alternative proxies could be used both for the dependent and for some of the independent 
variables.  The level of compliance (dependent variable) is measured by two compliance 
indices (primary and secondary compliance index) as explained in Section 5.6)  Instead 
of using HHI the market concentration could be measured by the four (or eight) – firm 
concentration ratio.  Besides total sales the value of the company’s total assets, the 
company’s market capitalisation or the number of employees can also be used as a proxy 
for the company’s size.  Net income to sales could be just as good proxy for profitability 
as ROE.  The original proxies were replaced by the alternative proxies one-by-one and 
the regression models were re-ran.46  
 
OLS regression models were calculated with unranked and ranked data (Section 4.3) to 
test that the results are not method-driven.47  
 
Although differences exists between these models in respect of the explanatory power of 
the models and the significance of some of the independent variables, on the whole, the 
results reported in Table 5.16 Summary of the results are not especially sensitive (1) to 
the use of alternative dependent and independent variables and / or (2) to whether these 
variables are transformed (ranks, normal-scores) or not. (Section 4.3) 
 
In summary, the robustness tests confirmed the key findings summarised in Table 5.16. 
 
5.8 Discussion and conclusion 
 
The extent of compliance with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8 and the effect of 
different company characteristics on compliance was examined in Section 5.7.  The level 
of compliance was measured by compliance indices based on a checklist of the disclosure 
requirements of IFRS 8. (Section 5.6) 
 
This part of the study provides answer to RQ1.1 and RQ1.2 from the research questions of 
this thesis. With regard to RQ1.1 the findings of the present study suggest that there is 
                                                 
46 Given the large number of regressions the details of the results are not reported here but they are available 
on request. 
47 Additionally, because of the bounded dependent variables, Tobit models were also calculated. Their 
results are consistent with the results of the OLS regression models.  
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substantial non-compliance with the entity-wide disclosure requirements of IFRS 8 and 
there is scope for companies to increase their degree of compliance with the segment 
reporting requirements.  However, the companies provided compliance statement in their 
notes.  The auditors assessed the full compliance with IFRSs in their audit reports and all 
of the sample companies received unqualified audit opinion.  The content of the 
segmental notes is the result of the negotiation between the preparer and its auditor.  
Whether the non-disclosure of the required information is material or not depends on the 
auditor judgement.  Libby et al. (2006) argue that partners of BIG 4 audit companies 
require greater correction of misstatements in recognised amounts than in the equivalent 
amount disclosed in the notes.  Thus, partners view recognised amounts to be more 
material while they tolerate more error in disclosures.  Additionally, auditors’ materiality 
judgements are influenced by client importance, client pressure and preference. (e.g. 
Libby and Kinney, 2000; Acito et al., 2009; Beeler and Hunton, 2002; Nelson et al., 2002)  
These may affect the audit quality.  Furthermore, Crawford et. al. (2012a) recommended 
that auditors “should challenge preparers about IFRS 8 disclosures with regard to .... 
ensuring that segment information is not being withheld on the grounds that it represents 
commercially sensitive information.” (p 9)  Researchers highlighted the importance of 
enforcement in increasing compliance with IFRSs. (Street and Bryant, 2000; Glaum and 
Street, 2003; Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004; Hodgdon et al., 2009)  The findings of this 
study suggest that enforcement is still seems to be an issue 1) in order to improve 
disclosures under IFRS 8 and 2) in achieving comparability across entities that adopt the 
same accounting standards.  
 
The results also indicate that the extent of compliance varies significantly.  As far as 
RQ1.2 is concerned, the present study identified several factors that affect the companies’ 
compliance with the requirements of IFRS 8.  Propositions of enforcement, agency, 
proprietary, political cost and signalling theories can provide the basis for interpreting 
these findings.  
 
First, the evidences suggest that the identity of the auditor is the most important 
determinant in explaining the level of compliance with the segmental reporting 
requirements of IFRS 8.  Thus, the audit quality provided by the BIG 4 audit companies 
seems to be different.  Therefore the BIG 4 companies should not be treated as a 
homogenous group of auditors. (Table 5.14, Table 5.16) 
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Second, the findings reveal that the overall level of compliance and the level of 
compliance with the entity-wide requirements of the standard is significantly greater for 
companies organised around different products and services (business reporting 
segments) or a combination of different products, services and geographical areas (mixed 
reporting segments) compared to companies organised around different geographical 
areas (geographic reporting segments).  It raises the question whether the companies use 
geographic reporting segments to conceal information from their stakeholders including 
shareholders (agency cost), competitors (proprietary costs), and tax authorities (political 
costs).  Further research on the subject might address this question. (Table 5.14, Table 
5.16) 
 
Table 5.16 Summary of the results 
 
 
Independent variable* / Tested hypothesis / Theory 
Compliance with the  
reportable 
segment 
 
entity-wide 
information 
segmental 
information 
(total) 
requirements of IFRS 8 
Identity of the auditor / Ha1 
Regulation & Enforcement
 
√ √ √ 
Organisational structure / Ha9 
Agency, Proprietary and Political cost theory 
X √ √ 
Early adoption / Ha3 
Signalling theory, Agency theory, Regulation & 
Enforcement 
√ X X 
Capital intensity / Ha2 
Proprietary theory 
X √ X 
*: with significant effect on the dependent variables 
 
Third, the results of this study indicate that companies operating in less competitive 
environment (higher capital intensity) tend to disclose less commercially sensitive 
segment information (lower levels of compliance with entity-wide disclosure 
requirements such as the company’s reliance on major customers; non-current assets in 
and external revenues attributed to the entity’s country of domicile and all foreign 
countries; basis for attributing revenues to individual countries). (5.7.1)  These findings 
are in line with the results of previous research that the competitive harm associated with 
segment disclosure (proprietary costs) decreases the companies’ willingness to disclose 
more segment information to the market. (Table 5.14, Table 5.16) 
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Fourth, the level of compliance with the reporting segment requirements is significantly 
greater for companies that decided to adopt IFRS 8 earlier than its mandatory application 
date.  These findings suggest that the early adopter companies use their annual report to 
signal to the market, their stakeholders (e.g. their legitimacy, accountability) and 
distinguish themselves from their competitors.  It also can indicate that these companies 
and their auditors might had been aware of and prepared for the requirements of the new 
standard (e.g. because of the company’s US listing). (Table 5.14, Table 5.16) 
 
Additionally, the relatively high level of non-compliance with the entity-wide 
requirements of the standard and the considerable variance between the levels of 
compliance of the individual companies raise concerns about the successfulness of the 
convergence of the accounting standards (copying the SFAS 131) and the quality and 
comparability of the financial statements. An analysis and comparison of the level of 
compliance with the requirements of SFAS 13 / IFRS 8 of a sample of US and EU 
companies could provide valuable information to the Boards’ convergence project.  
 
Previous studies focused on compliance with the requirement of earlier segmental 
regulations (IAS 14, IAS 14R) used different self-constructed compliance indices based 
on different check lists, used different measures to proxy company characteristics and 
their samples referred to different accounting periods.(Section 5.2 and Section 5.4)  
Therefore, no attempt was made to compare the results with those of previous research. 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
Geographic disclosures provide useful information on assessing internationally 
diversified companies’ risks and prospects.  Research found evidence that the use of 
geographic segment disclosures significantly improve forecast accuracy compared to 
forecasts using consolidated data (Roberts, 1989; Balakrishan et al., 1990; Ahadiat, 1993; 
Nichols et al, 1995; Herrman, 1996; Herrman and Thomas, 2000; Behn et al., 2002; Kou 
and Hussain, 2007) and the predicative ability of geographic information increases when 
more disaggregated information is provided (Ahadiat, 1993; Herrmann, 1996; Behn et 
al., 2002).  Furhermore, geographic segment information disclosed by the companies has 
incremental value-relevance compared to company-level accounting information. 
(Thomas, 2000; Bodnar et al., 2003; Aleksanyan and Danbolt, 2005; Olibe and Kinney, 
2007; Kajüter and Nienhans, 2014) (see more in Section 2.4.5) 
 
It is not in doubt that users of financial statements welcome and use the geographic 
information disclosed by the companies when making economic decisions.  The question 
is whether the introduction of the new standard enhanced the quality of the companies’ 
geographic disclosures.  Looking for the answer to this question is timely and relevant 
because of the following reasons: 
 
First, the introduction of SFAS 131 in the US had a number of negative effects on the 
companies’ geographic disclosures including the decrease in the number of firms 
disclosing earnings by geographic areas, the decrease in the number of items disclosed 
for each geographic locations and the continued use of broad, vague geographic grouping.  
Although the new standard increased the number of countries reported individually 
(increased fineness, decreased aggregation) the information provided for these countries 
might be less useful for users. (Herrman and Thomas, 2000) (see more in Section 2.4.2) 
 
Second, the potential loss of geographic information as an impact of the new standard 
was one of the major concerns expressed during the public discussion and the EU 
endorsement of the proposed new standard. (see more in Section 2.2) 
 
Third, during the PIR of IFRS 8 the IASB received mixed views on the geographic 
information reported under the new standard.  Some investors expressed that they would 
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welcome the disclosure of a full segment analysis based on geographic areas.  Others 
questioned the usefulness of the disclosed geographic information (identification of 
reported geographic areas) and the use of entity-wide disclosures (poorly understood and 
inconsistently applied among the companies).  However, in its response the IASB claimed 
that based on the feedback they received they “did not identify a clear or consistent 
problem” that they “need to address”.  Additionally, the IASB maintains that 
geographical disclosures under IFRS 8 do not “warrant any further action at this time.” 
(IASB, 2013b, p24) 
 
Fourth, the earlier part of this research found relatively high level of non-compliance with 
the geographic information related requirements of IFRS 8 (non-disclosure of revenues / 
NCA for the country of domicile and for all foreign countries; non-disclosure of the basis 
for attributing revenues from external customers to individual countries). (see more in 
chapter Chapter 5) 
 
Fifth, prior research on IFRS 8 focused on the connection between the companies 
operating segment disclosure (e.g. number of segments, number of items per segments) 
and different company characteristics (e.g. Pardal and Morais, 2011; Pisano and 
Landriana, 2012)  Less is known about the quality of geographic disclosures and their 
determinants.  
 
This part of the study investigates the companies’ geographic disclosures and the effects 
of different company characteristics on the geographic disclosure under IAS 14R and 
IFRS 8.  Preparers’ intentions to reveal / hide geographic information (e.g. proprietary 
cost, political cost) are linked to the quality of geographic disclosure of the companies. 
 
6.2 Research Objective, Research Questions and Hypothesis development 
 
As it was indicated in the previous section, the objective of this part of the research is (1) 
to analyse the impacts of IFRS 8 on the sample companies’ geographic disclosure and (2) 
to explain the diversity of the companies’ geographic disclosure practice. (RO2)  The 
study seeks answers to the following research questions:  
 
RQ2.1: Did the quality of geographic disclosures improve under IFRS 8? 
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RQ2.2: What company characteristics drive secrecy and support openness? 
 
Research and its findings on the companies’ geographic disclosures under SFAS 131 and 
IFRS 8 is introduced in Section 2.4.2.  Prior research indicates that the results are sensitive 
to the disclosure quality measure employed and warns against the use of a single 
geographic disclosure quality measure.  While the quality of geographic disclosure is 
shown to be increasing in certain aspects (e.g. increase in the number of locations / 
countries disclosed; more individual country disclosed; finer geographic information 
provided) it is also shown to be decreasing in other aspects (e.g. decrease in the number 
of items disclosed for each geographic area; decrease in the proportion of companies 
disclosing geographic earning measures).  Thus, one cannot examine the effects of IFRS 
8 on geographic disclosure quality by simply analysing the change of only one measure.  
 
Therefore, in this study, after the general introduction of the sample companies’ 
geographic disclosure practice geographic disclosure measures such as (1) the number of 
the disclosed geographic locations / countries / regions; (2) the proportion of revenues 
reported by country; (3) the proportion of revenues reported by ROW; (4) the fineness of 
geographic information disclosed; (5) the number of items disclosed for each country, (6) 
the homogeneity of the geographic disclosures provided by the companies and (7) the 
disclosure of information about the base used to allocate revenues to individual countries 
are used to describe the quality of geographic disclosure and capture the impacts of the 
introduction of IFRS 8 on geographic disclosures.  
 
Company characteristics used to test hypotheses (Ha1 – Ha11) in the compliance chapter 
(Chapter 5) of the thesis are used in this chapter and in the following two chapters of the 
thesis as well. (see more in Section 5.4)  
 
Additionally, it can be argued that (1) there is a relationship between the companies’ 
financial reporting behaviour and their tax reporting behaviour and (2) the companies’ 
disclosure quality can be influenced by the preparers’ desire to conceal the companies’ 
tax avoidance behaviour. (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Hope et al., 2013) (Section 2.3)  
Low transparency (disclosure quality) might be associated with the companies’ tax 
avoidance activities.  For example, Hope et al. (2013) studied the geographic earnings 
disclosure practice of US MNCs and found that the companies’ decisions on whether to 
disclose geographic earnings under SFAS 131 were affected by the companies’ attempts 
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to hide their tax avoidance behaviour (proxied by the companies‘ effective tax rate). Thus, 
the preparer’s desire to conceal the company’s tax avoidance can influence the company’s 
disclosure policy, practice. (Political cost theory, Regulation and enforcement) 
 
Based on the findings of previous research it can be assumed that companies might have 
lower transparency related to their foreign operation (e.g. lower number of individually 
discloses countries, lower percentage of the revenues disclosed by countries, lower 
fineness score, lower number of items disclosed by country) to make it more difficult to 
the financial statement users to detect the companies’ tax avoidance behaviour.  
Therefore, an additional hypothesis has been developed to test the effect of the 
companies’ tax avoiding behaviour on the quality of their geographic disclosures. 
 
Ha12: The company’s tax avoiding behaviour is associated with the quality of the 
company’s geographic disclosures. 
 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) recently reviewed tax research.  They identified corporate 
tax avoidance as one of the main areas of tax research.  The different studies they 
reviewed used (1) effective tax rate (usually calculated as total income tax expense 
divided by pre-tax accounting income, p139), (2) long-run effective tax rates (calculated 
as the sum of cash paid for income taxes over ten years scaled by the sum of pre-tax 
income over the same period, p141), (3) book-tax differences, (4) discretionary or 
“abnormal” measures (e.g. abnormal book-tax differences), (5) unrecognised tax benefits 
(measured as the levels and / or changes in unrecognised tax benefits, the accounting 
reserve for future tax contingencies, p143) and (6) tax shelter firms as proxies for tax 
avoidance.  
 
The companies’ tax avoiding behaviour in this study is proxied by (1) the companies’ 
effective tax rate (total income tax divided by the pre-tax profit), (2) the number of tax 
haven countries48 where the company has subsidiaries and (3) the number of subsidiaries 
in tax havens.  
 
“The tax area is exciting and big contributions can still be made that will advance our 
understanding of corporate and individual decisions (both reporting and “real”), and perhaps more 
importantly, inform managerial decisions and tax policy.” (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010, p169) 
                                                 
48 http://www.oecd.org/tax/harmfultaxpractices/43606256.pdf [accessed 12 February 2013] 
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Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) called for further research on the connection between the 
companies’ financial reporting practice and their tax reporting behaviour.  This part of 
the research provides response to this call as well. 
 
6.3 Sample selection and Data collection 
 
Analysis is carried out (1) for the companies that provided geographic information both 
under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 (N=178) and (2) for the companies that provided geographic 
information for at least one country, the country of domicile (N=155) under IFRS 8. 
(Table 6.1)  Most of the results are presented for both sample size in the Appendices.  The 
detailed analysis and results provided in this chapter, if not stated otherwise, is based on 
the smaller sample size. 
 
Table 6.1 Sample selection process49 
 Number % 
FTSE350 (as at 22 June 2011) 350  
Less: ICB Financials (Banks, Insurance, Financial services) 113 
Less: Missing data 15 
Sample size 222 100.00 
Less: No geographic information provided* 44 19.82 
Companies providing geographic information 178 80.18 
Less: No domestic/foreign revenue provided** 23 10.36 
Geographic information & domestic/foreign revenue available*** 155 69.82 
*:  detailed geographic information not provided under IAS 14R; plus Hays, stopped providing geographic 
revenue information under IFRS 8 
**: revenue not provided for the country of domicile under IAS 14R and/or under IFRS 8 
***: domestic revenue for 29 companies only available from the restated numbers provided under IFRS 8 
 
Previous studies separately analysed the companies’ geographic disclosures provided as 
geographic reportable segment disclosure or entity-wide disclosure.  However, the results 
of this study indicate that more than a fifth50  of the geographic revenue disclosing 
companies provide geographic information both as entity-wide disclosure and as 
geographic or mixed reportable segment disclosure.  Therefore, in this study the 
geographic information provided by the companies under reportable segment and entity-
                                                 
49 see the list of the sample companies in Appendix A. 1 
50 40/188 = 21.28%; Table 6.2 
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wide disclosure is combined.  In every case the less aggregated information (measured 
by the fineness score, see in Section 6.4.2) was used. 
 
6.4 Results and Analysis 
 
This section introduces the results of the different statistical methods applied on the data 
collected for the sample companies.  An analysis of the results is also provided.  
 
6.4.1 General introduction of the companies’ geographic disclosure practice 
 
The disclosure of geographic revenue information 
Under IAS 14 R the companies were required to provide geographic information either 
as primary or as secondary segment information.  Almost a fifth of the companies did not 
provide detailed geographic revenue information under IAS 14R.  With the exception of 
3 companies these companies stated in their notes to the Financial Statements that they 
did not have major activity in or revenue from foreign countries.  From the remaining 179 
companies 124 provided detailed geographic information under its secondary segments.  
Only a quarter (55 companies, 24.77%) of the sample had geographic location based 
primary segments. (Table 6.2) 
 
Those companies who provided geographic information either as primary or as secondary 
segment information under IAS 14R kept disclosing geographic information under IFRS 
8 as well.  The only exception is Hays.  Hays stopped providing revenue information for 
its geographic locations. (Appendix C. 9)  Under IFRS 8 companies that define operating 
segments on a basis other than geographic location have to provide geographic 
disclosures (revenues and NCAs) as part of their entity-wide disclosures.  From the 188 
companies that provided detailed geographic information under IFRS 8 108 disclosed it 
as entity-wide information.  An additional 40 companies disclosed geographic 
information both under entity-wide information and under reporting segments (double 
reporting practice).  Most of these companies (36) used different geographic locations for 
their entity-wide information and for their reporting segments.  However, 4 of the 
companies provided exactly the same geographic structure under their entity-wide 
information and under their reporting segments.  Most of the (91/108 and 22/40) 
companies that provided geographic information as entity-wide information under IFRS 
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8 had geographic secondary segments under IAS 14R.  The number of non-disclosing 
companies decreased under IFRS 8 from 43 to 34. 10 of the non-disclosing companies 
did not mention why geographic information was not provided.  It is likely that most of 
them did not have any revenue or did not have material revenue outside the country of 
domicile.  For example, under IAS 14R 7 of these non-disclosing companies mentioned 
that all of their revenues generated in the UK (4 companies) or they do not have major 
revenues from foreign countries (3 companies).  However, under IFRS 8 these companies 
did not comment on the origin of their revenues. (Table 6.2) 
 
Table 6.2 The geographic revenue reporting practice of the companies under IAS 
14R and IFRS851 
 
 
                                                 
51 see additional details in Appendix C. 1 and Appendix C. 2 
Entity wide information 7 91 98 3 6 9 1 10 108
Geo reporting segments 20 3 23 0 0 0 0 0 23
Mixed reporting segments 9 8 17 0 0 0 0 0 17
Both entity wide and reporting segments information provided 18 22 40 0 0 0 0 0 40
in same structure 1 3 4 0 0 0 0 0 4
in different structure 17 19 36 0 0 0 0 0 36
Detailed geo information provided 54 124 178 3 6 9 1 10 188
All revenue generated in one country 0 0 0 14 0 14 0 14 14
No major revenue from foreign countries 0 0 0 2 8 10 0 10 10
No major activity in foreign countries 0 0 0 16 8 24 0 24 24
Geo information not provided 1* 0 1 4** 3 7 2 9 10
Detailed geo information not provided 1 0 1 20 11 31 2 33 34
Total 55 124 179 23 17 40 3 43 222
Entity wide information 3.15 40.99 44.14 1.35 2.70 4.05 0.45 4.50 48.65
Geo reporting segments 9.01 1.35 10.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.36
Mixed reporting segments 4.05 3.60 7.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.66
Both entity wide and reporting segments information provided 8.11 9.91 18.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.02
in same structure 0.45 1.35 1.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.80
in different structure 7.66 8.56 16.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.22
Detailed geo information provided 24.32 55.86 80.18 1.35 2.70 4.05 0.45 4.50 84.68
All revenue generated in one country 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.31 0.00 6.31 0.00 6.31 6.31
No major revenue from foreign countries 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 3.60 4.50 0.00 4.50 4.50
No major activity in foreign countries 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.21 3.60 10.81 0.00 10.81 10.81
Geo information not provided 0.45 0.00 0.45 1.80 1.35 3.15 0.90 4.05 4.50
Detailed geo information not provided 0.45 0.00 0.45 9.01 4.95 13.96 0.90 14.86 15.32
Total 24.77 55.86 80.63 10.36 7.66 18.02 1.35 19.37 100.00
*: Hays
**: Wm Morrison Supermarkets, Booker Group, Drax Group, W H Smith
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Different company characteristics might affect the way companies disclose their 
geographic revenue information.  For example, 90% of the non-single segment companies 
disclosed detailed revenue information whereas only less than a third of the single 
segment companies did the same.  Single segment companies either do not want to reveal 
geographic information or they not only have one business segment but also generate 
(majority of) their  revenues in (from) one geographic location.  Companies in the Health 
Care (100.00%), Oil and Gas (100.00%), Technology (100.00%) and Basic Materials 
(91.67%) industries were more likely provide detailed geographic information than 
companies in the Utilities (66.67%), Customer Goods (75.00%) and Consumer Services 
(71.19%) industries. (Appendix C. 2)  These results are not surprising because the way 
the companies provide geographic information probably is linked to the internationality 
of the companies.  Many of the companies in the Utilities and Consumer Services 
industries simply do not have any or do not have material revenue generating activity 
outside the country of domicile. Whereas, companies in industries like Health Care, Oil 
and Gas, Technology and Basic Materials are more likely generate greater percentage 
(most) of their revenues from / in abroad.52 (Appendix C. 3)  
 
Both the frequencies and percentages in Table 6.2 and the results of Pearson’s Chi-square 
tests (Appendix C. 4, Panel A: χ2(28) = 354.98, p < 0.000; Panel B: χ2(1) = 155.161, p < 
0.000)) indicate that the way companies reported their geographic revenues under IFRS 
8 is influenced by the way the companies reported geographic information under IAS 
14R.  For example, 92.86% of the companies that had geographic secondary segments 
under IAS 14R reported geographic information as entity-wide disclosure under IFRS853.  
Cramer’s Vs show strong association between the companies’ geographic reporting 
practice under the old and the new standard. (Appendix C. 4, Panel A: C = 0.632, p < 
0.000; Panel B: C= 0.836, p IFRS 8 < 0.000) 
 
The results indicate that both under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 categorical variables 1) industry 
type (χ2(8)IAS 14R = 32.697, p IAS 14R < 0.000; χ2(8)IFRS 8 = 22.881, p IFRS 8 < 0.004), 2) whether 
the company is an FTSE 100 index constituent or not (χ2(1)IAS 14R = 6.662, p IAS 14R < 0.010; 
χ2(1)IFRS 8 = 8.113, p IFRS 8 < 0.004), 3) whether the company is a single segment company 
                                                 
52 For a smaller sample (N=155, where companies provided foreign revenue information) the results of 
ANOVA test indicate that there is significant difference between the means of foreign revenue percentages 
in different industries. Average (standard deviation) foreign revenue percentages are lower (higher) in 
Utilities and Consumer Services industries and higher (lower) in Health Care, Oil and Gas, Technology and 
Basic Materials industries. (Appendix C. 3) 
53 91/98 → 92.86% (Table 6.2) 
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or not (χ2(1)IAS 14R = 52.538, p IAS 14R < 0.000; χ2(1)IFRS 8= 52.623, p IFRS 8 < 0.000) and 4) 
whether the company is US listed or not (χ2(1)IAS 14R = 6.804, p IAS 14R < 0.009; χ2(1)IFRS 8= 
5.903, p IFRS 8 < 0.015) significantly influence whether the company discloses detailed 
geographic revenue information or not. (Appendix C. 4 Panel B)  For the categorical 
variables industry type (CIAS 14R = 0.384, p IAS 14R < 0.000; CIFRS 8=0.321, p IFRS 8 < 0.004), 
FTSE 100/250 (CIAS 14R = 0.173, p IAS 14R < 0.010; C IFRS 8 = 0.191, p IFRS 8 < 0.004) and 
US listing (CIAS 14R = 0.175, p IAS 14R < 0.009; C IFRS 8 = 0.163, pIFRS 8 < 0.015), Cramer’s 
statistics indicate association between the categorical variables.  However, the results 
indicate even stronger association between the way the companies reported their 
geographic revenues and whether the company was a single segment company or not 
(CIAS 14R = 0.486, p IAS 14R < 0.000; C IFRS 8 = 0.487, p IFRS 8 < 0.000). (Appendix C. 4 Panel 
B) 54   
 
Further analysis reveals that the companies that provided detailed geographic information 
are the ones that, on average, have greater total sales (bigger companies), growth rate (in 
total sales) and international visibility (measured by the number of foreign countries 
where the company has subsidiary, by the number of subsidiaries in foreign countries and 
by the number of foreign stock exchanges where the company is listed).  Thus, the results 
indicate that big multinational companies more likely provide detailed geographic 
information.  On the other hand, the non-disclosing companies, on average, have greater 
capital intensity (PPE/total assets), higher liquidity and gearing ratios. (Appendix C. 6 
and Appendix C. 7) 
 
The disclosure of geographic NCA information 
While 188 (188/222 → 84.68%) of the sample companies disclosed more or less detailed 
geographic revenue information under IFRS 8 only 125 (125/222 → 56.31%) of the 
sample companies disclosed geographic NCA information.  It means, that only 66.49% 
(125/188 → 66.49%) of the revenue disclosing companies disclosed NCA as well. (Table 
6.6 and Appendix C. 5) 
                                                 
54 When using more detailed categories (Appendix C. 4 Panel A)for the companies’ geographic revenue 
disclosures the results indicate that both under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 industry type (χ2(32)IAS 14R = 67.073, p 
IAS 14R < 0.000; χ2(56)IFRS 8= 95.939, p IFRS 8 < 0.001) , FTSE 100/250 (χ2(4)IAS 14R = 12.619, p IAS 14R < 0.013; 
χ2(7)IFRS 8= 15.286, p IFRS 8 < 0.033) and single segment or not (χ2(4)IAS 14R = 69.757, p IAS 14R < 0.000; χ2(7)IFRS 
8= 67.869, p IFRS 8 < 0.000) categorical variables have significant influence on the way the companies report 
their revenues.  The identity of the auditor (χ2(16)IAS 14R = 62.521, p IAS 14R < 0.000) and the US listing status 
of the company (χ2(4)IAS 14R = 9.662, p IAS 14R < 0.047) also had significant influence on the companies’ 
geographic revenue reporting under IAS 14R but not under IFRS 8. (Appendix C. 4 Panel A) 
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Table 6.3 The disclosure of geographic NCA information by geographic revenue 
disclosing companies  
 
 
 
 
Two of the geographic revenue providing companies (easy/Jet plc and Carnival) indicated 
that they cannot disclose meaningful NCA information for the different geographic 
locations where / from they earn revenues. (Table 6.3) 
 
“easyJet’s non-current assets principally comprise its fleet of aircraft (including 62 held 
under operating leases). All of these aircraft are registered in the United Kingdom except 
for 15 registered in Switzerland. These assets are used flexibly across the entire route 
network, and accordingly there is no suitable basis for allocating them to geographic 
segments.” (easy-Jet plc Annual Report and accounts 2010, p88) 
“Substantially all of our cruise assets are ships and our cruise capital expenditures are 
incurred for ships and ships under construction. Our ships move between geographic 
regions and, therefore, it is not meaningful to allocate these ship assets and ship capital 
expenditures to particular regions.” (Carnival Annual Report 2010, p16) 
 
A further 44 (44/188 → 23.40%) of the 188 companies disclosed “segment asset” by 
geographic locations.  These companies might have forgotten to change their reporting 
practice under IFRS 8 and kept disclosing “the total carrying amount of segment assets 
by geographic location of assets”. (IAS 14R 69(b) and 70(b))  However, almost 10% 
(17/188 → 9.04%) of the geographic revenue disclosing companies and 43.69% (100 – 
125/222 → 43.69%) of the sample companies did not report any kind of asset information 
by geographic locations. (Table 6.6 and Table 6.3) 
 
The disclosure of external revenue and NCA information by geographic location 
85 companies provided their geographic revenue and NCA information in the same 
structure by using the same geographic locations.  Whereas, almost a third of the 
companies (40/125 → 32.00%) provided either more detailed revenue information (e.g. 
Table 6.5) or more detailed NCA information (e.g. Table 6.4 and Table 6.6).  Although, 
N=188 NCA disclosed Not applicable Total
Segment Asset No Asset info
Geographic revenue information provided as
Entity wide information 83 10 13 23 2 108
Geographic reporting segments 7 14 2 16 0 23
Mixed reporting segments 4 11 2 13 0 17
Both entity wide information and reporting segments 31 9 0 9 0 40
in same structure 3 1 0 1 0 4
in different structure 28 8 0 8 0 36
Detailed geographic information provided 125 44 17 61 2 188
NCA not disclosed
provided Sub total
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8 of these companies did not disclose their basis for attributing revenues to geographic 
locations most of the remaining companies (71.88%) used customer location as a basis 
for attributing revenues from external customers to geographic locations.  However, the 
NCAs of the companies should be attributed to different geographic locations based on 
the location of assets55.  The different distribution basis could be the reason why the 
companies disclose different geographic locations when providing revenue and NCA 
information.  This finding indicates, that users of the financial statements have to be 
careful when they calculate, analyse and compare financial ratios (e.g. non-current asset 
usage = revenue / non-current assets * 100%) for different geographic locations.  
 
Table 6.4 Examples of the use of different geographic locations for reporting 
revenue and NCA information _ more detailed NCA information provided 
 
Panel A 
 
  Britvic Annual Report 2010, p64 
 
Panel B 
 
  Filtrona Annual Report 2009, p85 
 
Revenue and NCA information disclosure for the country of domicile 
IFRS 8 requires the disclosure of “revenues from external customers (i) attributed to the 
entity’s country of domicile” (IFRS 8 33(a)) and “non-current assets ... (i) located in the 
entity’s country of domicile” (IFRS 8 33(b)).  However, only 86.70% (163/188 → 
                                                 
55 “located in ... countries ... in which the entity holds assets”, IFRS 8.33(b) 
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86.70%) of the geographic revenue disclosing companies and 73.42% (163/222 → 
73.42%) of the sample companies disclosed the domestic revenue of the company.   
 
Table 6.5 Examples of the use of different geographic locations for reporting 
revenue and NCA information _ more detailed revenue information provided 
Panel A 
 
 
  Antofagasta Annual Report and Financial Statements 2009, pp76-77 
Panel B 
 
  Rolls-Royce Group Annual Report 2009, p107 
 
From the 125 companies that disclosed NCA by geographic locations 112 (112/125 → 
89.60%) disclosed NCA information for the company’s country of domicile as well.  
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However, these 112 companies are only the half (112/222 → 50.45%) of the total number 
of the sample companies.  Thus, another half (49.55%) of the sample companies did not 
disclose NCA information for the country of domicile. (Table 6.6 and Table 6.7) 
 
Table 6.6 Disclosure of NCA information for geographic areas under IFRS8 
 
 
It is somehow surprising that only 60.87% (71.43%) of the companies organised around 
geographic areas disclosed external revenue (NCA) information for their country of 
domicile.  Whereas, these percentages are much higher for companies organised around 
business areas or mix of business and geographic areas.  Companies with geographic 
reporting segments either intentionally hold back information or simply forgot to disclose 
the external revenue and NCA information for the country of domicile and comply with 
the new requirements of IFRS 8. (Table 6.7) 
 
Table 6.7 The disclosure of revenue and NCA information for the country of 
domicile 
 
 
Disclosure of geographic locations, regions and countries 
In this study geographic region is defined as any grouping of individual countries such as 
sub-continent, continent, multi-continent, emerging markets, foreign, ROW etc..  
Geographic regions and individual countries together are called as geographic locations.  
 
The following analysis based on the companies geographic revenue disclosures. In the 
case of double reporting the more detailed (less aggregated) information was used.  
 
 
 
N=188 % of NCA
providers same
Geographic revenue information provided as revenue providers = 100% structure revenue NCA Total
Entity wide information 108 83 76.85 55 25 3 28
Geographic reporting segments 23 7 30.43 6 0 1 1
Mixed reporting segments 17 4 23.53 4 0 0 0
Both entity wide information and reporting segments 40 31 77.50 20 6 5 11
in same structure 4 3 75.00 3 0 0 0
in different structure 36 28 77.78 17 6 5 11
Detailed geographic information provided 188 125 66.49 85 31 9 40
different sturcture
Revenue and NCA provided inNumber of companies
providing
more detailed
revenue NCA
N=188 % of NCA
providers
Geographic revenue information provided as no of companies % of companies no of companies % of companies
188 = 100% 125 = 100% revenue providers = 100%
Entity wide information 96 88.89 73 87.95 76.04
Geographic reporting segments 14 60.87 5 71.43 35.71
Mixed reporting segments 13 76.47 4 100.00 30.77
Both entity wide information and reporting segments 40 100.00 30 96.77 75.00
in same structure 4 100.00 3 100.00 75.00
in different structure 36 100.00 27 96.43 75.00
Detailed geographic information provided 163 86.70 112 89.60 68.71
Revenue provided for NCA provided for the
country of domicile country of domicile
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The number of disclosed locations and countries under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
The number of companies providing geographic information increased from 179 to 188 
under IFRS 8.  43 companies did not disclose any geographic information under IAS 14R.  
From these 43 companies 10 started to provide geographic disclosure under IFRS 8. 
(Table 6.2)  Only one company, Hays, stopped disclosing geographic revenue information 
under IFRS 8 (although other items were disclosed for different geographic locations by 
the company). (Appendix C. 9)  The number of geographic locations disclosed by the 
companies ranged from 2 to 15.  Most of the companies disclosed 4 geographic locations 
(IAS 14R: 55 companies; IFRS 8: 50 companies).  More than 70% (80%)56 of the 
companies disclosed 5 or less geographic locations under IFRS 8 (IAS 14R).  The greatest 
number of geographic location (15) was disclosed by AstraZeneca (both under IAS 14R 
and IFRS 8) and Anglo American (under IFRS 8).  Most of the geographic locations 
disclosed by these two companies were individual countries. (Table 6.8) 
 
Table 6.8 The number of reported geographic locations and countries under IAS 
14R and IFRS 8 
 
based on geographic revenue disclosure 
 
82 (36.94%) of the companies increased the number of their disclosed geographic 
locations.  Most of them added 1 or 2 additional locations to their previous practice.  Only 
                                                 
56 IFRS 8: 135/188 = 71.81%, IAS 14R: 152/179 = 84.92% 
number % number % number % number % number % number %
43 19.37 34 15.32 -9 -4.05 83 37.39 46 20.72 -37 -16.67
0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 85 38.29 60 27.03 -25 -11.26
30 13.51 30 13.51 0 0.00 27 12.16 48 21.62 21 9.46
41 18.47 33 14.86 -8 -3.60 13 5.86 26 11.71 13 5.86
55 24.77 50 22.52 -5 -2.25 5 2.25 20 9.01 15 6.76
26 11.71 22 9.91 -4 -1.80 2 0.90 7 3.15 5 2.25
10 4.50 12 5.41 2 0.90 4 1.80 4 1.80 0 0.00
7 3.15 13 5.86 6 2.70 0 0.00 2 0.90 2 0.90
4 1.80 10 4.50 6 2.70 0 0.00 3 1.35 3 1.35
3 1.35 5 2.25 2 0.90 2 0.90 1 0.45 -1 -0.45
2 0.90 7 3.15 5 2.25 0 0.00 1 0.45 1 0.45
0 0.00 2 0.90 2 0.90 0 0.00 3 1.35 3 1.35
0 0.00 2 0.90 2 0.90 1 0.45 1 0.45 0 0.00
0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
1 0.45 2 0.90 1 0.45 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00
179 80.63 188 84.68 9 4.05 139 62.61 176 79.28 37 16.67
222 100.00 222 100.00 0 0.00 222 100.00 222 100.00 0 0.00
Countries
locations,
countries
5
9
6
7
Number of
0
1
2
3
4
ChangeIFRS 8
12
13
Geographic locations
Change IAS 14R
10
11
IFRS 8
14
15
Total
IAS 14R
8
 1 - 15
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8 of the companies added 5 or more new geographic locations to their earlier practice.  
For example, Anglo American reported sub-continents, continents and multi-continents 
under IAS 14R.  Under IFRS 8 the company still used these broader geographic regions 
but attributed most of its revenues to 9 individual countries.  Not all of the companies 
increased the number of geographic locations under IFRS 8.  21 companies decreased the 
number of their disclosed geographic locations.  More than half of these companies 
decreased the number of their disclosed geographic locations by only 1.  But for example 
Aggreko decreased the number of disclosed geographic locations from 8 (UK, 
Continental Europe, North America, Middle East, Australia, Africa, South America, 
Other) to 4 (Middle East and South East Europe, Europe, North America, Other).  
However, more than 50% of the companies (119 companies) did not change the number 
of their disclosed geographic locations.  Even more interestingly, 105 (105/119 = 88.24%) 
of these 119 companies used exactly the same geographic locations under IAS 14R and 
IFRS 8.  Thus, almost half of the sample companies (105/222 = 47.30%) did not change 
their disclosure practice under the new segmental reporting standard. (Table 6.9, Panel A 
in  Appendix C. 8) 
 
IFRS 8 appears to achieve that a significant number of companies started to disclose 
revenues at the individual country level.  83, almost two fifths of the companies did not 
disclose country level information under IAS 14R.  40 companies started to disclose 
country level information under IFRS 8. (Appendix C. 8 Panel B)  As a result, under IFRS 
8 four fifths (176) of the companies provided geographic information for at least one 
individual country.  The percentage of the companies providing country level information 
for only one individual country decreased (38.29% → 27.03%).  However, the percentage 
of the companies providing country level information for 2-5 individual countries 
increased (21.17% → 45.49%).  AstraZeneca disclosed the greatest number of individual 
countries (12) both under IAS 14R and IFRS 8. (Table 6.8, Panel B in Appendix C. 8) 
 
More than 40% of the companies increased the number of reported individual countries.  
For about a third of these companies (32/90 = 35.56%) the increase was 2.  Some great 
individual change also can be noted.  For example Petrofac increased the number of its 
individually disclosed countries from zero to 7.  8 of the sample companies decreased the 
number of their disclosed countries. 3 companies (Aggreko, Genus, Hays) that disclosed 
at least one individual country under IAS 14R stopped doing so under IFRS 8. (Appendix 
C. 8 Panel B and Table 6.9)  However, 55.86% (124 companies) did not change the 
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number of reported individual countries.  Almost all of these companies (119/124 = 
95.97%) disclosed exactly the same individual countries under both IAS 14 and IFRS 8. 
(Table 6.9) 
 
Table 6.9 Change in disclosed geographic locations and countries 
 
based on geographic revenue disclosure 
 
Individual countries and geographic regions under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
Table 6.10 and Table 6.11 list the individual countries and group of countries (geographic 
regions) which were most commonly disclosed by the sample companies. It is not 
surprising, that the number of individual country disclosures is higher (262 → 475), while 
the number of geographic region disclosures is lower (474 → 428) under IFRS 8.  
 
Under IAS 14R 44 and under IFRS 8 66 different countries were individually reported.  
Central African Republic was not reported separately any more under IFRS 8 but the 
companies started to disclose information for 23 new countries (e.g. South Korea, 
Taiwan, Czech Republic, Serbia, Venezuela, United Arab Emirates etc.)  53.03% 
(45.45%)57 of the individually disclosed countries was reported by more than one 
company under IFRS 8 (IAS 14R).  However, only 22.73% (25.00%)58 of the countries 
was reported at least by 5 of the sample companies. (Table 6.10) 
                                                 
57 IFRS 8: (66-30-1)/66; IAS 14R: (44-15-9)/44) 
58 IFRS 8: 15/66; IAS 14R: 11/44 
Number of companies % of  companies Number of companies % of companies
Decrease 21 9.46 8 3.60
-4 1 0.45 0 0.00
-3 3 1.35 0 0.00
-2 6 2.70 5 2.25
-1 11 4.95 3 1.35
No change 119 53.60 124 55.86
same areas / countries 105 47.30 119 53.60
different areas / countries 14 6.31 5 2.25
Increase 82 36.94 90 40.54
+1 30 13.51 27 12.16
+2 24 10.81 32 14.41
+3 9 4.05 13 5.86
+4 11 4.95 11 4.95
+5 3 1.35 1 0.45
+6 1 0.45 0 0.00
+7 2 0.90 3 1.35
+8 0 0.00 1 0.45
+9 1 0.45 2 0.90
+10 1 0.45 0 0.00
Total 222 100.00 222 100.00
Change in disclosed Locations Countries
locations & countries
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Most of the sample companies are domiciled in the UK.  As expected, both under IAS 
14R and IFRS 8 the UK was the most commonly disclosed individual country.  Under 
IFRS 8 (IAS 14R) 160 (116) of the sample companies disclosed information for the UK.  
The top three countries following the UK were the US, Germany and France.  These 
countries are the top countries in terms of the UK’s foreign trade (exports and imports) 
as well. (Office for National Statistics, 2010, pp140-141., Table 6.10) 
 
Table 6.10 Individual countries disclosed under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 (N=222) 
 
based on geographic revenue disclosure 
 
 
 
 
Country
in %
Number %, N=222 %, N=139 Number %, N=222 %, N=176  IAS14=100%
UK 116 52.25 83.45 160 72.07 90.91 44 137.93
US 29 13.06 20.86 70 31.53 39.77 41 241.38
Germany 13 5.86 9.35 26 11.71 14.77 13 200.00
France 11 4.95 7.91 21 9.46 11.93 10 190.91
Australia 14 6.31 10.07 19 8.56 10.80 5 135.71
China 7 3.15 5.04 17 7.66 9.66 10 242.86
Canada 5 2.25 3.60 17 7.66 9.66 12 340.00
Japan 5 2.25 3.60 13 5.86 7.39 8 260.00
Republic of Ireland 1 0.45 0.72 11 4.95 6.25 10 1100.00
Netherlands 3 1.35 2.16 9 4.05 5.11 6 300.00
Spain 5 2.25 3.60 8 3.60 4.55 3 160.00
Brazil 1 0.45 0.72 6 2.70 3.41 5 600.00
Russia 6 2.70 4.32 5 2.25 2.84 -1 83.33
South Africa 5 2.25 3.60 5 2.25 2.84 0 100.00
Italy 3 1.35 2.16 5 2.25 2.84 2 166.67
Belgium 3 1.35 2.16 4 1.80 2.27 1 133.33
India 2 0.90 1.44 4 1.80 2.27 2 200.00
South Korea 0 0.00 0.00 4 1.80 2.27 4
Switzerland 3 1.35 2.16 3 1.35 1.70 0 100.00
Chile 2 0.90 1.44 3 1.35 1.70 1 150.00
Indonesia 2 0.90 1.44 3 1.35 1.70 1 150.00
Taiwan 0 0.00 0.00 3 1.35 1.70 3
Hungary 0 0.00 0.00 3 1.35 1.70 3
Mexico 1 0.45 0.72 3 1.35 1.70 2 300.00
Ukraine 2 0.90 1.44 2 0.90 1.14 0 100.00
Poland 1 0.45 0.72 2 0.90 1.14 1 200.00
Oman 1 0.45 0.72 2 0.90 1.14 1 200.00
Peru 1 0.45 0.72 2 0.90 1.14 1 200.00
Singapore 1 0.45 0.72 2 0.90 1.14 1 200.00
Philippines 1 0.45 0.72 2 0.90 1.14 1 200.00
Vietnam 1 0.45 0.72 2 0.90 1.14 1 200.00
Saudi Arabia 0 0.00 0.00 2 0.90 1.14 2
Kazakhstan 0 0.00 0.00 2 0.90 1.14 2
Algeria 0 0.00 0.00 2 0.90 1.14 2
United Arab Emirates 0 0.00 0.00 2 0.90 1.14 2
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2 0.90 1.44 1 0.45 0.57 -1 50.00
Other individual countries 15 6.76 10.79 30 13.51 17.05 15 200.00
Total 262  -  - 475  -  - 213 181.30
Number of reported countries 44  -  - 66  -  - 22  -
   new countries under IFRS 8 23
   not reported any more under IFRS 8 1
companies
ChangeIAS14R IFRS8
in number
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Table 6.11 Geographic regions used by the companies under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
(N=222) 
 
based on geographic revenue disclosure 
 
IFRS 8 only requires the disclosure of country level information for the company’s 
country of domicile and for individually material countries.  Additionally, the companies 
may disclose geographic information (as geographic or mixed reportable segments and / 
or voluntarily as entity-wide information) for group of countries (geographic regions).  
Under IAS 14R 82 and under IFRS 8 78 geographic regions were reported.  The number 
of disclosed geographic regions decreased by only 4 but behind this change there was a 
greater movement in the geographic regions disclosed by the companies. 23 of the 
geographic regions were not used any more under IFRS 8 (e.g. Central, Eastern and 
Southern Europe; Developing Markets; European Union; Euro Zone; North Sea; Other 
Eastern Hemisphere; US and Canada etc.).  On the other hand, the companies started to 
disclose 19 new geographic regions under the new segment reporting standard (e.g. China 
Geographic regions
in %
Number %, N=222 %, N=179 Number %, N=222 %, N=188  IAS14=100%
ROW 96 43.24 53.63 124 55.86 65.96 28 129.17
Rest of / Other Europe 33 14.86 18.44 39 17.57 20.74 6 118.18
North America 58 26.13 32.40 36 16.22 19.15 -22 62.07
Europe 47 21.17 26.26 24 10.81 12.77 -23 51.06
Asia Pacific 34 15.32 18.99 20 9.01 10.64 -14 58.82
Americas 30 13.51 16.76 16 7.21 8.51 -14 53.33
Continental Europe / Mainland Europe 23 10.36 12.85 15 6.76 7.98 -8 65.22
Asia 18 8.11 10.06 13 5.86 6.91 -5 72.22
Africa 11 4.95 6.15 10 4.50 5.32 -1 90.91
Rest of / Other North America 2 0.90 1.12 9 4.05 4.79 7 450.00
Rest of / Other Americas 1 0.45 0.56 7 3.15 3.72 6 700.00
South America 10 4.50 5.59 6 2.70 3.19 -4 60.00
Middle East 8 3.60 4.47 6 2.70 3.19 -2 75.00
Rest of / Other Asia 4 1.80 2.23 6 2.70 3.19 2 150.00
Rest of / Other Asia Pacific 1 0.45 0.56 6 2.70 3.19 5 600.00
(EMEA) Europe, Middle East and Africa 9 4.05 5.03 5 2.25 2.66 -4 55.56
Latin America 5 2.25 2.79 4 1.80 2.13 -1 80.00
Nordic 4 1.80 2.23 3 1.35 1.60 -1 75.00
Eastern Europe 3 1.35 1.68 3 1.35 1.60 0 100.00
Western Europe 3 1.35 1.68 3 1.35 1.60 0 100.00
Benelux 1 0.45 0.56 3 1.35 1.60 2 300.00
Africa and Middle East 4 1.80 2.23 2 0.90 1.06 -2 50.00
Europe and Middle East 4 1.80 2.23 2 0.90 1.06 -2 50.00
Australia and Asia 2 0.90 1.12 2 0.90 1.06 0 100.00
Far East 2 0.90 1.12 2 0.90 1.06 0 100.00
Rest of / Other Africa 2 0.90 1.12 2 0.90 1.06 0 100.00
Central Europe 1 0.45 0.56 2 0.90 1.06 1 200.00
Middle East and Africa 1 0.45 0.56 2 0.90 1.06 1 200.00
Middle East and the Gulf States 1 0.45 0.56 2 0.90 1.06 1 200.00
Northern Europe 1 0.45 0.56 2 0.90 1.06 1 200.00
South Asia 1 0.45 0.56 2 0.90 1.06 1 200.00
Rest of / Other South America 0 0.00 0.00 2 0.90 1.06 2
Rest of Europe, Middle East and Africa 0 0.00 0.00 2 0.90 1.06 2
Rest of Western Europe 0 0.00 0.00 2 0.90 1.06 2
Australia and Far East 3 1.35 1.68 1 0.45 0.53 -2 33.33
Continental Europe and Rest of World 2 0.90 1.12 1 0.45 0.53 -1 50.00
Other geographic ares reported by only one company 49 22.07 27.37 42 18.92 22.34 -7 85.71
Total 474  -  - 428  -  - -46 90.30
Number of different regions reported 82  -  - 78  -  - -4  - 
   new area under IFRS 8 19
   not reported any more under IFRS 8 23
companies
in number
IAS14R IFRS8 Change
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and Europe; Emerging Europe; Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and India; 
Germany and Austria; North Sea and West Africa etc.).  This and the fact that more than 
50% (69.51%)59 of the geographic regions was reported by only one company and an 
additional 23.08% (14.63%)60 was disclosed by less than 5 of the companies indicate that 
the geographic disclosure of the companies is highly “personalised”.   
 
The examples above and the geographic regions listed in Table 6.11 also indicate that the 
companies group the individual countries in a way that is possible the most convenient 
for them and the problem of broad, vague geographic aggregation still has not been 
resolved.  It can be hardly believed that a geographic region like “Europe, the Middle 
East, Latin America and India” can be of any use either for the management of the 
company or for the users of financial statements. (Table 6.11)  
 
With the exception of the ROW “geographic region” the UK’s top foreign trading regions 
North America and Europe (plus Rest of / Other Europe) were the most common 
geographic regions disclosed by the companies. (Office for National Statistics, 2010, 
pp140-141,Table 6.11) 
 
The total number of geographic region disclosures decreased under IFRS 8.  But the 
analysis reveals that this decrease is linked to a rather unfortunate structural change.  The 
disclosure of continents as a geographic region decreased from 59.28% to 52.57% under 
IFRS 8.  On the other hand, the use of “ROW” category as a geographic region increased 
from 20.68% to 29.21%. (Table 6.11, Table 6.12) 
 
Table 6.12 Aggregation of geographic regions under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
 
based on geographic revenue disclosure 
 
                                                 
59 IFRS 8: 44/78 = 56.41%; IAS 14R: 57/82 = 69.51% 
60 IFRS 8:16/78; IAS 14R: 13/82 
Number of Number of Number of
regions used number % regions used number % regions used number %
Continent 42 281 59.28 43 225 52.57 1 -55 -6.71
Multicontinent _ 2 continents 25 71 14.98 21 60 14.02 -4 -13 -0.96
Multicontinent _ 3 continents 10 21 4.43 8 14 3.27 -2 -7 -1.16
Multicontinent _ 4 continents 3 3 0.63 4 4 0.93 1 1 0.30
Multicontinent total 38 95 20.04 33 78 18.22 -5 -19 -1.82
ROW 2 98 20.68 2 125 29.21 0 28 8.53
Total 82 474 100.00 78 428 100.00 -4 -46 0.00
Total disclosures Total disclosures Total disclosures
IAS14 IFRS8 Change
Geographical regions
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6.4.2 Change in the geographic disclosure quality and the effect of different company 
characteristics on the quality measures 
 
The change in the geographic disclosure quality of the companies and the effect of the 
different company characteristics on the quality measures analysed in this Section for the 
companies providing geographic information under IAS 14R and IFRS 8. 
 
The number of geographic locations / countries / regions disclosed 
Dependent-means (paired) t-test is used to test whether the difference in the average 
number of geographic location/country/region disclosed under IFRS 8 and under IAS 14 
is significant.  On average, companies disclosed significantly higher number of 
geographic locations under IFRS 8 (M(IFRS8, N=155)=5.04, SE(IFRS8, N=155)=2.68), than under 
IAS 14 (M(IAS14, N=155)=4.08, SE(IAS14, N=155)=1.89) (t(154)=-6.08, p=0.000).  This can be 
explained by the significant increase in the average number of countries (M(IFRS8, 
N=155)=2.77, SE(IFRS8, N=155)=2.19, M(IAS14, N=155)=1.45, SE(IAS14, N=155)=1.56, t(154)=-8.61, 
p=0.000) and the significant decrease in the average number of other regions (e.g. 
continents, multi-continents, ROW) (M(IFRS8, N=155)=2.27, SE(IFRS8, N=155)=1.42, M(IAS14, 
N=155)=2.63, SE(IAS14, N=155)=1.37, t(154)=4.37, p=0.000) disclosed under IFRS 8 compared 
to IAS 14. (Appendix C. 10) 
 
With the exception of the companies reporting geographic disclosures under either 
geographic or mixed reportable segment the companies disclosed, on average, higher 
number of geographic location and individual country under IFRS 8 than under IAS 14.   
The detailed information suggests that companies in the Basic Material and 
Telecommunication (Consumer Services) industries, constituents of the FTSE 100 index, 
US listed, provide geographic disclosure under entity-wide information and attribute 
revenue to individual countries based on customer location disclose, on average, higher 
(lower) number of geographic locations, individual countries and geographic regions 
under IFRS 8.  Early adopter companies reported higher number of geographic locations 
and individual countries than not early adopters under IFRS 8.  Thus, it seems companies 
that started to apply the new regulation earlier provided more detailed geographic revenue 
information as well. (Appendix C. 11 and Appendix C. 12) 
 
Companies in the Oil and Gas and Basic Materials industries, audited by Not Big4, 
reporting a single segment, constituents of the FTSE100 index, not cross listed but US 
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listed, early adopters, attribute their revenues to the individual countries based on 
customer location and provide geographic disclosure under IFRS 8 either as entity-wide 
information or both under reportable segments and entity-wide information had, on 
average, greater increase in the number of the individual countries they disclosed. 
(Appendix C. 11 and Appendix C. 12) 
 
Parametric and not parametric tests indicate that FTSE 100 and US listed companies 
disclose a significantly higher number of geographic locations and regions under both 
reporting standards.  However, being listed in the US has no significant effect on the 
number of countries disclosed by companies.  Being a constituent of the FTSE 100 index 
has significant effect on the number of countries reported under IFRS 8.  Some of the 
results indicate that the industry type can have significant effect on the number of reported 
locations, regions, countries but the results are not conclusive. (Appendix D. 13 and Table 
6.25) 
 
The number of geographic locations (r(IFRS 8) = 0.530, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000), countries (r(IFRS 8) 
= 0.388, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000) and regions (r(IFRS 8) = 0.472, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000) reported by the 
companies under IFRS 8 is significantly, positively correlated with level of international 
visibility (proxied by the percentage of the foreign revenues within the total revenues).  
However, under IAS 14 R there was no significant relationship between the foreign 
revenue percentage and the reported number of individual countries (r(IAS 14R) = 0.106, 
p(IAS 14R) = 0.190).  The greater the number of the countries where the company has 
subsidiaries, the higher the number of geographic locations (r(IFRS 8) = 0.158, p(IFRS 8) = 
0.049) and regions (r(IFRS 8) = 0.249, p(IFRS 8) = 0.002) disclosed by the company.  
Surprisingly, the correlation coefficient does not indicate a significant relationship 
between the number of countries with subsidiary and the number of reported countries 
(r(IFRS 8) = 0.032, p(IFRS 8) = 0.689). (Appendix C. 28, Appendix C. 29 and Appendix C. 
30)  The results also suggest, that the companies’ disclosure practice under the new 
regulation is highly correlated with the companies’ disclosure practice under IAS 14R. 
The number of locations (countries, regions) reported under IFRS 8 are positively 
correlated with the number of locations61 (countries62, regions63) reported under IAS 14R.  
It also seems that companies with higher level gearing disclose greater number of 
                                                 
61 (r(IFRS 8) = 0.678, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000) 
62 (r(IFRS 8) = 0.527, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000) 
63 (r(IFRS 8) = 0.738, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000) 
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geographic locations (r(IFRS 8) = 0.225, p(IFRS 8) = 0.005) and countries (r(IFRS 8) = 0.233, 
p(IFRS 8) = 0.004)  under IFRS 8.  Additionally, the higher the market concentration 
(measured by HHI), the greater the number of the individually disclosed countries(r(IFRS 
8) = 0.186, p(IFRS 8) = 0.020) . (Appendix C. 28 - Appendix C. 32 and Table 6.26) 
 
The distribution of the disclosed geographic revenue 
The adoption of IFRS 8 resulted in a shift in the number of geographic locations reported 
by the companies.  The use of individual countries increased while the use of geographic 
regions decreased.  Additionally, the use of more specific geographic regions (continent) 
decreased whereas the use of the ROW category increased. (see in Section 6.4.1)  The 
change in the number of the geographic locations reported by the companies resulted in 
a change in the distribution of the revenue reported by different geographic locations.  
The percentage of the total revenues reported by individual countries increased from 
47.97% to 60.32%.  In addition, the percentage of the total revenues reported by ROW 
also increased from 9.79% to 16.70%.  On the other hand, the percentage of the total 
revenues reported by continent and multi-continent decreased from 42.24% (33.85% + 
8.39%) to 22.98% (18.07% + 4.91%).  Thus, while the new standard demonstrated great 
improvement in country level revenue disclosure it also resulted in a significant increase 
in more aggregated revenue information reported under the “foreign, other, ROW” 
category. (Table 6.13, Appendix D. 14) 
 
Table 6.13 Revenue distribution under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
 
 
The proportion of revenue reported by country and ROW is further analysed.  Under IAS 
14R about a fifth (18.71%) of the companies did not disclose country level information 
and about half of them (48.39%) allocated only 40.00% or less of their total revenues to 
individual countries.  Under IFRS 8 there was a significant improvement and as a result 
Revenue distribution
N=155 £m % £m %
Revenue by country 480,767 47.97 545,494 60.32
Revenue by continent 339,237 33.85 163,417 18.07
Revenue by multicontinent 84,135 8.39 44,399 4.91
Revenue by foreign & other / ROW 98,102 9.79 151,053 16.70
Total 1,002,241 100.00 904,362 100.00
IAS14 R IFRS8
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of this improvement more than half64 (third65) of the companies allocated more than 
60.00% (80.00%) of their revenues to individual countries. (see the change in Median as 
well, 43.08% → 67.49%) (Table 6.14) 
 
Table 6.14 The proportion of revenue reported by country under IAS 14R and IFRS 
8 (N=155) 
 
 
Under IAS 14 R 11 companies and under IFRS 8 9 companies disclosed all of their 
revenues by individual countries.  8 of these companies allocated 100% of their total 
revenues to individual countries under both reporting standard. (Table 6.14)  
 
The mean of the percentage of total revenues by country increased significantly (t(154)=-
7.732, p=0.000) from 44.45% to 61.52%. (Appendix C. 1) 63.23% of the sample 
companies increased and almost a third (31.61%) of the sample companies decreased the 
percentage of their total revenues reported by individual countries.  There were 
                                                 
64 11.61+11.61+12.90+20.65=56.77% 
65 12.90+20.65=33.55% 
number % number %
  0.00   -   10.00 37 23.87 37 23.87 7 4.52 7 4.52
10.01   -   20.00 18 11.61 55 35.48 10 6.45 17 10.97
20.01   -   30.00 12 7.74 67 43.23 11 7.10 28 18.06
30.01   -   40.00 8 5.16 75 48.39 10 6.45 38 24.52
40.01   -   50.00 11 7.10 86 55.48 18 11.61 56 36.13
50.01   -   60.00 12 7.74 98 63.23 11 7.10 67 43.23
60.01   -   70.00 11 7.10 109 70.32 18 11.61 85 54.84
70.01   -   80.00 10 6.45 119 76.77 18 11.61 103 66.45
80.01   -   90.00 9 5.81 128 82.58 20 12.90 123 79.35
90.01   - 100.00 27 17.42 155 100.00 32 20.65 155 100.00
Total 155 100.00 155 100.00
    0.00 29 18.71 0 0.00
100.00 11 7.10 9 5.81
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Std. Deviation
Increase
Decrease
No change
Total
IFRS 8
number
Company
%
%number
61.52
Revenue % by country
28.82
cumulative
IAS 14 R
%
cumulative
Change in revenue %
provided by country
44.45
43.08
0.00
100.00
100.00
35.63
number
Company
67.49
1.19
100.00
98.81
98
%
63.23
155 100.00
49 31.61
8 5.16
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outstanding changes within both the “increase” and “decrease” group of companies. CSR 
(8.23% → 95.28%), Petrofac (0.00% → 87.31%), Balfour Beatty (0.00% → 91.59%) all 
increased the percentage of their total revenues reported by countries by more than 80 
percentage points.  Balfour Beatty and Petrofac did not report any revenue allocated to 
individual countries under IAS 14R.  But for example, Logica decreased the percentage 
of its total revenues allocated to individual countries by more than 20 percentage points 
(61.81 → 41.64) because it stopped providing revenue information for the Netherland 
and for Germany under IFRS 8.  These two countries were aggregated into geographic 
regions (Benelux, International).  
 
Table 6.15 The proportion of revenue reported by ROW under IAS 14R and IFRS 
8 (N=155) 
 
 
Almost half of the companies (46.45%) did not use the ROW “geographic region” under 
IAS 14R.  The number of these companies decreased from 72 to 53 (34.19%) under IFRS 
8.  The companies disclosed maximum 60% of their revenues by ROW under IAS 14R.  
number % number %
  0.00   -   10.00 124 80.00 124 80.00 105 67.74 105 67.74
10.01   -   20.00 13 8.39 137 88.39 18 11.61 123 79.35
20.01   -   30.00 12 7.74 149 96.13 10 6.45 133 85.81
30.01   -   40.00 3 1.94 152 98.06 7 4.52 140 90.32
40.01   -   50.00 2 1.29 154 99.35 2 1.29 142 91.61
50.01   -   60.00 1 0.65 155 100.00 5 3.23 147 94.84
60.01   -   70.00 0 0.00 155 100.00 5 3.23 152 98.06
70.01   -   80.00 0 0.00 155 100.00 2 1.29 154 99.35
80.01   -   90.00 0 0.00 155 100.00 1 0.65 155 100.00
90.01   - 100.00 0 0.00 155 100.00 0 0.00 155 100.00
Total 155 100.00 155 100.00
    0.00 72 46.45 53 34.19
> 0.00 83 53.55 102 65.81
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Std. Deviation
Increase
Decrease
No change
Total
number %
cumulative
0.00 0.00
58.98 88.48
%
6.22 12.00
0.77 2.98
Change in revenue %
provided by ROW
Company
number %
Revenue % by ROW
IAS 14 R IFRS 8
Company
number %
cumulative
58.98 88.48
10.33 19.09
76 49.03
28 18.06
51 32.90
155 100.00
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More importantly, 80.00% of the companies disclosed less than 10% of their revenues by 
ROW.  Even under IFRS 8 only 8 companies reported more than 60% of their total 
revenues by ROW.  Thus, it seems that most of the companies try to keep the ROW 
category relatively low. (Table 6.15) 
 
However, the mean of the percentage of the total revenues reported by ROW increased 
significantly (p(154)=-3.931, p=0.000) from 6.22% to 12.00%. (Appendix C. 18)  If we 
assume that the companies used a 10% quantitative threshold for materiality these 
numbers seem to be reasonably low even after the significant increase under IFRS 8.  
However, the percentage of the total revenues allocated to ROW varies significantly 
between the companies (see Table 6.15, Standard Deviations are almost twice the value 
of the means). 
 
76 of the sample companies increased and only 28 companies decreased the percentage 
of their total revenues reported by ROW. (Table 6.15)  Sthree (47.79% → 4.94%), De La 
Rue (58.98% → 16.95%) and RPS Group (33.90% → 0.35%) made a great decrease in 
the use of ROW category.  However, in the case of De La Rue the decrease was not the 
result of the company’s intention to provide less aggregated, more detailed information 
but the result of the use of different attribution basis for allocating revenues.  On the other 
hand, Croda International for example increased the percentage of its total revenues 
reported under ROW by more than 70 percentage point (2.56% → 73.63%).  
 
Single segment, not cross listed, not US listed, early adopter companies, companies in the 
Utilities and Telecommunications industries and companies attributing their revenues 
based on origin and have mixed reporting segments under IFRS 8, on average, allocated 
more of their total revenues to individual countries.  Companies in the Oil and Gas 
industry, on average, allocated 35.52% of their revenues to individual countries under 
IAS 14 R.  Under IFRS 8, on average, 76.30% of the total revenues of the same companies 
were allocated to individual countries.  Extractive industry initiatives and regulations / 
proposed regulations requiring CBCR from companies in the extractive industries might 
have had a positive effect on the segmental reporting notes of these companies. (see more 
in Chapter 8)  Companies in the Basic Materials industry also increased the proportion of 
their revenues reported by country.  However, the proportion of the revenues reported by 
countries by the companies in this industry, on average, are still under 47.03%, which is 
less than the mean for all industries (61.52%). (Appendix C. 19 and Appendix C. 20) 
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The average of the total revenue reported as ROW increased with the exception of single 
segment companies and companies reporting geographic revenue information under 
geographic reporting segments. (Appendix C. 19 and Appendix C. 20) 
 
While both industry type and US listing had significant effect on the revenue percentage 
reported by country under IAS 14R only industry type has significant effect on the 
revenue percentage reported by country under IFRS 8.  Follow up post hoc analysis 
indicated that companies in the Basic Materials, Industrials and Technology industries 
reported significantly lower percentage of their total revenues by individual countries 
than companies in the Utilities industry.  None of the company characteristics had 
significant effect on the percentage of the total revenues reported by ROW. (Table 6.25 
and Appendix C. 16) 
 
It is not surprising that there is significant negative correlation between the percentage of 
the total revenues reported by country and the percentage of the total revenues reported 
under ROW category both under IAS 14 R and under IFRS 8 (r(IFRS 8) = -0.338, p(IFRS 8) = 
0.000; r(IAS 14R) = -0.258, p(IAS 14R) = 0.001).  The percentage of the total revenues reported 
by country under IFRS 8 significantly, positively correlated to the percentage of the total 
revenues reported by country under IAS 14 (r(IFRS 8) = 0.655, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000) and to the 
number of individual countries reported under IFRS 8 (r(IFRS 8) = 0.328, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000).  
There is significant, negative correlation between the percentage of the total revenues 
reported by country and the proportion of the foreign revenues within total revenues (r(IFRS 
8) = -0.461, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000), the number of countries where the company has subsidiaries 
(r(IFRS 8) = -0.382, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000) and the number of regions the company reports (r(IFRS 
8) = -0.435, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000).  Thus, the higher the percentage of the foreign revenues, the 
greater the number of countries where the company has subsidiaries and the greater the 
number of geographic regions reported by the company, the lower the percentage of the 
total revenues reported by individual countries.  Whereas, the higher the proportion of the 
foreign revenues within the company’s total revenues (r(IFRS 8) = 0.230, p(IFRS 8) = 0.004) 
and the greater the number of the countries where the company has subsidiaries (r(IFRS 8) 
= 0.313, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000), the greater the percentage of the total revenues reported under 
ROW by the company. (Appendix C. 28 - Appendix C. 32 and Table 6.26) 
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The fineness of geographic revenue information provided by the companies 
Doupnik and Seese (2001) argue that comparing the number of geographic areas reported 
under the old (SFAS 14) and the new standards (SFAS 131) is an imperfect measure of 
the change in fineness.  The new regulation requires the disclosure of country-level 
information if the country is material.  However, the geographic areas reported under the 
old regulation are likely to be more aggregated (countries, continent, multi-continent 
etc.).  The authors argue that “an information set in which disclosures are made on a 
country basis but for a small number of countries may be more useful than information 
set in which data are provided for a greater number of areas but at more aggregated 
level.” (p124)  Additionally, a higher percentage of total foreign revenues disclosed by 
geographic areas probable provides more useful geographic information for financial 
statement users.  
 
Calculation of Fineness score 
Doupnik and Seese (2001) developed a fineness score “that combines the number of areas 
reported, the level of aggregation represented by each area and the percentage of foreign 
operation in that area”. (p124) (Equation 6.1) 
 
(Equation 6.1) 
      
 
Where 
AREAREVi = revenue for geographic area i 
FORREV = total foreign revenues 
weighti = 0, for geographic areas described as “Foreign” or “Other” 
1, for geographic areas defined as multi-continents 
2, for geographic areas defined as continents 
3, for geographic areas defined as countries 
Source: Doupnik and Seese, 2001, p124. 
 
Doupnik and Seese (2001) used two other weighting schemes to test the sensitivity of the 
fineness score to the weights used.  For geographic areas defined as countries they used 
weight 4 and 8 beside weight 3, with other weights remaining the same.  
 
The higher the fineness score, the finer the geographic revenue information provided by 
a company.  The comparison of the fineness scores under the old regulation and under the 
i
i
n
i
weight
FORREV
AREAREV
F *)(
1



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new regulation can indicate whether the companies provided finer geographical revenue 
information under the new segment reporting standard. (Doupnik and Seese, 2001) 
 
Doupnik and Seese (2001) did not find significant change in the mean fineness score 
when they weighted the country level disclosures by 3.  However, they found significant 
increase in the mean fineness score when they assigned weight 4 and 8 to the country 
level disclosures.  Thus, for their sample the change in the fineness score depends on the 
weight assigned to the country level information.  
 
Table 6.16 Examples of the calculation of fineness scores 
Panel A 
 
Ultra Electronics Holdings Plc, Annual Report and Accounts 2009, p59. 
Panel B 
 
Ultra Electronics Holdings Plc, Annual Report and Accounts 2008, p52. 
Panel C 
 
 
 
Revenue
£'000
3 4 8 3 4 8
1 2
Under IAS 14 _ 2008
Country 426,374 0.83 3 4 8 2.48 3.31 6.62
Continent 51,892 0.10 2 2 2 0.20 0.20 0.20
Multicontinent 0 0.00 1 1 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign / other 37,005 0.07 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 515,271 1.00 2.68 3.51 6.82
Under IFRS 8 _ 2009
Country 522,693 0.80 3 4 8 2.41 3.21 6.42
Continent 59,453 0.09 2 2 2 0.18 0.18 0.18
Multicontinent 0 0.00 1 1 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign / other 68,890 0.11 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 651,036 1.00 2.59 3.39 6.60
Difference -0.09 -0.12 -0.22
Country weight
AREAREV / FORREV
Area
Weight
3
F
4 = 3*2
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In this study “total revenues” (TOTREV) is used instead of “foreign revenues” 
(FORREV) to calculate the measurement of the fineness of geographic revenue 
information.  Thus, the fineness of geographic revenue information measured rather than 
the fineness of foreign revenue disclosed. (Equation 6.2) 
 
(Equation 6.2) 
 
       
 
Where 
AREAREVi = revenue for geographic area i 
TOTREV = total revenues 
weighti = 0, for geographic areas described as Foreign/Other/ROW 
1, for geographic areas defined as multi-continents 
2, for geographic areas defined as continents 
3, 4 or 8 for geographic areas defined as countries 
c   country weight = 3, 4 and 8 
based on Doupnik and Seese, 2001, p124. 
 
To check the robustness of the fineness score the three weighting schemes applied by 
Doupnik and Seese (2001) (country weight = 3, 4, and 8) is also used in this study.  
 
Different growth rates of revenues from different geographic areas (change in the 
structure of the revenue) can easily change the fineness score of a company from one year 
to another even if the company uses exactly the same geographic areas under both IAS 
14R and IFRS 8. (see an example in Panel A, B, C in Table 6.16)  The study focuses on 
the first time adoption of IFRS 8.  Corresponding (restated) information for the new 
reporting structure is available in the Annual Report of the companies.  Therefore, the 
restated and the original IAS 14 numbers are compared to capture the change due to the 
more / less detailed geographic information provided by the sample companies under 
IFRS 8. (Panel A, B, C in Table 6.17) 
 
Change in fineness scores and the effect of different company characteristic on the 
fineness score 
When assigning country level disclosures weight=3, paired t-test indicates significant 
increase in the mean fineness score from the last application of IAS 14R (M(IAS14R, 
N=155)=2.17; SE(IAS14R, N=155)=0.60)  to the first application of IFRS 8 (M(IAS14Rrestated, 
i
i
n
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N=155)=2.31; SE(IAS14Rrestated, N=155)=0.59).  On average, companies disclosed significantly 
finer geographic revenue information under IFRS 8 than under IAS 14R (t(154)=-3.69, 
p=0.000).  (Table 6.18, Appendix C. 21 and Appendix C. 22) 
 
Table 6.17 Example of the decomposition of the change in fineness score 
Panel A 
 
Charter International Plc, Annual Report 2009, p78. 
Panel B 
 
Charter International Plc, Annual Report 2008, p70. 
Panel C 
 
Revenue
£'m
3 4 8 3 4 8
1 2
Under IAS 14 _ 2008
Country 173 0.09 3 4 8 0.28 0.37 0.74
Continent 1,408 0.75 2 2 2 1.49 1.49 1.49
Multicontinent 0 0.00 1 1 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign / other 306 0.16 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 1,887 1.00 1.77 1.86 2.23
Under IFRS 8 _ 2009
Country 676 0.41 3 4 8 1.23 1.63 3.26
Continent 641 0.39 2 2 2 0.77 0.77 0.77
Multicontinent 0 0.00 1 1 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign / other 342 0.21 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 1,659 1.00 2.00 2.40 4.03
Under IFRS 8 _ Restated 2008
Country 762 0.40 3 4 8 1.21 1.61 3.23
Continent 820 0.43 2 2 2 0.87 0.87 0.87
Multicontinent 0 0.00 1 1 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
Foreign / other 306 0.16 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 1,887 1.00 2.08 2.48 4.10
Difference (IFRS 8 _ 2009) - (IAS 14 _ 2008) 0.23 0.54 1.80
Difference (IFRS 8 _ Restated 2008) - (IFRS 8 _ 2009) 0.08 0.08 0.07
Difference (IFRS 8 _ Restated 2008) - (IAS 14 2008) 0.31 0.62 1.87
Country weight
AREAREV / FORREV
Area
Weight
3
F
4 = 3*2
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The fineness score increased for two fifth of the companies (66 companies, 42.58% of the 
sample).  Some companies had great increase in fineness score by simply reporting less 
broad geographic areas.  For example, Bodycote used Europe, Middle East and Africa, 
Americas, Asia Pacific geographic areas under IAS 14R and Western Europe, North 
America and Emerging Markets under IFRS 8.  The use of continents (North America) 
instead of multi-continents (Americas) resulted in a 1.46 increase in the fineness score of 
the company.  Others, for example Misys started to provide revenue information for 
additional material countries (IAS 14R: UK, Rest of Europe, Asia-Pacific, Americas → 
IFRS 8: UK, Rest of Europe, Asia-Pacific, USA, Middle East and Africa).  The decrease 
of the fineness score for 27 companies indicated that almost a fifth of the sample 
companies (17.42%) provided less fine geographic revenue information under the new 
standard.  Within this group Victrex plc had the greatest decrease in fineness score (from 
2.34 to 1.07).  Under IAS 14R (2009) Victrex disaggregated its revenue into Europe, US 
and Asia-Pacific geographic areas.  Whereas, under IFRS 8 (2010) the company used 
broader geographic areas (EMEA, Americas and Asia-Pacific) and stopped to disclose 
separately its revenues from the US.  In both years the company attributed its revenues to 
the reported geographical areas based on the customer’s location.  In 2009 44.15% of the 
company’s revenues were allocated to the US.  It is hard to believe that in 2010 the 
revenues from the US were not material enough to be disclosed separately.  Generally, 
companies in this group started to use broader geographic areas (e.g. Victrex) or reported 
only revenues from the country of domicile and foreign revenues (e.g. Rentokil).  
Additionally, for 62 of the sample companies (40.00%) the fineness score did not change 
at all.  These companies used exactly the same geographic revenue reporting structure 
under both segmental reporting standards. (Table 6.18 and Appendix C. 21) 
 
Table 6.18 Change in fineness scores (N=155) 
 
 
The company with the greatest increase in fineness score (from 0.82 to 2.42) is De La 
Rue.  Under IAS 14R (2009) the company disaggregated its revenues into UK and Ireland, 
Rest of Europe, Americas and ROW geographic areas.  Under IFRS 8 (2010) the company 
IAS 14 R IAS 14 R restated IAS 14 R IAS 14 R restated IAS 14 R IAS 14 R restated
Mean 2.17 2.31 2.61 2.93 4.39 5.41
Standard Deviation 0.60 0.59 0.94 0.85 2.34 1.96
Increase 66 42.58% 70 45.16% 77 49.68%
Decrease 27 17.42% 23 14.84% 16 10.32%
No change 62 40.00% 62 40.00% 62 40.00%
Total 155 100.00% 155 100.00% 155 100.00%
-0.09 -0.38
Change in fineness (number & % of companies)
-0.01
Fineness 
Change
N=155
0.14
Change
Country weight = 3 Country weight = 4 Country weight = 8
0.32 1.02
Statistics
Change
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only disclosed revenues from the UK and from “Other” countries.  Thus, a decrease in 
fineness score could be expected.  Under IAS 14R the company attributed its revenues to 
the different geographic areas based on destination.  In 2009 12.36% of the revenues was 
allocated to the UK and Ireland geographic segment.  However, under IFRS8 the 
company attributed its revenues to the geographic areas based on origin.  As a result, in 
2010 83.05% of the revenues were allocated to the UK geographic area (80.75% based 
on the restated 2009’s numbers).  This example clearly indicates that one selected quality 
measure (e.g. change in fineness score or change in the number of reported areas) is not 
enough to analyse the effects of the new standard and the different measures should be 
analysed with caution. 
 
Appendix C. 24 provides the means and standard deviations of the fineness scores by 
different categorical variables. Early adopter, single segment, not cross listed, not US 
listed, not FTSE 100 companies, companies audited by Big4_D and Big4_A (Not Big4 
and Big4_C), companies providing geographic information only under geographic or 
mixed reporting segments, companies attributing their revenues to individual countries 
based on the origin of the revenues, and companies in the Utilities (Technology) industry, 
on average, provide more (less) fine geographic revenue information under IAS 14R and 
IFRS 8.  Companies providing geographic revenue information only under geographic 
(F3, IAS14R=2.41; F3, IAS14Rrestated=2.45) or mixed (F3, IAS14R=2.49; F3, IAS14Rrestated=2.42) 
reporting segments and companies providing geographic information under reporting 
segments and entity-wide information in the same structure (F3, IAS14R=2.45; F3, 
IAS14Rrestated=2.59) have the highest fineness score under both segmental reporting 
standards.  Whereas, companies providing only entity-wide geographic revenue 
information (companies with business reporting segments; F3, IAS14R=2.12; F3, 
IAS14Rrestated=2.30) or disclosing geographic revenue information under both reporting 
segments and entity-wide disclosures but in a different structure (F3, IAS14R=2.04; F3, 
IAS14Rrestated=2.20) have the lowest fineness score.
66 (Appendix C. 23 and Appendix C. 24)  
However, none of the previously mentioned company characteristics (industry, auditor, 
single segment, early adopter, FTSE 100/250, cross listing, US listing, type of reporting 
segment, type of geographic disclosure under IFRS 8 and base of revenue attribution) 
seems to have significant effect on the IFRS 8 fineness score.  There is some evidence 
                                                 
66 However, the fineness score for companies providing only entity-wide information significantly 
increased under the new standard (t(97)=-3.54, p=0.001). 
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that industry type, US listing and the way the companies report geographic information 
under IFRS 8 have significant effect on the IAS 14R fineness score.67 (Appendix C. 25) 
 
The correlation coefficient between the IAS 14R and IFRS 8 fineness scores shows 
significant, positive correlation (r(IFRS 8) = 0.680, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000).  This is in line with the 
previous findings.  Thus, the disclosure practice of the companies under IFRS 8 is based 
on their disclosure practice under IAS 14.  Additionally, the higher the proportion of the 
foreign revenues within the total revenues (r(IFRS 8) = -0.497, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000) and the 
greater the number of the countries where the company has subsidiaries (r(IFRS 8) = -0.454, 
p(IFRS 8) = 0.000), the lower the fineness score. (Appendix C. 28, Appendix C. 29 and 
Appendix C. 30)  Furthermore, the higher the number of tax haven countries where the 
companies have subsidiaries (r(IFRS 8) = -0.298, p(IFRS 8) = 0.000)/ the number of 
subsidiaries in tax haven countries (r(IFRS 8) = -0.218, p(IFRS 8) = 0.006), the lower the 
fineness score.  Thus, the results provide some indication that the companies’ tax policy 
(when proxied by the number of tax haven countries with subsidiaries or with the number 
of subsidiaries in tax havens) affects the companies’ geographic disclosure practice / 
quality.  
 
The use of country level weight=4 and 8 generally lead to similar results. (Appendix C. 
21 - Appendix C. 25 and Table 6.18) 
 
The number of items disclosed by country  
Table 6.19 shows the items disclosed by the companies for individual countries under 
IFRS 8.  Most companies report only external revenues and NCA for individual countries.  
This is not surprising because more than half of the companies (87/155=56.19%) 
provided information under entity-wide disclosures.  These companies only had to report 
external revenue and NCA for their country of domicile and for their individually material 
foreign countries.  IAS 14R required the disclosure of external revenues, segment assets 
and capital expenditures for secondary segments.  Most of these companies provided 
geographic information entity-wide disclosure under IFRS 8. (Table 6.2)  About a fifth 
of the companies that report geographic information under entity-wide disclosure kept 
providing capital expenditures items under IFRS 8 as well.  However, with the exception 
of some Financial Statement items (mostly some additional asset measure) the companies 
                                                 
67 But for the industry type and US listing the significant effect can only be measured when weight =4 and 
8 were assigned to the country level revenue disclosures. 
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generally did not disclose any additional, voluntary financial statements items by country.  
Whereas, more than 60% of the companies that provided country level information under 
their geographic or mixed reportable segments disclosed capital expenditure, segment 
assets, depreciation / amortisation and segment liabilities for their individually reported 
countries. (Table 6.19) 
 
Table 6.19 Items disclosed by individual country under IFRS 8 (N=155) 
Geographic disclosure  
under IFRS 8 
 
 
Item 
Geographic 
reportable 
segment 
Mixed 
reportable 
segment 
Entity-wide 
information 
Both EWI & 
reportable 
segment 
Total  
Company 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Revenues from external customer   15 100.00   13 100.00   87 100.00   40 100.00 155 100.00 
Non-current assets     6   40.00     4   30.77   71   81.61   31   77.50 112   72.26 
Capital expenditure   12   80.00     11   84.62   18   20.69   11   27.50   52   33.55 
Segment Assets   13   86.67   10   76.92   14   16.09   13   32.50   50   32.26 
Profit measure   15 100.00   13 100.00     5     5.75   10   25.00   43   27.74 
Depreciation / Amortisation   12   80.00   11   84.62     2     2.30     8   20.00   33   21.29 
Segment Liabilities   10   66.67     8   61.54     0     0.00     8   20.00   26   16.77 
Additional Balance Sheet items1     6   40.00     3   23.08     6     6.90     6   15.00   21   13.55 
Intersegment revenues     4   26.67     3   23.08     2     2.30     6   15.00   15   9.68 
Additional Income Statement items2     5   33.33     3   23.08     1     1.15     3     7.50   12     7.74 
Equity method interest     3   20.00     4   30.77     1     1.15     3     7.50   11     7.10 
Exceptional items     1     6.67     5   38.46     0     0.00     5   12.50   11     7.10 
Equity method investment     3   20.00     1     7.69     0     0.00     3   7.50     7     4.52 
Other material non-cash item     2   13.33     1     7.69     0     0.00     0     0.00     3     1.94 
Share based payments     2   13.33     0     0.00     0     0.00     1     2.50     3     1.94 
Number of employees     0     0.00     0     0.00     2     2.30     0     0.00     2     1.29 
Financial Ratio     1     6.67     1     7.69     0     0.00     0     0.00     2     1.29 
Net interest     1     6.67     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     1     0.65 
Restructuring expense     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     1     2.50     1     0.65 
Income tax / expense     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     1     2.50     1     0.65 
Interest revenue     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00 
Interest expense     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00 
Cash Flow item     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00 
R & D      0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00 
Mean (St Deviation) 7.80 (2.15) 7.38 (3.07) 2.56 (1.40) 3.73 (3.02) 3.77 (2.84) 
1: e.g. PPE, tangible assets, intangible assets, net assets, goodwill, other receivables, cash at bank and hand, current assets 
2: e.g. sales, financial income, financial cost, inventory write off, unwinding discount, net provision, cost of sales, operating expenses 
 
Profit measure is not required to be disclosed for individual countries if they are not 
reported as one of the company’s reportable segments.  Thus, the disclosure of an earning 
measure for individual country is voluntary under entity-wide information.  27.74% of 
the companies disclosed one or more profit measure for the reported individual countries.  
Every company that disclosed country level information under reporting segments 
provided at least one profit measure.  However, only 5 (5.75%) of the companies that 
disclosed country level information as entity-wide information provided any profit 
measure. (Table 6.19)  Although, 27.74% seems to be quite a reasonable proportion of 
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the companies, users can not be really happy with the disclosed information.  The 
companies use several different, and in many cases non GAAP, profit measures.  For 
example the 43 profit measure disclosing company reported the following profit 
measures: Earnings Before Interest (EBI); Earnings Before Interest, Taxes and 
Amortisation (EBITA); Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortisation 
(EBITDA); Profit Before Interest, Tax and Amortisation (PBITA); Profit Before Interest 
and Tax (PBIT); retail profit; trading profit or loss; gross profit; underlying profit; 
segment result; brand contribution; headline contribution; adjusted operating profit; 
operating profit; profit before tax; profit before financial expenses; result etc..  Thus, the 
comparability of the disclosed earning measures between companies is questionable.  
 
The average number of items disclosed by the sample companies is 3.77.  There are 
considerable differences between the number of items disclosed by the companies 
(standard deviation=2.84).  Companies in the Consumer Services and 
Telecommunication (Basic Materials, Utilities) industries, audited by Big4_A (Not Big4), 
not cross listed (cross listed), not US listed (US listed), early adopters (not early adopters) 
and companies that report their geographic information under either as geographic or 
mixed reportable segments (entity-wide information) disclosed, on average, higher 
(lower) number of items for their individually reported countries.  The industry type68 and 
the way the company provides its geographic information significantly affects the number 
of items disclosed by country.  Post hoc analysis indicates that companies in the 
Consumer Services (5.32) industry disclose significantly higher number of items by 
country than companies in the Basic Materials (2.40) industry.  Additionally, companies 
that provide their geographic information under geographic (7.80) or mixed (7.38) 
reportable segments disclose significantly higher number of items by country than 
companies that provide entity-wide geographic information (2.56). (Appendix C. 26) 
 
With the exception of current ratio none of the other quantitative company characteristics 
(proportion of foreign revenues, proportion of revenue reported by country, capital 
intensity, total sales, growth rate, profitability, current ratio, gearing, effective tax rate, 
number of geographic location / country / region reported, number of foreign countries 
with subsidiary, number of subsidiaries in foreign countries) had significant correlation 
                                                 
68 although the result of  the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test does not show this effect 
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with the number of items disclosed by country. (Appendix C. 28, Appendix C. 29 and 
Appendix C. 30) 
 
From the 155 companies that disclosed geographic information for at least one country 
under IFRS 8 126 (81.29%) disclosed country level information under IAS 14R as well.  
The impacts of the new standard on the items disclosed by country can be further studied 
on this smaller sample. 
 
On average, companies disclosed significantly lower number of items by individual 
countries under IFRS 8 (M(IFRS8, N=126)=3.95, SE(IFRS8, N=126)=0.256) than under IAS 14R 
(M(IAS14R, N=126)=5.49, SE(IAS14R, N=126)=0.257) (t(125)=6.662, p=0.000). (Appendix C. 27, 
Table 6.20)  The result is not surprising and was expected based on the changes 
introduced in the new segmental reporting standard. (see Table 2.2 and Sector 2.2 for 
details about the disclosure requirements of IAS 14R and IFRS 8) 
 
Both under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 the sample companies disclosed external revenue for the 
reported individual countries.  Beside the revenue item under IAS 14R almost all of the 
companies disclosed segment assets (98.41%) and capital expenditures (97.62%) and 
more than two fifths of the companies disclosed profit measure (44.44%) and segment 
liabilities (42.86%) as well.  The disclosure of segment assets and capital expenditures is 
no longer mandatory under IFRS 8.  It resulted in significant decrease in the proportion 
of the capital expenditure (97.62% → 39.68%) and segment asset (98.41% → 38.10%) 
disclosing companies. (Table 6.20) 
 
The percentage of the profit measure disclosing companies decreased from 44.44% to 
33.33% under IFRS 8.  The disclosure of profit measure was required for the primary 
segments under IAS 14R and is required for the reportable segments under IFRS 8.  
Companies that provided country level geographic information as primary segments 
under IAS 14R and as geographic or mixed reportable segments under IFRS 8 disclosed 
profit measure for their individually reported countries.  However, the disclosure of profit 
measure for other companies was / is not mandatory.  The proportion of companies that 
voluntarily provided profit measure for their individually reported countries was low 
under both segmental reporting standards. (Table 6.20) 
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Table 6.20 Items disclosed by individual country under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 (N=126)  
Geographic disclosure under IFRS 8 
 
 
 
Item 
 Geographic segments under IAS 14R Geographic reporting under IFRS 8 
Primary Secondary Total Geographic 
reportable segment 
Mixed reportable 
segment 
Entity-wide 
information 
Both EWI & rep. 
segment 
Total 
Company 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Revenues from external customer   33 100.00   93 100.00 126 100.00   15 100.00   13 100.00   68 100.00   30 100.00 126 100.00 
Non-current assets     1     3.03     0     0.00     1     0.79     6   40.00     4   30.77   55   80.88   22   73.33   87  69.05 
Capital expenditure   33 100.00   90   96.77 123   97.62   12   80.00   11   84.62   17   25.00   10   33.33   50   39.68 
Segment Assets   33 100.00   91   97.85 124   98.41   13 100.00   10   76.92   12   17.65   13   43.33   48   38.10 
Profit measure   33 100.00   23   24.73   56   44.44   15 100.00   13   100.00     5     7.35     9   30.00   42   33.33 
Depreciation / Amortisation   32   96.97   12   12.90   44   34.92   12   80.00   11   84.62     1     1.47     7   23.33   31   24.60 
Segment Liabilities   33 100.00   21   22.58   54   42.86   10   66.67     8   61.54     0     0.00     8   26.67   26   20.63 
Additional Balance Sheet items1   16   48.48   22   23.66   38   30.16     6   40.00     3   23.08     4     5.88     4   13.33   17   13.49 
Intersegment revenues   14   42.42     5     5.38   19   15.08     4   26.67     3   23.08     2     2.94     5   16.67   14   11.11 
Additional Income Statement items2   18   54.55   19   20.43   37   29.37     5   33.33     3   23.08     1     1.47     3   10.00   12     9.52 
Exceptional items     7   21.21     7     7.53   14   11.11     1     6.67     5   38.46     0     0.00     5   16.67   11     8.73 
Equity method interest     9   27.27     9     9.68   18   14.29     3   20.00     4   30.77     1     1.47     2     6.67   10     7.94 
Equity method investment     8   24.24     6     6.45   14   11.11     3   20.00     1     7.69     0     0.00     3   10.00     7     5.56 
Other material non-cash item     9   27.27     3     3.23   12     9.52     2   13.33     1     7.69     0     0.00     0     0.00     3     2.38 
Share based payments     4   12.12     0     0.00     4     3.17     2   13.33     0     0.00     0     0.00     1     3.33     3     2.38 
Number of employees     0     0.00     2     2.15     2     1.59     0     0.00     0     0.00     2     2.94     0     0.00     2     1.59 
Financial Ratio     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     1     6.67     1     7.69     0     0.00     0     0.00     2     1.59 
Net interest     1     3.03     0     0.00     1     0.79     1     6.67     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     1     0.79 
Restructuring expense     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     1     3.33     1     0.79 
Income tax / expense     2     6.06     0     0.00     2     1.59     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     1     3.33     1     0.79 
Interest revenue     1     3.03     1     1.08     2     1.59     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00 
Interest expense     1     3.03     0     0.00     1     0.79     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00 
Cash Flow item     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00 
R & D      0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00     0     0.00 
Mean (St Deviation) 8.73 (1.84) 4.34 (2.25) 5.49 (2.89) 7.47 (1.85) 6.85 (2.64) 2.51 (1.11) 4.20 (3.64) 3.95 (2.88) 
1: e.g. PPE, tangible assets, intangible assets, net assets, goodwill, other receivables, cash at bank and hand, current assets 
2: e.g. sales, financial income, financial cost, inventory write off, unwinding discount, net provision, cost of sales, operating expenses 
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The disclosure of segment liabilities was mandatory for the companies reporting 
geographic information under primary segments.  However, under IFRS 8 the disclosure 
of segment liabilities became voluntary even for the companies that provide geographic 
information under their reportable segments.  As a result the proportion of the companies 
that disclosed segment liabilities for individually reported countries decreased from 
42.86% to 20.63%. (Table 6.20) 
 
The results in this chapter indicate that there was significant increase in the number of 
countries reported by the companies under IFRS 8.69  However, the results also suggest 
that for this increased number of individually reported countries the companies disclosed 
fewer items.  Thus, it seems that the companies made a trade-off between providing less 
aggregated geographic locations and disclosing fewer numbers of items for these 
geographic locations.  Pearson correlation coefficient indicates significant, negative 
correlation (N=126, r=-0.212, p=0.017) between the change in the number of individual 
countries reported and the change in the number of items disclosed by individual 
countries.  Thus, the more the companies increased the number of their reported countries 
the more they decreased the number of items disclosed for their individually reported 
countries.  
 
Homogeneity / heterogeneity of the companies’ geographic disclosure 
The different quality measures used in this study indicate considerable variation between 
the geographic disclosure quality of individual companies both under IAS 14 R and IFRS 
8 (see standard deviations in Table 6.21).  The previous part of the study tried to explain 
this variation with the effects of different company characteristics on the companies’ 
geographic disclosure quality. (see Section 6.5.2)  Company characteristics used in this 
study usually do not change significantly from one year to another.  Therefore, an increase 
in the homogeneity (heterogeneity) of the geographic disclosure quality of the companies 
could be an indication of that the previously (1) poorly reporting companies enhanced 
(further decreased) and / or (2) good and excellent disclosers decreased (further enhanced) 
the quality of their geographic reporting.  Previous results in this study indicated that there 
were companies that increased the quality and there were companies that decreased the 
quality of their geographic disclosure. (see e.g. Table 6.9, Table 6.18)  However, the 
                                                 
69 M(IAS14R, N=126)=1.79 , SE(IAS14R, N=126)=0.138 , M(IFRS8, N=126)=2.82 , SE(IFRS8, N=126)= 0.208, t(125)=-6.091, 
p=0.000  
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question is whether the introduction of IFRS 8 resulted in more homogenous geographic 
disclosures.  
 
The results of this study indicate significant increase (1) in the number of countries 
reported, (2) in the proportion of revenues reported by countries and (3) in the fineness 
scores of the companies.  The relative standard deviations and the changes in these 
relative standard deviations in Table 6.21 indicate that the homogeneity of these quality 
measures of the companies’ geographic disclosures increased.  Thus, better quality (more 
details, less aggregated, more homogenous) geographic information is provided by the 
companies in these areas under IFRS 8.  This could increase the usefulness of the 
geographic information disclosed by the companies.  On the other hand, the number of 
items disclosed by countries not just decreased significantly under the new standard but 
the companies’ disclosure practice became more heterogeneous as well.  These impacts 
of the new standard could negatively affect the usefulness of the geographic information 
disclosed by the companies. (Table 6.21) 
 
However, there is evidence that the companies’ geographic disclosure practice / quality 
under IAS 14R significantly affects the companies’ geographic disclosure practice / 
quality under IFRS 8 (see more in Section 6.5.3 and examples e.g. in Table 6.9, Table 
6.18)  Whether the companies that provided poor quality geographic disclosure under IAS 
14R and had more room for quality improvement used the introduction of the new 
standard to improve the quality of their geographic disclosures could be a question for 
further analysis.  
 
Information about the revenue attribution to geographic locations 
IAS 14R required the disclosure of “segment revenue from external customers by 
geographic areas based on the geographic location of” the company’s “customer70” 
(IAS 14R, 69(a)) even if the company’s “primary reporting segment information is 
geographical segments that are based on location of assets71” (IAS 14R, 71).  Thus, the 
disclosed geographic revenue information was comparable between companies because 
every company needed to disclose its external revenues attributed to different geographic 
areas based on the location of the customer of the company. 
 
                                                 
70 “where its products are sold or services are rendered” (IAS 14R, 68(c)) 
71 “where the products are produced or where the service delivery operations are based“ (IAS 14R, 68(b)) 
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Table 6.21 Mean, Standard Deviation, Relative Standard Deviation of the different geographic disclosure quality measures under IAS 14R and 
IFRS 8 
 
Standard 
 
Quality measure 
IAS 14R IFRS 8 Change in 
Relative 
Std.dev. (%) 
Mean Std.dev. Relative 
Std.dev. (%) 
Mean Std.dev. Relative 
Std.dev. (%) 
N=155 
Number of reported 
 locations   4.08   1.89   46.32   5.04   2.68   53.17 +  6.85 
 countries   1.45   1.56 107.59   2.77   2.19   79.06 -28.53 
Proportion of revenue (%) reported by 
 
 country 44.45 35.63   80.16 61.52 28.82   46.85 -33.31 
 ROW   6.22 10.33 166.08 12.00 19.09 159.08 -  7.00 
Fineness score 
 country weight=3   2.17   0.60   27.65   2.30   0.59   25.65 -  2.00 
 country weight=4   2.61   0.94   36.02   2.91   0.85   29.21 -  6.81 
 country weight=8   4.39   2.34   53.30   5.37   1.96   36.50 -16.80 
N=126 
Number of reported items   5.49   2.89   52.64   3.95   2.88   72.91 +20.27 
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Under IFRS 8 companies have a greater degree of the flexibility in deciding how to 
attribute revenues from external customers to individual countries but the basis for 
attributing revenues need to be disclosed (IFRS 8, 33(b)72).  The companies used a variety 
of bases which were grouped into two bigger categories, namely customer location and 
origin. (Table 6.22) 
 
Table 6.22 Revenue attribution to individual countries under IFRS 8 
 
 
 
Only about 70% of the sample (N=155) companies disclosed their basis for attributing 
revenues to individual countries.  Most of the disclosing companies (73/(155-44) → 
65.77%) attributed revenues on the basis of the location of the customer. (Table 6.22) 
 
Some of the companies argued that “Due to the nature of the Group’s businesses, the 
origin and destination of revenue is the same.” (e.g. National Express Group Plc, Annual 
Report and Accounts 2009, p71.; Stagecoach Group Plc, Annual Report and Accounts 
2009, p53.)  The operation of these companies tightly linked to geographical markets and 
the services they provide on those markets.  Therefore, these companies were grouped 
into the “location of the customer” category by the researcher.  
 
                                                 
72 “If revenues from external customers attributed to an individual foreign country are material, those revenues 
shall be disclosed separately.  An entity shall disclose the basis for attributing revenues from external customers 
to individual countries.” (IFRS 8, 33(b)) 
Sample size
Revenue attributed by Number % Number % Number % 
Customer location 50 22.52 47 26.40 43 27.74
Destination 22 9.91 22 12.36 21 13.55
Geographic market 6 2.70 5 2.81 5 3.23
Where services performed (product provided, project location) 4 1.80 3 1.69 3 1.94
Location of the first departure / hotel 2 0.90 1 0.56 1 0.65
Customer location _ total 84 37.84 78 43.82 73 47.10
Origin 14 6.31 14 7.87 11 7.10
Location of operation 13 5.86 12 6.74 9 5.81
Sale origin 9 4.05 9 5.06 7 4.52
Location of asset 1 0.45 1 0.56 1 0.65
Location from which billing took place 3 1.35 2 1.12 2 1.29
Origin _ total 40 18.02 38 21.35 30 19.35
Destination & location of operation 2 0.90 2 1.12 2 1.29
Destination & origin 2 0.90 2 1.12 1 0.65
Customer location & origin 4 1.80 4 2.25 3 1.94
Customer location & location of assets 1 0.45 1 0.56 1 0.65
Origin & geo market 1 0.45 1 0.56 1 0.65
Both customer location & origin _ total 10 4.50 10 5.62 8 5.16
Not mentioned 54 24.32 52 29.21 44 28.39
Not applicable 34 15.32 0 0.00 0 0.00
Total 222 100.00 178 100.00 155 100.00
N=222 N=178
Companies
N=155
Chapter 6: Geographic disclosure quality under IFRS 8 
170 
 
Table 6.23 Examples of different revenue structures as a result of using different 
bases for attributing revenues 
Panel A 
 
    ITE Group plc, Annual Report and Accounts 2010, p67. 
Panel B 
 
Tate & Lyle Annual Report 2010, p71. 
Panel C 
 
   BBA Aviation Annual Report 2009, p70. 
Panel D 
 
   Yule Catto Annual Report 2009, p45.  
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A few companies (ARM Holdings, AstraZeneca, BBA Aviation, JKX Oil & Gas, Mondi, 
Reed Elsevier, Tate & Lyle, Yule Catto) used two bases for attributing revenues from 
external customers to individual countries73. (Table 6.23)  These companies disclosed 
their revenues under IAS 14R by using the same bases.  It seems that the companies 
intentionally provide more information about the structure of their geographic revenue.  
However, the practice of these companies clearly indicates that the use of different bases 
for attributing revenues to geographic areas can result in completely different geographic 
revenue structures.  For example, the revenue of ITE Group plc. from the UK and Western 
Europe geographic area is 7.28%74 of the total revenues if the revenue is attributed by 
geographic location of events and activities and 42.97%75 of the total revenues if the 
revenue is attributed by origin of sale. (see more examples in Table 6.23 and the example 
of De La Rure earlier in this chapter)  Thus, users of financial statements, including 
researchers, have to be aware of the potential effects of the different bases on the 
geographic information disclosed by the companies (e.g. non-comparability).  This is 
especially important when high percentage (almost 30%) of the companies did not even 
mention what kind of basis they used for attributing revenues.  
 
6.5 Discussion and conclusion 
 
This Section attempts to draw out conclusions from the detailed findings of the analysis 
of the companies’ different geographic disclosure measures.  
 
6.5.1 The effects of IFRS 8 on the geographic disclosures  
 
Table 6.24 summarises the main findings of the study on the geographic disclosure quality 
of the companies. It is not the intention of the researcher to repeat the findings of the 
whole chapter again.  This summary is meant to emphasise that the introduction of IFRS 
8 has both positive (e.g. more than 40% of the companies increased the number of their 
reported individual countries; the companies disclosed significantly higher number of 
                                                 
73 For these companies the researcher used the attribution that resulted in finer geographic revenue 
information, measured by fineness score.  
74 8.188/113.547=7.28% 
75 48.796/113.547=42.97% 
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geographic locations and countries under IFRS 8; the companies disclosed significantly 
higher proportion of their revenues by country etc.) and negative (e.g. the proportion of 
revenues reported by “ROW” increased; under IFRS 8 the companies disclosed 
significantly lower number of items by countries etc.) impacts on the geographic 
disclosure practice / quality of the companies. (Table 6.24)  Additionally, the use of broad, 
vague and highly personalised geographic areas is still a problem. (RQ2.1) 
 
These research results suggest that in some aspects the negative impacts of the new 
standard seems to overcome the positive ones. (Table 6.24).  However, whether the 
positive effects of the new standard on the usefulness of the geographic disclosures 
outweigh the negative effects of the new standard on the usefulness of geographic 
disclosures is a subject for further research.  
 
Furthermore, the findings clearly indicate that the companies’ geographic disclosure 
quality cannot be measured / described by only one of the quality measures used in this 
study (and in other previous studies on geographic disclosure quality).  However, the 
construction of a single quality measure that combines the attributes / dimensions of the 
different geographic quality proxies might be an interesting and challenging subject for 
further research.  
 
6.5.2 The impact of different company characteristics on the company’s geographic 
disclosure 
 
Considerable variation was found in the companies’ geographic disclosure quality both 
under IAS 14R and IFRS 8. (see previous sections) The question is what might be the 
reason behind this diversity.  Part of these variations can be explained by the effects of 
different company characteristics on the companies’ geographic disclosure quality.  The 
effect of the different company characteristics on the quality measures of the companies’ 
geographic disclosures is summarised in Table 6.25. (RQ2.2)  
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Table 6.24 Summary: The effects of IFRS 8 on the geographic disclosures  
Sample Positive effects Negative effects 
N=222 the proportion of non-disclosing companies 
decreased under IFRS 8 from 19.37% to 15.32% 
only 56.13% of the sample companies disclosed 
more or less detailed geographic NCA 
information 
36.94% of the companies increased the number or 
their disclosed geographic locations 
only 73.42%(50.45%) of the sample companies 
disclosed domestic revenue (NCA) information 
the proportion of companies providing geographic 
revenue for at least one individual country 
increased (62.61% → 79.28%) 
32% of the revenue and NCA disclosing 
companies used different geographic structure for 
providing revenue and NCA information 
40.54 % of the companies increased the number of 
their reported individual countries 
the geographic region disclosure of the companies 
is highly “personalised” 
 the problem of broad, vague geographic 
aggregation is still exists 
 the use of “ROW” geographic region increased 
and the disclosure of continents as geographic 
region decreased 
 N=155 companies disclosed significantly higher (lower) 
number of geographic locations and countries 
(regions) under IFRS 8 
the proportion of revenues reported by ROW 
within the total revenue generated by the sample 
companies increased (9.379% → 16.70%) 
the proportion of revenues reported by individual 
countries within the total revenue generated by the 
sample companies increased (47.97% → 60.32%) 
almost a third of the companies (31.61%) 
decreased the percentage of their total revenues 
reported by individual countries 
the companies disclosed significantly higher 
proportion of their revenues by country (44.45% → 
61.52%) 
the companies disclosed significantly higher 
proportion of their revenues by ROW (6.22% → 
12.00%) 
63.23% of the companies increased the percentage 
of their total revenues reported by country 
the percentage of the companies that do not use 
ROW category decreased (46.45% → 34.19%) 
the companies disclosed significantly finer 
(measured by fineness score) geographic revenue 
information under IFRS 8 (2.17 → 2.31) 
49.03% of the companies increased the 
percentage of their total revenues reported by 
ROW 
41.94% of the companies increased the fineness of 
their geographic revenue information 
17.42% of the companies decreased the fineness 
of their geographic revenue information 
 most of the companies reported  only external 
revenues and NCA for individual countries 
 only 27.74% of the companies disclosed profit 
measure for the reported individual countries 
 the basis for attributing revenues to individual 
countries was not disclosed by 28.39% of the 
companies 
 N=126  under IFRS 8 companies disclosed significantly 
lower number of items by countries (5.49 → 3.95) 
 under IFRS 8 significantly lower percentage of 
the companies disclosed capital expenditures, 
profit measure, segment assets and liabilities 
information 
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Table 6.25 Summary: The effect of the different company characteristics on the 
quality of geographic information disclosed by the companies  
(YES: significant effect at the 0.05 level76, +/-: direction of the relationship77) 
N=155 
 
Company characteristics / 
Tested hypothesis 
No. of the reported Revenue % by Fineness  
score78 
No. of 
the 
reported 
items 
locations countries regions country ROW 
Categorical company characteristics 
Industry / Ha10 YES NO YES YES NO NO YES 
Auditor / Ha1 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Single segment / Ha4 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
FTSE 100 / 250 / Ha4 YES YES YES NO NO NO NO 
Listing status / Ha11 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
US listing / Ha11 YES NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Early adopter / Ha3 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Type of operating segment / 
Ha9 
NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Geographic revenue 
disclosure / Ha9 
NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Quantitative company characteristics 
Total sales / Ha4 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Foreign revenue / Ha11 YES (+) YES (+) YES (+) YES (-) NO YES (-) NO 
Capital intensity / Ha2 NO NO YES (-) YES (+) YES (-) YES (+) NO 
HHI / Ha2 NO YES (+) NO NO NO NO NO 
Growth rate / Ha8 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Profitability / Ha7 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Current ratio / Ha6 YES (+) NO NO YES (-) NO NO YES (-) 
Gearing / Ha5 YES (+) YES (+) NO NO NO NO NO 
No. of foreign countries with 
subsidiary / Ha11 
YES (+) NO YES (+) YES (-) YES (+) YES (-) NO 
No. of subsidiaries in foreign 
countries / Ha11 
YES (+) NO YES (+) YES (-) YES (+) YES (-) NO 
Effective tax rate / Ha12 NO NO YES (+) NO NO NO NO 
No. of tax haven countries 
with subsidiaries / Ha12 
NO NO NO YES (-) NO YES (-) NO 
No. of subsidiaries in tax 
havens / Ha12 
YES (+) NO NO NO NO YES (-) NO 
 
The results indicate that none of the studied company characteristics had significant effect 
on all of the quality measures.  However, industry type, the proportion of foreign revenues 
in total revenues, capital intensity, the number of foreign countries with subsidiaries and 
                                                 
76 both for parametric and non-parametric tests 
77 where applicable 
78 YES: if both parametric and non-parametric tests show significant relationship for the three fineness 
scores calculated (country code=3, 4 and 8) 
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the number of subsidiaries in foreign countries significantly affect most of the quality 
measures.  
 
The results suggest that the internationally more visible companies (higher percentage of 
foreign revenues in total revenues; higher number of foreign countries with subsidiaries; 
higher number of subsidiaries in foreign countries) report greater number of geographic 
locations.  However, they also tend to report lower percentage of their revenues by 
countries.  Therefore, the fineness of the geographic information provided by them tends 
to be lower as well.  As the number of countries with subsidiaries increases, it may be 
less likely that (1) a particular country meets the company’s materiality threshold and (2) 
revenues from this country reported individually.  On the other hand, the lower quality 
geographic information (lower percentage of the revenue by country, lower fineness 
scores) could indicate that internationally more visible companies might prefer to hold 
back country level information to conceal the company’s activity in those countries.  This 
could reduce their political and proprietary costs and hide the management’s activity from 
the shareholders and debt providers (e.g. poorly performing countries, management’s 
empire building plans) (Ha11) 
 
The preparers’ decision to disclose more or less segmental information depends both on 
the segmental rules and on the management’s decision.  In determining the level / quality 
of segment disclosure preparers, among other factors, consider the competition on the 
market (industry, geographic location) in which they operate.  Results from previous 
studies supported the hypothesis that companies operating more (less) competitive 
markets have more (less) incentive to disclose segmental information to the market, 
because there is less (more) competitive harm associated with the information provided. 
(see more in Section 2.4.4)  The results of this study indicate significant positive 
correlation between the capital intensity and the proportion of revenues reported by 
countries / the fineness of the geographic information provided by the companies.  The 
higher the capital intensity, the lower the market competition because it is more difficult 
to enter the market.  Thus, the more capital intensive the company (the less competitive 
the market), the higher the quality of the geographic information it provides.  It seems 
that these results are not in line with the findings of previous research and the findings of 
the compliance part of this research (Chapter 5).  However, previous research focused on 
the connection between the market competition and the information provided by the 
companies about their business segments.  Whereas, this study focuses on the connection 
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between market competition and the companies’ geographic disclosure quality.  One 
possible explanation of the finding could be that the more capital intensive the business 
is, the more costly is to set up a new site of business in different geographic locations 
(companies are protected by the higher entry barriers). Thus, because of the high entry 
barrier the companies might have less competitors and competitive harm to fear. (Ha2) 
 
On the other hand, the results in Chapter 5 indicate that companies operating in less 
competitive environment (higher capital intensity) tend to disclose less commercially 
sensitive segment information (lower level of compliance with entity-wide disclosure 
requirements).  In summary, the result of this study seems to be inconclusive on the effect 
of market competition on the companies’ segmental disclosure quality (where quality 
measured by the company’s compliance index, the proportion of revenues disclosed by 
country and the fineness of revenue information provided).  However, beside geographic 
information external revenue from each products and services and from major customers 
need to be disclosed under entity-wide information.  Additionally, the sample analysed in 
Chapter 6 is only a part of the sample used in Chapter 5.  Companies analysed in Chapter 
6 are the ones whose domestic and foreign revenues are disclosed under segmental notes.  
Thus, the compliance level for these companies can be expected to be generally higher.  
 
Although, there is some indication that the companies’ tax (avoiding) policy (proxied by 
the number of tax haven countries with subsidiaries and the number of subsidiaries in tax 
havens) might have an impact on the companies’ geographic disclosure practice / quality 
(significant negative correlation between the number of tax haven countries with 
subsidiaries and the fineness score / revenue percentage reported by countries; significant 
negative correlation between the number of subsidiaries in tax havens and the fineness 
score) the results are not conclusive.  Further research on this subject might find more 
conclusive results. (Ha12) 
 
6.5.3 The connection between the companies’ geographic disclosure under IAS 14R 
and IFRS8 
 
“Statement 131 did not result in any significant changes in operating or financial 
reporting practice, nor did it have any significant economic consequences” (FAF, 2012) 
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The application of IFRS 8 was expected to change the content of segmental reporting of 
the companies.  The introduction of the management approach aimed to provide those 
pieces of information to the investors which are used by the company’s decision makers.  
Studies have already found evidence that majority of the companies did not change the 
number of their reported segments (geographic areas) and many of them used exactly the 
same segments (geographic areas) under IFRS 8 and IAS 14R. (e.g. Heem and Valenza, 
2012; Bugeja et al., 2012; Crawford et al., 2012a; Nichols et al., 2012; Pisano and 
Landriana, 2012; Kang and Gray, 2013)  These results are in line with the findings of US 
studies on the impacts of the introduction of SFAS 131.  For example, after the 
introduction of SFAS 131 Tsakumis et al. (2006) analysed the geographic disclosures of 
a sample of 115 Fortune 500 US companies.  The authors found evidence that companies 
disclosing a higher percentage of revenues by country under SFAS 14 disclosed a higher 
percentage of revenues under SFAS 131 as well. 
 
The above mentioned research results indicate that companies stick with their “disclosure 
position”.  This suggests that the companies either (1) have already reported segmental 
information to stakeholders “through the eye of the management” under IAS 14R (Heem 
and Valenza, 2012; Nichols et al, 2013); (2) they simple kept the same segmentation 
under the new standard in order to reduce any incremental costs associated with changes 
to the preparation of the financial statements of the company under the new standard 
(King and Gray, 2013) or (3) the companies have already provided optimal segmental 
disclosure (disclosure of disaggregated information for efficient resource allocation by 
financial statement users and the cost of revealing proprietary information to competitors 
and / or potential entrants) under IAS 14R. (Schneider and Scholze, 2011)  This latest 
suggestion is in line with the theoretical explanation provided by Gibbins et al. (1990).  
They argue that the companies’ disclosure position is relatively stable and can be 
explained by ritualism (the application of formal and informal rules, procedures, and 
standards by the management) and opportunism (management seeks company-specific 
advantage in the disclosure of particular information).  Thus, the management only 
changes the company’s disclosure if it is advantageous for the company (opportunism).  
 
Companies apply different strategies with regard to their geographic disclosures 
(aggregation, details etc.).  If the company did not change its disclosure strategy then the 
company’s geographic reporting practice under IAS 14R and under IFRS 8 could be very 
similar even if the company complies with the requirements of the new standard.  
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Table 6.26 Pearson correlation coefficients between the different quality measures of geographic disclosure under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
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The results from this study indicate that a high proportion of the sample companies did 
not change or did not change significantly their geographic disclosure practice under the 
new standard. (see e.g. Table 6.9, Table 6.18)  For example, 40% of the companies had 
exactly the same fineness score under IAS 14R and IFRS 8.  Furthermore, even if a 
company changed its reporting practice the change did not necessarily improve the 
company’s disclosure quality.  For example, more than 10% of the companies decreased 
the fineness of its geographic disclosures.  
 
Additionally, Pearson correlation coefficients79 indicate significant positive correlation 
between the different quality measures of geographic disclosures under IAS 14R and 
IFRS 8.  Thus, companies disclosing higher (poorer) quality geographic disclosure under 
IAS 14R continue to do so under IFRS 8.  
 
In summary, this study provides additional evidences that the companies’ geographic 
disclosure practice / quality under IAS 14R significantly affects the companies’ 
disclosure practice / quality under IFRS8. (Table 6.26)  This result seems to indicate that 
it is not in the interest of a relatively high percentage of the sample companies to change 
geographic disclosure practice and provide better quality geographic information 
(opportunism).  
 
                                                 
79 see Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho in Appendix C. 29 and Appendix C. 30 
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disclosure of individually material countries 
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7.1 Introduction 
 
Geographic information disaggregated to country-level is more useful and relevant than 
information provided for geographic regions80.  Prior research shows evidence that the 
predicative ability of geographic information increases when more disaggregated 
information disclosed by the companies (e.g. Ahadiat, 1993; Herrmann, 1996; Behn et 
al., 2002) (see more in Section 2.4.5)  Additionally, in the last decade there have been 
calls from civil societies (e.g. Richard Murphy and the TJN, 2010; the PWYP coalition, 
2005 and 2010), regulatory bodies (e.g. US Congress, 2010: Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform Act.; US Congress, 2013: proposal of the Cut the Unjustified Tax Loopholes 
Act.; EP, 2013b and 2013c: Transparency, Accounting and Capital Requirements 
Directives) and from international economic organisations (e.g. OECD, 2013a: Action 
Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) to require MNCs to disclose information about 
their activities in specific countries where they operate. (see more in Section Chapter 8)   
 
Both SFAS 131 and IFRS 8 require the separate disclosures of individually material 
countries.  The materiality decision made by preparers affects the number of countries 
identified and reported individually and impacts on the aggregation and fineness of the 
geographic disclosures of the companies. 
 
Although research results indicate that the use of broad, vague geographic grouping still 
continued under SFAS 131 and IFRS 8 (e.g. SFAS 131: Herrmann and Thomas, 2000; 
Nichols, et al., 2000; Doupnik and Seese, 2001; IFRS 8: Aleksanyan and Danbolt, 2012; 
Nichols et al., 2012), the introduction of these standards resulted in more country-level 
disclosure, greater disaggregation and finer geographic information (e.g. SFAS 131: 
Herrmann and Thomas, 2000; Nichols et al., 2000; Doupnik and Seese, 2001; Hope, 
2008; IFRS 8: Nichols et al., 2012; Crawford et al., 2012a; Mardini et al., 2012; 
Aleksanyan and Danbolt, 2012; Pardal and Morais, 2011). (see more in Section 2.4.2) 
 
This study provides empirical evidence to demonstrate how a sample UK listed 
companies have applied the materiality concept in defining their individually material 
                                                 
80 any grouping of individual coutrties such as sub-continent, continent, multi-continent, emerging markets, 
foreign, ROW etc. 
Chapter 7: Application of the materiality concept 
182 
countries.  The effects of different company characteristics on the companies’ materiality 
decision are also examined.  
 
The method applied by Doupnik and Seese (2001) is followed to measure the quantitative 
materiality threshold used by the companies.  However, to provide a more complete 
picture, in addition to examining the companies’ geographic revenue disclosures this 
study also examines the companies’ geographic asset disclosures.  
 
The IASB has recently announced plans to consider a project on materiality (IASB, 
2013a), as a follow on to its survey (2012) and public discussion forum (2013) on 
financial reporting disclosures and evidence gathered from other professional body 
publications (e.g. FRC, EFRAG, IAASB, ICAS, NZICA, ESMA).  This part of the 
research can help the IASB’s work on the application of materiality concept.  Concerns 
with the application of the materiality concept call for “research relevant to the IASB’s 
development of further guidance on materiality” which “could contribute to promoting 
the quality of financial reporting and avoiding boilerplate, irrelevant disclosures.” 
(Nichols et al., 2013, p303) 
 
In this chapter literature from the 60’s, 70’s and 80’s is intentionally used and contrasted 
with more recent literature to emphasize that although time has passed, the application of 
materiality concept has remained an “unsolved issue”. 
 
7.2 Regulatory background and Literature Review 
7.2.1 Disclosure problem and the application of the materiality concept 
 
“Without such a rule [materiality concept], unwarranted amounts of time would almost 
certainly be spent on insignificant matters, and financial statements would undoubtedly 
be cluttered with useless or unimportant information, obscuring the necessary and 
important facts and relationships they are intended to convey.” (Hicks, 1964, p158)  
“...the presentation of significant data intermixed with insignificant data can also be 
misleading.  Hence to make the information not misleading, items which do not matter 
need no separate disclosure.” ... “... they [SEC] are concerned with the possibility that 
the reader of financial statements will be swamped with unimportant information which 
may be indiscriminately commingled with significant information.” (Bernstein, 1967, p87 
and p88) 
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“For many companies, the size of their annual report is ballooning.  The amount of useful 
information contained within those disclosures has not necessarily been increasing at the 
same rate.” ... “After all, no CFO has ever been sacked for producing voluminous 
disclosure, while restatements may be career-limiting.  Moreover, excessive disclosures 
can even be very handy for burying unpleasant, yet very relevant information!” 
(Hoogervorst, 2013) 
 
Over the years disclosures in the notes have expanded and resulted in financial statements 
being filled with immaterial information that can obscure relevant information.  The 
IASB carried out a survey (December 2012) and hosted a public discussion forum (28 
January 2013) on financial reporting disclosures.  Most of the respondents agree that there 
is a disclosure problem.  However, it is not surprising that the preparers and the users 
view the problem differently.  The preparers feel that the disclosure requirements of the 
different standards are too extensive and more should be done to exclude immaterial 
information from the financial statements to reduce disclosure overload and the cost of 
financial reporting.  Users, on the other hand feel that the communication of the relevant 
information needs to be improved, because the financial reports are not providing the 
information that they need (too much trivial information but not enough information on 
critical issues). (Figure 7.1) (IASB, 2013a; Hoogervorst, 2013) 
 
Figure 7.1 Disclosure problem (IASB Disclosure Survey Result) 
 
Source: IASB, Feedback Statement: Financial Reporting Disclosure, May 2013, p36 
 
“... material improvements will require behavioural change to ensure that financial 
statements are regarded as tools of communication rather than compliance.  That means 
addressing the root causes of why preparers may err on the side of caution and ‘kitchen-
sink’ their disclosures.” (Hoogervorst, 2013)  
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It is argued that financial statements are rather compliance than communication 
documents and they are full of boilerplate and immaterial information.  Many preparers, 
auditors and regulators apply the cautious compliance (checklist, tick box) approach and 
treat the different IFRSs as a list of requirements.  The use of compliance approach can 
result in a lack of professional judgements when determining whether information is 
material or not for the particular entity. (ESMA, 2013; IASB, 2013a; Hoogervorst, 2013) 
 
“... we must isolate from among many problem areas revealed by practice those whose 
definition and resolution would make the greatest relative contribution to the furthering 
of better accounting.  Recently concluded research clearly indicates that the concept of 
materiality is such a problem area.” (Bernstein, 1967, p86) 
“... materiality operates at the site of truth games about making visible, controlling, 
taming, managing or hiding errors and subjectivities in the translation of accounting 
inscriptions.” (Edgley, 2014, p268) 
 
Several professional bodies (e.g. FRC, EFRAG, IAASB, ICAS, NZICA, ESMA) 
highlighted that more emphasis should be given to the application of the concept of 
materiality in financial reporting.  If an item is required by an accounting standard that 
does not necessarily mean that the particular item is material for the reporting entity.  It 
is suggested that if the concept of materiality is applied properly then immaterial 
information, details that obscure information and are not relevant to users would be 
removed from the disclosures of financial reporting.  On the other hand, the appropriate 
application of the materiality concept could also ensure that relevant information would 
not be omitted or mis-stated. (IASB, 2013a; ESMA, 2013) 
 
ESMA (2013) emphasised in its report that there is a need for education material or for 
more guidance for the consistent application of the materiality concept from a disclosure 
perspective.  The guidance could be applied by the preparers to determine whether 
particular requirements of the different accounting standards are relevant to the entity or 
not.  The proper application of the materiality concept could solve the disclosure problem 
as it could reduce the disclosure burden on the preparers and the information overload in 
the financial statements.  Thus, relevant, entity specific information in the financial 
statements would not be buried by irrelevant information. (ESMA, 2011 and 2013; 
EFRAG, 2012; IASB, 2013a)  
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Based on the results of the IASB survey, the public hearing and the work performed by 
ESMA in relation to materiality the IASB is going to consider a project on materiality.  
The project would assess how materiality is applied in practice and whether the IASB 
should develop a general application guidance or educational material on materiality, 
“but avoiding anything that could become a checklist”. (Mackintosh, 2013, p11; IASB, 
2013a; Hoogervorst, 2013)  IASB Chair Hans Hoogervorst (2013) listed an additional 
seven short-term options to encourage the behavioural change of preparers, auditor, 
regulators and users to make financial reporting more effective.  The following four of 
these suggestions are directly related to materiality: 
1. The materiality principle means not only that material items should be included, 
but also means that non-material items should be excluded from the companies’ 
financial statements and notes.  This needs to be made clear in IAS 1. 
2. It is suggested that the IASB should clarify that a materiality assessment applies 
to the whole financial statements, including the notes.  Thus, if an item is 
immaterial that should not be disclosed anywhere at all in the financial statements.  
3. Hoogervorst suggested that the IASB should clarify that if a standard is relevant 
to the financial statements of an entity, it does not automatically mean that every 
disclosure requirements of that standard provides material information.  
4. When developing new Standards the IASB will use less prescriptive wording for 
disclosure requirements.  This approach will create more room for professional 
judgment on materiality. 
 
However, the appropriate application of the materiality concept alone will not solve the 
entire disclosure problem.  To decide whether a piece of information is material or not 
preparers still have to collect the data (expenses).  Additionally, the simple removal of 
immaterial information from the financial statements will not necessarily make the 
remaining part of the reports more readable and useful for the financial statement users. 
(Hitchins, 2013, p1)  
 
7.2.2 Defining materiality: Material versus Immaterial 
 
“The question of what is material has puzzled a great many people over a great many 
years, yet nobody is prepared to define it so that it does not ultimately rest on someone’s 
judgements.” (Blought, 1949, p13 in Hicks,1964) 
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Studies summarised and compared the accounting, legal and stock exchange definition of 
materiality (e.g. Brennan and Gray, 2005; Messier et al., 2005; Edgley, 2014).  However, 
Brennan and Gray (2005) argue that none of the sources (general legal background, 
professional accounting and stock exchange requirements) provides a precise definition 
of materiality.  
 
Materiality is a key accounting concept which is deeply ingrained in financial reporting. 
(Hofstedt and Hughes, 1977)  It has long been discussed by professionals and researchers.  
More than six decades have passed since in 1949 Blough wrote about materiality.  
However, the quotation still accurately describes the accounting profession’s position on 
materiality. (Rose et al., 1970) 
 
In a recent study Edgley (2014) argues that materiality is not a term, with a core meaning.  
The author rather suggests that accounting materiality is a multiplicity of the following 
knowledge objects: a social responsibility (materiality is a moral responsibility to protect 
investors, p260); a solution to the problem of over-auditing (materiality is part of 
commercial knowledge and it solves the problem of over-auditing through a cost / benefit 
solution, p262); a solid foundation for auditing (materiality is expert knowledge, solid 
object, technique, p263); a tolerable error (materiality is an acceptable level of error in 
reporting, p264); a rule-of-thumb (materiality generally positioned within a range of 5-
10% of net income, p264); a risk management process (materiality is a risk management 
technique that reduces uncertainty and audit risk, p266); and a mysterious professional 
lens and shield (materiality is a protective shield and a shooting target, p266). (Edgley, 
2014) 
 
The IASB defines that “Information is material if omitting it or misstating it could 
influence decisions that users make on the basis of financial information about a specific 
reporting entity.” (IASB, 2010d The Conceptual Framework: QC11, p17) and makes 
several references to the application of the materiality concept in different IASs and 
IFRSs (see a summary of “IFRS references to materiality and users of financial 
statements” in the ESMA Consultation Paper, Consideration of materiality in financial 
reporting, 2011).  
 
“In essence, “materiality” means simply this: if it doesn’t really matter, don’t bother with 
it.” (Hicks, 1964, p158) 
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“The materiality concept states that not all financial information need or should be 
communicated in accounting reports – only material information should be transmitted.  
Immaterial information may and probably should be omitted.” (Rose et. al, 1970, p138)  
“Materiality defines the threshold between the important and the trivial.” (Heitzman et 
al., 2010, p111) 
 
IFRS disclosure requirements do not need to be applied to information that is not material.  
However, there are no practical guidelines to help the preparers to apply the materiality 
threshold.  Beside the general materiality definition it is tempting to have a quantitative 
materiality threshold (e.g. 5% or 10% of the net income, revenue) to make materiality 
decisions easier and less subjective.  Materiality is entity-specific, and needs to be judged 
in the context of an entity’s financial report.  Therefore, a uniform quantitative threshold 
cannot be specified.  Only in very limited cases does the IASB provide quantitative 
guidance in specific standards on how to determine what material is.  
 
“In a profession where objectivity is a consideration of cardinal importance, materiality 
seems to be its “Achilles’ Heel”.” (Bernstein, 1967, p90) 
“While professional competence has many determinants, the exercise of professionalism 
is often most evident when the professional – doctor, lawyer, accountant – is confronted 
with a vast array of disparate information – a medical history, a legal brief or a 
prospectus for new issue – and “processes” that information into a professional judgment 
– the patient has leukaemia, the client should “cop a plea” or the financial statements 
present fairly.  ...   All such scenarios have in common the reliance upon the informed 
judgement of the professional in the face of complex and often conflicting information.” 
(Hofstedt and Hughes, 1977, p380) 
 
Materiality is not an objective measure.  The concept of materiality requires the 
interpretation of particular circumstances and the exercise of professional judgement.  
The question is: “Who makes the materiality judgements?”  Only those who know the 
facts can make materiality decisions.  It is the management’s responsibility to make all 
the decisions, including materiality judgment, when preparing the company’s financial 
statements.  The judgement of the management about materiality should depend on the 
relevance of information to assessment of the company’s financial performance, position 
and adaptability.  Thus, in considering materiality the preparers are expected to focus on 
information that could influence the economic decisions of the users. (Hicks, 1964, 
Morris et al., 1984; Seese and Doupnik, 2003; ESMA, 2011 and 2013; IASB, 2010d) 
 
“... materiality, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.” (Hicks, 1964, p159) 
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Preparers, auditors and users81 of financial statements are all concerned with materiality 
decisions and are all important in making materiality judgements.  However, there can be 
asymmetry (between preparers and auditors, preparers and users, auditors and users) of 
and differences (based on different decision contexts, objectives, relevant factors, factor 
weights and decision models used) between the materiality judgements of these groups. 
(Figure 7.2) (Boatsman and Robertson, 1974; Pattillo, 1976 in Morris et al., 1984; Morris 
et al, 1984; Lo, 2010) 
 
Figure 7.2 Materiality Concept 
 
 
Preparers try to make their materiality judgement from the users’ perspective.  To be able 
to do so they have to answer the question as to what financial statement users consider 
material.  Morris et al. (1984) argue that because of the diversity of the financial statement 
users and the limited knowledge of the decision models they use, the preparers (including 
auditors) are not able to make materiality decisions from the users’ perspective.  Instead, 
they make their own materiality judgments based on their own objectives, decision 
models, factors and factor weights.  
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7.2.3 Quantitative versus Qualitative factors 
 
 “Magnitude by itself, without regard to the nature of the item and the circumstances in 
which the judgement has to be made, will not generally be a sufficient basis for a 
materiality judgement.” (SEC, SAB No. 99, 1999) 
 
As a general rule, companies must disclose material information in their financial 
statements.  The type of factors that could influence the materiality decisions are for 
example the followings: magnitude and financial effect of an item (monetary amount or 
percentage) or cumulative effects of individually immaterial items; the nature of the item 
(e.g. misstatement that changes a loss into profit or vice versa, item that effects the 
company’s compliance with regulatory requirements, the possibility of breaching the loan 
covenants, fines, penalties, improper depreciation etc.82); risks, uncertainty and other 
circumstances surrounding the item; external auditors, accountants and accounting 
policies of the company; characteristics of the company (e.g. corporate governance, 
incentives of the managements); environmental factors (e.g. industry, general economic 
and political conditions) etc..  Some of the factors can be the subject of quantification in 
financial terms (e.g. the magnitude of the item) but many of the factors require qualitative 
considerations and cannot be mathematically expressed (e.g. the nature of the item). 
(FASB, 1975; SEC, SAB No. 99, 1999; ICAEW Tech 03/08, 2008; AASB 1031, 2010; 
Eilifsen and Messier, 2013)  When defining a materiality threshold both quantitative and 
qualitative aspects need to be considered.  However, the considerable factors and their 
weight are not specified.  Every one of the factors or more than one factor could be the 
determining factor. (AASB 1031, 2010) 
 
Previous research on materiality indicates that materiality decisions are often based on a 
percentage figure of Statement of Financial Position or Income Statement items. (e.g. 
Boatsman and Robertson, 1974; Steinbart, 1987; Chewning and Higgs, 2000; Brennan 
and Gray, 2005; Iyer and Whitecotton, 2008; Vance, 2011; Libby and Brown, 2013)  In 
the absence of general materiality standards and authorative guidelines on materiality the 
profession created its own unwritten but consistently used quantitative materiality 
benchmarks (rule-of-thumb) to assist decision making. (e.g. Jennings et al., 2001; 
Gleason and Mills, 2002, Iyer and Whitecotton, 2008; Vance, 2011; Eilifsen and Messier, 
                                                 
82 see lists of considerable items in e.g. SEC, SAB No.99, 1999; ICAEW Tech 03/08, 2008; AASB 1031, 
2010 
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2013; Edgley, 2014)  These “rules” however lack of authority. They are conventions of 
practice. 
 
Studies found that the most important factor to distinguish material from immaterial is 
the percentage of the item to the net income. (e.g. Frishkoff, 1970; Woolsey, 1973; 
Boatsman and Robertson, 1974; Pattillo, 1976 in Morris et al., 1984; Moriarty and Barron, 
1979; Holstrum and Messier, 1982; Morris et al., 1984; Jennings et al., 1987; Vance, 
2011; Eilifsen and Messier, 2013)  It can be argued that reasonable investors should not 
be influenced by a misstatement, omission of a financial statement item which is 5% or 
less that the net income. (Iyer and Whitecotton, 2008) 
 
Vance (2011) quantitatively integrated the findings of 42 prior studies on materiality by 
using meta-analysis.  All these studies measured materiality as a percentage of net 
income.  Vance (2011) found a considerable degree of variability in materiality decisions 
(materiality threshold ranging from 0.44% of net income to 54.65% of net income).  He 
found that the overall mean was 8.52% and 66.7% of the materiality thresholds were 
above the 5% of net income “rule-of-thumb”. 
 
The overreliance on quantitative materiality threshold might result in the discounting of 
qualitative materiality factors. (Bernardi and Pincus, 1996)  SAB No.99 in the US, 
ICAEW Tech 03/08 in the UK and AASB 1031 in Australia are among the documents83 
that give examples of cases in which qualitative factors make quantitatively immaterial 
information material.  Additionally, research provides empirical evidence that in certain 
cases investors care about information even if the information does not have 
quantitatively material impact on the company’s financial statements (e.g. Shafer, 2004) 
and qualitative factors influence materiality judgements (e.g. Iyer and Whitecotton, 2008, 
Acito et al., 2009).  Thus, materiality cannot be “reduced to a number formula” (SEC, 
SAB No. 99, 1999) and an overall quantitative materiality threshold that can be applied 
by every company, all the time, for all transactions, balances and disclosures cannot be 
defined.  
 
However, for example a relatively new accounting standard, AASB 1031 “Materiality” 
issued by the Australian Accounting Standard Board in 2010 and effective from 1 January 
                                                 
83 stock exchange regulation, professional guidance, accounting standard 
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2011, sets general quantitative thresholds that may be used by the preparers as guidance 
in considering the materiality of the financial amount of an item.  According to AASB 
1031 15 (a) and (b) an amount is presumed to be material (immaterial) if it is equal or 
greater (less) than 10 (5) percent of the appropriate base amount unless there is evidence 
or convincing argument to the contrary.  The standard also defines the appropriate bases 
(AASB 1031:13) such as the recorded amount of equity, the appropriate asset or liability 
class total, profit or loss, the appropriate income or expense amount for the current period 
or an average of them for a number of reporting periods, net cash or average net cash 
provided by or used in the operating, investing, financing and other activities.  The general 
quantitative threshold in the standard seems to be in line with the quantitative benchmarks 
otherwise used by the profession as a rule-of-thumb. 
 
7.2.4 General standard or guidance on materiality versus disclosure of the applied 
materiality judgements / policies 
 
“Communication about materiality judgement among preparers and users appears either 
to have broken down or never to have efficiently existed.” (Rosen, 1981 in Jennings et. 
al., 1996, p62) 
 
It is difficult and sometimes almost impossible for the users to assess whether the non-
disclosure of a required item is a non-compliance with the standard (omission of 
disclosure) or the item is immaterial and the company simply tries to avoid information 
overload by only disclosing material items. (Brennan and Gray, 2005; Tsalavoutas, 2011; 
Crawford et al., 2012a) (see more in Section 5.6)  Additionally, many items, which are 
not individually required by IFRSs, are only disclosed because preparers need to disclose 
material information and not because they have incentives and want to provide voluntary 
information. (Heitzman et al., 2010)  
 
Research results indicate that there appears to be little consistency of understanding of 
the materiality concept between different groups and even within groups.  As a result, 
there is considerably diversity in materiality judgements in practice.  Financial statement 
users receive information judged to be material by preparers and auditors but they do not 
have information how the materiality judgments were made. (Morris et.al, 1984)  The 
undefined nature of the materiality concept (Bernstein, 1967) and the secrecy about its 
application (“accounting’s best kept secret”, Brennan and Gray, 2005) provide flexibility 
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and leeway for the preparers and shield their materiality judgements from the users. 
(Bernstein, 1967; Lee, 2004; Brennan and Gray, 2005)  In order to understand and 
appropriately interpret the information in the Financial Statements the users need to know 
the materiality guidelines applied and the different quantitative and qualitative factors 
considered by preparers and auditors in assessing the materiality of an item.  
 
“No reasonable accountant advocates setting or thinks it is possible to set a standard for 
judging materiality which automatically gives a final and correct answer” ... “Instead, 
an accountant must always exercise judgement in making a final materiality decision. But 
a standard should be available to help him exercise that judgment more effectively.” 
(Woolsey, 1973, p47) 
 
Standard setters have never developed a standard or general guideline on materiality.  
Although, the FASB considered issuing a general materiality standard (FASB, 1975) the 
Board eventually removed the topic from its agenda.  The FASB concluded that it would 
not attempt to develop a standard on materiality, stating, “The Board’s present position 
is that no general standards of materiality could be formulated to take into account all 
the considerations that enter into an experienced human judgment.84” (FASB, SFAC 
No.2, 1980, p3)  
 
Many researchers and professionals called for establishing a uniform materiality standard 
(Bernstein, 1967; Woolsey, 1973; Jennings et al., 2001) or at least specific materiality 
guidelines (Morris et al., 1984; Ng and Tan, 2007; EFRAG, 2012; ESMA, 2013; 
Hoogervorst, 20013).  It is argued that in the absence of materiality standard / guidelines 
decisions of professionals (preparers, auditors, legal professionals) on materiality may 
lack of uniformity and consistency. (Bernstein, 1967; Morris et al., 1984; Jennings et al., 
1987; Ng and Tan, 2007; ESMA, 2013; Hoogervorst, 2013)  A standard or guidelines on 
materiality would help preparers, auditors, legal professionals to exercise professional 
judgement (Berstein, 1967; Woolsey, 1973), would facilitate comparability (Bernstein, 
1967; Morris et al., 1984; Jennings et al., 1987), would enhance the financial statement 
users’ understanding of the materiality concept (Woolsey, 1973; Morris et al., 1984) and 
could help to avoid any disagreement between the preparers and auditors (Woolsey, 
1973).  It is also argued that even if a materiality standard cannot meet the requirements 
of all of its users that still could provide a good starting point. (Jennings et al., 2001)  
                                                 
84 “Quantitative materiality criteria may be given by the Board in specific standards in the future, as in 
the past, as appropriate.” (FASB, SFAC No.2, 1980, p3) 
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“The materiality function of an item is, in general, not monotone.  Therefore, no unique, 
fixed materiality standard for an item can exist even for a given user if the standard is 
stated as a magnitude of the item.  Thus the derivation of a unique, fixed materiality 
standard relevant to all users is not feasible.” (Ro, 1982, p407) 
 
Materiality decisions need to be based on both quantitative and qualitative factors.  
Opponents of a uniform materiality standard argue that any attempt to develop an 
extensive list of the possible factors that could influence materiality decisions would fail. 
Any list would be incomplete and would be in need of constant change. (Hicks, 1964; 
Moriarty and Barron, 1979; FASB, 1980; ESMA, 2013)  Additionally, it would question 
the role of professional judgment in the decision making process. (Moriarty and Barron, 
1979) 
 
In the absence of a materiality standard and guidance issued by standard setters 
accounting and auditing professional bodies (e.g. Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales, ICAEW) issued general guidelines on materiality for determining 
whether a particular item is material or not.  Although, these guidelines usually provide 
several examples of considerable qualitative factors the list of these examples is not 
claimed to be exhaustive (e.g. “examples of such items include...”, “Further examples of 
qualitative items would include...”, ICAEW Tech 03/08:25, 2008)  Additionally, the 
guidelines do not provide “bright-line” quantitative rules. (ICAEW Tec 03/08, 2008; 
Acito et al., 2009;) 
 
Auditing companies also developed their in-house guidance for setting materiality 
thresholds. (Bernardi and Pincus, 1996; Eilifsen and Messier, 2013)  Eilifsen and Messier 
(2013) examined the materiality guidance of eight large US auditing companies and found 
consistency across the companies in terms of the quantitative benchmarks, percentages 
used and in terms of evaluating qualitative factors.  Thus, at least the auditors have more 
or less consistent guidelines when assessing materiality.  It can be assumed that this 
consistency across the companies’ materiality guidelines eventually will result in greater 
consistency in the auditors’ materiality judgements as well.  
 
The Financial Reporting Faculty of ICAEW suggested to preparers in its “Guidance on 
materiality in financial reporting by UK entities” to formally document their principles, 
policies, guidelines and main decisions on materiality for their own purposes (e.g. dealing 
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with FRRP). (ICAEW, Tech 03/08, 2008)  It can be argued that the way how a reporting 
company applies the materiality concept is part of the company’s significant accounting 
policies.  Therefore, according to IAS 1 it should be disclosed in the company’s notes to 
the financial statements. (Morris et.al., 1984) and it should be available for the financial 
statement users as well. 
 
More transparency on the companies’ approach to materiality decision makes financial 
statements more understandable and useful (because it facilitates comparability and 
enhances understanding of the limitations of information in financial statements) for 
financial statement users in their decision making. (e.g. Morris et. al., 1984; Robinson 
and Fertuck, 1985; De Martinis and Burrowes, 1996; Brennan and Gray, 2005)  It also 
can reduce the users’ confusion over the disclosures in the financial statements (e.g. non-
compliance or just not material item, voluntary disclosure or material item) (e.g. De 
Martinis and Burrowes, 1996; Jennings et al., 2001), the litigation risks (e.g. Jennings 
et.al., 1996), the unreasonable audit expectations of the users (e.g. De Martinis and 
Burrowes, 1996) and eventually it can reduce the communication gap between the 
preparers, auditors and users of financial statements (e.g. Morris et. al, 1984; Leslie, 1985 
in Jennings et al., 1996).  
 
“More important than establishing a general guideline, however is the necessity for 
disclosing the materiality criteria used by reporting firms.” (Morris et. al, 1984, p554) 
“Management have incentives for materiality levels to be as high as possible.  Auditors 
also have similar incentives.  This is not necessarily in the best interest of shareholders.  
This best kept secret in accounting should be revealed to shareholders.” (Brennan and 
Gray, 2005, p28) 
 
Among other researchers (e.g. Morris et. al, 1984; Leslie, 1985 in Jennings et al., 1996; 
De Martinis and Burrowes, 1996; Nelson et al., 2005) Brennan and Gray (2005) suggest 
that regulators should “extend disclosure requirements to include information about 
materiality levels to enhance transparency of accounting and auditing”. (p28)  They 
argue that users of financial statements are entitled to know this information especially 
because preparers might have incentives for setting as high materiality level as possible 
to avoid costs associated with disclosure (e.g. agency, proprietary, political costs).  
Additionally, there is some support from the users of financial statements that an 
accounting policy disclosure in respect of materiality judgements made by preparers 
could be useful. (ESMA, 2013)  However, other stakeholders argue that “such disclosures 
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would become boilerplate (e.g. repeating the definition of materiality from the standard) 
and therefore, would not provide relevant entity-specific information to users.” (ESMA, 
2013, p12)  Alternatively, an accounting policy disclosure about materiality judgement in 
the financial statements would become too complex and difficult to explain by the 
preparers and understand by the users. (ESMA, 2013) 
 
7.2.5 Materiality concept and segmental reporting 
 
In the case of segmental reporting the standard setter provides a standard based 
quantitative materiality threshold. IAS 14R used a 10% materiality threshold for 
determining when business and geographic segments needed to be disclosed separately 
(IAS 14R:35, 69-72, 74).  Additionally, the standard makes it clear that “The 10% 
thresholds in this Standard are not intended to be guide for determining materiality for 
any aspect of financial reporting other than identifying reportable business and 
geographical segments.” (IAS 14R:38) IFRS 8 also uses the same 10% quantitative 
threshold for determining when an operating segment (IFRS 8:13) or major customer 
(IFRS 8:34) is reportable. 
 
IFRS 8 requires the disclosure of material items in two other cases (reconciliation and 
country level revenue /NCA).  Reconciliation between the total of the reportable 
segments’ revenues / profit or loss / assets / liabilities / other material items and the 
entity’s revenues / profit or loss / assets / liabilities / other material items need to be 
disclosed under IFRS 8.85  The standard requires that “all material reconciling items” 
need to be “separately identified and described” (IFRS 8:28)  
 
IFRS 8 requires entity-wide geographic disclosures (revenues, NCA) if that information 
is not provided as part of the reportable segment information required by the standard. 
(IFRS 8:31)  Revenues from external customers and NCA must be disclosed (a) for the 
company’s country of domicile and (b) for all foreign countries in total from which the 
company derives revenues / in which the company holds assets.  Additionally, if revenues 
from / NCA in an individual foreign country are material, those revenues, NCA need to 
be disclosed separately (IFRS 8:33(a) and (b)).  
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“the potential benefits of country-level disclosures may never be realized because 
companies are likely to apply a relatively high level of materiality in defining “material” 
individual foreign countries” (Herrmann and Thomas, 2000, p10) 
 
However, the standard does not set an explicit quantitative materiality threshold and does 
not provide guidance for determining the materiality of a reconciling item and the 
materiality of an individual country.  The determination of what is meant by the “material 
reconciling item” and by the “individually material foreign country” and therefore what 
will or will not be disclosed in the company’s segmental notes is left to management 
decision.  The concept of materiality brings professional judgement and flexibility into 
segmental disclosures.  On the other hand it also can lead to misuse and / or abuse. 
(Brennan and Gray, 2005)  For example, it can be argued that the new standard gives 
opportunity to the companies’ management to set a relatively high level of materiality if 
they want to avoid the disclosure of certain countries or the disclosure of country-level 
information entirely.  Crawford et al. (2012a) recommend to auditors to challenge the 
materiality threshold used by preparers when deciding on entity-wide disclosures.  The 
materiality threshold used by companies affects the aggregation and the fineness of the 
disclosed geographic information.  Geographic information disclosed under IFRS 8 could 
be either less or more aggregated and fine than under IAS 14R depending on the 
materiality decision of the companies’ management. (Herrmann and Thomas, 2000; 
Doupnik and Seese, 2001)  
 
While IAS 14R allowed individually material countries to be reported together as 
geographic areas, IFRS 8 requires the separate disclosures of individually material 
countries.  Companies can provide country-level geographic information either as part of 
their reportable segment information or as entity-wide information.  IFRS 8 sets a 10% 
quantitative threshold for determining when an operating segment needs to be reported.  
However, companies can also choose to use lower quantitative threshold.  Additionally, 
the standard does not set a quantitative materiality threshold for companies that provide 
country-level geographic information as entity-wide information.  Thus, the users of 
financial statements cannot be certain of the materiality threshold applied by the company 
if the company does not disclose information about its materiality threshold used to 
determine whether an individual foreign country is material or not.  
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7.2.6 Literature on the use of materiality concept86  
 
Literature on materiality was recently reviewed by e.g. Chewning et al. (2000), Messier 
et al. (2005), Brennan and Gray (2005) and Vance (2011).  Most of the studies on 
materiality focused on the auditors’ materiality judgements and provide insight into their 
decisions. (see e.g. a review by Messier et al. from 2005 and studies from Libby et al., 
2006; Keune and Johnstone, 2012; Libby and Brown, 2013; Moroney and Trotman, 2013; 
Eilifsen and Messier, 2013)  Fewer studies focused on the materiality threshold applied 
by companies to decide whether a particular item (recognised or disclosed) is material 
therefore reportable or not. (e.g. Frishkoff, 1970, reclassifications; Morris, et al., 1984, 
capitalisation of interest; Adams et al., 1999, US GAAP reconciliation; Doupnik and 
Seese, 2001, geographic segment disclosure; Gleason and Mills, 2002, contingent tax 
liabilities; Acito et al., 2009, correction of operating lease related to accounting errors; 
Heitzman et al., 2010, advertisement cost)  
 
Both archival and experimental research techniques (questionnaires, case studies, games) 
were used to study materiality decisions.  In the archival studies the researchers used the 
companies’ financial statements and studied the disclosure of a particular financial 
statement item. (e.g. Morris et al., 1984, Adams et al., 1999, Doupnik and Seese, 2001, 
Gleason and Mills, 2002, Acito et al., 2009, Heitzman et al., 2010)  Experimental studies 
examined the decision making behaviour and materiality decisions of different groups 
(preparers, auditors, analysts, judges, lawyers) in different experimental settings. (e.g. 
Rose et al., 1970; Boatsman and Robertson, 1974; Hofstedt and Hughes, 1977; Ro, 1982; 
Jennings et al., 1996; Bernardi and Pincus, 1996; Libby and Kinney, 2000; Jennings et 
al., 2001; Seese and Doupnik, 2003; Shafer, 2004; Nelson et al., 2005; Ng and Tan, 2007; 
Iyer and Whitecotton, 2008; Pinsker et al., 2009; Libby and Brown, 2013; Moroney and 
Trotman, 2013)87  Hofstedt and Hughes (1977) argue that it is impossible to make 
extrapolations from the finding of these later studies because the use of experimental 
method is weak on the external validity dimension in the case of materiality.  However, 
materiality is entity specific, needs to be judged in the context of a particular entity’s 
financial statement.  Thus, generalisation from the results of either of the archival or the 
experimental studies would be difficult and questionable. 
                                                 
86 with a focus on segmental disclosures 
87 See a comprehensive list of the studies in Vance’s meta-analysis (2011) Table 1, p56; in Brennan and 
Gray (2005) Table 2 , p21-23; Messier et al. (2005) Table 1, 2 & 3  
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Studies proved that the threshold of materiality varies by different accounting issues (e.g. 
Holstrum and Messier, 1982; Messier et al., 2005, Vance, 2011), whether the materiality 
relates to recorded or disclosed item (e.g. Libby et al., 2006; Libby and Brown, 2013), 
whether the materiality relates to financial statements or environmental issues, 
sustainability reports (e.g. Deegan and Rankin, 1997; Moroney and Trotman, 2013) and 
when the materiality decision was made (e.g. Vance, 2011).  An item may not be material 
in one financial reporting period but it could become material in another reporting period.  
Preparers, auditors and users have different opinions as what is material. (e.g. Pattillo, 
1976 in Morris et al., 1984; Holstrum and Messier, 1982; Morris et al., 1984; Jennings et 
al., 1987 and 2001; Messier et al., 2005; Brennan and Gray, 2005; Vance, 2011)  
 
Archival studies that focus on the use of materiality within segmental reporting include 
research from Emmanuel et al. (1999), Herrmann and Thomas (2000), Doupnik and Seese 
(2001).  SSAP 25 in the UK introduced the 10% quantitative materiality threshold to help 
preparers identify reportable business and geographic segments.  Emmanuel et al. (1999) 
studied the segmental disclosure practice of a sample of UK companies to analyse how 
the preparers interpreted the 10% materiality rule.  The authors found that the sample 
companies reported fewer and larger segments particularly for their geographic 
operations.  Thus, contrary to the intention of the standard the introduction of 10% 
materiality threshold in SSAP 25 did not improve the companies’ segmental quality.  
Based on their findings Emmanuel et al. (1999) suggested that more detailed guidance on 
the case of the 10% materiality threshold would be necessary.  
 
Herrmann and Thomas (2000) analysed the effect of SFAS 131 on a sample of US 
companies’ individual foreign country disclosures and found that companies seem to use 
the 10% materiality threshold similarly to the quantitative threshold for determining 
operating segments.  However, Doupnik and Seese (2001) found that more than 70% 
(40%) of the sample companies reporting country-level geographic information used less 
than 10% (5%) quantitative threshold to decide the materiality of revenues.  Thus, these 
companies reported finer information than they would have if there was a 10% threshold 
in SFAS 131 strictly followed by the companies. (Doupnik and Seese, 2001)  
 
Later the same authors (Seese and Doupnik, 2003) conducted an experiment (using 476 
equity analysts located in the US as subjects) and found that both the magnitude of 
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operation (quantitative benchmark) and the level of country risk (qualitative benchmark) 
associated with an individual country affect the financial analysts’ judgements about firm 
risk.  The authors suggest that firms might use a quantitative threshold for determining 
reportable individual countries.  However, the research results indicate that firms also 
should consider a qualitative threshold, such as country risk in determining materiality 
because this may dominate in importance. (Seese and Doupnik, 2003)  Additionally, 
Herrmann and Thomas (2000) suggest that disaggregation is relevant only if the different 
segments, in this case the individually disclosed countries, have different risk 
characteristics.  These studies support the notion that both quantitative and qualitative 
considerations are important in evaluating the materiality of a foreign country. 
 
In an attempt to establish some qualitative guidance the SEC issues SAB No.99 which 
provides several examples of cases88 in which qualitative factors may render small 
amounts, misstatements material.  Among others the SEC suggest to consider “whether 
the misstatement concerns a segment or other portion of the registrant’s business that 
has been identified as playing a significant role in the registrant’s operations or 
profitability“. (SEC, SAB No.99, 1999)  According to Eilifsen and Messier (2013) the 
big US audit companies provide guidance for their auditors to include in the evaluation 
of misstatements the effect of a misstatement on segmental information. (Eilifsen and 
Messier, 2013, Table 6)  
 
In an experiment based study Libby and Brown (2013) found that experienced auditors 
require correction of smaller errors in disaggregated numbers.  Thus, disaggregation 
increases the reliability of the numbers in the financial statements by decreasing the 
auditors’ tolerance (lower materiality threshold) for misstatement.  However, the location 
of the disaggregated data in the notes moderates this effect.  
 
The application of materiality concept involves professional judgement and decisions are 
made at the entity level.  Thus, considerable diversity in application of materiality 
thresholds is highly likely. 
 
 
                                                 
88 though it is emphasized that the list provided in the Bulletin is not exhaustive 
Chapter 7: Application of the materiality concept 
200 
7.3 Research Objectives, Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
Geographic information disaggregated to country-level is more useful and relevant than 
information provided for geographic regions. (see more in Section 2.4)  However, IFRS 
8 only requires the disclosure of individually material countries.  Thus, the preparers’ 
materiality decision affects the countries disclosed and the fineness of the companies’ 
geographic disclosures.  
 
Concerns (e.g. disclosure overload versus not enough relevant information; exercise of 
professional judgement; asymmetry between the preparer’, users’ and auditors’ 
materiality judgement; preparers’ possible incentives to set high materiality threshold; 
lack of uniformity, consistency and transparency in the companies’ approach to 
materiality decisions) with the application of the materiality concept (summarised in 
Section 7.2) call for research on materiality.  This part of the thesis aims to provide (1) 
insight into how the companies apply the materiality concept in defining their individually 
material countries and (2) an understanding of the factors that might help to explain the 
diversity of the companies’ materiality decisions. (RO3) To achieve this research 
objective the following research questions will be answered.  
 
RQ3.1: To what extent do companies disclose information about their materiality 
judgment (how and why is an individual country determined to be material)? 
RQ3.2: What quantitative and qualitative thresholds are used to determine the materiality 
of individual countries? 
RQ3.3: What company characteristics affect the companies’ materiality decision? 
 
Hypotheses (Ha1 – Ha12) developed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4) and Chapter 6 (Section 6.2) 
of this thesis are tested in this chapter as well to investigate different corporate disclosure 
theories (Section 2.3) via the investigation of the effects of different company 
characteristics (Table 5.5) on the companies’ materiality decisions. 
 
7.4 Sample selection 
 
From the 155 companies that provided domestic / foreign revenue information under their 
IFRS 8 segmental notes (Table 6.1) 107 (69.03%) provided revenue and 76 (49.03%) 
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provided both revenue and NCA disclosure for at least one individual foreign country. 
(Appendix A. 1 and Table 7.1)  Under IAS 14R 60 companies disclosed revenue 
information for at least one foreign individual country.  42 of these companies disclosed 
revenue and NCA information under IFRS 8 as well  
 
Table 7.1 Sample selection: foreign country disclosures 
 
Sample 
IAS 14R IFRS 8 
Number of 
companies 
% of 
companies 
Number of 
companies 
% of 
companies 
Geographic information available under 
IFRS 8 (Table 6.1) 
155 100.00 155 100.00 
Less: No revenue by country 29 18.71 0 0.00 
Less: Only country of domicile revenue 
provided 
66 42.58 48 30.97 
Revenue provided for foreign country / 
countries 
 
60 
 
38.71 
 
107 
 
69.03 
Less: No NCA by foreign country  31 20.00 
Revenue and NCA disclosed for foreign 
country / countries 
76 49.03 
 
 
7.5 Quantitative materiality threshold measure 
 
Doupnik and Seese (2001) argue that based on the individual country disclosures of the 
company it is possible to determine the upper bound to the quantitative threshold used by 
the company.  It is assumed that to set the quantitative materiality threshold the companies 
compared the revenues from (NCA in) individual countries with the total revenues (NCA) 
of the company.  The upper bound of the materiality threshold used by the company is 
calculated as the smallest percentage of total revenue (NCA) disclosed by the company.  
If the proportion of the individual country’s revenue (NCA) exceeds the quantitative 
materiality threshold (the smallest percentage) than it is assumed that the country would 
be (was) disclosed separately. (Equation 7.1) (Equation 7.2)  It is also possible that the 
company has a materiality threshold lower than the calculated smallest percentage but it 
does not have any individual country that meets this lower threshold. (Doupnik and Seese, 
2001) 
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(Equation 7.1) 
                  
 
Where 
 MTREV    =  Materiality Threshold for revenue  
FORCOUNTRYREVi = revenue from foreign country i  
 TOTREV   = total revenues 
 
(Equation 7.2) 
    
 
Where 
 MTNCA    =  Materiality Threshold for NCA 
FORCOUNTRYNCAi = NCA in foreign country i  
 TOTNCA   = total NCA 
 
One can argue that for a materiality judgment based on quantitative data different 
measures can be and probably have been used by the companies.  Beside the revenue 
from and / or NCA in the countries the companies could and might have used e.g. earnings 
from, capital invested in the individual foreign countries when selecting the individually 
material countries.  However, based on the geographic disclosure provided by the 
companies other measures cannot even be calculated for the sample companies. For 
example, only 17.11% of the companies (N=76) disclosed earning measure for the 
reported foreign country (countries). (Table 7.4)  Additionally, qualitative factors (e.g. 
political and exchange risks, the company’s geographic diversity etc.) might also have 
impacts on the preparers’ decision.  The fact that those companies which voluntarily 
disclosed information about their materiality decision89 applied the simple “contributes 
more than 10% of the Group’s revenue or non-current assets” (WS Atkins plc 2010 
Annual Report and Accounts, p91; see more in Appendix D. 1) approach indicates that 
the proposed materiality threshold measures (Equation 7.1), (Equation 7.2) could be good 
starting points for studying the materiality cut-off applied by the companies.  It is also 
                                                 
89 14/155 → 9.03%; 14/76 → 18.42% 
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worth to mention that none of these companies disclosed any qualitative materiality 
factors which were considered during the company’s materiality decision making. 
 
 
7.6 Analysis and results 
7.6.1 Disclosure of the applied materiality judgements / policies 
 
Based on the financial statements of a company it is impossible to find out what 
materiality aspects were considered by the company unless the company discloses 
specific information about its materiality judgements.  
 
To date preparers are not required to disclose information about their materiality 
decisions.  Therefore it is not surprising that only 14 companies provided voluntary 
disclosure on the materiality level they used. (See the extracts of the materiality notes of 
the companies in Appendix D. 1)  The extract of the notes from the companies’ financial 
statements suggests the dominance of the use of quantitative materiality thresholds.  With 
the exception of one company90, these companies applied 10% materiality threshold when 
they decided whether an individual country is material or not.  Thus, any country which 
meets the 10% materiality thresholds was considered reportable.  The companies might 
have applied the same 10% quantitative threshold which is set in IFRS8 for other 
segmental disclosures (operating segments, major customers) and was used by IAS 14R 
to identify reportable geographic segments.  On the other hand, the use of the “10% of 
revenues / NCA” can be the application of a more general rule of thumb as well.  
 
However, none of the companies mentioned any qualitative factors that were considered 
in assessing the materiality of an individual foreign country.  Thus, the actual qualitative 
factors, if there were any, used by the companies cannot be directly studied based on the 
historical information provided by the companies in their financial statements.  
 
 
                                                 
90 Spectris plc (3%) 
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7.6.2 Individually material countries  
 
“Those countries which account for more than 10% of the group’s total revenue and / or 
non-current assets are considered individually material and are reported separately ... .” 
(SABMiller plc Annual Report 2010, p87) 
“The Group’s revenue and non-current assets (excluding the financial asset and deferred 
tax assets) by geographical location are separately detailed below where they exceed 
10% of total revenue or non-current assets, respectively, in any particular year:...” 
(SOCO International plc Annual Report and Accounts 2009, p71) 
 
It also could happen that under entity-wide information the company discloses revenues 
but not NCA for one country and discloses NCA but not revenues for another. (see more 
in Chapter 6 and Table 7.3)  IFRS 8 does not require the disclosure of NCA for a country 
which is individually disclosed because the external revenues attributed to it are found to 
be material, and vice versa.  An individually reported country might be material because 
of its revenue contribution and also because of the NCA the company allocated to it.  
However, it is also possible that a country is individually material because of its revenue 
contribution or the NCA the company allocated to it. (see the extracts above)  It is the 
decision of the preparers’ management whether the company provide both the revenue 
and NCA information for a country found to be individually material based on either the 
revenues or the NCA allocated to it.  
 
“Analysts argue that information about revenues from customers in different geographic 
areas aids in understanding concentration of risks due to negative changes in economic 
conditions and prospects for growth due to positive economic changes.  Information 
about assets located in different areas assists in understanding concentration of risks 
such as political risk (e.g. expropriation).” (Nichols et al., 2000, p64)  
 
From the 76 companies that provided both revenue and NCA information for individually 
material countries 20 (20/76 → 26.32%) companies disclosed the revenue and NCA 
information in a different structure.  Most of these companies (16/20 → 80.00%) 
disclosed more detailed revenue than NCA information.  For example, BHP Billiton 
disclosed both revenue and NCA information for Australia and the UK but only revenue 
information for China and Japan. (Table 7.3 and Table 7.2) 
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Table 7.2 Example of reporting geographic revenue and NCA information in 
different structure 
Panel A 
 
    BHP Billiton Annual Report 2010, p207 
Panel B 
 
   Rolls-Royce Group Plc Annual Report, p107 
 
A further analysis reveals that the companies disclosed the carrying amount of the NCA 
by the geographical location in which the assets are located.  However, 70.00% (14/20; 
e.g. Antofagasta, BAE Systems, BHP Billiton, Lonmin, Petrofac, Rolls-Royce Group, 
Hikma Pharmaceuticals etc.) of the companies disclosed revenue from external customers 
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by the location of the customer. (Table 7.2)  This could be an explanation why these 
companies reported partially different individually material countries by revenue and by 
NCA. 
 
It has already been indicated in Chapter 6 that calculating financial ratios from revenue 
attributed to countries based on customer location and from NCA attributed to countries 
based on the location of the asset could be misleading when the revenue structure based 
on origin and the revenue structure based on destination are significantly different. (see 
more in Section 6.4.1)  This could be a problem even if the company regarded the same 
countries to be individually material based on both revenue and NCA attribution. 
 
Table 7.3 The structure of geographic revenue and NCA information  
 
Geographic revenue information 
provided as  
Revenue and NCA provided in 
 
same 
structure 
different structure, 
more detailed 
Revenue NCA Total 
Entity-wide information 34 13   1 14 
Geographic reporting segments   4   0   0   0 
Mixed reporting segments   1   0   0   0 
Both entity-wide information and 
reporting segments 
     0 
   in same structure   3   0   0   0 
   in different structure 14   3   3   6 
Detailed geographic information 
provided 
 
56 
 
16 
 
  4 
 
20 
 
7.6.3 Quantitative materiality thresholds under IFRS 8 
 
The distribution of quantitative materiality thresholds used by the companies 
Appendix D. 2 summarises information about the smallest revenue and NCA disclosures 
provided by the sample companies.  As in the study by Doupnik and Seese (2001) the 
sample companies were grouped into three materiality categories based on the smallest 
revenue (NCA) information they provided.  The categories are (1) less than 5% of total 
revenues (NCA), (2) between 5% and 10% of total revenues (NCA) and (3) more than 
10% of total revenues (NCA).  One can argue that a country that provides greater (less) 
than 10% (5%) of the company’s total revenues (NCA) is material (immaterial) for the 
company.  Under IFRS 8 more than half of the sample companies (41 companies, 53.95%) 
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applied 10% or less revenue materiality cut-off point to determine the material countries.  
Fewer companies, only 34 companies (44.74%) used 10% or less NCA materiality 
threshold to determine the materiality of an individual country.  The remaining companies 
(revenue → 46.05%, NCA → 55.26%) either used more than 10% materiality threshold 
or they simply did not have revenues / NCA less than 10% from any of the countries. 
(Appendix D. 2)  
 
28.95% (26.32%) of the companies reported individual countries with less than 5% 
revenue (NCA) contribution to the company’s total revenues (NCA). (Appendix D. 2)  
Many companies (revenues: 9/76 → 11.84%; NCA: 11/76 → 14.47%) used less than 1% 
of total revenues / NCA as materiality threshold.  It is highly unlikely that in any 
circumstances a country with less than 1% (even 5%) of the total revenues / NCA can be 
regarded as quantitatively material.  There must be other reasons why the companies 
disclose these quantitatively immaterial countries individually.  Doupnik and Seese 
(2001) argued that management might have incentives to use low materiality threshold 
and report individual countries to signal to investors the company’s geographic 
diversification and / or its operation on low risk countries.  Additionally, information 
reported at country level is very welcomed by different user groups (e.g. financial 
analysts; Civil Society Organisations, CSOs; tax governance etc.). (see more in Section 
2.4)  Thus, another possible reason why the preparers disclose information about 
quantitatively relatively immaterial countries is to please these user groups.  It is also 
worth to mention that the companies usually disclose only revenue and NCA information 
for the reported countries.  These two items, without earnings measure disclosed for the 
same countries, probably do not reveal too much commercially sensitive information and 
threaten the company’s competitive position. 
 
Table 7.4 provides some further and rather interesting details.  From the 76 companies 
that disclosed both revenue and NCA information for at least one foreign country only 13 
(17.11%) provided earnings measure for the disclosed countries.  Surprisingly, the 
average number of disclosed items by country is higher for those companies which 
applied revenue materiality cut-off point lower than 5%.  Additionally, the proportion of 
the earning disclosing companies is higher for the companies which used less than 10% 
revenue materiality threshold.  These findings indicate that many companies that used 
less than 10% revenue materiality threshold are willing to reveal more detailed and 
relevant geographic information even for the quantitatively less important countries.  
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However, 53.85% of the earning disclosing companies used greater than 10% NCA 
materiality threshold and there is not a big difference between the average number of 
items disclosed by NCA materiality categories. 
 
Table 7.4 The number of disclosed items and earning measure disclosure by 
materiality categories 
 
 
The variance of materiality thresholds and the mean materiality threshold used by the 
companies 
Boxplots for revenue and NCA materiality cut-off points indicate the presence of outliers 
and the asymmetrical distribution of the materiality cut-off points (top whiskers of the 
boxplots are much longer than the bottom whiskers). (Figure 7.3)  A wide range of 
materiality thresholds were used by the companies in deciding the individually material 
countries (revenue → Minimum: 0.02%, Maximum: 63.91%, Mean: 14.36%, Standard 
Deviation: 14.72%; NCA → Minimum: 0.01%, Maximum: 99.97%, Mean: 19.87%, 
Standard Deviation: 22.72%).  The NCA cut-off points varied even more than the revenue 
cut-off points (Revenue → Range: 63.91% - 0.02% = 63.89%, Relative St. Dev.: 
14.72/14.36 = 1.0251; NCA → Range: 99.97% - 0.01% = 99.96%, Relative St. Dev.: 
22.72/19.87 = 1.1434). (Appendix D. 2) 
 
Due to the lack of detailed guidelines and a quantitative cut-off point set by the standard, 
companies use very different materiality thresholds.  The middle 50% of the revenue 
(NCA) materiality thresholds applied by the different companies fall between 3.49% 
(4.48%) and 20.10% (29.10%).  The distance between the lower and upper quartile of the 
revenue (NCA) materiality cut-off points is almost 17% (25%).  These relative big 
numbers indicate high degree of inconsistency in the materiality thresholds even after 
eliminating the outliers. (Figure 7.3 and Table 7.5)  This suggests that the companies 
Standard
Revenue / NCA
Sample
Materiality categories < 5% 5 - 10% > 10% Total < 5% 5 - 10% > 10% Total
Number of companies 22 19 35 76 20 14 42 76
% of companies 28.95 25.00 46.05 100.00 26.32 18.42 55.26 100.00
Number of items disclosed by countries
Mean 3.45 2.68 3.14 3.12 3.05 3.14 3.14 3.12
Median 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Minimum 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Maximum 11.00 6.00 9.00 11.00 8.00 8.00 11.00 11.00
Standard Deviation 2.52 1.34 3.14 2.01 1.96 1.83 2.14 2.01
Earning measure disclosed
Number of companies 4 6 3 13 3 3 7 13
% of companies within the materiality category 18.18 31.58 8.57 17.11 15.00 21.43 16.67 17.11
% of companies within the earning disclosing
companies 30.77 46.15 23.08 100.00 23.08 23.08 53.85 100.00
Revenue NCA
N=76 N=76
Materiality threshold under IFRS 8
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probably do not use any general quantitative rule, benchmark when they define their 
individually material therefore reportable countries.  It might also be that the companies 
do follow general quantitative benchmarks but additional qualitative factors also play an 
important role when the companies set their own materiality threshold for individually 
material countries.  
 
Figure 7.3 Boxplots for revenue and NCA materiality cut-off points 
 
 
Table 7.5 Percentiles for revenue and NCA cut-off points 
 
 
Table 7.6 provides some illustrating examples. Petrofac, Tate & Lyle and Invensys are 
internationally highly visible companies (Table 7.6, Panel A).  They have a considerable 
number of principal subsidiaries abroad and earn about 80% of their total revenues from 
foreign countries.  Although, all three company provide geographic revenue disclosure as 
entity-wide information they do that in a very different way.  Petrofac reports 6 countries 
individually one of which has as small revenue percentage as 5.04%.  This could be 
contrasted with for example Invensys which only considered one country material, from 
which it had almost a third of its total revenues. (Table 7.6) 
 
IFRS 8 requires 10% quantitative threshold for determining operating segments and 
major customers.  Although the average of the revenue and the NCA cut-off point were 
above 10% (revenue → 14.36%, NCA → 19.87%) around 50% of the companies applied 
less than 10% as materiality threshold. (Appendix D. 2)  If IFRS 8 had required a general 
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10% quantitative materiality threshold which had been followed the average materiality 
thresholds would have been even higher.  This result is in line with the findings of 
Doupnik and Seese (2001).  
 
Table 7.6 Examples of different revenue materiality cut-off points 
 
 
 
 
Company 
 
 
 
Foreign 
revenue % 
 
Number of 
countries 
with principal 
subsidiary 
 
 
 
Smallest 
revenue % 
 
% of foreign 
revenues 
reported by 
country 
Number of 
individual 
foreign 
countries 
reported 
Panel A 
Petrofac 80.71 24   5.04 84.28 6 
Tate & Lyle 82.03 27 52.65 64.19 1 
Invensys 83.64 25 30.14 36.03 1 
Panel B 
Keller Group 94.45 14 12.23 60.58 2 
AstraZeneca 94.49 14   1.08 84.69 11 
 
It seems that the companies used higher materiality threshold in determining the 
materiality of NCA in individual countries than they used in determining the materiality 
of revenues in individual countries.  The mean revenue cut-off point was 14.36% (St. 
Dev.: 14.72%) and the mean NCA cut-off point was higher, 19.87% (St. Dev.: 22.72%).  
On average, the companies used significantly higher NCA cut-off (M = 19.87%, SE = 
2.61%) than revenue cut-off (M = 14.36%, SE = 1.69%; p < 0.005, r = 0.677). (Part I in 
Appendix D. 4, Table 7.5 and Figure 7.3) 
 
IAS 14R did not require the disclosure of geographic revenues (NCA) for individually 
material countries.  However, many companies defined individual countries as their 
geographic segments (e.g. Roll-Royce Group, Logica, Rio Tinto Group, GSK, Hikma 
Pharmaceuticals, Antofagasta, Kingfisher, Vodafone etc.) and disclosed country-level 
information.  The threshold used by the companies to determine what to disclose under 
IAS 14R and IFRS 8 can be compared for the 42 companies that disclosed revenue 
information for individual countries under both standards.  The mean revenue cut-off 
point applied by these companies significantly decreased under the new regulation 
(MIAS14R = 15.97%, SEIAS14R = 2.02; MIFRS8 = 10.75%, SEIFRS8 = 1.76%; p < 0.001, r = 
0.684). (Part II in Appendix D. 4)  Thus, the use of the new regulation resulted in lower 
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level revenue materiality threshold for the companies that provided country-level revenue 
information under IAS 14R. 
 
The effect of different company characteristics on the quantitative materiality threshold 
applied by the companies 
This part of the section provides answer to RQ3.3: What company characteristics affect 
the companies’ materiality decisions by testing hypotheses Ha1 – Ha12 developed in earlier 
chapters (Section 5.4 and Section 6.2). Connections between the quality measures of the 
companies’ geographic disclosures and the revenue / NCA materiality thresholds applied 
by the companies are also analysed.  
 
The results in Appendix D. 2 indicate that bigger (total sales), internationally more visible 
(proportion of foreign revenues in total revenues, number of foreign countries with 
subsidiaries, number of subsidiaries in foreign countries) companies with higher growth 
rate (change in total sales) are more likely to use more than 10% quantitative threshold.  
Additionally, there seems to be negative relationship between the cut-off points applied 
and the number of geographic locations and individual countries disclosed by the 
company.  
 
Correlation coefficients were calculated to measure the relationship between the revenue 
(NCA) cut-off point used by the companies and several quantitative company 
characteristics. (Table 7.7 and Appendix D. 3)  The Pearson correlation coefficients show 
significant, positive correlation between the revenue and the NCA materiality threshold 
used by the companies (r = 0.677, p = 0.000).  Thus, the higher the revenue threshold 
used, the higher the NCA threshold applied.  The NCA cut-off point applied by the 
companies is significantly, positively correlated with the growth rate of the company (r = 
0.342, p = 0.002) 91. (Table 7.7 and Appendix D. 3) 
 
However, there is not any other significant relationship between the revenue / NCA 
materiality threshold of the company and the tested company characteristics (foreign 
revenue / NCA, capital intensity, total sales, profitability, liquidity, gearing, effective tax 
rate, number of items reported by country, number of foreign countries with subsidiaries, 
number of subsidiaries in foreign countries). (Table 7.7 and Appendix D. 3) 
                                                 
91 However, neither the Spearman’s nor the Kendall’s coefficients indicate significant relationships between 
the growth rate and the companies’ NCA threshold. 
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Table 7.7 Pearson correlation coefficients between different quantitative company 
characteristics, quality measures of geographic disclosure and the revenue / NCA 
materiality thresholds used by the companies under IFRS 892 
 
 
 
N=76 
Materiality threshold under IFRS 8* 
Revenue % NCA % 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Pearson 
correlation 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Materiality threshold 
NCA smallest %   0.677 0.000   1.000 - 
Revenue smallest %   1.000 -   0.677 0.000 
Company characteristics / Tested hypothesis 
Foreign revenue / Ha11   0.080 0.493   0.105 0.368 
Foreign NCA / Ha11   0.163 0.158   0.244 0.034 
Capital intensity / Ha2 -0.029 0.802 -0.054 0.641 
HHI / Ha2   0.096 0.407   0.074 0.523 
Total sales / Ha3   0.095 0.413   0.084 0.471 
Growth rate / Ha8 -0.050 0.669   0.342 0.002 
Profitability / Ha7   0.027 0.817 -0.019 0.868 
Current ratio / Ha6   0.047 0.684   0.067 0.563 
Gearing / Ha5 -0.072 0.539   0.088 0.450 
No. of foreign countries with subsidiary / Ha11   0.145 0.212 -0.013 0.913 
No. of subsidiaries in foreign countries / Ha11   0.088 0.451 -0.014 0.902 
Effective tax rate / Ha12   0.050 0.671 -0.083 0.478 
No. of tax haven countries with subsidiary / Ha12   0.212 0.066   0.027 0.816 
No. of subsidiaries in tax havens / Ha12   0.000 0.998 -0.091 0.436 
Quality measures of geographic disclosures 
% of revenue reported by country / Ha11 -0.156 0.179 -0.255 0.026 
No. of geographic locations reported -0.459 0.000 -0.409 0.000 
No. of individual countries reported -0.508 0.000 -0.454 0.000 
No. of geographic regions reported -0.104 0.372 -0.090 0.437 
No. of items disclosed by countries -0.001 0.992 -0.047 0.686 
Fineness score _ 3 -0.260 0.023 -0.312 0.006 
Fineness score _ 4 -0.237 0.040 -0.305 0.007 
Fineness score _ 8 -0.196 0.090 -0.283 0.013 
*: smallest revenue (NCA) % disclosed by the companies 
 
The materiality threshold used by the companies affects the number of countries 
identified and reported and impacts on the aggregation and therefore on the fineness of 
the company’s geographic disclosures.  If the company sets a higher cut-off point it 
probably means that fewer countries are determined to be individually material, less 
geographical location is reported.  This could lead to greater aggregation and less fine 
                                                 
92 see Appendix D. 3 as well 
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information.  Both the revenue and the NCA materiality threshold applied by the 
companies are significantly, negatively correlated with the number of reported location 
(rREV = -0.459, pREV = 0.000; rNCA = -0.409, pNCA = 0.000) and with the number of reported 
individual countries (rREV = -0.508, pREV = 0.000; rNCA = -0.454, pNCA = 0.000).  Thus, 
the higher the materiality threshold used, the lower the number of geographic locations 
and individual countries reported.  Additionally, the correlation coefficients show 
significant, negative relationship (e.g. rREV&F3 = -0.260, pREV&F3 = 0.023) between the 
fineness scores (see more in Section 6.4.2) and the materiality cut-off points used by the 
companies.  Thus, the lower the revenue materiality threshold used, the finer the revenue 
information disclosed in the notes. (Appendix D. 3 and Table 7.7) 
 
Companies in the Telecommunication and Consumer Services (Health Care and 
Technology) industries, not cross listed, not US listed and early adopters, on average, 
applied lower (higher) materiality cut-off point.  However, only early adoption had 
significant effect on the materiality threshold used by the companies to determine when 
revenues (NCA) in individual country are important enough to be reported.  Early adopter 
companies (revenue → 6.86%, NCA → 10.43%) applied significantly lower materiality 
threshold than not early adopter companies (revenue → 16.05%, NCA → 22.00%). 
(Appendix D. 5) 
 
Companies that were organised around geographic areas (15.76%) and a mixture of 
geographic and business areas (15.07%) used higher materiality threshold than companies 
that were organised around business areas (13.76%)93. (Appendix D. 5)  Companies 
organised around business areas provided geographic disclosures under entity-wide 
information.  A possible reason for the lower materiality threshold applied by these 
companies could be that under entity-wide information companies only have to disclose 
revenue and NCA for their individually material countries.  Whereas, companies that 
report individual countries under geographic or mixed reporting segments have to 
disclose other, more sensitive items as well (IFRS 8:23).  It means that these companies 
have to disclose for example a measure of profit or loss for the individually reported 
countries.  This could affect the company’s competitive position (proprietary cost), could 
help to evaluate the work done by the management of the company (agency cost) and also 
                                                 
93 Although, the difference between the means is not significant.  
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could provide useful information for the reported countries’ national tax authorities 
(political cost). 
 
Figure 7.4 Boxplots for revenue and NCA materiality cut-off point by IFRS 8 
operating segment 
 
 
Further analysis reveals that from the 28 companies that used geographic or mixed 
reporting segments 20 provided additional entity-wide information94.  Companies with 
geographic and mixed reporting segments have the 10% materiality threshold set by IFRS 
8 (IFRS 8:13).  This means that they should report every country where the company has 
more than 10% revenue or earnings from and every country where the company has more 
than 10% of its assets unless they provide this country level information as entity-wide 
information.  Rather than reporting as operating segments the companies usually report 
their individually material countries under entity-wide information (double reporting 
practice, see more in Chapter 6).  However, even with this double reporting practice the 
companies with geographic or mixed reporting segments (materiality threshold under 
entity-wide information: revenue → 16.23%; NCA → 22.45%) seem to use higher 
materiality threshold than the companies with business reporting segments (revenue → 
13.76%; NCA → 19.50%). (Appendix D. 5)  The use of the higher materiality threshold 
could indicate that companies organised around geographic areas and a mixture of 
geographic and business areas try to hide as much country specific information as 
possible.  These companies seem to be more secretive than the companies organised 
around business areas. (see more in Chapter 6) (Appendix D. 5 and Figure 7.4) 
 
                                                 
94 in different structure 
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7.7 Foreign country reporters versus non reporters 
 
The analysis of the country-level revenue and NCA disclosure of 76 companies can 
provide some insight into how these companies might set their materiality thresholds.  
However, the relatively small sample size (only 76 companies from the 155) indicates 
that it might be even more important and interesting to study the company characteristics 
that affect the individual foreign country disclosures of the companies (no disclosure at 
all, only revenue disclosure, both revenue and NCA disclosed by individual foreign 
countries). 
 
155 companies disclosed domestic / foreign revenue as it required by IFRS 8 (IFRS 
8:33(a)).  Almost a third of these companies (48 companies, 30.97%) did not disclose 
revenue / NCA information for any individual foreign company.  Thus, although 155 
companies “admitted” foreign revenues only 107 companies could find at least one 
foreign country to be material enough to be disclosed separately.  From the 107 companies 
that provided revenue information only 76 provided NCA as well for at least one 
individual foreign country. (Appendix D. 6, Table 6.1 and Table 7.1)  
 
Companies in the Health Care, Oil and Gas and Telecommunication industries, audited 
by one of the Big4 auditors, not single segment companies, FTSE 100 constituents, cross 
listed, US listed, early adopters, organised around business areas and report geographic 
revenue / NCA either as entity-wide information or both as entity-wide information and 
reporting segments more likely provide revenue and NCA information for individual 
foreign country(ies).  On the other hand, for example 38.24% of the companies in the 
Consumer Services, 35.85% of the companies in the Industrials and 35.71% of the 
companies in the Technology industries, 39.80% of the FTSE 250 constituents and 
43.55% of the companies not listed in the US provided neither revenue nor NCA 
information for any foreign country. (Appendix D. 6) 
 
The frequencies and relative frequencies in Appendix D. 6 and the results of Pearson’s 
Chi-square test (Appendix D. 7) suggest that FTSE (χ2(2) = 11.366, p < 0.003) and US 
listing (χ2(2) = 7.790, p < 0.020) status and the way companies reported their geographic 
revenues under IFRS 8 (χ2(8) = 16.045, p < 0.042) influenced whether the companies 
disclosed individual foreign country revenue / NCA information or not.  Cramer’s 
statistics indicate some association between categorical variables FTSE listing (C = 
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0.271, p < 0.003), US listing (C = 0.224, p < 0.020), the type of geographic disclosure 
under IFRS 8 (C = 0.228, p < 0.042) and the individual foreign country disclosure practice 
of the companies.  Although, the frequencies indicate some association between the 
company’s industry type and whether the company discloses revenue / NCA information 
by individual foreign country or not, this association is not significant (χ2(16) = 16.443, p 
< 0.442). (Appendix D. 7) 
 
Companies providing neither revenue nor NCA information for any individual country 
have, on average, the lowest foreign revenue percentage (49.24%), number of foreign 
countries with subsidiary (9.17) and number of subsidiaries in foreign countries (15.42).  
Based on the averages these companies seem to be internationally less visible than the 
companies that disclosed revenue or revenue and NCA for at least one foreign country. 
(Appendix D. 8) However, a more detailed analysis can reveal that about half (a third) of 
the non-disclosing companies generate 50% (75%) or more of their revenues from / in 
abroad and have subsidiaries at least 5 (10) foreign countries.  Thus, a relatively high 
proportion of these non-disclosing companies have considerable presence in foreign 
countries.  
 
Company characteristics 1) foreign revenue percentage and 2) number of subsidiaries in 
foreign countries significantly affect whether the companies report revenue or revenue 
and NCA for individual foreign country(ies).  The companies in the non-disclosing group 
reported lower number of geographic locations (3.13) and only one country, their country 
of domicile.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the fineness score calculated for this group 
of companies, on average, is lower than the fineness score calculated for the other two 
groups of companies. (Appendix D. 8) 
 
An interesting fact is that companies that only provide revenue for foreign countries have, 
on average, higher percentage of their revenues reported by country (68.29% ↔ 65.55%) 
and higher fineness score (F3: 2.46 ↔ 2.32) than the companies that report both revenue 
and NCA for foreign countries although they have fewer locations (5.52 ↔ 6.05) and 
countries (3.32 ↔ 3.66) reported.  This can indicate that the operation of these companies 
is more concentrated in some countries.  Thus, providing NCA information beside the 
revenue information might be commercially more harmful for the companies.  However, 
these companies also disclosed higher number of items by countries (5.29 ↔ 3.12; post 
hoc analysis shows significant difference between the means). (Appendix D. 8)  The 
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companies did not provide NCA information for individual foreign countries but it seems 
that they tried to compensate the users of financial statements with other items disclosed 
by country.  
 
7.8 Discussion and conclusion 
 
The disclosure of an individual country depends on the preparer’s materiality decision.  
Segmental data from the sample companies’ annual reports indicate considerable levels 
of inconsistency in the preparers’ materiality judgements.  Thus, the flexibility provided 
for the companies on the identification of individually reportable countries resulted in a 
wide variety of disclosure practices. (RQ3.2) 
 
The results indicate that certain company characteristics have a significant effect on the 
companies’ decision whether to report individual country information or not.  Companies 
which are FTSE 250 constituents, not US listed, internationally less visible (lower 
revenue percentage from abroad, lower number of subsidiaries in foreign countries) and 
are organised around geographic areas or a mixture of geographic and business areas more 
likely hold back their country level revenue / NCA information. (RQ3.3) 
 
One can argue, that information relating to quantitatively relatively immaterial countries 
(e.g. 5%, 5-10% of the revenues and / or NCA) will not significantly improve the financial 
statement users understanding about the risks and rewards of the company’s activities in 
different countries.  The question is whether there is a need to for a minimum threshold 
set either in IFRS 8 or in a general materiality standard.  About a quarter (half) of the 
companies reported individual countries with less than 5% (10%) contribution to the 
company’s total revenues / NCA.  This more detailed, seemingly immaterial information 
could be valuable for financial statement users such as civil societies, tax authorities etc. 
and in most of the cases this is the only available information about the companies’ 
activities in different foreign countries.  Additionally, the reported countries might not 
seem to be quantitatively material but they still can be material in qualitative terms.  On 
the other hand, even if a minimum threshold is set standards and guidelines do not offer 
upper limit of applicable materiality thresholds (e.g. “10 per cent or more”, IFRS 8:13 
and 34).  A quarter (two fifths) of the sample companies used revenue (NCA) materiality 
threshold 20% or more.  These companies simply might not have any other country with 
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smaller revenue / NCA contribution.  Other individually relatively immaterial countries 
with more or less the same qualitative characteristics (e.g. risk and rewards, general 
economic and political environment etc.) might have been grouped together and reported 
under a geographic region (e.g. Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North America etc.)  In 
summary, it seems that both preparers and users of financial statements might be better 
off if the company’s country level disclosures are not guided by materiality thresholds 
but by the proper application of the materiality concept. (see more in Section 7.2.4) 
(RQ3.2) 
 
Country-level data from the companies’ segmental notes documents the inconsistency 
between the companies’ materiality decisions.  The materiality threshold applied by the 
sample companies varies considerably.  This result indicates that the companies do not 
apply a general quantitative benchmark such that countries that contribute more (less) 
than a certain percent of the total revenues / NCA are always material (immaterial).  
However, with the exception of early adoption (Ha3) none of the studied company 
characteristics had significant effect on the materiality threshold applied by the 
companies.  Early adopter companies are not just ahead of other companies in the 
application of the new standards but they use significantly lower level materiality 
threshold as well.  These companies might use early adoption and lower materiality 
thresholds to (1) signal to the market and to different stakeholders and (2) differentiate 
themselves from their competitors.  The results suggest that there could be factors, not 
studied in this research that might be more important in the preparers’ materiality 
decisions.  These factors could be both quantitative (e.g. the individual country’s 
contribution to the companies’ total earnings, capital expenditure percentage allocated to 
the country etc.) and qualitative (e.g. the management’s personal empire building plans, 
stability of the foreign currency, the company’s tax policy etc.). (RQ3.3) 
 
Only the preparers know what is behind their materiality decision.  However, only a few 
companies disclosed information about the quantitative materiality threshold applied and 
none of them disclosed information about the qualitative factors considered in assessing 
the materiality of an individual country.  The results of the analysis of the country 
disclosures indicate that the preparers’ materiality decisions are probably based on both 
quantitative and qualitative considerations.  Thus it would be useful to have additional 
disclosure about the quantitative and qualitative aspects considered by the companies 
when they set their materiality threshold (e.g. the use of lower materiality threshold 
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because the company has operations in countries with higher political, exchange risks or 
because in the near future the company is going to expand its production and / or sales 
operation in that country etc.). (RQ3.1) 
 
The empirical findings provide evidence that the companies use both the flexibility 
provided by IFRS 8 and the shield of the materiality concept when they make materiality 
decision about their individually material, therefore reportable countries.  Greater 
transparency and detail about the companies’ materiality decision would reduce the 
uncertainty and would enhance the understanding of the companies’ segmental notes.  
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8.1 Introduction 
 
In the last decade there have been calls to require MNCs to disclose information about 
their activities in those countries where they have operations.  This reporting requirement 
is often called country by country reporting (CBCR).  However, to date with the exception 
of the IFRS 8 requirement to disclose external revenues and NCAs for individually 
material countries and for the country of incorporation, MNCs are not required to disclose 
financial information on a CBC basis in their audited financial statements.  
 
In the absence of CBCR the activities of MNCs and local authorities cannot be assessed.  
Disclosing CBC information sheds light on the countries where MNCs actually operate; 
the contribution of MNCs to the budget of different countries through taxation, royalties 
etc.; the intra-group trading, artificial profit shifting and tax avoidance of MNCs; the risk 
exposure of MNCs in different countries; the resource allocation decision of the directors 
of MNCs; the reputational risks of MNCs; the relationship between MNCs and their host 
countries; the special arrangements between governments and MNCs; the use of the 
national resources; the corruption gaps95 etc..  Thus, CBCR has the potential to result in 
greater accountability and transparency and to provide financial information that is 
essential for financial statements users to make appropriate decisions. 
 
The Transparency International (TI, 2012) studied the CBCR of the 105 largest publicly 
listed MNCs.  A company was regarded as fully transparent if revenue, capital 
expenditure, income before tax, income tax and community contributions were disclosed 
by the company for all its countries of operation.  Only 4 of the sample companies96 
reported some of the financial data for all countries in which they operate.  The remaining 
companies only disclosed some of the data for some of the countries.  Companies in the 
basic materials and oil and gas industry had the highest transparency score.  The research 
also found that there is a considerable level of variability and lack of consistency in the 
geographic information provided by the sample companies. 
 
Both SFAS 131 and IFRS 8 require that companies provide external revenue and NCA 
information for their country of incorporation.  Therefore, it is not surprising that the TI 
                                                 
95 the difference between the spending of a government and its incomes from MNCs 
96 BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto, Statoil and Tesco 
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(2012) found that the sample companies disclosed a good level of data on their country 
of domicile.  They argue that if the companies were able to provide a considerable level 
of disclosure for their country of domicile they should be able to do the same for their 
foreign operations.  Murphy (2009) also argues that if it is technically possible for a 
company to collect and report information for its country of domicile it is technically 
possible to do the same for all the countries where the company operates.  Multinational 
companies typically record and report financial information for each country where they 
have operating subsidiaries to comply with local tax and anti-bribery laws and to provide 
geographic information for the company’s management for decision making.  As a result, 
the companies have financial information on a CBC basis.  In 2011, the EFRAG collected 
some evidence about the administrative costs that would be associated with the 
implementation of CBCR. 5 out of 7 MNCs that participated in their study indicated that 
all the information required for geographic disclosures on a CBC basis is available in their 
accounting system.  Thus, the one-off costs on implementing (e.g. training to employees, 
IT system changes, documenting new business process and controls) and the ongoing 
costs (e.g. incremental cost of preparation, auditing, publishing of financial information) 
of complying with the new disclosure requirements would not be significant. (PWYP, 
2005; EC, 2011; EFRAG, 2011; TI, 2012)  However, even Murphy (2009) admits that 
there could be some additional direct cost (e.g. additional audit cost because the auditors 
might have to perform audit activities in additional foreign countries).  Most of the MNCs 
still resist providing meaningful country-level information in their financial statements 
although country-level information is most likely readily available for MNCs or can be 
produced by them with little effort and costs.  However, CBCR also could be associated 
with considerable level of implicit cost (e.g. proprietary cost: competitive harm, 
disadvantages etc.).  
 
This part of the study introduces the regulatory background of country-level reporting 
and provides a summary of the impacts of the introduction of IFRS 8 on the sample UK 
listed companies’ country-level disclosure.  
 
8.2 The regulatory background  
 
The original idea of CBCR was first presented in 2003 in a proposed IAS (Reporting 
Turnover and Tax by Location) made by Richard Murphy in cooperation with the 
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Association for Accountancy and Business.  Based on the proposed standard MNCs 
should report external and internal sales, purchases, value of resources (labour and 
natural) used, value added, profit generated, and taxes on profit for each country in which 
the company operates. (Murphy, 2003)  The proposed standard was submitted to the IASB 
while it was working on IFRS 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral Resources.  
The IASB issued IFRS 6 in December 2004, with little regard to the submission. 
(Gallhofer and Haslam, 2007) 
 
Murphy’s main partner in the CBCR campaign became the TJN.  They joined the PWYP 
coalition and focused on IFRS 8.  The PWYP coalition prepared a proposed standard on 
segmental reporting and submitted it to the IASB. The PWYP coalition (2005) argued in 
its proposal that shareholders, other capital providers of the company, management, 
employees, governments, local populations of countries in which MNCs operate and 
those with social concerns all would benefit of the adoption of their recommendation.  
 
When reasoning for CBCR the PWYP coalition emphasised the value of CBCR to 
investors and argued that without CBCR market valuations might be distorted, cost of 
capital will be higher because of systematic risk (e.g. political risk related to a country, 
the companies taxpaying practice, compliance with the local regulations, the country 
dependence on the company, possible corruption, possible reputational risk from trading 
in the country etc.) and the markets will operate less effectively than they should. (PWYP, 
2005)  
 
The segmental reporting standard proposed by the IASB only required external revenue 
and NCA information to be disclosed for individually material countries.  However, the 
PWYP coalition expected the disclosure of a relatively long list of items (external and 
internal revenue, third party costs, interest paid, profit before tax, current and deferred tax 
on profit, other taxes or charges due to the local government, payments made to the 
government, liabilities owing to the local government, deferred tax liabilities, gross and 
net assets employed, number of employees, employment costs, name of all subsidiaries, 
comparative data) for every country where the company operates. (PWYP, 2005) 
 
The PWYP coalition (2005) emphasised that neither the Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) report (voluntary, not always subject to audit, no standard for it) nor listing 
requirements (only applicable in a limited territory) could provide the necessary 
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information by country.  Additionally, if the disclosure requirement were regulated by an 
IFRS it would mean that all companies should provide the information.  Thus, none of 
the companies would suffer a competitive disadvantage by providing CBC information. 
(PWYP, 2005) 
 
In January 2006 IASB issued ED8 (Operating segments) for public consultation.  The 
PWYP coalition submitted 80 of the 182 comment letters received by the IASB.  
 
“And what happened to this proposed standard?  PWYP sent in the submission.  80 NGOs 
wrote in support of it.  And the IASB ignored us.  We asked for meetings.  They said that 
was not possible.  We offered to take them to places to show them the need.  They did not 
respond.  And in July they approved the standard they had promoted.” (Murphy, 2006) 
 
The IASB treated the 80 comment letters related to the PWYP coalition as one item and 
considered CBCR as a CSR issue. (Crawford et al., 2012a)  Although, the PWYP 
coalition asked the IASB to extend the scope of IFRS 8 with requirement of CBCR the 
IASB did not address this reporting issue in the new segmental reporting standard. (IASB, 
2006a)  
 
“The European Parliament … 
4. Expresses reservation as to the Commission’s analysis that disclosure of geographic 
information would in practice not be reduced compared to IAS 14, and considers it vital 
that management continues to provide segmental information sufficient to allow users to 
assess the risk and drives of the business in terms of geography, where relevant country-
by-country, … 
…. 
8. Requests therefore that the Commission go beyond voluntary guidelines and support 
the development of an appropriate accounting standard requiring country-by-country 
reporting by extractive companies.” (EP, 2007) 
 
The suggestion of the PWYP coalition was treated in the same way during the EU 
endorsement of IFRS 8. (EC, 2007)  Although the EP accepted the EC’s proposal to 
endorse IFRS 8 it also expressed that the disclosure of geographic information should not 
be reduced and supported that more detailed CBC disclosure should be developed for 
extractive companies. (EP, 2007) 
 
“... countries are more likely to prosper when governments are accountable to their 
people.  So we are leading a global effort to combat corruption which in many places is 
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the single greatest barrier to prosperity, and which is a profound violation of human 
rights.” (Obama, 2010) 
 
Not much happened until in July 2010 the USA Congress signed the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform Act.  Section 1504 of this act requires CBC and project by project (PBP) 
reporting of payment to governments by all US listed companies in the oil and gas, and 
mining sectors (extractive industries).  The detailed reporting requirements were 
published by the SEC on 22 August 2012.  However, following a successful legal 
challenge by the American Petroleum Institute97 the implementation of the SEC 
regulation is suspended.98 (Jackson, 2013; PWC, 2013) 
 
The US is not the only country which uses mandatory reporting to increase transparency.  
In September 2010, the EC agreed with the EP to evaluate the feasibility of CBC 
disclosures in the annual financial reports of MNCs.  In October 2010 the EC started a 
public consultation to gather stakeholders’ view on CBCR by MNCs.  Beside the specific 
transparency obligation for companies in the extractive industry the EC also considered 
general CBCR by multinational companies.  According to the EC the CBCR of these 
companies would (1) help investors to better assess the activities of multinational 
companies in different countries, and (2) enhance transparency about capital flows (e.g. 
taxation). (EC, 2010)  
 
“... users need country-by-country reporting data because this data; 
 Adds essential information for the effective operation of capital markets to that available 
in existing financial statements. 
 Emphasises the duty of directors to exercise sound governance over the assets of which 
they have stewardship, including the decisions they make as to where to invest those 
assets and to undertake trade. 
 Ensures that all users of accounts receive the information that they require to appraise 
the performance of the reporting entity. 
 Provides essential information required by users of accounts which is not made available 
by existing International Financial Reporting Standards. 
 Provides that information, if delivered consistently across Europe, on as basis that 
ensures that comparison can be made between reporting entities, which is a key attribute 
essential to successful interpretation of financial data. 
                                                 
97 API argued e.g. that the public availability of the company’s SEC report makes US companies less 
competitive 
98 02.07.2013 
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 Will increase the well-being of the people of Europe as a consequence of the enhanced 
return likely be made when directors of multinational corporations are held accountable 
for locating corporate investment in those places where their use is likely to be most 
advantageous.” (Murphy on behalf of the TJN, 2010, pp3-4) 
 
Murphy and the TJN (2010) emphasised the importance of CBC data to investors and 
other financial statement users in their response to the questions asked by the EC in public 
consultation on CBCR by MNCs.  The EC’s recommendation for full CBCR was rejected 
during the consultation process.  A majority of respondents (45%) and most preparers 
(65%) thought that no company should be targeted by CBCR at all. (EC, 2011)  While 
users (Non-Governmental Organisations, NGOs; investors; taxation institute) and other 
respondents (public authorities) were in favour of the introduction of CBCR, preparers, 
accountants and auditors were in general against reporting on CBC basis.  This later group 
of respondents argued that (1) sufficient transparency has already been provided by 
existing requirements (IFRS 8, Transparency Directive, Accounting Directives); (2) 
CBCR would be a competitive disadvantage for EU companies and it could affect the 
security of energy supply in the EU; (3) financial information should be regulated by 
global accounting standards and not by the EU; (4) CBCR can harm investors (by e.g. 
making financial statements more difficult to understand, revealing sensitive information 
about the company); (5) CBCR should not be in the companies’ audited financial 
statements because it is rather a CSR than an accounting issue; (6) CBCR would not 
enhance tax governance (e.g. tax and accounting information based on different rules); 
(7) the cost of implementing and producing CBC information would be substantial 
(employment cost, professional and consultancy fees, changes in information systems) 
etc..  However, preparers from the extractive industry expressed the view that the 
domestic accountability and governance of resource-rich countries could be improved by 
CBCR. (EC, 2011)  
 
“The reporting of payments to government by the extractive and logging industries will 
provide civil society with significantly more information on what specifically is paid by 
EU companies to host governments in exchange for the right to extract the relevant 
countries' natural resources.” (EC, 2013b) 
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On 12 June 2013 the EP voted in favour of new EU Transparency (2011/0307)99 and 
Accounting (2011/0308) Directives.  These new rules bring the EU rules into line100 with 
similar extractive industry transparency rules in the US and requires EU listed and large 
privately owned extractive and logging companies to publish CBC and project-by-project 
(PBP) of all payment over €100,000101 to governments.  A number of countries (e.g. 
Canada, Norway and Switzerland) also announced that they establish new mandatory 
reporting rules for extractive companies.  As a result the transparency “regulations will 
cover 70 percent of extractive industries by market capitalisation”. (Balleny and 
Dowson, 2013)  
 
Additional new transparency rules have been introduced on 26 June 2013 in the EU for 
the financial services industry in the Article 89 of CRD IV (Capital Requirements 
Directive 2013/36/EU).  Credit institutions and investments firms resident in the EU 
should report annually the following information on CBC basis: (1) name of their 
establishment and the nature of its activity; (2) turnover; (3) number of full time 
employees; (4) profit before tax; (5) tax on profit or loss and (6) public subsidies received 
by all institutions which have an establishment in the EU. (EP, 2013a; EC, 2013a)  
 
“On a report to be delivered by 21 July 2018 by the Commission, it will have to be 
considered the possibility of introducing an obligation requiring large undertakings to 
produce, on an annual basis, a country-by-country report for each member state and third 
country in which they operate, containing information on profits made, taxes paid on 
profits and public subsidies received.  The report will take into account developments to 
increase transparency in financial reporting carried out at international level.” (EC, 
2014, p2) 
 
A proposal for extending the CRD IV requirements to all MNCs was rejected by the EP 
and the Council recently.  However, the EC has to report back on CBCR on tax matters 
by 2018. (EC, 2014) 
 
Profit transfer, tax avoidance, corruption etc. are not unique to the extractive industry and 
finance sector.  When collecting enough revenue is a challenge for both poor and rich 
                                                 
99 The Council of The European Union approved the updating of transparency requirements on 17 October 
2013. 
100 with some exceptions e.g. the EU rules also apply to the logging sector and large unlisted companies 
incorporated in the EU 
101 $100,000 in the USA 
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governments (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2007) multinational companies all over the world 
transfer jobs and profit offshore (where income is exempt from taxation) and take 
advantage of cross-border loopholes to minimise their tax burden.  This activity is harmful 
to governments (e.g. less tax income, higher enforcement cost), to individual tax payers 
(e.g. greater burden to generate tax income for the budget of the country), to businesses 
(e.g. reputation risk, unfair competition) and to local societies (e.g. not enough money in 
the central budget for proper healthcare, education, infrastructure etc.). (OECD, 2013a)  
Well known, profitable companies such as Apple, Google, and Microsoft in the US have 
used offshore tax loopholes to avoid paying taxes. (Levin, 2013)  To stop this practice US 
senators Carl Levin and Sheldon Whitehouse introduced a bill in the Senate of the US on 
11 February 2013102.  Section 111 of the proposed Cut Unjustified Tax Loopholes Act 
(S.268) would require all multinational companies to disclose (1) a list of each country of 
operations; (2) the name of each entity in each country of operation; and (3) the number 
of employees, the total pre-tax gross revenues and the total amount of payments made to 
governments (taxes) on a CBC basis.  Thus, the requirements of the new bill are similar 
to the CBCR requirements of CRD IV. (PWC, 2013)  The acceptance of the proposed Act 
would be another major step towards the full CBCR. 
 
Even more recently the G20 endorsed (July 2013, Moscow and September 2013, Saint-
Petersburg) the OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS).  Action 
13 in the BEPS calls on the OECD to re-examine transfer pricing documentation to 
improve transparency by developing a template for CBCR. (OECD, 2013a and 2013b) 
 
Both the EU (Transparency and Accounting Directives, CRD IV) and the US (Dodd-
Frank Act) have implemented CBCR to improve transparency in selected industries.  The 
tax transparency initiative of the OECD and the Cut Unjustified Tax Loopholes bill in the 
US have the same objectives as these regulations but it is “driven by concerns about the 
erosion of tax bases in various countries” and therefore its main focus the collection “of 
relevant information for tax administration of governments”. (Deloitte, 2013)  Questions 
like what should be reported on a CBC basis, what currencies should be used, how the 
information should be aggregated, what should be the reporting mechanism etc. still need 
to be discussed and answered in the upcoming OECD consultation process.  
 
                                                 
102 the document is substantially similar to the bill introduced in the Senate in 2012 
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Table 8.1103 compares the requirements of the current and proposed USA and EU 
regulations, IFRS 8 and the Full CBCR as proposed by Murphy and the TJN.  With the 
exception of their special industry focus (extractive, logging and finance) the current 
legislative requirements are very close to the full CBCR.  The proposed Cut Unjustified 
Tax Loopholes Act in the US and the planned additional template in the OECD transfer 
pricing documentation would further extend the detailed CBC requirements to all sectors.  
 
“The rush to country-by-country reporting has begun.” (Murphy, 2013) 
 
The EU, the USA and the OECD have already taken major steps towards CBCR and the 
introduction of mandatory CBC reporting rules has accelerated recently.  However, the 
introduction of several, different rules is also a cause for concern.  Only IFRS issued by 
the IASB can have global impact on the companies’ financial reporting.  Therefore, the 
question is, how does the IASB react to these developments?  
 
“The Board will continue to examine the merits for a requirement of country-by-country 
disclosure as suggested by supporters of the Publish What You Pay campaign. A group 
of Board members will discuss this issue with other interested organisations.” (IASB, 
2006a) 
 
The IASB promised to revisit the issue of CBCR (e.g. IASB, 2006a; EC, 2007)  For 
example, in a meeting between the IASB Trustees and representatives of PWYP (3 July 
2007) the IASB agreed to reconsider CBCR during the revision of IFRS 6. (EC, 2007)  In 
2010 the IASB published a discussion paper and analysed the comment letters on 
accounting for extractive activities. (IASB, 2010b) However, the IASB did not add the 
extractive activities project to its active agenda and in December 2012 the project was 
discontinued104.  
 
                                                 
103 Based on: 
 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act (2010) and related SEC regulation (2012) 
 Transparency (2011/0307) and Accounting (2011/0308) Directives of the EU 
 Capital Requirements Directive (2013/36) of the EU 
 Cut Unjustified Tax Loopholes bill (2013/S.268) 
 Murphy, R. on behalf of TJN (2010), Country-by-Country Reporting, Shining Light onto Financial 
Statements  
104 the IASB started a research project on intangible assets and claimed that aim of this new project to 
“develop one set of requirements for investigative, exploratory and developmental activities across a wide 
range of activities” (Deloitte, 2012) 
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Table 8.1 Summary of the requirements of the current and proposed USA and EU regulations, IFRS 8 and full CBCR as proposed by Murphy 
and the TJN (2010) 
 
Regulation,  
Standard 
 
Requirement 
USA EU International Accounting 
(IASB) 
Full CBCR 
Dodd-Frank Act + 
SEC regulation 
Cut Unjustified Tax 
Loopholes Act (proposed) 
Transparency & Accounting 
Directives 
CRD IV  
IFRS8 
 
Murphy & TJN 
 
Industry 
 
Extractive 
 
all industry 
extractive & logging industry credit institutions & 
investment firms 
 
all industry 
 
all industry 
 
Listing status 
 
US listed companies 
 
US listed companies 
EU listed & large unlisted 
companies 
all institutions which has an 
establishment in the EU 
 
listed companies 
 
MNCs 
Disclosure requirement payments to governments (for 
the year in which payments are 
made) 
 taxes 
 royalties 
 fess (licence, rental, 
entry fees) 
 production entitlements 
 bonuses (e.g. signature, 
discovery, production) 
 dividends 
 infrastructure 
improvements  
 a list of each country of 
operation 
 name of the entities in 
the country 
 number of employees 
 pre-tax gross revenue 
 payments to 
governments (Federal, 
regional, local, and other 
tax; total amount of tax 
paid from the treasury)  
payments made to 
governments 
(a) name of the 
establishment and the 
nature of its activity and 
geographic locations 
(b) turnover 
(c) number of full time 
employees 
(d) profit before tax 
(e) tax on profit or loss 
(f) public subsidies received 
on a CBC basis 
 external revenue 
 NCA 
 the name of each country 
of operation 
 the name of all the 
companies in the country 
 external and internal 
sales, purchases, 
financial costs 
 labour costs and 
employee numbers 
 pre-tax profit, net profit 
after tax 
 the cost and NBV of the 
company’s physical 
fixed assets 
 the gross and net assets 
in total 
 tax charge (current and 
deferred) 
 tax paid to the 
government 
 tax assets / liabilities 
 deferred tax liabilities 
and 
 for companies in the 
extractive industries 
benefits paid to the 
government by country  
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Table 8.1 (continued) Summary of the requirements of the current and proposed USA and EU regulations, IFRS 8 and full CBCR as proposed 
by Murphy and the TJN (2010) 
 
Regulation,  
Standard 
 
Requirement 
USA EU International Accounting 
(IASB) 
Full CBCR 
Dodd-Frank Act + 
SEC regulation 
Cut Unjustified Tax 
Loopholes Act (proposed) 
Transparency & Accounting 
Directives 
CRD IV  
IFRS8 
 
Murphy & TJN 
De-minimis / 
Reporting criteria 
payment over $100,000 not mentioned payment over €100,000 not mentioned material  the net value of tangible 
fixed asset increases by 
more than US$5 million 
or 
  turnover plus financial 
income exceeds more 
than US$5 million in the 
jurisdiction in the 
reporting period 
 turnover plus financial 
income in the 
jurisdiction exceeds 5% 
of the consolidated total 
 any jurisdiction 
reportable in which 
upstream extractive 
industries activity occurs 
Disclosure level CBC (by country of operation) 
& PBP 
CBC (by each member of the 
group in each country of 
operation) 
CBC & PBP CBC CBC (the basis is the 
company’s decision but need 
to be disclosed) 
CBC (by country of operation) 
 
Form 
separate report 
(Form SD) 
separate report (prescribed by 
the SEC & available to the 
public online) 
 
separate report 
Annual Report / Annex to the 
Financial Statements 
Annual Report / Financial 
Statements 
Annual Report / Financial 
Statements or published on the 
company’s website 
Audit  no need not mentioned no need  need to be audited  need to be audited need to be audited 
Frequency annual annual annual annual annual annual 
First report must be filed within 150 days 
of an issuer’s first fiscal year 
ending after 30 September 
2013 _ suspended by court 
decision 
not applicable Member States transpose the 
Directives into national law 
within two years of the 
Directive coming into force 
(probable applicable from 
2016) 
on 1 July 2014: (a)-(c) to the 
public; (d)-(f) to EC  
from 1 January 2015 (a)-(f) to 
the public (subject to the EC’s 
impact assessment) 
for periods beginning on or 
after 1 January 2009 (earlier 
application was permitted) 
not applicable 
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 “The agenda consultation [2011] revealed little support for such a project [CBCR], and 
we do not plan to undertake any specific work on this topic.” (IASB, 2012, p13) 
“In the light of this feedback [2012] the IASB has decided not to undertake proactive 
work in this area [CBCR] for the next two years. The IASB will review its priorities again 
in 2015.” (IASB, 2013a, p22) 
 
During its first agenda consultation (launched on 26 July 2011) the IASB was asked to 
consider the introduction of CBC requirements into IFRS.  In its Feedback Statement to 
the agenda consultation (18 December 2012) the IASB refused to undertake any work on 
this topic.  In January 2013 the IASB organised a Discussion Forum on Financial 
Reporting Disclosure.  During this Forum the IASB was asked again to consider adding 
CBR requirements to its agenda.  It was refused again by the IASB.  Thus, the IASB’s 
viewpoint on CBCR has not changed in the last decade and it does not plan to carry out 
any work in this area.  This is despite the relevant and significant changes introduced in 
the USA and EU.  
 
Evers et al. (2014) argues that neither extended financial accounting standards nor 
separate CBCR templates can prevent MNCs from profit shifting because their tax 
minimisation strategies are based on legal exploitation of gaps and loopholes in different 
tax laws.  Thus, CBCR cannot fight international profit shifting.  They call for closing 
gaps in tax rules and using more standardised transfer pricing regulations at an 
international level.  The authors argue that “segmental reporting as … part of 
consolidated accounts does not deliver country-specific information ….”  “According to 
the management approach …, data is disclosed on a business-unit level, yet not 
necessarily on a geographic or even per-country basis.” (Evers et al., 2014, p9)  
However, Evers et al. (2014) do not mention the entity-wide disclosures where companies 
(should) provide country level financial information. 
 
8.3 Research Objective and Research Question 
 
Different stakeholder groups have different levels of success in incorporating their 
motivations in accounting standards.  In the case of CBCR the preparers’ motivations 
seem to drive the IASB. (Crawford et.al., 2012b) On the other hand, different legislative 
bodies (e.g. US Congress, EP) made a major step forward and mandate limited CBCR to 
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fulfil the needs of other stakeholder groups such as tax authorities, regulators, civil 
societies etc.. 
 
Preparers argue that enough transparency is provided by existing requirements (IFRS 8: 
geographic disclosure in the notes; Transparency Directive: review of the company’s 
country risk exposure in the management report; Accounting Directives: identification of 
subsidiaries, jointly controlled entities and associates) (EC, 2011) 
 
The question is whether the existing geographic disclosure requirements through IFRS 8 
provide sufficient financial information and transparency for the different financial 
statement users. (RO4)  
 
RQ4.1: Can individual country disclosure under IFRS 8 provide sufficient information and 
transparency? 
 
8.4 Analysis of findings on country-level reporting 
 
Results from previous Sections about the individual country disclosure of the sample 
companies is summarised in Table 8.2 (see the details in Chapter 6)  
 
It is not in doubt that the introduction of IFRS 8 resulted in some positive changes in the 
companies’ country level geographic disclosure (e.g. significant increase in the number 
of reported countries and in the proportion of revenues reported by country).  However, 
many of the largest MNCs still do not provide country level geographic breakdown of 
their operations.  Although IFRS 8 requires the disclosure of external revenue and NCA 
for the company’s country of domicile and for the individually material foreign countries 
one fifth of the sample companies (N=222) do not provide any country-level information.  
Not even the external revenues attributed to the country of domicile is provided by these 
companies even though this is required. MNCs are even more reluctant to provide country 
level financial information about their foreign operation.  Only 107 (76) companies 
disclosed revenue (revenue and NCA) information for at least one foreign country.  
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Table 8.2 Individual country disclosure facts 
Sample Facts 
N=222  the percentage of companies not providing country level information for at least one country 
decreased from 37.39% to 20.72% 
 the percentage of companies providing country level information for only one individual country 
decreased from 38.29% to 27.03% 
 the percentage of companies providing country level information for 2-5 individual countries 
increased from 21.17% to 45.49% 
 40.54% of the companies increased the number of reported individual countries 
 more than half of the companies (53.60%) did not change the number of reported individual 
countries 
 the number of countries which were individually reported in the companies’ financial statements 
increased from 44 to 66 
 N=155  on average, companies disclosed significantly higher number of individual countries under IFRS 8 
(2.77) than under IAS 14R (1.45) 
 being a constituent of the FTSE 100 index has significant effect on the number of countries reported 
under IFRS 8 
 the number of countries reported under IFRS 8 is significantly, positively correlated with the 
percentage of foreign revenues within total revenues 
 there is no significant relationship between the number of countries where the company has 
principal subsidiaries and the number of reported countries  
 the number of countries reported under IFRS 8 is positively correlated with the number of countries 
reported under IAS 14R 
 there is a significant, positive relationship between the companies’ gearing ratio and the number of 
individual countries disclosed 
  only 5.81 % of the companies (9 companies) disclosed all of their revenues by individual countries 
 under IFRS 8 more than half (third) of the companies allocated more than 60% (80%) of their 
revenues to individual countries 
 the mean of the percentage of total revenue reported by country increased significantly from 
44.45% to 61.52% 
 industry type has significant effect on the revenue percentage reported by country (Basic Materials, 
Industrials and Technology industries reported significantly lower % of their total revenues by 
individual countries than companies in the Utilities industry) 
 the greater the number of countries and tax haven countries where the company has principal 
subsidiaries the lower the percentage of total revenues reported by individual countries 
  most of the companies attributes revenues on the basis of the location of the customer (47.10%) 
and not on the basis of the origin (only 19.35%) of the revenues 
 28.39% of the companies do not mention of their basis of revenue attribution 
  72.26% of the companies report only external revenues and NCA for individual countries 
 only 27.74% of the companies disclosed one or more profit measure for the reported individual 
countries 
 the average number of items disclosed by country is 3.77 
based on the findings in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 
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Table 8.2 (continued) Individual country disclosure facts  
Sample Facts 
N=155  companies that provide their geographic information under geographic (7.80) or mixed (7.38) 
reporting segments disclose significantly higher number of items by country than companies that 
provide entity-wide geographic information 
 companies in the Customer Services (5.32) industry disclose significantly higher number of items 
by country than companies in the Basic Materials industry 
  only 107 (69.03%) companies disclosed revenue information for at least one foreign country 
 only 76 (49.03%) companies disclosed NCA information for at least one foreign country 
 26.32% of the companies that disclosed both revenue and NCA information for at least one foreign 
country reported revenue and NCA in a different structure 
 the greater the number of countries where the company has principal subsidiaries the lower the 
percentage of total revenues reported by individual countries 
 N=126  companies disclosed significantly lower number of items by individual countries under IFRS 8 
(3.95) than under IAS 14R (5.49) 
 the proportion of companies that disclosed country level segment asset, capital expenditure, 
depreciation / amortisation, segment liability and profit measure disclosing companies decreased 
under IFRS 8 
 there is significant, negative correlation between the change in the number of individual countries 
reported and the change in the number of items disclosed by individual countries 
based on the findings in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 
 
Although there is no significant correlation between the number of foreign countries with 
subsidiaries and the number of individual countries reported (rN=155=0.032, pN=155=0.689), 
both the number of foreign countries with subsidiaries (rN=155=-0.382, pN=155=0.000) and 
the number of tax haven countries with subsidiaries (rN=155=-0.253, pN=155=0.002) have 
significant negative effect on the proportion of the company’s revenues reported by 
country. (Appendix C. 28, Appendix C. 29 
 
Full country-level disclosure of financial information is very rare among MNCs.  For 
example, there are only a few (9) companies (9/155→5.81%) which voluntarily allocate 
all of their revenues to countries in which the company operates or from which the 
company has revenues. (Table 8.3)  
 
Unfortunately the introduction of IFRS 8 had some negative impacts as well on the 
companies’ country level reporting.  Under the new standard the companies disclosed 
significantly lower number of items by country because many companies stopped 
disclosing country level segment assets, capital expenditures, segment liabilities and 
profit measure information.  The average number of items reported by countries under 
IFRS 8 is 3.77 but only external revenue (100.00%) and NCA (72.36%) are disclosed by 
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most of the companies. Items (profit measure, number of employees and labour costs, 
current and deferred tax charges, tax assets / liabilities, payments to local governments 
etc.) that could help to shed light on profit shifting, tax erosion, corruption gap etc. are 
only reported by a few companies or not reported at all. (see the details in Table 6.19 and 
Table 6.20)  Thus, under their segmental reporting the companies do not provide the 
necessary information that would be welcomed by the different governmental bodies (e.g. 
tax authorities and central government) and CSOs.  The value relevance and usefulness 
of the country level disclosures for investors also questionable since e.g. only a quarter 
of the companies provide any earning measures by country (Table 6.19) and only 56.77% 
(63.87%) of the companies disclosed more than 60% (50%) of their total revenues by 
individual countries. (Table 6.14)  
 
Crawford et al. (2012a) provided some insight into difference in the segmental disclosures 
of the companies in different industries.  The authors found that the mining sector was 
the only industry sector where the companies disclosed more items by segment under the 
management approach.  Crawford et al. (2012a) argue that the pressure from the PWYP 
coalition “may have encouraged mining companies to disclose more information.” (p30)  
However, the type of reporting segments (business, geo, mixed) is not mentioned.  The 
authors also mentioned that under IAS 14R companies in the oil sector disclosed the most 
items by segments and the reported number of items was almost the same under IFRS 8.  
 
The results of this study demonstrate that companies in Basic Materials (Oil and Gas) 
industry reported, on average, the lowest (second highest) number of items by country 
under both segment reporting standards.  However, just like in every other industry the 
number of items disclosed by country decreased in these two extractive industries as well. 
(Table 8.4)  Thus, it seems that the pressure from the PWYP coalition and other civil 
society organizations was not even enough to compensate for the decrease in the number 
of items disclosed by country that resulted from the change in the disclosure requirements.  
 
Additionally, there is a strong negative correlation between the change in the number of 
countries reported and the change in the number of items disclosed for each country.  
Thus, the more the companies increased the number of their reported countries, the more 
they decreased the number of items disclosed for their individually reported countries. 
(Table 8.2) 
 
Chapter 8: “CBCR” under IFRS 8: How far are we? Evidence from UK companies 
237 
Table 8.3 “Best practice” country-level disclosure examples 
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National Grid FTSE 100 Utilities 31.03.2010 No Mixed reporting segment 2 
Customer 
location 
6 
Domino’s Pizza UK & IRL FTSE 250 Consumer Services 27.12.2009 No Geo reporting segment 2 Origin 11 
FirstGroup FTSE 250 Consumer Services 31.03.2010 No 
Both reporting segment & 
entity-wide information 
3 Origin 3 
Hochshild Mining FTSE 250 Basic Materials 31.12.2009 No Entity-wide information 11 
Customer 
location 
2 
Howden Joinery FTSE 250 Industrials 25.12.2010 Yes Entity-wide information 2 
Customer 
location 
3 
JKX Oil & Gas FTSE 250 Oil & Gas 31.12.2009 No Geo reporting segment 4 
Customer 
location 
8 
Mitchells & Butlers FTSE 250 Consumer Services 25.09.2010 Yes Entity-wide information 2 
Customer 
location 
3 
Northgate FTSE 250 Industrials 30.04.2010 No 
Both reporting segment & 
entity-wide information 
2 Origin 9 
Shanks Group FTSE 250 Industrials 31.03.2008 No Mixed reporting segment 4 Origin 7 
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Table 8.4 The number of items disclosed for each reported country by industry 
 
Industry 
No. of 
companies* 
No. of items disclosed by country 
IAS 14R IFRS 8 Change 
Basic materials   12 4.67 2.33 -2.34 
From which: Mining     8 4.50 2.13 -2.37 
Consumer Services   30 6.23 5.77 -0.46 
Customer Goods   11 6.36 3.18 -3.18 
Health Care     6 5.33 3.17 -2.16 
Industrials   45 4.67 3.56 -1.11 
Oil & Gas     4 8.25 4.25 -4.00 
Technology   10 5.30 4.20 -0.80 
Telecommunication     3 8.67 3.67 -5.00 
Utilities     5 5.00 2.60 -2.40 
Total 126 5.49 3.95 -1.54 
*: N=126: country-level information disclosing companies both under IFRS 8 and IAS 14R 
 
These results demonstrate the reluctance of companies to provide detailed and useful 
CBC information and are in line with the theory that increased disclosure requirement 
(disclosure of external revenue and NCA information for the country of domicile and for 
the individually material countries) can decrease the company’s value relevant disclosure 
(less items disclosed, smaller proportion of the companies disclose earnings, capital 
expenditure etc.). (Nagarajan and Sridhar, 1996) 
 
There is also some indication that the companies’ tax avoiding behaviour affects the 
companies’ country-level geographic disclosures.  There is a significant negative 
relationship between the number of tax haven countries with subsidiaries and the 
proportion of the companies’ revenues reported by countries.  Thus, the more the 
company needs to hide, the less country-level information it provides. (Table 8.2) 
 
8.5 CBCR and the application of materiality concept 
 
What is disclosed in the companies’ financial statements is limited by using the 
materiality concept because IFRS disclosure requirements only need to be applied to 
information that is material.  Thus, companies only disclose countries which are material 
enough to be reported. (see Chapter 7)  Whereas other countries that are judged to be 
immaterial can be aggregated to different geographic regions (e.g. continents, multi-
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continents) or grouped to the ROW.  The requirement to disclose information about all 
countries in the company’s financial statements raises the concern that it could result in 
“overly detailed and voluminous reports, which would obscure rather than provide any 
useful information to the users”. (EFRAG, 2011, p10)  For example, the number of 
foreign countries with principal subsidiaries of the sample companies in this study varies 
between 1 and 51105. (Table 8.5)  Providing information for all 51 countries (which is 
more than a quarter of the number of the countries in the world)106 clearly would increase 
the number of pages in the company’s Annual Report but it is highly unlikely that it also 
would enhance the usefulness of the company’s geographic disclosure.  Most of these 
countries must be immaterial at least quantitatively (e.g. low attribution to the company’s 
total external revenue, operating NCA in the country, capital expenditure invested in the 
country, contribution to the local government’s budget, number of employees etc.).  The 
Dodd-Frank Act and the EU’s Transparency and Accounting Directives set certain 
threshold, de-minimis to reduce the disclosure burden on the companies and the 
information overload on the financial statement users.  In their response to the questions 
asked by the EC during public consultation on CBCR by MNCs Murphy and the TJN 
(2010) also suggested that full CBCR (audited, detailed financial statement information) 
should only be required for countries that considered to be highly material107.  They argue 
that it would require the disclosure of a limited number of countries which would provide 
relevant information to the users.  However, a country which is quantitatively immaterial 
to the entity could be material for it in qualitative terms (e.g. material to the company’s 
reputation) or could be material for the host country (e.g. economic dependence of the 
country on the company’s investment).  Therefore, it can be argued that the disclosure of 
the individual countries only should be limited by the appropriate application of the 
materiality concept. 
 
IFRS 8 only requires the disclosure of the country of domicile and the material foreign 
countries and does not define quantitative materiality threshold to be applied.  Thus, the 
                                                 
105 Rentokil Initial 
106 51/196=26.02% 
107 “This requirements will exist if one of the following four situation arises: 
1. Turnover plus financial income (...) in the jurisdiction exceeds US$5 million in the reporting 
period. 
2. The net value of tangible fixed assets in the jurisdiction increases by more than US$5 million in 
the reporting period. 
3. Turnover plus financial income in the jurisdiction exceeds 5% of the total consolidated turnover 
plus financial income of the reporting entity during the reporting period. 
4. Any jurisdiction in which upstream extractive industries activity occurs.” (Murphy and TJN, 2010, 
p12) 
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companies have already applied the materiality concept when they decided which 
individual country they provide geographic information for in their segmental notes.  The 
materiality judgement is made by the company’s management and based on different 
quantitative and qualitative factors.  While, the mean of the number of foreign countries 
with principal subsidiaries is 10.95 the mean number of individual countries reported 
(including the country of domicile) is only 2.77. (Table 8.5)  
 
Table 8.5 Summary statistics for the number of foreign and tax haven countries with 
subsidiary, the number of individual countries reported and the revenue percentage 
reported by country under IFRS 8 
 
 
 
Statistics (N=155) 
Number of  Revenue % 
reported by 
country 
foreign 
countries with 
subsidiary 
tax haven 
countries with 
subsidiary 
individual 
countries 
reported 
Mean     10.95       1.53       2.77     61.52 
Std. Deviation     10.45       1.77       2.19     28.82 
Median   8   1   2     67.49 
Minimum   0   0   1       1.19 
Maximum 51   9 12 100.00 
 
The country-level reporting of two big pharmaceutical companies well illustrates the 
different use of the materiality concept. “AstraZeneca operates through 282 subsidiaries 
worldwide.  Products are manufactured in 18 countries worldwide and sold over 100 
countries.” (AstraZeneca Annual Report 2009, p186)  The company reports external 
revenue108 109 for 12 countries out of the 15 countries where it has principal subsidiaries.  
GlaxoSmithKline Group has principal subsidiaries in 44 countries worldwide.  However, 
it only reports external revenue110 and NCA111 information for two countries (the USA 
and the UK).  93.53% of AstraZeneca’s external revenue is allocated to and reported by 
individual countries.  Even the remaining 6.47% is allocated to continents or multi-
continents by the company.  Whereas, GlaxoSmithKline only reports 42.49% of its 
revenues by country and the remaining 57.51% is reported as ROW.  
 
Only a few companies disclose information about the factors they considered during their 
materiality decision and the materiality threshold they applied.  The previous example 
                                                 
108 generated by companies located in that country 
109 and operating profit, profit before tax, NCA, total assets, assets acquired, net operating assets and 
revenue by geographic market for its country of domicile and foreign countries 
110 by location of customer 
111 by location of asset 
Chapter 8: “CBCR” under IFRS 8: How far are we? Evidence from UK companies 
241 
and the results in Chapter 7 indicate that the companies’ materiality judgement varies 
significantly.  It means that the application of materiality concept itself could result in 
very different country-level reports (e.g. quantitative materiality threshold applied, 
disclosure of revenue / NCA for different countries etc.) and could undermine the 
transparency, consistency and comparability of the country level reporting of the 
companies.  
 
8.6 Discussion and conclusion 
 
In summary, the results of this study indicate that (1) the fact that IFRS 8 only requires 
the disclosure of revenue and NCA for the country of domicile and for the material foreign 
countries, (2) the way the MNCs apply the materiality concept to define countries that 
need to be individually disclosed and (3) the companies’ preference to keep geographic 
information at a minimum level (non-compliance with the requirements of IFRS 8; low 
level voluntary information) result in a relatively poor level of audited country level 
information even among the largest listed companies. 
 
Whether the positive effect of the more detailed country level information or the negative 
effect of the less detail about the reported countries (in most of the cases only revenue 
and NCA) is the greater, is a question to answer in further studies.  However, the results 
clearly indicate that the companies’ current geographic segment reporting practice, in 
general, is very far from the idea of full CBCR.  The preparers are more likely secretive 
and hold back country level information by repeatedly claiming the high costs of 
implementing and producing country-level information, the competitive harm and 
disadvantages caused by country level information and the difficulty of understanding 
financial statements with detailed country-level information in them.  To date, none of 
these arguments have been proven by studies. 
 
Preparers and the IASB also claimed that enough information and transparency is 
provided under the existing requirements of IFRS 8 and any further country level 
information is subject to CSR reporting.  However, the findings of this study and the fact 
that legislative bodies in the US and in the EU had to bypass the IASB and issue CBCR 
related new regulations indicate that the country level requirements of IFRS 8 and the 
country level information provided by the companies in their segmental notes are not 
sufficient and transparent enough.  
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The recent legislative actions in the USA and in the EU are the first but major steps 
towards full CBCR.  However, their limitations (only covers selected industries, requires 
a limited number of items on a CBC basis and only compulsory in the EU / USA) reduces 
their potential values and usefulness to stakeholders.  Policy decision made by the G20 
and the proposed Cut-Unjustified Tax Loopholes Act in the USA are further major steps 
in the direction of full CBCR.  The impacts of these new regulations on the companies’ 
country level geographic disclosure is an area for further research. 
 
The pressure is now on the IASB.  To ensure the same reporting requirement for entities 
worldwide and to increase transparency and the availability of important geographic 
financial information, to enhance consistency and to help the comparison CBCR needs to 
be considered by the IASB and should be addressed in international accounting standards.  
As Murphy and the PWYP coalition suggested in 2005, the best place to deal with CBCR 
would be IFRS 8.  
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9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the main findings and conclusions of the present thesis.  Section 9.2 
summarises the research objectives and questions and outlines the research methods 
followed in the study in order to reach the research objectives and answer the research 
questions.  Section 9.3 presents the concluding comments that emerged from the findings 
of this thesis.  Section 9.5 deals with the limitations of the study and sets out suggestions 
for further research.  
 
9.2 Summary of Research Objectives, Questions and Methods 
 
This research sought to make a contribution to the relevant accounting literature 
concerning 
 the compliance with the requirement of IFRS 8 (RO1); 
 the impact of the introduction of IFRS 8 on the quality of the companies’ 
geographic disclosure (RO2); 
 the application of the materiality concept in defining the company’s individually 
material countries (RO3); 
 the sufficiency and transparency of the companies’ existing country-level 
disclosures (RO4) and 
 the corporate disclosure theories via the investigation of the effect of different 
company characteristics on (1) the level of compliance with the requirement of 
IFRS 8 (RO1), (2) the quality of geographic disclosures (RO2) and (3) the 
materiality threshold applied by the companies in defining the company’s 
individually material countries (RO3). (Chapter 3) 
 
The following research questions were formulated and answered to achieve the research 
objectives:  
RQ1.1: What is the level of compliance with the segmental reporting requirements 
of IFRS 8? 
RQ1.2: What company characteristics are associated with the extent of compliance 
with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8?  
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RQ2.1: Did the quality of geographic disclosures improve under IFRS 8? 
RQ2.2: What company characteristics drive secrecy and support openness? 
 
RQ3.1: To what extent do companies disclose information about their materiality 
judgment (how and why is an individual country determined to be material)? 
RQ3.2: What quantitative and qualitative thresholds are used to determine the 
materiality of individual countries? 
RQ3.3: What company characteristics affect the companies’ materiality decision? 
 
RQ4.1: Can individual country disclosure under IFRS 8 provide sufficient 
information and transparency? (Chapter 3) 
 
To provide answers to the research questions, data for a sample of 222 listed companies 
(FTSE 350) were collected and analysed using different statistical methods. (Chapter 4)  
The results of the statistical analysis were used to draw conclusions and critically evaluate 
the companies’ segmental disclosure practice under IFRS 8. (Chapter 5, Chapter 6, 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8) 
 
9.3 Summary of findings of the study 
 
9.3.1 Summary of findings 
Discussion and summaries of the research findings and concluding comments were 
provided at the end of Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.  The most important 
findings and comments from these chapters are summarised in this section. 
 
9.3.2 Compliance with the requirements of IFRS 8112  
 
The results in Chapter 5 reveal that there is substantial non-compliance with the entity-
wide disclosure requirements of IFRS 8.  Previous research has highlighted the 
importance of enforcement in increasing compliance with IFRSs. (Street and Bryant, 
2000; Glaum and Street, 2003; Prather-Kinsey and Meek, 2004; Hodgdon et al., 2009)  
                                                 
112 RO1; Chapter 5 
Chapter 9: Conclusions, Limitations and Further Research 
 
246 
The findings of this study suggest that enforcement is still an issue and there is scope for 
the companies to increase their degree of compliance with the segment reporting 
requirements of the standard.  Increased compliance with the requirements of the standard 
could improve (1) the companies’ segmental disclosures and (2) the comparability across 
entities. (RQ1.1) 
 
The results also indicate that the extent of compliance varies significantly.  The present 
study identified several factors that affect the companies’ compliance with the 
requirements of IFRS 8.  Propositions of enforcement, agency, proprietary, political cost 
and signalling theories can provide the basis for interpreting these findings.  
 
First, the evidences suggest that the identity of the auditor is the most important 
determinant in explaining the level of compliance with the segmental reporting 
requirements of IFRS 8.  Thus, the audit quality (measured by the extent of compliance) 
provided by the BIG 4 audit companies seems to be different.  Therefore, the results 
suggest that the BIG 4 companies should not be treated as a homogenous group of 
auditors. (RQ1.2) 
 
Additionally, the findings reveal that the overall level of compliance and the level of 
compliance with the entity-wide requirements of the standard is significantly greater for 
companies organised around different products and services (business reporting 
segments) or a combination of different products, services and geographical areas (mixed 
reporting segments) compared to companies organised around different geographical 
areas (geographic reporting segments).  It raises the question whether the companies 
intentionally use geographic reportable segments to conceal information from their 
stakeholders including shareholders (agency cost), from their competitors (proprietary 
costs), and from tax authorities (political costs).  (RQ1.2) 
 
Furthermore, the level of compliance with the reporting segment requirements is 
significantly greater for early adopters.  These findings suggest that the early adopter 
companies use their annual report to signal to the market, their stakeholders (e.g. their 
legitimacy, accountability) and distinguish themselves from their competitors.  It also can 
indicate that these companies and their auditors might had been aware of and prepared 
for the requirements of the new standard (e.g. because of the company’s US listing). 
(RQ1.2) 
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Additionally, the relatively high level of non-compliance with the entity-wide 
requirements of the standard and the considerable variance between the levels of 
compliance of the individual companies raise concerns about the successfulness of the 
convergence of the accounting standards (copying the SFAS 131) and the quality and 
comparability of the financial statements. 
 
9.3.3 Quality of the companies’ geographic disclosures113  
 
The results of the analysis in Chapter 6 suggest that the introduction of IFRS 8 has both 
positive (e.g. more than 40% of the companies increased the number of their reported 
individual countries; the companies disclosed significantly higher number of geographic 
locations and countries; the companies disclosed significantly higher proportion of their 
revenues by country etc.) and negative (e.g. the proportion of revenues reported by 
“ROW” increased; the companies disclosed significantly lower number of items by 
countries; the use of broad, vague geographical areas remained a problem, etc.) impacts 
on the geographic disclosure practice / quality of the companies.  These results reinforce 
previous research findings and indicate that the companies’ geographic disclosure quality 
cannot be measured / described by only one quality measure. (RQ2.1) 
 
Research results in Chapter 6 indicate that companies stick with their “disclosure 
position” and a high proportion of the sample companies did not change or did not change 
significantly their geographic disclosure practice under the new standard.  Furthermore, 
even if a company changed its reporting practice the change did not necessarily improve 
the company’s disclosure quality.  These results are in line with the argument of Gibbins 
et al. (1990) that the management only changes the company’s disclosure if it is 
advantageous for the company (opportunism).  Thus, the results seem to indicate that it 
is not in the interest of a relatively high percentage of the sample companies to change 
geographic disclosure practice and provide better quality geographic information. (RQ2.1) 
 
Considerable variation was found in the companies’ geographic disclosure quality both 
under IAS 14R and IFRS 8.  The results indicate that none of the studied company 
                                                 
113 RO2; Chapter 6 
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characteristics had a significant effect on all of the quality measures.  The findings suggest 
that companies that are more visible internationally (higher percentage of foreign 
revenues in total revenues; higher number of foreign countries with subsidiaries; higher 
number of subsidiaries in foreign countries) report greater number of geographic 
locations.  However, they also tend to report lower percentage of their revenues by 
countries.  Therefore, the fineness of the geographic information provided by them tends 
to be lower as well.  As the number of foreign revenue generating countries increases, it 
is probably less likely that (1) a particular country meets the company’s materiality 
threshold and (2) revenues from this country are reported individually.  On the other hand, 
the lower quality geographical information (lower percentage of the revenues reported by 
country, lower fineness scores) could indicate that internationally more visible companies 
might prefer to hold back country level information to conceal the company’s activity in 
those countries. This could reduce their political and proprietary costs and hide the 
management’s activity from the shareholders and debt providers (e.g. poorly performing 
countries, management’s empire building plans). (RQ2.2) 
 
Although, there is some indication that the companies’ tax (avoiding) policy (proxied by 
the number of tax haven countries with subsidiaries and the number of subsidiaries in tax 
havens) might have an impact on the companies’ geographic disclosure practice / quality 
(significant negative correlation between the number of tax haven countries with 
subsidiaries and the fineness score / revenue percentage reported by countries; significant 
negative correlation between the number of subsidiaries in tax havens and the fineness 
score) the results are not conclusive.  (RQ2.2) 
 
9.3.4 Application of the materiality concept114  
 
The disclosure of an individual country depends on the preparer’s materiality decision.  
The results in Chapter 7 indicate considerable levels of inconsistency in the preparers’ 
materiality judgements.  Thus, the flexibility provided for the companies on the 
identification of individually reportable countries resulted in a wide variety of disclosure 
practices. (RQ3.2) 
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The results indicate that certain company characteristics have a significant effect on the 
companies’ decision whether to report individual country disclosure or not.  Companies 
which are FTSE 250 constituents, not US listed, internationally less visible (lower 
revenue percentage from abroad, lower number of subsidiaries in foreign countries) and 
are organised around geographic areas or a mixture of geographic and business areas are 
more likely to hold back their country level revenue / NCA information. (RQ3.2) 
 
One can argue, that information relating to quantitatively relatively immaterial countries 
(e.g. 5%, 5-10% of the revenues and / or NCA) will not significantly improve the financial 
statement users’ understanding about the risks and rewards of the company’s activities in 
different countries.  The question is whether there is a need for a minimum threshold set 
either in IFRS 8 or in a general materiality standard.  About a quarter (half) of the 
companies reported individual countries with less than 5% (10%) contribution to the 
company’s total revenues / NCA.  This more detailed, seemingly immaterial information 
could be valuable for financial statement users such as civil societies, tax authorities etc. 
and in most of the cases this is the only available information about the companies’ 
activities in different foreign countries.  Additionally, the reported countries might not 
seem to be quantitatively material but they still can be material in qualitative terms.  On 
the other hand, even if a minimum threshold is set standards and guidelines do not offer 
an upper limit of applicable materiality thresholds (e.g. “10 per cent or more”, IFRS 8:13 
and 34).  A quarter (two fifths) of the sample companies used revenue (NCA) materiality 
threshold 20% or more.  These companies simply might not have any other country with 
smaller revenue / NCA contribution.  Other individually relatively immaterial countries 
with more or less the same qualitative characteristics (e.g. risk and rewards, general 
economic and political environment etc.) might have been grouped together and reported 
under a geographic region (e.g. Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North America etc.)  In 
summary, it seems that both preparers and users of financial statements might be better 
off if the company’s country level disclosures are not guided by materiality thresholds set 
in standards but by the proper application of the materiality concept. (RQ3.2) 
 
Country-level data from the companies’ segmental notes documents the inconsistency 
between the companies’ materiality decisions.  The materiality threshold applied by the 
sample companies varies considerably.  This result indicates that the companies do not 
apply a general quantitative benchmark such that countries that contribute more (less) 
than a certain percent of the total revenues / NCA are always material (immaterial).  
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However, with the exception of early adoption none of the studied company 
characteristics had a significant effect on the materiality threshold applied by the 
companies.  Early adopter companies are not just ahead of other companies in the 
application of the new standards but they use a significantly lower level materiality 
threshold as well.  These companies might use early adoption and lower materiality 
thresholds to (1) signal to the market and to different stakeholders and (2) differentiate 
themselves from their competitors. The results suggest that there could be factors, not 
studied in this research that might be more important in the preparers’ materiality 
decisions.  These factors could be both quantitative (e.g. the individual country’s 
contribution to the companies’ total earnings, capital expenditure percentage allocated to 
the country etc.) and qualitative (e.g. stability of the foreign currency, political risks of 
the individual country, the company’s tax policy etc.) ones or they could be simply 
incentives of the company’s management (e.g. the management’s personal empire 
building plans). (RQ3.3) 
 
Only the preparers know what is behind their materiality decision.  However, the research 
results in Chapter 7 indicate that only a few companies disclosed information about the 
quantitative materiality threshold applied and none of them disclosed information about 
the qualitative factors considered in assessing the materiality of an individual country.  
The results of the analysis of the country disclosures indicate that the preparers’ 
materiality decisions are probably based on both quantitative and qualitative 
considerations.  Thus it would be useful to have additional disclosure about the 
quantitative and qualitative aspects considered by the companies when they set their 
materiality threshold (e.g. the use of lower materiality threshold because the company has 
operations in countries with higher political, exchange risks or because in the near future 
the company is going to expand of its production and / or sales operation in that country 
etc.). (RQ3.1) 
 
The empirical findings provide evidence that the companies use both the flexibility 
provided by IFRS 8 and the shield of the materiality concept when they make materiality 
decision about their individually material, therefore reportable countries.  Greater 
transparency and detail about the companies’ materiality decision would reduce the 
uncertainty and would enhance the understanding of the companies’ segmental notes.  
 
Chapter 9: Conclusions, Limitations and Further Research 
 
251 
9.3.5 Country-level reporting115  
 
In the last decade there have been calls to require MNCs to disclose information about 
their activities in those countries where they have operation.  However, to date with the 
exception of the IFRS 8 requirement to disclose external revenues and NCAs for 
individually material countries and for the country of incorporation MNCs are not 
required to disclose financial information on a CBC basis in their audited financial 
statements.  
 
Chapter 8 introduces the regulatory background of country-level reporting and provides 
a summary of the impacts of the introduction of IFRS 8 on the sample UK listed 
companies’ country-level disclosure.  In summary, the results indicate that (1) the fact 
that IFRS 8 only requires the disclosure of revenue and NCA for the country of domicile 
and for the material foreign countries, (2) the way the MNCs apply the materiality concept 
to define countries that need to be individually disclosed and (3) the companies preference 
to keep geographic information at a minimum level (non-compliance with the 
requirements of IFRS 8, low level voluntary information) result in a relatively poor level 
of audited country level information even among the largest listed companies. 
 
Whether the positive effect of the more detailed country level information or the negative 
effect of the less detail about the reported countries (in most of the cases only revenue 
and NCA) is the greater, is a question to answer in further studies.  However, the results 
clearly indicate that the companies’ current geographic segment reporting practice, in 
general, is very far from the idea of full CBCR.  The preparers are more likely secretive 
and hold back country level information. 
 
The preparers and the IASB claimed that enough information and transparency is 
provided under the existing requirements of IFRS 8 and any further country level 
information is a subject for CSR reporting.  However, the findings of this study and the 
fact that legislative bodies in the US and in the EU had to bypass the IASB and issue 
CBCR related new regulations indicate that the country level requirements of IFRS 8 and 
the country level information provided by the companies in their segmental notes are not 
sufficient and transparent enough.  
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The recent legislative actions in the USA and in the EU are the first but major steps 
towards full CBCR.  However, their limitations (only covers selected industries, requires 
a limited number of items on a CBC basis and only compulsory in the EU / USA) reduces 
their potential values and usefulness to stakeholders.  The policy decision made by the 
G20 and the proposed Cut-Unjustified Tax Loopholes Act in the USA are further major 
steps in the direction of full CBCR.  The impacts of these new regulations on the 
companies’ country level geographic disclosure is an area for further research. 
 
To ensure the same reporting requirement for entities worldwide and to increase 
transparency and the availability of important geographic financial information, to 
enhance consistency and to help the comparison CBCR needs to be considered by the 
IASB and should be addressed in international accounting standards. (RQ4.1) 
 
9.4 Contribution of the study 
 
The present study contributes to the accounting literature in several areas and may be of 
benefit to many groups of users of financial statements.  
 
The study complements and extends the existing research on (1) the compliance with the 
requirements of IFRS 8 (RO1, Chapter 5 ); (2) the impact of the introduction of IFRS 8 on 
the quality of the companies’ geographic disclosures (RO2, Chapter 5); (3) the application 
of the materiality concept in defining the company’s individually material countries (RO3, 
Chapter 7); (4) the sufficiency and transparency of the companies’ existing country-level 
disclosures (RO4, Chapter 8) and (5) the corporate disclosure theories via the investigation 
of the effect of different company characteristics on (a) the level of compliance with the 
requirement of IFRS 8 (RO1, Chapter 5), (b) the quality of geographic disclosures (RO2, 
Chapter 6) and (c) the materiality threshold applied by the companies in defining the 
company’s individually material countries (RO3, Chapter 7)  
 
Extensive research was carried out in the US after the introduction (1997) of SFAS 131. 
IFRS 8 became mandatory for periods beginning on or after 1 January 2009.  However, 
scarce empirical evidence is available regarding the application and impact of IFRS 8 on 
the companies’ segmental disclosures. This study contributes to the accounting literature 
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by providing empirical evidence on this topic. (Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 8) Additionally, the findings of this research can help to facilitate informed 
debate on the ongoing issues (Section 2.2) regarding the costs and benefits of applying 
IFRS 8 by increasing the understanding of how the requirements of this new standard are 
applied by the sample companies. (Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7, Chapter 8) 
 
 
By answering the research questions the study (1) fills research gaps identified by the 
researcher (Section 2.5) and also (2) addresses calls for research on (a) the compliance 
with the requirements of IFRS 8 (Chapter 5); (b) the effectiveness of auditors in enforcing 
IFRS 8 compliance (Chapter 5); (c) the possible incentives behind the geographic 
disclosure decisions of the preparers (Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8); (d) 
the application of the materiality concept (in defining the individually material countries, 
Chapter 7) (Nichols et al., 2013) and (e) the connection between the company’s financial 
reporting practice and their tax reporting behaviour (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010) 
(Chapter 6). 
 
The research provides useful findings for researchers and academics with an interest in 
corporate disclosure in general and segmental reporting and audit quality in particular. 
First, the result in this study highlights that the BIG 4 audit companies should not be 
treated as a homogenous group in accounting research. (Chapter 5) Second, the results 
from this study reinforce previous research findings and indicate that the geographic 
disclosure quality of the companies cannot be measured / described by only one quality 
measure. (Chapter 6) Third, researchers should consider the company’s organisational 
structure (proxied by the type of the company’s reportable segments) as a factor which 
might have a significant influence on the segmental disclosure quality of a company 
(Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7).  
 
Furthermore, the findings of this thesis could provide useful input to (1) the work of 
different enforcement bodies (Chapter 5), (2) the IASB’s present work on financial 
reporting disclosure and materiality (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7), (3) different civil societies 
(e.g. TJN, PWYP), governmental (e.g. EU, UK) and non-governmental bodies (e.g. 
OECD) in their fight for country-level disclosures and against profit shifting and tax 
avoidance (Chapter 8) and (4) investors when they evaluate the risks and rewards 
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associated with diversified companies and make informed economic decisions (Chapter 
5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). 
 
Lastly, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first academic study which (1) 
provides insight into how the companies apply the materiality concept in defining their 
individually material countries under IFRS 8 and (2) tries to identify different company 
characteristics that can help to explain the diversity of the companies’ materiality 
decisions. (Chapter 7) 
 
9.5 Limitations and further research 
 
The limitations of the study and suggestions for future research are presented in Section 
9.5.1 and in Section 9.5.2. 
 
9.5.1 Limitation of the research  
 
The findings of this study have to be interpreted with caution because they are subject to 
the following limitations. 
 
Different regression models were used to test the hypotheses in Chapter 5.  Company 
characteristics that could be justified both theoretically and empirically were included in 
these regression models.  However, the relatively low explanatory power of the regression 
models indicates that the companies’ compliance with the disclosure requirements of 
IFRS 8 might be influenced by characteristics not included in the regression models 
(omitted independent variables).  For example, ownership structure, Audit Committee 
quality might also explain the variability of compliance.  Additionally, various other 
proxies of the different independent variables might have a more / less significant effect 
on the dependent variables.  For example, in the regression model international visibility 
is measured by the number of foreign subsidiaries of the company but it also could have 
been measured by e.g. the % of foreign sales.  However, non-availability of some 
information116 did not allow their introduction into the model.  Furthermore, alternative 
modelling (e.g. logistic regression, the use of robust regression estimators) might provide 
                                                 
116 for all of the sample companies 
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additional information about the relationship between the companies’ compliance indices 
and their possible determinants.  
 
Additionally, the scoring process used in Chapter 5 is subject to judgement.  Thus, the 
use of a disclosure index to measure level of compliance is always limited by a degree of 
subjectivity. 
 
The compliance index analysed in the study is based on a check list constructed by the 
researcher.  Additionally, the fineness score used to measure the quality of the companies’ 
geographic disclosures is a modified version of the fineness score first applied by 
Doupnik and Seese (2001).  Therefore, comparability of the results with those reported 
in other studies need to be considered. (Chapter 5, Chapter 6) 
 
The data used in this study were hand collected from the sample companies’ Annual 
Reports.  Therefore, there might unquestionably be data collection errors.  
 
“Some investors prefer to have information about how management views the business, ...” .... 
“Other investors, however, are wary of a segmentation process that is based on the management 
perspective.  Those investors mistrust management’s intentions and sometimes think that segments 
are reported in such a way to obscure the entity’s true management structure (often as a result of 
concerns about commercial sensitivity) or to mask loss-making activities within individual 
segments.” (IASB, 2013b, p5) 
 
The research used segment disclosures provided by the companies in their Annual 
Reports.  However, preparers have discretion in providing segment information.  Users 
of financial statements – including the researcher – cannot examine whether all segments 
used internally, all individual countries with material foreign revenues, all major 
customers etc. has actually been disclosed in the financial statements of the companies.  
Even auditors “wouldn’t be able to argue with what managements were sharing...”.  
“They would say they were showing you what they usually looked at.” (Tim Bush in Sarah 
Perrin’s article, 2012) (Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7, Chapter 8) 
 
The sample is not randomly selected.  The research examined non-financial companies 
listed on the London Stock Exchange.  It is not known whether the results are similar to 
financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange and / or non-financial 
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companies listed in other countries.  Therefore, it is not claimed that the results are 
generalizable to those companies. (Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7, Chapter 8) 
 
9.5.2 Future research 
 
The results and limitations suggest opportunities for further research.  The study focused 
on the first year of the implementation of IFRS 8.  It would be interesting and useful to 
carry out the same analysis a few years from now to examine whether (1) the companies’ 
compliance with the disclosure requirements of IFRS 8 and (2) the quality of the 
companies’ geographic disclosures has improved since the first adoption and (3) whether 
the findings of this study still hold. 
 
222 non-financial FTSE 350 constituents represent the original sample for the study.  
Future research could explore data collected for more countries.  There might be 
significant country specific determinants (e.g. secrecy, regulatory background, 
enforcement) of the segmental disclosure practice of the companies. 
 
IFRS 8 is almost identical to its US counterpart, SFAS 131.  Concerns were raised during 
the IASB’s due process and during the EU endorsement process that the convergence of 
accounting rules should not be a simple copying activity of the American accounting 
standard.  The results of this study suggest a certain level on non-compliance with the 
requirements of IFRS 8 in the UK. (Chapter 5)  A study comparing the level of 
compliance of American and EU (UK and continental EU) companies with the segmental 
reporting requirements could provide some indication whether the convergence of 
accounting standards eventually resulted in the convergence of accounting practices as 
well. 
 
The results indicate that the introduction of IFRS 8 has both positive and negative impacts 
on the quality of the companies’ geographic disclosures.  However, whether the positive 
effects of the new standard on the usefulness of the geographic disclosures outweigh the 
negative effects of the new standard on the usefulness of geographic disclosures is a 
subject for further research. (Chapter 6, Chapter 8) 
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The thesis found some connection between the companies’ geographic reporting practice 
and their tax avoiding behaviour. (Chapter 6)  Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) argue that 
“the relevance of tax research will increase as governments try to close the tax gap, 
increase compliance, and collect more revenue.” (p168)  Further research on the subject 
(e.g. more than one year data from different countries) could provide important help for 
the different governments, international bodies in their fight against profit shifting and 
tax avoidance.  
 
In spite of the limitations, the results of this research might be of interest to users, 
preparers and auditors of the companies’ segmental disclosure, as well as the regulators 
and enforcement bodies.  Findings of the research could provide input to (1) the work of 
the different enforcement bodies (Chapter 5), (2) the IASB’s present work on financial 
reporting disclosure and materiality (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7), (3) different civil societies 
(e.g. TJN, PWYP), governmental (e.g. EU, UK) and non-governmental bodies (e.g. 
OECD) in their fight for country-level disclosure. (Chapter 8)  
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Appendix A. 1 Companies in the samples 
 
 
No. 
 
 
Name of the company117 
Sample size (N)118 
222 200 178 155 126 107 76 42 
    1 Aggreko X119 X X      
    2 AMEC X X X X X X X  
    3 Anglo American plc X X X X X X X X 
    4 Antofagasta X X X X X X X X 
    5 ARM Holdings X X X X X X X X 
    6 Associated British Foods X X X X X    
    7 AstraZeneca X  X X X X   
    8 Autonomy Corporation X  X X     
    9 BAE Systems X X X X X X X  
  10 BG Group X X X X  X X  
  11 BHP Billiton X X X X X X X X 
  12 BP X X X X X X X X 
  13 BT Group X X X X X    
  14 British American Tobacco X X X X  X   
  15 British Sky Broadcasting X        
  16 Burberry Group X X X X X X   
  17 Cairn Energy X X X      
  18 Capita Group X X X X X    
  19 Carnival plc X X X      
  20 Centrica X X X X X X X  
  21 Compass Group X X X X X X   
  22 Diageo X X X X X X X  
  23 Eurasian Natural Resources X X X      
  24 Experian X X X X X X X  
  25 Fresnillo X X       
  26 G4S X X X X X X   
  27 GKN X X X X  X X  
  28 GlaxoSmithKline X X X X X X X X 
  29 IMI X X X X X X X X 
  30 ITV X X X X X    
  31 Imperial Tobacco Group X X X X  X X  
  32 Inmarsat X X X      
  33 InterContinental Hotels Group X X X X  X X  
  34 International Power X X X X X X X X 
  35 Intertek Group X X X X  X X  
  36 Johnson Matthey X X X X  X X  
  37 Kazakhmys X X X      
  38 Kingfisher  X X X X X X X X 
  39 Lonmin X X X X X X X X 
  40 Marks & Spencer Group X X X X X    
  41 Wm Morrison Supermarkets X        
  42 National Grid X X X X X X   
  43 Next X X X X X    
  44 Pearson X X X X  X X  
  
                                                 
117 FTSE 100 constituents: No. 1-73; FTSE 250 constituents: No. 74-222 
118 N=222 and N=200: Chapter 5, Table 5.6; N=178 and N=155: Chapter 6, Table 6.1; N=126: Chapter 6, 
Section 6.4.2; N=107 and N=76: Chapter 7, Table 7.1; N=42: Chapter 7, Section 7.6.3 
119 X: the company is in the sample 
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Appendix A. 1 (continued) Companies in the samples  
 
 
No. 
 
Name of the company 
Sample size (N) 
222 200 178 155 126 107 76 42 
  45 Petrofac X X X X  X X  
  46 Randgold Resources X X       
  47 Reckitt Benckiser X X X X  X X  
  48 Reed Elsevier X X X X X X   
  49 Rexam X X X X X X X X 
  50 Rio Tinto Group X X X X X X X X 
  51 Rolls-Royce Group X X X X X X X X 
  52 Royal Dutch Shell X X X      
  53 SABMiller X X X X X X X X 
  54 Sage Group X X X X X    
  55 Sainsbury’s X X       
  56 Scottish and Southern Energy  X X X X X    
  57 Serco Group X X X X X X X  
  58 Severn Trent X X X X X X X X 
  59 Smith & Nephew X X X X X X X X 
  60 Smiths Group X X X X X X X  
  61 Tate & Lyle X X X X X X X  
  62 Tesco X X X X X X   
  63 Tullow Oil X X X      
  64 Unilever X X X X  X X  
  65 United Utilities X X       
  66 Vedanta Resources X X X X X X X X 
  67 Vodafone Group X X X X X X X X 
  68 WPP Group X X X X X X   
  69 Weir Group X X X X X X X X 
  70 Whitebread X X       
  71 Wolseley X X X X X X   
  72 John Wood Group X X X X  X   
  73 Xstrata X X X      
  74 Aegis Group X X X X  X X  
  75 Afren X X X      
  76 Anglo Pacific Group X X       
  77 Aquarius Platinum X X X      
  78 Ashtead Group X X X X X    
  79 WS Atkins X X X X X    
  80 Aveva X X X X     
  81 Avis Europe X X X X X X X X 
  82 BBA Aviation X X X X X    
  83 BTG X X X X X X   
  84 Babcock International  X X X X X    
  85 Balfour Beatty X X X X  X X  
  86 A.G. Barr X X X X X    
  87 Barrat Developments X X       
  88 Bellway X        
  89 Berendsen X X X X X    
  90 Berkeley Group Holdings X        
  91 Bodycote X X X X  X   
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Appendix A. 1 (continued) Companies in the samples 
 
 
No. 
 
Name of the company 
Sample size (N) 
222 200 178 155 126 107 76 42 
  92 Booker Group X        
  93 Bovis Homes Group X        
  94 Britvic X X X X X X X  
  95 Bwin.Party Digital 
Entertainment 
X X X X  X   
  96 N Brown Group X        
  97 Bunzl X X X X X    
  98 CSR X X X X X X X X 
  99 Carillion X X X X X    
100 Carpetright X X X X X X   
101 Centamin  X        
102 Charter International X X X X X X X X 
103 Chemring Group X X X X X X   
104 Cobham X X X X X X X X 
105 Colt Group X X X X X X X X 
106 Computacenter X X X X X X   
107 Cookson Group X X X      
108 Cranswick X X X X X    
109 Croda International X X X X  X   
110 Daily Mail and General Trust X X X X X X X X 
111 Dairy Crest Group X X X X X X X  
112 De La Rue X X X X X    
113 Debenhams X X       
114 Devro X X X X  X   
115 Dignity X X       
116 Dixons Retail X X X X X    
117 Domino Printing Sciences X X X X  X X  
118 Domino’s Pizza  X X X X X X   
119 Drax Group X        
120 Dunelm Group X        
121 EasyJet X        
122 Electrocomponents X X X X X    
123 Elementis X X X X     
124 Enterprise Inns X        
125 Euromoney Institutional 
Investor 
X X X X X    
126 Fenner X X X      
127 Ferrexpo X  X X X X   
128 Fidessa Group X X X      
129 Filtrona X X X X  X X  
130 FirstGroup X X X X X X   
131 Gem Diamonds X X X      
132 Genus X X X      
133 Go-Ahead Group X X       
134 Greene King X X       
135 Greggs X        
136 Halfords Group X X       
137 Halma X X X X X X X X 
138 Hays X X       
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Appendix A. 1 (continued) Companies in the samples 
 
 
No. 
 
Name of the company 
Sample size (N) 
222 200 178 155 126 107 76 42 
139 Heritage Oil X X X      
140 Hikma Pharmaceuticals X X X X X X X X 
141 Hochschild Mining X X X X X X X X 
142 Home Retail Group X X       
143 Homeserve X X X X X X X X 
144 Howden Joinery  X  X X X X   
145 Hunting X X X X X X X X 
146 ITE Group X X X      
147 Imagination Technologies 
Group 
X X X      
148 Inchcape X X X X X X   
149 Informa X X X X X    
150 Invensys X X X X X X X  
151 JD Sports Fashion X X       
152 JKX Oil & Gas X X X X X X   
153 Keller Group X X X X X X X X 
154 Kesa Electricals (Darty) X X X X X X   
155 Kier Group X X       
156 Kofax X X X X  X X  
157 Ladbrokes X X X X X    
158 Laird X X X X     
159 Lamprell X X       
160 Logica X X X X X X X X 
161 MITIE Group X X       
162 Marston’s X X X X X    
163 Meggitt X X X X X    
164 Michael Page International X X X X X    
165 Micro Focus International X X X      
166 Millennium & Copthorne 
Hotels 
X X X X X X X X 
167 Misys X X X X X X X  
168 Mitchells & Butlers X  X X X X X X 
169 Mondi X X X X X X X X 
170 Morgan Crucible Co X X X X     
171 Mothercare X X X X X    
172 National Express Group X X X X X    
173 Northgate X X X X X X X X 
174 Northumbrian Water Group X X       
175 PZ Cussons X X X      
176 Pace X  X X X    
177 Pennon Group X X       
178 Persimmon X        
179 Petropavlovsk plc X X X X X    
180 Premier Farnell X X X X X    
181 Premier Foods X X X X X    
182 Preier Oil X X X      
183 Punch Taverns X X       
184 QinetiQ X X X X X    
185 RPC Group X X X X X X X  
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Appendix A. 1 (continued) Companies in the samples 
 
 
No. 
 
Name of the company 
Sample size (N) 
222 200 178 155 126 107 76 42 
186 RPS Group X X X X X X   
187 Rank Group X X X X X    
188 Redrow X        
189 Regus X X X X X X X X 
190 Renishaw X X X X X X   
191 Rentokil Initial X X X X X    
192 Restaurant Group X X       
193 Rightmove X X       
194 Rotork X X X X  X X  
195 SDL International X X X X X X X X 
196 SIG plc X X X X X X   
197 Salamander Energy X X X      
198 Senior X X X X X X X  
199 Shanks Group X X X X X X X X 
200 Smiths (DS) X X X X X X   
201 SOCO International X X X X  X X  
202 Spectris X X X X X X X X 
203 Spirax-Sarco Engineering X X X X X    
204 Spirent X X X X  X X  
205 Sport Direct X X X X X    
206 Stagecoach Group X X X X X    
207 SThree X X X X X    
208 Stobart Group X X       
209 Synergy Health X X X X X X X  
210 Taylor Wimpey X X X X X    
211 Telecity Group X X X X X    
212 Telecom Plus X X       
213 Thomas Cook Group X X X X X X   
214 Travis Perkins X X       
215 TUI Travel X X X X X X X X 
216 Ultra Electronics Holdings X X X X X X X X 
217 United Business Media 
(UBM) 
X X X X X X X  
218 Victrex X X X X X    
219 W H Smith X X       
220 Wetherspoon (J D) X        
221 William Hill X X       
222 Yule Catto X X X X X    
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Appendix B.  1 IFRS 8 Disclosure checklist 
Company number: ........................................................................................... 
name: ........................................................................................... 
Reference 
IFRS8 
 
Disclosure requirement 
Disclosure made 
YES NO NA NK 
8.15 
At least 75% of the entity external revenue shall be included in reportable 
segments.  
 
  
8.16 
Information about other business activities and operating segments that are not 
reportable shall be combines and disclosed in an “all other segments” category 
separately from other reconciling items. The sources of the revenue included in 
the “all other segments” category shall be described.  
 
  
8.22 (a) 
The entity shall disclose the factors used to identify the entity’s reportable 
segments, including the basis of organisation (for example, whether 
management has chosen to organise the entity around differences in products 
and services, geographical areas, regulatory environments, or a combination of 
factors and whether operating segments have been aggregated).  
 
  
8.22 (b)  
The entity shall disclose the types of products and services from which each 
reportable segment generates revenues.  
 
  
8.23 An entity shall report a measure of profit or loss for each reportable segment.     
8.23  
An entity shall also disclose the following about each reportable segment if 
the specific amounts are included in the measure of profit or loss ..... 
(a) revenues from external customers ....  
 
  
8.27 
An entity shall provide an explanation of the measurement of  
 segment profit or loss for each reportable segments  
 
  
 segment assets for each reportable segments (if segment assets are 
disclosed)  
 
  
 segment liabilities for each reportable segment. (if segment liabilities are 
disclosed)  
 
  
8.27 (a) 
An entity shall disclose the basis of accounting for any transactions between 
reportable segments.   
 
  
8.27 
An entity shall disclose the nature of differences between the measures of the 
reportable segment numbers and the entity’s amount for 
(b) profit or loss  
 
  
(c) assets (if segment assets are disclosed)     
(d) liabilities (if segment liabilities are disclosed)     
8.28  
An entity shall provide reconciliation of  
(a) the total of the reportable segments’ revenues to the entity’s 
revenue   
 
  
(b) the total of the reportable segments measure of profit or loss 
before tax and discontinued operations However, if an entity 
allocates to reportable segments items such as tax expense (tax 
income), the entity may reconcile the total of the segments measures 
of profit or loss to the entity profit or loss after those items.  
 
  
(c) the total of the reportable segments’ assets to the entity’s assets 
(if segment assets are disclosed)  
 
  
(d) the total of the reportable segments’ liabilities to the entity’s 
liabilities (if segment liabilities are disclosed)  
 
  
(e) other material items (if disclosed for the segments)     
Total for reportable segment     
CI1_R % 
CI2_R % 
Chapter 10: Appendices 
267 
Appendix B.  1 (continued): IFRS 8 Disclosure checklist 
 
Reference 
IFRS8 Disclosure requirement 
Disclosure made 
YES NO NA NK 
 
8.32120 
An entity shall report the revenues from external customer for each product 
and service, or each group of similar product and services, unless the necessary 
information is not available and the cost to develop it would be excessive (in 
which case that fact shall be disclosed). 
Data  
  
Excuse 
The amounts of revenues reported shall be based on the financial 
information used to produce the entity’s financial statements.  
 
  
8.33 (a) 
An entity shall report the following geographical information unless the 
necessary information is not available and the cost to develop it would be 
excessive (in which case that fact should be disclosed): (a) Revenues from 
external customers (i) attributed to the entity’s country of domicile and (ii) 
attributed to all foreign countries in total from which the entity derives 
revenues.  
Data  
  
Excuse 
An entity shall disclose the basis for attributing revenues from external 
customers to individual countries  
 
  
8.33 (b) 
An entity shall report the following geographical information unless the 
necessary information is not available and the cost to develop it would be 
excessive (in which case that fact should be disclosed):  (b) Non-current assets 
other than financial instruments, deferred tax assets, post-employment benefit 
assets, and rights arising under insurance contracts (i) located in the entity’s 
country of domicile and (ii) located in all foreign countries in total in which the 
entity holds assets.  
Data  
  
Excuse 
8.33  
(a)-(b) 
The amounts reported shall be based on the financial information used to 
produce the entity’s financial statements.  
 
  
8.34 
An entity shall provide information about the extent of its reliance on its 
major customers.  
 
  
8.34 
If revenues from transactions with a single external customer amounts to 
10% or more of an entity’s revenues the entity shall disclose 
 that fact  
 
  
 the total amount of revenues from each such customer     
 the identity of the segment or segments reporting the revenues     
Total for entity-wide information     
CI1_EWI % 
CI2_EWI % 
Grand total     
CI1_T % 
CI2_T % 
 
                                                 
120 8.31: information required by paragraphs 8.32-8.34 shall be provided only if it is not provided as part of 
the reportable segment information & 8.32-8.34 apply to all entities including those entities that have a 
single reportable segment 
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Appendix B.  2 Check list _ % of the companies 
 
Reference 
IFRS8 
 
Disclosure requirement 
Disclosure made 
YES NO NA NK 
8.15 
At least 75% of the entity external revenue shall be included in reportable 
segments. 100.00 
 
- - - 
8.16 
Information about other business activities and operating segments that are 
not reportable shall be combines and disclosed in an “all other segments” 
category separately from other reconciling items. The sources of the revenue 
included in the “all other segments” category shall be described.   23.00 
 
 
 
- 77.00 - 
8.22 (a) 
The entity shall disclose the factors used to identify the entity’s reportable 
segments, including the basis of organisation (for example, whether 
management has chosen to organise the entity around differences in products 
and services, geographical areas, regulatory environments, or a combination 
of factors and whether operating segments have been aggregated). 99.00 
 
 
 
 
  1.00 - - 
8.22 (b)  
The entity shall disclose the types of products and services from which each 
reportable segment generates revenues. 86.00 
 
14.00 - - 
8.23 
An entity shall report a measure of profit or loss for each reportable 
segment. 99.00 
 
  1.00 -  - 
8.23  
An entity shall also disclose the following about each reportable segment if 
the specific amounts are included in the measure of profit or loss ..... 
(e) revenues from external customers .... 96.50 
 
 
  3.50 - - 
8.27 
An entity shall provide an explanation of the measurement of  
 segment profit or loss for each reportable segments 97.00 
 
  3.00 - - 
 segment assets for each reportable segments (if segment assets are 
disclosed) 74.00 
 
13.50 12.50 - 
 segment liabilities for each reportable segment. (if segment liabilities 
are disclosed) 56.00 
 
10.00 34.00 - 
8.27 (a) 
An entity shall disclose the basis of accounting for any transactions 
between reportable segments.  38.00 
 
12.50 22.00 27.50 
8.27 
An entity shall disclose the nature of differences between the measures of 
the reportable segment numbers and the entity’s amount for 
(f) profit or loss 97.00 
 
 
  2.50   0.50 - 
(g) assets (if segment assets are disclosed) 74.50 13.00 12.50 - 
(h) liabilities (if segment liabilities are disclosed) 56.00 10.00 34.00 - 
8.28  
An entity shall provide reconciliation of  
(f) the total of the reportable segments’ revenues to the entity’s 
revenue  98.50 
 
 
  1.50 - - 
(g) the total of the reportable segments measure of profit or loss 
before tax and discontinued operations However, if an entity 
allocates to reportable segments items such as tax expense (tax 
income), the entity may reconcile the total of the segments 
measures of profit or loss to the entity profit or loss after those 
items. 97.00 
 
 
 
 
 
  2.00   1.00 - 
(h) the total of the reportable segments’ assets to the entity’s assets 
(if segment assets are disclosed) 79.50 
 
  8.00 12.50 - 
(i) the total of the reportable segments’ liabilities to the entity’s 
liabilities (if segment liabilities are disclosed) 59.50 
 
  6.50 34.00 - 
(j) other material items (if disclosed for the segments) 24.50 - 75.50 - 
Total for reportable segment 75.28   5.67 17.53 1.52 
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Appendix B.  2 (continued) Check list _ % of the companies 
 
Reference 
IFRS8 Disclosure requirement 
Disclosure made 
YES NO NA NK 
 
8.32121 
An entity shall report the revenues from external customer for each 
product and service, or each group of similar product and services, unless 
the necessary information is not available and the cost to develop it would be 
excessive (in which case that fact shall be disclosed). 
Data 
 
80.50 
 
 
 
 
13.50 
 
 
 
 
5.50 
 
 
 
 
0.50 
Excuse 
 
- 
The amounts of revenues reported shall be based on the financial 
information used to produce the entity’s financial statements. 80.50 0.50 19.00 - 
8.33 (a) 
An entity shall report the following geographical information unless the 
necessary information is not available and the cost to develop it would be 
excessive (in which case that fact should be disclosed): (a) Revenues from 
external customers (i) attributed to the entity’s country of domicile and (ii) 
attributed to all foreign countries in total from which the entity derives 
revenues.  
Data 
 
 
74.00 
 
 
 
 
 
  6.50 
 
 
 
 
 
  7.50 
 
 
 
 
 
12.00 
Excuse 
 
 
- 
An entity shall disclose the basis for attributing revenues from external 
customers to individual countries 64.50 24.00 11.50 - 
8.33 (b) 
An entity shall report the following geographical information unless the 
necessary information is not available and the cost to develop it would be 
excessive (in which case that fact should be disclosed):  (b) Non-current 
assets other than financial instruments, deferred tax assets, post-employment 
benefit assets, and rights arising under insurance contracts (i) located in the 
entity’s country of domicile and (ii) located in all foreign countries in total in 
which the entity holds assets.  
Data 
 
 
54.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  8.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13.00 
Excuse 
 
 
0.50 
8.33  
(a)-(b) 
The amounts reported shall be based on the financial information used to 
produce the entity’s financial statements. 84.50   2.50 12.00   1.00 
8.34 
An entity shall provide information about the extent of its reliance on its 
major customers. 48.50 - - 51.50 
8.34 
If revenues from transactions with a single external customer amounts to 
10% or more of an entity’s revenues the entity shall disclose 
 that fact 22.50 - 77.50 - 
 the total amount of revenues from each such customer 19.50   3.00 77.50 - 
 the identity of the segment or segments reporting the revenues 21.50   1.00 77.50 - 
Total for entity-wide information 55.10   7.45 29.65   7.80 
Grand total 68.07   6.30 21.86   3.77 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121 8.31: information required by paragraphs 8.32-8.34 shall be provided only if it is not provided as part of 
the reportable segment information & 8.32-8.34 apply to all entities including those entities that have a 
single reportable segment 
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Appendix B.  3 Pearson correlation matrix (unranked) for the compliance indices and for the continuous independent variables 
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Appendix B.  4 Pearson correlation matrix (ranked) for the compliance indices and for the continuous independent variables 
   
Chapter 10: Appendices 
272 
Appendix B.  5 Kendall`s tau for the compliance indices and for the continuous independent variables (ranked) 
 
Chapter 10: Appendices 
273 
Appendix B.  6 Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
continuous variables 
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Appendix B.  6 (continued) Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables 
 
Chapter 10: Appendices 
275 
Appendix B.  7 Results of different regression models _ primary compliance score for reportable segments 
 
Dependent variable
PANEL A Coef. Std. Error t Sig. Coef. Std. Error t Sig. Coef. Std. Error t Sig.
Independent variable
(Constant) 98.702 3.425 28.815 0.000 146.029 22.817 6.400 0.000 0.111 0.198 0.560 0.576
Auditor_Big4_D_A -4.285 2.644 -1.621 0.107 -21.537 11.811 -1.823 0.070 -0.327 0.183 -1.787 0.076
Auditor_Big4_D_B -9.684 2.665 -3.634 0.000 -45.575 12.005 -3.797 0.000 -0.709 0.186 -3.808 0.000
Auditor_Big4_D_C -2.271 2.733 -0.831 0.407 -15.112 12.382 -1.220 0.224 -0.217 0.192 -1.131 0.260
Auditor_Big4_D_Not Big4 -11.236 5.506 -2.041 0.043 -51.479 24.078 -2.138 0.034 -0.851 0.374 -2.274 0.024
Market concentration 0.000 0.001 0.420 0.675
Rank (Normal score) of market concentration -0.039 0.072 -0.540 0.590 -0.042 0.065 -0.639 0.523
Capital intensity -0.015 0.038 -0.382 0.703
Rank (Normal Score) of capital intensity -0.016 0.071 -0.223 0.824 -0.014 0.064 -0.219 0.827
Early adoption 5.599 2.454 2.282 0.024 22.450 11.161 2.011 0.046 0.384 0.172 2.231 0.027
Total sales 9.943E-06 0.000 0.255 0.799
Rank (Normal Score) of total sales -0.022 0.077 -0.289 0.773 0.008 0.072 0.105 0.917
Gearing (liability based) -0.013 0.009 -1.374 0.171
Rank (Normal Score) of gearing -0.149 0.086 -1.745 0.083 -0.110 0.077 -1.428 0.155
Liquidity (current ratio) -0.889 0.912 -0.975 0.331
Rank (Normal Score)of liquidity (current ratio) -0.050 0.080 -0.619 0.536 -0.037 0.075 -0.489 0.626
Profitability (ROE) -0.004 0.006 -0.685 0.494
Rank (Normal Score) of profitability (ROE) -0.037 0.073 -0.505 0.614 -0.020 0.065 -0.302 0.763
Business reporting segment 1.257 2.270 0.554 0.580 15.721 10.475 1.501 0.135 0.202 0.162 1.244 0.215
Mixed reporting segment 0.617 2.737 0.225 0.822 10.847 12.681 0.855 0.393 0.135 0.197 0.684 0.495
Number of foreign subsidiaries -0.078 0.046 -1.712 0.089
Rank (Normal Score) of the number of foreign subsidiaries -0.030 0.070 -0.425 0.671 -0.055 0.067 -0.828 0.409
Growth -0.033 0.016 -1.982 0.049
Rank (Normal Score) of growth -0.022 0.072 -0.304 0.761 -0.041 0.065 -0.630 0.530
PANEL B _ Model summary
R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the Estimate
Durbin-Watson
PANEL C _ ANOVA
F
Sig.
PANEL D _ Collinearity Statistics
Minimum Tolerance
Maximum VIF
Average VIF
PANEL E _ Case diagnostics 
No of standardized resid >|2|_ 95%
No of standardized resid >|2.5|_ 99%
No of standardized resid >|3|_ outliers
Maximum Cook`s distance
Skewness of the residuals -1.731 -0.202 -0.501
Kurtosis of the residuals 3.246 -1.207 -0.565
CI1_R_Compliance score for reportable segments
Ranked Normal scoresUnranked
0.160 0.1640.186
0.431 0.400 0.405
11.753 52.776 0.818
0.119 0.092 0.096
2.795 2.342 2.401
1.919 1.9011.830
0.462 0.4620.458
0.001 0.004 0.003
1.534 1.543 1.534
2.184 2.163 2.165
7 0 1
0 59
0.039 0.0800.532
4 0 0
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Appendix B.  7 (continued) Results of different regression models _ primary compliance score for reportable segments 
 
  
Dependent variable
PANEL F
PANEL G
PANEL H
CI1_R_Compliance score for reportable segments
Ranked Normal scoresUnranked
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Appendix B.  8 Results of different regression models _ secondary compliance score for reportable segments 
 
Dependent variable
PANEL A Coef. Std. Error t Sig. Coef. Std. Error t Sig. Coef. Std. Error t Sig.
Independent variable
(Constant) 100.707 3.401 29.611 0.000 144.200 21.421 6.732 0.000 0.046 0.187 0.245 0.807
Auditor_Big4_D_A -3.579 2.625 -1.363 0.174 -13.563 11.092 -1.223 0.223 -0.218 0.173 -1.260 0.209
Auditor_Big4_D_B -8.576 2.646 -3.242 0.001 -35.700 11.270 -3.168 0.002 -0.576 0.176 -3.281 0.001
Auditor_Big4_D_C -2.170 2.714 -0.799 0.425 -12.138 11.624 -1.044 0.298 -0.181 0.181 -1.000 0.319
Auditor_Big4_D_Not Big4 -9.122 5.467 -1.669 0.097 -22.458 22.604 -0.994 0.322 -0.487 0.353 -1.379 0.170
Market concentration 0.000 0.001 0.436 0.664
Rank (Normal score) of market concentration -0.001 0.068 -0.019 0.985 -0.010 0.062 -0.166 0.868
Capital intensity -0.022 0.038 -0.577 0.565
Rank (Normal Score) of capital intensity -0.029 0.067 -0.438 0.662 -0.033 0.060 -0.539 0.590
Early adoption 5.956 2.436 2.445 0.015 25.385 10.478 2.423 0.016 0.417 0.162 2.570 0.011
Total sales 3.950E-06 0.000 0.102 0.919
Rank (Normal Score) of total sales -0.070 0.072 -0.965 0.336 -0.037 0.068 -0.539 0.590
Gearing (liability based) -0.013 0.009 -1.404 0.162
Rank (Normal Score) of gearing -0.086 0.080 -1.069 0.286 -0.060 0.073 -0.825 0.411
Liquidity (current ratio) -0.631 0.905 -0.696 0.487
Rank (Normal Score)of liquidity (current ratio) -0.650 0.075 -0.865 0.388 -0.048 0.070 -0.683 0.496
Profitability (ROE) 0.004 0.006 -0.705 0.482
Rank (Normal Score) of profitability (ROE) -0.670 0.068 0.979 0.329 -0.037 0.061 -0.615 0.539
Business reporting segment -0.047 2.254 -0.021 0.984 11.872 9.834 1.207 0.229 0.129 0.153 0.842 0.401
Mixed reporting segment -0.331 2.717 -0.122 0.903 10.153 11.905 0.853 0.395 0.122 0.186 0.659 0.511
Number of foreign subsidiaries -0.086 0.045 -1.892 0.060
Rank (Normal Score) of the number of foreign subsidiaries -0.070 0.066 -1.055 0.293 -0.090 0.063 -1.439 0.152
Growth -0.030 0.016 -1.816 0.071
Rank (Normal Score) of growth -0.005 0.068 -0.076 0.940 -0.021 0.061 -0.348 0.728
PANEL B _ Model summary
R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the Estimate
Durbin-Watson
PANEL C _ ANOVA
F
Sig.
PANEL D _ Collinearity Statistics
Minimum Tolerance
Maximum VIF
Average VIF
PANEL E _ Case diagnostics 
No of standardized resid >|2|_ 95%
No of standardized resid >|2.5|_ 99%
No of standardized resid >|3|_ outliers
Maximum Cook`s distance
Skewness of the residuals -1.802 -0.501 -0.808
Kurtosis of the residuals 3.514 -1.122 -0.197
CI2_R_Compliance score for reportable segments
Unranked Ranked Normal scores
0.162 0.130 0.132
0.403 0.360 0.363
11.669 49.546 0.772
0.0610.094 0.059
1.8602.374 1.825
1.849 1.974 1.942
0.458 0.462 0.462
0.004 0.034 0.030
1.534 1.543 1.534
2.1652.184 2.163
28 0
10 3 8
0.668 0.059 0.144
5 0 0
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Appendix B.  8  (continued) Results of different regression models _ secondary compliance score for reportable segments 
  
Dependent variable
PANEL F
PANEL G
PANEL H
CI2_R_Compliance score for reportable segments
Unranked Ranked Normal scores
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Appendix B.  9 Results of different regression models _ primary compliance score for entity-wide information 
 
Dependent variable
PANEL A Coef. Std. Error t Sig. Coef. Std. Error t Sig. Coef. Std. Error t Sig.
Independent variable
(Constant) 76.579 5.765 13.283 0.000 100.298 22.994 4.362 0.000 -0.183 0.206 -0.891 0.374
Auditor_Big4_D_A -12.633 4.450 -2.839 0.005 -25.945 11.906 -2.179 0.031 -0.469 0.190 -2.473 0.014
Auditor_Big4_D_B -10.040 4.485 -2.239 0.026 -25.277 12.098 -2.089 0.038 -0.420 0.193 -2.179 0.031
Auditor_Big4_D_C -3.000 4.600 -0.652 0.515 -6.194 12.478 -0.496 0.620 -0.109 0.199 -0.548 0.585
Auditor_Big4_D_Not Big4 -18.845 9.267 -2.034 0.043 -42.397 24.265 -1.747 0.082 -0.600 0.388 -1.548 0.123
Market concentration 0.001 0.001 0.501 0.617
Rank (Normal score) of market concentration 0.065 0.073 0.890 0.374 0.034 0.068 0.500 0.618
Capital intensity -0.203 0.064 -3.169 0.002
Rank (Normal Score) of capital intensity -0.174 0.072 -2.421 0.016 -0.156 0.066 -2.361 0.019
Early adoption -3.486 4.130 -0.844 0.400 -19.183 11.248 -1.706 0.090 -0.276 0.178 -1.549 0.123
Total sales 0.000 0.000 -2.111 0.036
Rank (Normal Score) of total sales -0.003 0.078 -0.036 0.972 0.030 0.074 0.405 0.686
Gearing (liability based) 0.035 0.016 2.216 0.028
Rank (Normal Score) of gearing -0.027 0.086 -0.317 0.752 0.002 0.080 0.031 0.975
Liquidity (current ratio) -3.569 1.535 -2.325 0.021
Rank (Normal Score)of liquidity (current ratio) -0.034 0.081 -0.424 0.672 -0.031 0.077 -0.403 0.687
Profitability (ROE) -0.012 0.010 -1.261 0.209
Rank (Normal Score) of profitability (ROE) -0.167 0.073 -2.285 0.023 -0.152 0.067 -2.274 0.024
Business reporting segment 17.595 3.821 4.605 0.000 45.024 10.556 4.265 0.000 0.734 0.168 4.363 0.000
Mixed reporting segment 10.285 4.606 2.233 0.027 17.054 12.780 1.335 0.184 0.296 0.204 1.451 0.148
Number of foreign subsidiaries 0.153 0.077 1.995 0.047
Rank (Normal Score) of the number of foreign subsidiaries 0.094 0.071 1.323 0.187 0.093 0.069 1.352 0.178
Growth 0.045 0.028 1.636 0.104
Rank (Normal Score) of growth 0.148 0.073 2.030 0.044 0.148 0.067 2.202 0.029
PANEL B _ Model summary
R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the Estimate
Durbin-Watson
PANEL C _ ANOVA
F
Sig.
PANEL D _ Collinearity Statistics
Minimum Tolerance
Maximum VIF
Average VIF
PANEL E _ Case diagnostics 
No of standardized resid >|2|_ 95%
No of standardized resid >|2.5|_ 99%
No of standardized resid >|3|_ outliers
Maximum Cook`s distance
Skewness of the residuals -0.952 0.008 -0.159
Kurtosis of the residuals 1.765 -1.007 -0.668
CI1_EWI_Compliance index for entity wide information
0.485 0.448 0.455
Unranked Ranked Normal scores
0.235 0.201 0.207
1.759 1.994 1.927
19.781 53.186 0.847
0.173 0.136 0.143
0.458 0.462 0.462
0.000 0.000 0.000
3.766 3.088 3.208
6 2 6
1.534 1.543 1.534
2.184 2.163 2.165
0.425 0.044 0.046
4 0 0
4 0 0
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Appendix B.  9 (continued) Results of different regression models _ primary compliance score for entity-wide information 
 
  
Dependent variable
PANEL F
PANEL G
PANEL H
CI1_EWI_Compliance index for entity wide information
Unranked Ranked Normal scores
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Appendix B.  10 Results of different regression models _ secondary compliance score for entity-wide information 
 
Dependent variable
PANEL A Coef. Std. Error t Sig. Coef. Std. Error t Sig. Coef. Std. Error t Sig.
Independent variable
(Constant) 82.457 5.249 15.710 0.000 76.259 20.834 3.660 0.000 -0.268 0.180 -1.494 0.137
Auditor_Big4_D_A -13.162 4.051 -3.249 0.001 -28.009 10.788 -2.596 0.010 -0.502 0.166 -3.025 0.003
Auditor_Big4_D_B -8.379 4.083 -2.052 0.042 -23.705 10.961 -2.163 0.032 -0.386 0.169 -2.289 0.023
Auditor_Big4_D_C -2.477 4.188 -0.591 0.555 -8.144 11.306 -0.720 0.472 -0.129 0.174 -0.740 0.460
Auditor_Big4_D_Not Big4 -17.930 8.437 -2.125 0.035 -57.321 21.985 -2.607 0.010 -0.806 0.339 -2.377 0.018
Market concentration 0.000 0.001 0.101 0.919
Rank (Normal score) of market concentration 0.104 0.066 1.581 0.116 0.086 0.059 1.454 0.148
Capital intensity -0.137 0.058 -2.343 0.020
Rank (Normal Score) of capital intensity -0.123 0.065 -1.886 0.061 -0.117 0.058 -2.019 0.045
Early adoption 1.413 3.759 0.376 0.707 0.512 10.191 0.050 0.960 0.030 0.156 0.192 0.848
Total sales 2.305E-07 0.000 0.004 0.997
Rank (Normal Score) of total sales 0.054 0.070 0.770 0.442 0.068 0.065 1.044 0.298
Gearing (liability based) 0.028 0.014 1.959 0.052
Rank (Normal Score) of gearing -0.020 0.078 -0.258 0.797 -0.004 0.070 -0.053 0.958
Liquidity (current ratio) -2.282 1.397 -1.633 0.104
Rank (Normal Score)of liquidity (current ratio) 0.018 0.073 0.245 0.807 -0.004 0.068 -0.062 0.951
Profitability (ROE) -0.009 0.009 -1.005 0.316
Rank (Normal Score) of profitability (ROE) -0.109 0.066 -1.644 0.102 -0.097 0.059 -1.660 0.099
Business reporting segment 18.093 3.479 5.201 0.000 52.489 9.565 5.488 0.000 0.805 0.147 5.476 0.000
Mixed reporting segment 8.112 4.194 1.934 0.055 12.018 11.579 1.038 0.301 0.201 0.178 1.127 0.261
Number of foreign subsidiaries 0.134 0.070 1.914 0.057
Rank (Normal Score) of the number of foreign subsidiaries 0.048 0.064 0.753 0.452 0.062 0.060 1.027 0.306
Growth 0.044 0.025 1.713 0.085
Rank (Normal Score) of growth 0.117 0.066 1.765 0.079 0.114 0.059 1.931 0.055
PANEL B _ Model summary
R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the Estimate
Durbin-Watson
PANEL C _ ANOVA
F
Sig.
PANEL D _ Collinearity Statistics
Minimum Tolerance
Maximum VIF
Average VIF
PANEL E _ Case diagnostics 
No of standardized resid >|2|_ 95%
No of standardized resid >|2.5|_ 99%
No of standardized resid >|3|_ outliers
Maximum Cook`s distance
Skewness of the residuals -1.866 -0.186 -0.434
Kurtosis of the residuals 6.119 -0.697 -0.108
Unranked Ranked Normal scores
CI2_EWI_Compliance index for entity wide information
0.504 0.521 0.524
0.254 0.272 0.275
0.2160.193 0.212
18.008 48.189 0.741
1.787 2.077 2.008
4.6474.175 4.580
0.000 0.000 0.000
0.458 0.462 0.462
2.1652.184 2.163
1.534 1.543 1.534
5 5 7
25 0
4 0 0
0.137 0.039 0.038
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Appendix B.  10 (continued) Results of different regression models _ secondary compliance score for entity-wide information 
  
Dependent variable
PANEL F
PANEL G
PANEL H
Unranked Ranked Normal scores
CI2_EWI_Compliance index for entity wide information
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Appendix B.  11 Results of different regression models _ primary compliance score for segmental information (total) 
 
Dependent variable
PANEL A Coef. Std. Error t Sig. Coef. Std. Error t Sig. Coef. Std. Error t Sig.
Independent variable
(Constant) 92.293 3.216 28.699 0.000 123.315 23.371 5.276 0.000 -0.044 0.216 -0.205 0.838
Auditor_Big4_D_A -6.024 2.482 -2.427 0.016 -26.787 12.102 -2.213 0.028 -0.454 0.199 -2.277 0.024
Auditor_Big4_D_B -9.588 2.502 -3.833 0.000 -43.005 12.296 -3.498 0.001 -0.738 0.203 -3.642 0.000
Auditor_Big4_D_C -2.253 2.566 -0.878 0.381 -12.333 12.683 -0.972 0.332 -0.185 0.209 -0.887 0.376
Auditor_Big4_D_Not Big4 -14.434 5.169 -2.792 0.006 -74.203 24.662 -3.009 0.003 -1.224 0.408 -3.002 0.003
Market concentration 0.000 0.001 0.513 0.609
Rank (Normal score) of market concentration 0.001 0.074 0.012 0.990 -0.023 0.071 -0.322 0.747
Capital intensity -0.060 0.036 -1.668 0.097
Rank (Normal Score) of capital intensity -0.128 0.073 -1.755 0.081 -0.106 0.070 -1.518 0.131
Early adoption 2.874 2.304 1.247 0.214 5.064 11.432 0.443 0.658 0.098 0.187 0.522 0.603
Total sales -3.269E-05 0.000 -0.891 0.374
Rank (Normal Score) of total sales 0.009 0.079 0.120 0.904 0.029 0.078 0.377 0.706
Gearing (liability based) -0.002 0.009 -0.278 0.781
Rank (Normal Score) of gearing -0.048 0.088 -0.546 0.586 -0.034 0.084 -0.408 0.684
Liquidity (current ratio) -1.552 0.856 -1.812 0.072
Rank (Normal Score)of liquidity (current ratio) -0.072 0.082 -0.872 0.384 -0.063 0.081 -0.770 0.442
Profitability (ROE) -0.006 0.005 -1.140 0.256
Rank (Normal Score) of profitability (ROE) -0.088 0.074 -1.189 0.236 -0.089 0.070 -1.270 0.206
Business reporting segment 5.921 2.132 2.778 0.006 41.844 10.729 3.900 0.000 0.621 0.177 3.515 0.001
Mixed reporting segment 3.058 2.570 1.190 0.236 20.862 12.989 1.606 0.110 0.302 0.215 1.408 0.161
Number of foreign subsidiaries -0.021 0.043 -0.496 0.621
Rank (Normal Score) of the number of foreign subsidiaries 0.005 0.072 0.068 0.945 -0.021 0.072 -0.295 0.768
Growth -0.007 0.015 -0.450 0.653
Rank (Normal Score) of growth 0.041 0.074 0.556 0.579 0.035 0.071 0.490 0.625
PANEL B _ Model summary
R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the Estimate
Durbin-Watson
PANEL C _ ANOVA
F
Sig. (F)
PANEL D _ Collinearity Statistics
Minimum Tolerance
Maximum VIF
Average VIF
PANEL E _ Case diagnostics 
No of standardized resid >|2|_ 95%
No of standardized resid >|2.5|_ 99%
No of standardized resid >|3|_ outliers
Maximum Cook`s distance
Skewness of the residuals -1.387 -0.019 -0.166
Kurtosis of the residuals 2.894 -0.760 -0.229
CI1_T_Compliance index for segmental information (total)
Normal scoresUnranked Ranked
0.441 0.437 0.431
0.194 0.191 0.185
0.129 0.125 0.119
11.034 54.057 0.891
1.886 1.960 1.903
2.956 2.897 2.791
4 0 2
0.000 0.000 0.001
0.458 0.462 0.462
2.184 2.163
10 3
2.165
7
1.534 1.543 1.534
0.262 0.038 0.060
4 0 0
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Appendix B.  11 (continued) Results of different regression models _ primary compliance score for segmental information (total) 
 
  
Dependent variable
PANEL F
PANEL G
PANEL H
CI1_T_Compliance index for segmental information (total)
Normal scoresUnranked Ranked
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Appendix B.  12 Results of different regression models _ secondary compliance score for segmental information (total) 
 
Dependent variable
PANEL A Coef. Std. Error t Sig. Coef. Std. Error t Sig. Coef. Std. Error t Sig.
Independent variable
(Constant) 95.983 2.970 32.321 0.000 125.346 22.617 5.542 0.000 -0.048 0.200 -0.239 0.811
Auditor_Big4_D_A -5.177 2.292 -2.258 0.025 -27.710 11.711 -2.366 0.019 -0.439 0.184 -2.383 0.018
Auditor_Big4_D_B -8.366 2.310 -3.622 0.000 -44.683 11.899 -3.755 0.000 -0.728 0.187 -3.886 0.000
Auditor_Big4_D_C -1.884 2.370 -0.795 0.428 -17.131 12.273 -1.396 0.164 -0.251 0.193 -1.302 0.195
Auditor_Big4_D_Not Big4 -11.812 4.774 -2.474 0.014 -65.751 23.866 -2.755 0.006 -1.104 0.377 -2.930 0.004
Market concentration 0.000 0.001 0.789 0.431
Rank (Normal score) of market concentration 0.039 0.072 0.539 0.590 0.028 0.066 0.421 0.674
Capital intensity -0.048 0.033 -1.437 0.152
Rank (Normal Score) of capital intensity -0.117 0.071 -1.655 0.100 -0.101 0.064 -1.566 0.119
Early adoption 4.355 2.127 2.048 0.042 21.761 11.063 1.967 0.051 0.366 0.173 2.113 0.036
Total sales 2.063E-07 0.000 0.006 0.995
Rank (Normal Score) of total sales -0.007 0.076 -0.095 0.925 0.003 0.072 0.047 0.962
Gearing (liability based) -0.005 0.008 -0.673 0.502
Rank (Normal Score) of gearing -0.034 0.085 -0.405 0.686 -0.031 0.077 -0.404 0.687
Liquidity (current ratio) -0.942 0.791 -1.191 0.235
Rank (Normal Score)of liquidity (current ratio) -0.068 0.079 -0.855 0.394 -0.066 0.075 -0.881 0.379
Profitability (ROE) -0.005 0.005 -0.976 0.330
Rank (Normal Score) of profitability (ROE) -0.089 0.072 -1.231 0.220 -0.067 0.065 -1.035 0.302
Business reporting segment 4.287 1.968 2.178 0.031 40.117 10.383 3.864 0.000 0.563 0.163 3.446 0.001
Mixed reporting segment 1.354 2.373 0.571 0.569 14.581 12.570 1.160 0.248 0.196 0.198 0.989 0.324
Number of foreign subsidiaries -0.042 0.040 -1.069 0.286
Rank (Normal Score) of the number of foreign subsidiaries -0.038 0.070 -0.543 0.588 -0.056 0.067 -0.833 0.406
Growth -0.007 0.014 -0.463 0.644
Rank (Normal Score) of growth 0.030 0.072 0.414 0.679 0.025 0.065 0.377 0.707
PANEL B _ Model summary
R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the Estimate
Durbin-Watson
PANEL C _ ANOVA
F
Sig.
PANEL D _ Collinearity Statistics
Minimum Tolerance
Maximum VIF
Average VIF
PANEL E _ Case diagnostics 
No of standardized resid >|2|_ 95%
No of standardized resid >|2.5|_ 99%
No of standardized resid >|3|_ outliers
Maximum Cook`s distance
Skewness of the residuals -1.632 -0.196 -0.485
Kurtosis of the residuals 3.406 -0.842 -0.250
CI2_T_Compliance index for segmental information (total)
Unranked Ranked Normal scores
0.177 0.212 0.208
0.421 0.460 0.456
10.189 52.313 0.823
0.1430.110 0.148
3.2222.644 3.301
1.980 2.173 2.131
0.458 0.462 0.462
0.001 0.000 0.000
1.534 1.543 1.534
2.1652.184 2.163
15 0
11 3 6
0.489 0.055 0.104
3 0 0
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Appendix B.  12 (continued) Results of different regression models _ secondary compliance score for segmental information (total) 
Dependent variable
PANEL F
PANEL G
PANEL H
CI2_T_Compliance index for segmental information (total)
Unranked Ranked Normal scores
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Appendix C. 1 The geographic revenue reporting practice of the sample companies under IAS 14R (N=222) 
 
Industry
Basic Materials 2 18 20 1 1 2 2 4 24 8.33 75.00 83.33 4.17 4.17 8.33 8.33 16.67 100.00 3.64 14.52 11.17 4.35 5.88 5.00 66.67 9.30 10.81
Consumer Services 11 25 36 12 10 22 1 23 59 23.73 37.29 61.02 20.34 16.95 37.29 1.69 38.98 100.00 20.00 20.16 20.11 52.17 58.82 55.00 33.33 53.49 26.58
Customer Goods 7 11 18 6 0 6 0 6 24 33.33 41.67 75.00 25.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 25.00 100.00 12.73 8.87 10.06 26.09 0.00 15.00 0.00 13.95 10.81
Health Care 1 6 7 0 0 0 0 0 7 14.29 85.71 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 1.82 4.84 3.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.15
Industrials 15 42 57 1 3 4 0 4 61 22.95 70.49 93.44 1.64 4.92 6.56 0.00 6.56 100.00 27.27 33.87 31.84 4.35 17.65 10.00 0.00 9.30 27.48
Oil and Gas 8 7 15 0 1 1 0 1 16 50.00 43.75 93.75 0.00 6.25 6.25 0.00 6.25 100.00 14.55 5.65 8.38 0.00 5.88 2.50 0.00 2.33 7.21
Technology 8 9 17 0 0 0 0 0 17 41.18 58.82 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 14.55 7.26 9.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.66
Telecommunication 2 2 4 1 0 1 0 1 5 40.00 40.00 80.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 100.00 3.64 1.61 2.23 4.35 0.00 2.50 0.00 2.33 2.25
Utilities 1 4 5 2 2 4 0 4 9 11.11 44.44 55.56 22.22 22.22 44.44 0.00 44.44 100.00 1.82 3.23 2.79 8.70 11.76 10.00 0.00 9.30 4.05
Total 55 124 179 23 17 40 3 43 222 25.68 54.95 80.63 10.36 7.66 18.02 1.35 19.37 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Auditor
Big4_A 22 37 59 5 6 11 0 11 70 32.84 52.24 85.07 7.46 7.46 14.93 0.00 14.93 100.00 40.00 29.84 32.96 21.74 35.29 27.50 0.00 25.58 31.53
Big4_B 13 33 46 6 4 10 1 11 57 25.42 55.93 81.36 10.17 6.78 16.95 1.69 18.64 100.00 23.64 26.61 25.70 26.09 23.53 25.00 33.33 25.58 25.68
Big4_C 11 29 40 9 1 10 0 10 50 18.52 59.26 77.78 18.52 3.70 22.22 0.00 22.22 100.00 20.00 23.39 22.35 39.13 5.88 25.00 0.00 23.26 22.52
Big4_D 9 20 29 2 6 8 0 8 37 27.78 52.78 80.56 2.78 16.67 19.44 0.00 19.44 100.00 16.36 16.13 16.20 8.70 35.29 20.00 0.00 18.60 16.67
Big4 55 119 174 22 17 39 1 40 214 26.39 55.09 81.48 10.19 7.87 18.06 0.46 18.52 100.00 100.00 95.97 97.21 95.65 100.00 97.50 33.33 93.02 96.40
Not Big4 0 5 5 1 0 1 2 3 8 0.00 50.00 50.00 16.67 0.00 16.67 33.33 50.00 100.00 0.00 4.03 2.79 4.35 0.00 2.50 66.67 6.98 3.60
Total 55 124 179 23 17 40 3 43 222 25.68 54.95 80.63 10.36 7.66 18.02 1.35 19.37 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Single segment/not
Single segment 0 9 9 15 4 19 1 20 29 0.00 27.27 27.27 68.18 0.00 68.18 4.55 72.73 100.00 0.00 7.26 5.03 65.22 23.53 47.50 33.33 46.51 13.06
Not single segment 55 115 170 8 13 21 2 23 193 29.69 60.42 90.10 0.00 8.85 8.85 1.04 9.90 100.00 100.00 92.74 94.97 34.78 76.47 52.50 66.67 53.49 86.94
Total 55 124 179 23 17 40 3 43 222 26.64 57.01 83.64 7.01 7.94 14.95 1.40 16.36 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
FTSE 100
FTSE 100 18 48 66 1 4 5 2 7 73 0.00 27.27 27.27 68.18 0.00 68.18 4.55 72.73 100.00 32.73 38.71 36.87 4.35 23.53 12.50 66.67 16.28 32.88
FTSE 250 37 76 113 22 13 35 1 36 149 29.69 60.42 90.10 0.00 8.85 8.85 1.04 9.90 100.00 67.27 61.29 63.13 95.65 76.47 87.50 33.33 83.72 67.12
Total 55 124 179 23 17 40 3 43 222 26.64 57.01 83.64 7.01 7.94 14.95 1.40 16.36 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Listing status
Cross listed 50 115 165 20 15 35 3 38 203 25.62 55.67 81.28 9.85 7.39 17.24 1.48 18.72 100.00 90.91 92.74 92.18 86.96 88.24 87.50 100.00 88.37 91.44
Not cross listed 5 9 14 3 2 5 0 5 19 26.32 47.37 73.68 15.79 10.53 26.32 0.00 26.32 100.00 9.09 7.26 7.82 13.04 11.76 12.50 0.00 11.63 8.56
Total 55 124 179 23 17 40 3 43 222 25.68 54.95 80.63 10.36 7.66 18.02 1.35 19.37 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
US listing status
US listed 37 73 110 10 5 15 2 17 127 29.13 57.48 86.61 7.87 3.94 11.81 1.57 13.39 100.00 67.27 58.87 61.45 43.48 29.41 37.50 66.67 39.53 57.21
Not US listed 18 51 69 13 12 25 1 26 95 21.05 51.58 72.63 13.68 12.63 26.32 1.05 27.37 100.00 32.73 41.13 38.55 56.52 70.59 62.50 33.33 60.47 42.79
Total 55 124 179 23 17 40 3 43 222 25.68 54.95 80.63 10.36 7.66 18.02 1.35 19.37 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
*: IFRS 8 first adoption with the exception of Auditor and single segment/not
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Appendix C. 2 The geographic revenue reporting practice of the sample companies under IFRS 8 (N=222) 
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Industry
Basic Materials 18 1 1 2 0 2 22 1 0 1 1 2 24 75.00 4.17 4.17 8.33 0.00 8.33 91.67 4.17 0.00 4.17 4.17 8.33 100.00 16.67 4.35 5.88 5.00 0.00 5.56 11.70 7.14 0.00 4.17 10.00 5.88 10.81
Consumer Services 20 5 8 9 0 9 42 4 8 12 5 17 59 33.90 8.47 13.56 15.25 0.00 15.25 71.19 6.78 13.56 20.34 8.47 28.81 100.00 18.52 21.74 47.06 22.50 0.00 25.00 22.34 28.57 80.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 26.58
Customer Goods 8 2 0 8 1 7 18 6 0 6 0 6 24 33.33 8.33 0.00 33.33 4.17 29.17 75.00 25.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 25.00 100.00 7.41 8.70 0.00 20.00 25.00 19.44 9.57 42.86 0.00 25.00 0.00 17.65 10.81
Health Care 4 0 1 2 0 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 7 57.14 0.00 14.29 28.57 0.00 28.57 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 3.70 0.00 5.88 5.00 0.00 5.56 3.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.15
Industrials 33 5 4 14 3 11 56 1 2 3 2 5 61 54.10 8.20 6.56 22.95 4.92 18.03 91.80 1.64 3.28 4.92 3.28 8.20 100.00 30.56 21.74 23.53 35.00 75.00 30.56 29.79 7.14 20.00 12.50 20.00 14.71 27.48
Oil and Gas 9 6 0 1 0 1 16 0 0 0 0 0 16 56.25 37.50 0.00 6.25 0.00 6.25 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 8.33 26.09 0.00 2.50 0.00 2.78 8.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.21
Technology 11 3 2 1 0 1 17 0 0 0 0 0 17 64.71 17.65 11.76 5.88 0.00 5.88 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 10.19 13.04 11.76 2.50 0.00 2.78 9.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.66
Telecommunication 3 1 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 1 0 1 5 60.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 20.00 100.00 2.78 4.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.13 7.14 0.00 4.17 0.00 2.94 2.25
Utilities 2 0 1 3 0 3 6 1 0 1 2 3 9 22.22 0.00 11.11 33.33 0.00 33.33 66.67 11.11 0.00 11.11 22.22 33.33 100.00 1.85 0.00 5.88 7.50 0.00 8.33 3.19 7.14 0.00 4.17 20.00 8.82 4.05
Total 108 23 17 40 4 36 188 14 10 24 10 34 222 48.65 10.36 7.66 18.02 1.80 16.22 84.68 6.31 4.50 10.81 4.50 15.32 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Auditor
Big4_A 29 5 11 15 1 14 60 4 3 7 0 7 67 43.28 7.46 16.42 22.39 1.49 20.90 89.55 5.97 4.48 10.45 0.00 10.45 100.00 26.85 21.74 64.71 37.50 25.00 38.89 31.91 28.57 30.00 29.17 0.00 20.59 30.18
Big4_B 24 11 2 12 2 10 49 4 1 5 5 10 59 40.68 18.64 3.39 20.34 3.39 16.95 83.05 6.78 1.69 8.47 8.47 16.95 100.00 22.22 47.83 11.76 30.00 50.00 27.78 26.06 28.57 10.00 20.83 50.00 29.41 26.58
Big4_C 29 4 1 10 1 9 44 4 3 7 3 10 54 53.70 7.41 1.85 18.52 1.85 16.67 81.48 7.41 5.56 12.96 5.56 18.52 100.00 26.85 17.39 5.88 25.00 25.00 25.00 23.40 28.57 30.00 29.17 30.00 29.41 24.32
Big4_D 22 3 3 3 0 3 31 1 3 4 1 5 36 61.11 8.33 8.33 8.33 0.00 8.33 86.11 2.78 8.33 11.11 2.78 13.89 100.00 20.37 13.04 17.65 7.50 0.00 8.33 16.49 7.14 30.00 16.67 10.00 14.71 16.22
Big4 104 23 17 40 4 36 184 13 10 23 9 32 216 48.15 10.65 7.87 18.52 1.85 16.67 85.19 6.02 4.63 10.65 4.17 14.81 100.00 96.30 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 97.87 92.86 100.00 95.83 90.00 94.12 97.30
Not Big4 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 1 1 2 6 66.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 66.67 16.67 0.00 16.67 16.67 33.33 100.00 3.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.13 7.14 0.00 4.17 10.00 5.88 2.70
Total 108 23 17 40 4 36 188 14 10 24 10 34 222 48.65 10.36 7.66 18.02 1.80 16.22 84.68 6.31 4.50 10.81 4.50 15.32 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Single segment / Not
Single segment company 7 0 0 0 0 0 7 9 2 11 4 15 22 31.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 31.82 40.91 9.09 50.00 18.18 68.18 100.00 6.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.72 64.29 20.00 45.83 40.00 44.12 9.91
Not single segment company 101 23 17 40 4 36 181 5 8 13 6 19 200 50.50 11.50 8.50 20.00 2.00 18.00 90.50 2.50 4.00 6.50 3.00 9.50 100.00 93.52 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 96.28 35.71 80.00 54.17 60.00 55.88 90.09
Total 108 23 17 40 4 36 188 14 10 24 10 34 222 48.65 10.36 7.66 18.02 1.80 16.22 84.68 6.31 4.50 10.81 4.50 15.32 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
FTSE 100
FTSE 100 43 4 6 16 2 14 69 0 1 1 3 4 73 58.90 5.48 8.22 21.92 2.74 19.18 94.52 0.00 1.37 1.37 4.11 5.48 100.00 39.81 17.39 35.29 40.00 50.00 38.89 36.70 0.00 10.00 4.17 30.00 11.76 32.88
FTSE 250 65 19 11 24 2 22 119 14 9 23 7 30 149 43.62 12.75 7.38 16.11 1.34 14.77 79.87 9.40 6.04 15.44 4.70 20.13 100.00 60.19 82.61 64.71 60.00 50.00 61.11 63.30 100.00 90.00 95.83 70.00 88.24 67.12
Total 108 23 17 40 4 36 188 14 10 24 10 34 222 48.65 10.36 7.66 18.02 1.80 16.22 84.68 6.31 4.50 10.81 4.50 15.32 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Listing status
Cross listed 102 21 15 35 3 32 173 13 9 22 8 30 203 50.25 10.34 7.39 17.24 1.48 15.76 85.22 6.40 4.43 10.84 3.94 14.78 100.00 94.44 91.30 88.24 87.50 75.00 88.89 92.02 92.86 90.00 91.67 80.00 88.24 91.44
Not cross listed 6 2 2 5 1 4 15 1 1 2 2 4 19 31.58 10.53 10.53 26.32 5.26 21.05 78.95 5.26 5.26 10.53 10.53 21.05 100.00 5.56 8.70 11.76 12.50 25.00 11.11 7.98 7.14 10.00 8.33 20.00 11.76 8.56
Total 108 23 17 40 4 36 188 14 10 24 10 34 222 48.65 10.36 7.66 18.02 1.80 16.22 84.68 6.31 4.50 10.81 4.50 15.32 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
US listing status
US listed 68 12 10 24 2 22 114 7 2 9 4 13 127 53.54 9.45 7.87 18.90 1.57 17.32 89.76 5.51 1.57 7.09 3.15 10.24 100.00 62.96 52.17 58.82 60.00 50.00 61.11 60.64 50.00 20.00 37.50 40.00 38.24 57.21
Not US listed 40 11 7 16 2 14 74 7 8 15 6 21 95 42.11 11.58 7.37 16.84 2.11 14.74 77.89 7.37 8.42 15.79 6.32 22.11 100.00 37.04 47.83 41.18 40.00 50.00 38.89 39.36 50.00 80.00 62.50 60.00 61.76 42.79
Total 108 23 17 40 4 36 188 14 10 24 10 34 222 48.65 10.36 7.66 18.02 1.80 16.22 84.68 6.31 4.50 10.81 4.50 15.32 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Early adopter
Early adopter 16 3 4 4 1 3 27 2 1 3 1 4 31 51.61 9.68 12.90 12.90 3.23 9.68 87.10 6.45 3.23 9.68 3.23 12.90 100.00 14.81 13.04 23.53 10.00 25.00 8.33 14.36 14.29 10.00 12.50 10.00 11.76 13.96
Not early adopter 92 20 13 36 3 33 161 12 9 21 9 30 191 48.17 10.47 6.81 18.85 1.57 17.28 84.29 6.28 4.71 10.99 4.71 15.71 100.00 85.19 86.96 76.47 90.00 75.00 91.67 85.64 85.71 90.00 87.50 90.00 88.24 86.04
Total 108 23 17 40 4 36 188 14 10 24 10 34 222 48.65 10.36 7.66 18.02 1.80 16.22 84.68 6.31 4.50 10.81 4.50 15.32 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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Appendix C. 3 The effect of industry type on the company’s foreign revenue 
proportion (N=155) 
 
 
 
Panel A: Statistics 
 
 
ICB Industry 
Foreign revenue % _ IAS 14R Foreign revenue % _ IFRS 8 
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation 
Basic Materials 92.74   9.16 92.36   9.65 
Consumer Services 49.06 32.71 49.84 32.84 
Customer Goods 58.46 38.13 58.92 37.62 
Health Care 85.40 19.93 86.79 18.79 
Industrials 67.63 28.76 69.12 27.95 
Oil & Gas 79.72 13.52 81.13 12.44 
Technology 80.08 17.69 82.69 15.86 
Telecommunication 68.50 41.28 69.29 40.81 
Utilities 37.04 31.58 35.83 29.67 
Total 66.45 31.19 67.48 30.83 
 
 
 
Panel B: ANOVA: foreign revenue % and industry type 
 
IAS 14R     IFRS 8 
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Appendix C. 4 The effect of different categorical variables on the companies’ 
geographic revenue / NCA disclosure practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N=222 Number and (%)
Value df Asymp.sign. of the expected Value Approx.Sig.
Categorical variables (2-sided) frequencies below 5
Panel A
Industry 95.939 56 0.001 62 (86.1) 0.248 0.001
Auditor 36.449 28 0.132 28 (70.0) 0.203 0.132
FTSE 100 15.286 7 0.033   5 (31.3) 0.262 0.033
Cross listing 4.885 7 0.674   8 (50.0) 0.148 0.674
US listing 9.188 7 0.239   4 (25.0) 0.203 0.239
Early adoption 2.994 7 0.886   7 (43.8) 0.116 0.886
Type of reporting segment 343.172 14 0.000 13 (54.2) 0.879 0.000
Single segment 67.869 7 0.000   8 (50.0) 0.553 0.000
Industry 67.073 32 0.000 32 (71.1) 0.275 0.000
Auditor 62.521 16 0.000 13 (52.0) 0.265 0.000
FTSE 100 12.619 4 0.013   2 (20.0) 0.238 0.013
Cross listing 1.383 4 0.847   5 (50.0) 0.079 0.847
US listing 9.662 4 0.047   2 (20.0) 0.209 0.047
Single segment 69.757 4 0.000   4 (40.0) 0.561 0.000
Geo revenue info under IAS 14R & under IFRS 8 354.98 28 0.000 28 (70.0) 0.632 0.000
Panel B
Industry 22.881 8 0.004   8 (44.4) 0.321 0.004
Auditor 3.331 4 0.504   1 (10.0) 0.122 0.504
FTSE 100 8.113 1 0.004   0 (  0.0) 0.191 0.004
Cross listing 0.527 1 0.468   1 (25.0) 0.049 0.468
US listing 5.903 1 0.015   0 (  0.0) 0.163 0.015
Early adoption 0.162 1 0.688   1 (25.0) 0.027 0.688
Type of reporting segment 19.603 2 0.000   0 (  0.0) 0.297 0.000
Single segment 52.623 1 0.000   1 (25.0) 0.487 0.000
Industry 32.697 8 0.000   8 (44.4) 0.384 0.000
Auditor 4.753 4 0.314   2 (20.0) 0.146 0.314
FTSE 100 6.662 1 0.010     0 ( 0.0) 0.173 0.010
Cross listing 0.642 1 0.423   1 (25.0) 0.054 0.423
US listing 6.804 1 0.009   0 (  0.0) 0.175 0.009
Single segment 52.538 1 0.000   0 (  0.0) 0.486 0.000
Geo revenue info under IAS 14R & under IFRS 8 155.161 1 0.000   0 (  0.0) 0.836 0.000
Industry 10.628 8 0.224   5 (27.8) 0.219 0.224
Auditor 4.800 4 0.308   2 (20.0) 0.147 0.308
FTSE 100 9.850 1 0.002   0 (  0.0) 0.211 0.002
Cross listing 0.675 1 0.411   0 (  0.0) 0.055 0.411
US listing 5.392 1 0.023   0 (  0.0) 0.156 0.020
Early adoption 4.686 1 0.030   0 (  0.0) 0.145 0.030
Type of reporting segment 1.046 2 0.593   0 (  0.0) 0.069 0.593
Detailed (revenue) disclosure under IFRS 8 83.340 7 0.000   4 (25.0) 0.613 0.000
Single segment 14.427 1 0.000   0 (  0.0) 0.255 0.000
Geographic revenue information under IFRS 8 (Entity wide information, Geo reporting segments, Mixed reporting segments, Both entity wide and reporting
segments info _same structure, Both entity wide and reporting segments info _ different structure, All revenue generated in one country, No major revenue from
foreign countries, Geo info not provided) &
Geographic revenue information under IAS 14R (Geo primary segments, Geo secondary segments, All revenue generated in one country, No major revenue
from foreign countries, Geo info not provided) &
Geographic revenue information under IFRS 8 (Detailed geo info provided, Detailed geo info not provided)&
Geographic revenue information under IAS 14R (Detailed geo info provided, Detailed geo info not provided) &
Pearson's Chi-square test Cramer's V
NCA disclosure under IFRS 8 (Detailed geo info provided, Detailed geo info not provided)&
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Appendix C. 5 The geographic NCA reporting practice of the sample companies 
under IFRS 8 
 
 
 
N=222
Categories disclosed not disclosed total disclosed not disclosed total disclosed not disclosed total
Industry
Basic Materials 16 8 24 66.67 33.33 100.00 12.80 8.25 10.81
Consumer Services 24 35 59 40.68 59.32 100.00 19.20 36.08 26.58
Customer Goods 14 10 24 58.33 41.67 100.00 11.20 10.31 10.81
Health Care 5 2 7 71.43 28.57 100.00 4.00 2.06 3.15
Industrials 38 23 61 62.30 37.70 100.00 30.40 23.71 27.48
Oil and Gas 9 7 16 56.25 43.75 100.00 7.20 7.22 7.21
Technology 11 6 17 64.71 35.29 100.00 8.80 6.19 7.66
Telecommunication 4 1 5 80.00 20.00 100.00 3.20 1.03 2.25
Utilities 4 5 9 44.44 55.56 100.00 3.20 5.15 4.05
Total 125 97 222 56.31 43.69 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Auditor
Big4_A 39 28 67 58.21 41.79 100.00 31.20 28.87 30.18
Big4_B 31 28 59 52.54 47.46 100.00 24.80 28.87 26.58
Big4_C 32 22 54 59.26 40.74 100.00 25.60 22.68 24.32
Big4_D 22 14 36 61.11 38.89 100.00 17.60 14.43 16.22
Not Big4 1 5 6 16.67 83.33 100.00 0.80 5.15 2.70
Total 125 97 222 56.31 43.69 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Single segment / Not
Not single segment company 121 79 200 60.50 39.50 100.00 96.80 81.44 90.09
Single segment company 4 18 22 18.18 81.82 100.00 3.20 18.56 9.91
Total 125 97 222 56.31 43.69 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
FTSE 100
FTSE 100 52 21 73 71.23 28.77 100.00 41.60 21.65 32.88
FTSE 250 73 76 149 48.99 51.01 100.00 58.40 78.35 67.12
Total 125 97 222 56.31 43.69 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Listing status
Cross listed 116 87 203 57.14 42.86 100.00 92.80 89.69 91.44
Not cross listed 9 10 19 47.37 52.63 100.00 7.20 10.31 8.56
Total 125 97 222 56.31 43.69 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
US listing status
US listed 80 47 127 62.99 37.01 100.00 64.00 48.45 57.21
Not US listed 45 50 95 47.37 52.63 100.00 36.00 51.55 42.79
Total 125 97 222 56.31 43.69 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Early adopter
Early adopter 23 8 31 74.19 25.81 100.00 18.40 8.25 13.96
Not early adopter 102 89 191 53.40 46.60 100.00 81.60 91.75 86.04
Total 125 97 222 56.31 43.69 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Type of reporting segment
Business 83 58 141 58.87 41.13 100.00 66.40 59.79 63.51
Geo 20 18 38 52.63 47.37 100.00 16.00 18.56 17.12
Mixed 22 21 43 51.16 48.84 100.00 17.60 21.65 19.37
Total 125 97 222 56.31 43.69 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Geo revenue disclosure under IFRS 8
Both reporting segm. & EWI _ diff 28 8 36 77.78 22.22 100.00 22.40 8.25 16.22
Both reporting segm. & EWI _ same 3 1 4 75.00 25.00 100.00 2.40 1.03 1.80
Entity wide information 83 25 108 76.85 23.15 100.00 66.40 25.77 48.65
Geo reporting segment 7 16 23 30.43 69.57 100.00 5.60 16.49 10.36
Mixed reporting segment 4 13 17 23.53 76.47 100.00 3.20 13.40 7.66
No detailed geo info 0 34 34 0.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 35.05 15.32
Total 125 97 222 56.31 43.69 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
NCA 
% of the companies
NCA 
number of the companies
NCA 
% of the companies
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Appendix C. 6 Revenue information under IFRS 8 by different quantitative company characteristics 
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Appendix C. 6 (continued) Revenue information under IFRS 8 by different quantitative company characteristics 
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Appendix C. 7 Revenue and NCA information under IFRS 8 by different 
quantitative company characteristics 
 
 
 
 
N=222 Categorical variables
NCA
Quantitative variables detailed info provided or not type of disclosure
*
detailed info provided or not
Capital intensity
parametric test NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO
Total sales
parametric test YES NO NO
non-parametric test NO YES YES
Growth rate (sales)
parametric test NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO
HHI_sales
parametric test NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO
No of foreign countries with subsidiary
parametric test YES NO YES
non-parametric test YES YES YES
No of subsidiaries in foreign countries
parametric test YES NO YES
non-parametric test YES YES YES
No of stock exchanges
parametric test YES NO YES
non-parametric test YES NO YES
No of foreign stock excanges
parametric test YES NO YES
non-parametric test YES NO YES
Profitability _ ROE
parametric test NO YES NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO
Current ratio
parametric test YES YES NO
non-parametric test NO YES NO
Gearing (liablity based)
parametric test YES YES NO
non-parametric test NO YES NO
No of geo locations reported
parametric test YES YES YES
non-parametric test YES YES YES
No of individual countries reported
parametric test YES YES YES
non-parametric test YES YES YES
No of regions reported
parametric test YES YES YES
non-parametric test YES YES YES
*  : singificant at the 0.05 level
**
: Entity wide information, Geo reporting segments, Mixed reporting segments, Both entity wide and reporting segments info _same structure, Both entity wide and
reporting segments info _ different structure, All revenue generated in one country, No major revenue from foreign countries, Geo info not provided
Significant effect on dependent variable
Revenue
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Appendix C. 8 The number of geographic locations and countries disclosed under 
IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
 
 
Panel A: The number of geographic locations disclosed under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
 
 
based on geographic revenue disclosure 
 
 
Panel B: The number of countries disclosed under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
 
 
based on geographic revenue disclosure 
 
 
IFRS8
IAS14R 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 33 0 7 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 17 6 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 30
3 1 0 1 18 10 4 1 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 41
4 0 0 3 7 30 5 2 4 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 55
5 0 0 2 1 1 11 4 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 26
6 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
7 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
8 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 3
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 ` 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
34 0 30 33 50 22 12 13 10 5 7 2 2 0 0 2 222Total
Number of geograpic locations
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
g
eo
g
ra
p
h
ic
 l
o
ca
ti
o
n
s
Total
IFRS8
IAS14R 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0 43 13 14 6 6 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 83
1 2 46 11 13 5 5 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 85
2 1 1 20 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 27
3 0 0 0 7 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 13
4 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
6 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
46 60 48 26 20 7 4 2 3 1 1 3 1 0 0 0 222
Number of countries
Total
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
Total
Chapter 10: Appendices 
297 
 
Appendix C. 9 Extract from the Annual Report and Financial Statements (2009 
and 2010) of Hays Plc 
 
Panel A 
 
  Hays Plc, Annual Report and Financial Statements 2010, p76. 
Panel B 
 
  Hays Plc, Annual Report and Financial Statements 2009, p74. 
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Appendix C. 10 Paired sample t-test for the number of locations / countries / regions 
 
N=178 
 
 
N=155 
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Appendix C. 11 The number of geographic locations / countries / regions disclosed under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 by different categorical company 
characteristics (N=178) 
 
N=178
Categories
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Industry
Basic Materials 20 11.24 5.30 2.43 6.85 3.57 1.55 3.05 2.20 2.38 3.65 3.39 1.45 2.96 3.10 2.05 3.20 1.85 0.10 0.97
Consumer Services 36 20.22 3.47 1.40 4.06 2.10 0.58 1.48 1.42 1.11 2.11 1.82 0.69 1.64 2.06 1.07 1.94 1.29 -0.11 0.82
Customer Goods 18 10.11 3.39 1.09 4.44 2.04 1.06 1.80 0.61 0.50 2.17 1.34 1.56 1.46 2.78 1.17 2.28 1.36 -0.50 1.25
Health Care 7 3.93 5.43 4.28 5.71 4.23 0.29 1.25 3.00 4.00 3.43 3.95 0.43 1.27 2.43 0.79 2.29 1.38 -0.14 0.69
Industrials 56 31.46 4.20 1.54 4.91 2.24 0.71 1.95 1.30 1.13 2.43 1.79 1.13 1.63 2.89 1.36 2.48 1.36 -0.41 1.02
Oil and Gas 15 8.43 4.27 1.71 4.60 1.96 0.33 1.23 1.93 2.63 3.27 2.52 1.33 2.02 2.33 1.54 1.33 1.18 -1.00 1.25
Technology 17 9.55 3.88 1.22 5.12 2.26 1.24 2.05 0.94 1.14 2.35 2.26 1.41 2.18 2.94 1.09 2.76 1.15 -0.18 0.73
Telecommunication 4 2.25 5.50 3.00 6.25 2.87 0.75 1.50 2.25 2.22 3.00 2.94 0.75 1.50 3.25 1.71 3.25 1.71 0.00 0.00
Utilities 5 2.81 3.20 1.30 3.80 2.49 0.60 1.52 1.40 0.55 2.40 1.14 1.00 1.41 1.80 1.48 1.40 1.52 -0.40 0.55
Total 178 100.00 4.12 1.87 4.93 2.56 0.81 1.92 1.47 1.69 2.59 2.24 1.12 1.87 2.65 1.40 2.34 1.45 -0.31 0.99
Auditor
Big4_A 57 32.02 3.96 1.49 4.77 2.06 0.81 1.73 1.33 1.34 2.42 1.87 1.09 1.75 2.63 1.28 2.35 1.32 -0.28 1.05
Big4_B 47 26.40 4.11 1.88 4.89 2.72 0.79 1.99 1.43 1.36 2.43 2.00 1.00 1.90 2.68 1.49 2.47 1.57 -0.21 0.88
Big4_C 42 23.60 4.67 2.37 5.31 3.01 0.64 1.94 1.62 2.27 2.76 2.64 1.14 1.69 3.05 1.32 2.55 1.47 -0.50 1.11
Big4_D 29 16.29 3.79 1.68 4.83 2.61 1.03 2.23 1.66 1.91 2.90 2.70 1.24 2.32 2.14 1.51 1.93 1.51 -0.21 0.86
Not Big4 3 1.69 2.67 0.58 4.33 2.52 1.67 2.08 0.67 0.58 3.00 2.00 2.33 2.08 2.00 1.00 1.33 0.58 -0.67 1.15
Total 178 100.00 4.12 1.87 4.93 2.56 0.81 1.92 1.47 1.69 2.59 2.24 1.12 1.87 2.65 1.40 2.34 1.45 -0.31 0.99
Single segment / Not
Not single segment company 172 96.63 4.10 1.68 4.88 2.40 0.78 1.82 1.41 1.51 2.51 2.05 1.10 1.80 2.69 1.37 2.37 1.45 -0.33 1.00
Single segment company 6 3.37 4.67 5.20 6.50 5.61 1.83 4.02 3.17 4.40 4.83 5.19 1.67 3.61 1.50 1.76 1.67 1.63 0.17 0.41
Total 178 100.00 4.12 1.87 4.93 2.56 0.81 1.92 1.47 1.69 2.59 2.24 1.12 1.87 2.65 1.40 2.34 1.45 -0.31 0.99
FTSE 100
FTSE 100 66 37.08 4.61 2.28 5.62 2.87 1.02 1.97 1.42 1.86 2.88 2.29 1.45 1.95 3.18 1.38 2.74 1.57 -0.44 1.10
FTSE 250 112 62.92 3.83 1.52 4.53 2.28 0.70 1.89 1.49 1.59 2.42 2.20 0.93 1.80 2.34 1.32 2.11 1.33 -0.23 0.92
Total 178 100.00 4.12 1.87 4.93 2.56 0.81 1.92 1.47 1.69 2.59 2.24 1.12 1.87 2.65 1.40 2.34 1.45 -0.31 0.99
Listing status
Cross listed 164 92.13 4.18 1.92 4.95 2.57 0.76 1.90 1.47 1.73 2.56 2.20 1.09 1.83 2.71 1.41 2.38 1.48 -0.33 1.03
Not cross listed 14 7.87 3.36 0.93 4.79 2.58 1.43 2.14 1.43 1.16 2.93 2.70 1.50 2.35 1.93 1.07 1.86 1.10 -0.07 0.27
Total 178 100.00 4.12 1.87 4.93 2.56 0.81 1.92 1.47 1.69 2.59 2.24 1.12 1.87 2.65 1.40 2.34 1.45 -0.31 0.99
US listing status
US listed 109 61.24 4.43 1.96 5.26 2.66 0.83 1.89 1.52 1.89 2.73 2.32 1.21 1.89 2.91 1.39 2.52 1.54 -0.39 1.04
Not US listed 69 38.76 3.62 1.60 4.42 2.32 0.80 2.00 1.38 1.33 2.36 2.09 0.99 1.85 2.25 1.33 2.06 1.26 -0.19 0.90
Total 178 100.00 4.12 1.87 4.93 2.56 0.81 1.92 1.47 1.69 2.59 2.24 1.12 1.87 2.65 1.40 2.34 1.45 -0.31 0.99
Early adopter
Early adopter 27 15.17 3.93 1.69 5.07 2.57 1.15 2.01 1.30 1.17 2.85 2.14 1.56 2.12 2.63 1.47 2.22 1.48 -0.41 1.12
Not early adopter 151 84.83 4.15 1.90 4.91 2.57 0.76 1.91 1.50 1.77 2.54 2.26 1.05 1.82 2.66 1.39 2.36 1.45 -0.29 0.97
Total 178 100.00 4.12 1.87 4.93 2.56 0.81 1.92 1.47 1.69 2.59 2.24 1.12 1.87 2.65 1.40 2.34 1.45 -0.31 0.99
Type of reporting segment
Business 98 55.06 4.19 1.99 5.28 2.79 1.08 2.02 1.40 1.80 2.84 2.51 1.44 2.03 2.80 1.27 2.44 1.38 -0.36 1.03
Geo 37 20.79 4.08 1.82 4.92 2.23 0.84 1.71 1.81 2.05 2.65 2.29 0.84 1.76 2.27 1.39 2.27 1.45 0.00 0.71
Mixed 43 24.16 3.98 1.66 4.16 2.14 0.19 1.75 1.33 0.92 1.98 1.23 0.65 1.45 2.65 1.65 2.19 1.64 -0.47 1.08
Total 178 100.00 4.12 1.87 4.93 2.56 0.81 1.92 1.47 1.69 2.59 2.24 1.12 1.87 2.65 1.40 2.34 1.45 -0.31 0.99
Geo disclosure under IFRS 8
Both reporting segm. & EWI _ diff 36 20.22 3.89 1.41 5.11 2.43 1.22 2.06 0.94 0.75 2.64 1.82 1.69 1.65 2.94 1.31 2.47 1.56 -0.47 1.16
Both reporting segm. & EWI _ same 4 2.25 3.50 2.38 5.00 2.94 1.50 1.73 1.25 0.96 2.50 1.00 1.25 1.89 2.25 2.87 2.50 2.65 0.25 0.50
Entity wide information 98 55.06 4.19 1.99 5.28 2.79 1.08 2.02 1.40 1.80 2.84 2.51 1.44 2.03 2.80 1.27 2.44 1.38 -0.36 1.03
Geo reporting segment 23 12.92 4.39 2.08 4.30 1.96 -0.09 0.60 2.43 2.31 2.30 2.16 -0.13 0.63 1.96 1.46 2.00 1.41 0.04 0.37
Mixed reporting segment 17 9.55 3.94 1.71 3.41 1.33 -0.53 1.33 1.71 1.10 1.47 1.18 -0.24 1.03 2.24 1.56 1.94 1.44 -0.29 0.99
Total 178 100.00 4.12 1.87 4.93 2.56 0.81 1.92 1.47 1.69 2.59 2.24 1.12 1.87 2.65 1.40 2.34 1.45 -0.31 0.99
Revenue attribution
Customer location 82 46.07 4.16 1.87 5.38 2.83 1.22 2.08 1.35 1.45 2.79 2.39 1.44 2.07 2.80 1.49 2.59 1.49 -0.22 0.88
Origin 44 24.72 4.57 2.32 4.95 2.63 0.39 1.73 1.95 2.36 2.75 2.63 0.80 1.82 2.61 1.26 2.20 1.46 -0.41 0.90
Not mentioned 52 29.21 3.67 1.29 4.21 1.83 0.54 1.71 1.23 1.26 2.13 1.46 0.90 1.49 2.44 1.36 2.08 1.36 -0.37 1.22
Total 178 100.00 4.12 1.87 4.93 2.56 0.81 1.92 1.47 1.69 2.59 2.24 1.12 1.87 2.65 1.40 2.34 1.45 -0.31 0.99
*:  IFRS8 first adoption
IAS 14 IFRS 8 ChangeChange
Countries
Number %
IAS 14
Geographic regions
IAS 14 IFRS 8 Change
Companies*
IFRS 8
Geographic locations 
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Appendix C. 12 The number of geographic locations / countries / regions disclosed under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 by different categorical company 
characteristics (N=155) 
 
N=155
Categories
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Industry
Basic Materials 15 9.68 5.47 2.70 7.67 3.77 2.20 3.19 2.07 2.43 4.27 3.65 2.20 3.03 3.40 2.13 3.40 1.88 0.00 1.07
Consumer Services 34 21.94 3.47 1.40 4.03 2.15 0.56 1.50 1.47 1.10 2.21 1.82 0.74 1.68 2.00 1.04 1.82 1.22 -0.18 0.76
Customer Goods 17 10.97 3.41 1.12 4.53 2.07 1.12 1.83 0.65 0.49 2.29 1.26 1.65 1.46 2.76 1.20 2.24 1.39 -0.53 1.28
Health Care 6 3.87 5.50 4.68 5.83 4.62 0.33 1.37 3.33 4.27 4.00 4.00 0.67 1.21 2.17 0.41 1.83 0.75 -0.33 0.52
Industrials 53 34.19 4.13 1.49 4.96 2.30 0.83 1.89 1.34 1.13 2.57 1.74 1.23 1.60 2.79 1.31 2.40 1.35 -0.40 1.03
Oil and Gas 8 5.16 4.00 1.07 4.75 1.67 0.75 1.58 1.25 1.58 3.63 1.60 2.38 2.33 2.75 1.28 1.13 0.35 -1.63 1.41
Technology 14 9.03 4.00 1.30 5.43 2.38 1.43 2.21 1.14 1.17 2.71 2.30 1.57 2.34 2.86 1.17 2.71 1.20 -0.14 0.77
Telecommunication 3 1.94 6.00 3.46 7.00 3.00 1.00 1.73 3.00 2.00 4.00 2.65 1.00 1.73 3.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 0.00 0.00
Utilities 5 3.23 3.20 1.30 3.80 2.49 0.60 1.52 1.40 0.55 2.40 1.14 1.00 1.41 1.80 1.48 1.40 1.52 -0.40 0.55
Total 155 100.00 4.08 1.89 5.04 2.68 0.96 1.97 1.45 1.56 2.77 2.19 1.32 1.90 2.63 1.37 2.27 1.42 -0.35 1.01
Auditor
Big4_A 50 32.26 3.96 1.44 4.90 2.16 0.94 1.68 1.46 1.36 2.74 1.77 1.28 1.76 2.50 1.23 2.16 1.27 -0.34 1.02
Big4_B 40 2.57 4.05 2.00 5.00 2.91 0.95 2.11 1.43 1.22 2.63 1.92 1.20 1.99 2.62 1.46 2.38 1.53 -0.25 0.93
Big4_C 38 24.52 4.63 2.36 5.32 3.09 0.68 2.03 1.55 2.01 2.76 2.50 1.21 1.74 3.08 1.28 2.55 1.45 -0.53 1.16
Big4_D 24 15.48 3.67 1.63 5.04 2.77 1.38 2.24 1.42 1.82 3.04 2.93 1.63 2.32 2.25 1.54 2.00 1.53 -0.25 0.90
Not Big4 3 1.94 2.67 0.58 4.33 2.52 1.67 2.08 0.67 0.58 3.00 2.00 2.33 2.08 2.00 1.00 1.33 0.58 -0.67 1.15
Total 155 100.00 4.08 1.89 5.04 2.68 0.96 1.97 1.45 1.56 2.77 2.19 1.32 1.90 2.63 1.37 2.27 1.42 -0.35 1.01
Single segment / Not
Not single segment company 149 96.13 4.05 1.67 4.98 2.51 0.93 1.86 1.38 1.33 2.68 1.97 1.30 1.82 2.67 1.34 2.30 1.41 -0.38 1.02
Single segment company 6 0.39 4.67 5.20 6.50 5.61 1.83 4.02 3.17 4.40 4.83 5.19 1.67 3.61 1.50 1.76 1.67 1.63 0.17 0.41
Total 155 100.00 4.08 1.89 5.04 2.68 0.96 1.97 1.45 1.56 2.77 2.19 1.32 1.90 2.63 1.37 2.27 1.42 -0.35 1.01
FTSE 100
FTSE 100 57 36.77 4.70 2.35 5.88 2.99 1.18 1.98 1.53 1.96 3.23 2.25 1.70 1.97 3.18 1.35 2.65 1.58 -0.53 1.07
FTSE 250 98 63.23 3.71 1.46 4.55 2.36 0.84 1.96 1.41 1.29 2.50 2.11 1.09 1.83 2.31 1.28 2.05 1.28 -0.26 0.97
Total 155 100.00 4.08 1.89 5.04 2.68 0.96 1.97 1.45 1.56 2.77 2.19 1.32 1.90 2.63 1.37 2.27 1.42 -0.35 1.01
Listing status
Cross listed 142 91.61 4.14 1.94 5.05 2.69 0.91 1.95 1.44 1.60 2.73 2.14 1.29 1.86 2.70 1.37 2.32 1.44 -0.38 1.05
Not cross listed 13 8.39 3.38 0.96 4.92 2.63 1.54 2.18 1.54 1.13 3.15 2.67 1.62 2.40 1.85 1.07 1.77 1.09 -0.08 0.28
Total 155 100.00 4.08 1.89 5.04 2.68 0.96 1.97 1.45 1.56 2.77 2.19 1.32 1.90 2.63 1.37 2.27 1.42 -0.35 1.01
US listing status
US listed 93 60.00 4.44 1.98 5.43 2.78 0.99 1.93 1.51 1.76 2.94 2.24 1.43 1.92 2.94 1.33 2.49 1.52 -0.44 1.07
Not US listed 62 40.00 3.53 1.61 4.45 2.43 0.92 2.04 1.37 1.23 2.52 2.10 1.15 1.87 2.16 1.31 1.94 1.20 -0.23 0.91
Total 155 100.00 4.08 1.89 5.04 2.68 0.96 1.97 1.45 1.56 2.77 2.19 1.32 1.90 2.63 1.37 2.27 1.42 -0.35 1.01
Early adopter
Early adopter 23 14.84 3.96 1.77 5.30 2.69 1.35 2.12 1.39 1.23 3.22 2.09 1.83 2.17 2.57 1.50 2.09 1.35 -0.48 1.16
Not early adopter 132 85.16 4.10 1.91 4.99 2.69 0.89 1.94 1.46 1.62 2.69 2.20 1.23 1.85 2.64 1.35 2.30 1.44 -0.33 0.99
Total 155 100.00 4.08 1.89 5.04 2.68 0.96 1.97 1.45 1.56 2.77 2.19 1.32 1.90 2.63 1.37 2.27 1.42 -0.35 1.01
Type of reporting segment
Business 87 56.13 4.28 2.07 5.44 2.91 1.16 2.12 1.52 1.86 3.10 2.52 1.59 2.09 2.76 1.28 2.33 1.34 -0.43 1.03
Geo 29 18.71 3.79 1.66 4.97 2.31 1.17 1.75 1.48 1.35 2.62 1.99 1.14 1.85 2.31 1.29 2.34 1.40 0.03 0.78
Mixed 39 25.16 3.85 1.58 4.21 2.23 0.36 1.66 1.28 0.83 2.13 1.15 0.85 1.35 2.56 1.60 2.08 1.61 -0.49 1.07
Total 155 9.95 4.08 1.89 5.04 2.68 0.96 1.97 1.45 1.56 2.77 2.19 1.32 1.90 2.63 1.37 2.27 1.42 -0.35 1.01
Geo disclosure under IFRS 8
Both reporting segm. & EWI _ diff 36 23.23 3.89 1.41 5.11 2.44 1.22 2.06 0.94 0.75 2.64 1.82 1.69 1.65 2.94 1.31 2.47 1.56 -0.47 1.16
Both reporting segm. & EWI _ same 4 2.58 3.50 2.38 5.00 2.94 1.50 1.73 1.25 0.96 2.50 1.00 1.25 1.89 2.25 2.87 2.50 2.65 0.25 0.50
Entity wide information 87 56.13 4.28 2.07 5.44 2.91 1.16 2.12 1.52 1.86 3.10 2.52 1.59 2.09 2.76 1.28 2.33 1.34 -0.43 1.03
Geo reporting segment 15 9.68 4.00 2.04 4.07 1.94 0.07 0.46 2.13 1.41 2.07 1.28 -0.07 0.59 1.87 1.30 2.00 1.31 0.13 0.35
Mixed reporting segment 13 8.39 3.54 1.45 3.31 1.44 -0.23 1.01 1.69 0.95 1.77 1.09 0.08 0.86 1.85 1.21 1.54 1.13 -0.31 0.95
Total 155 100.00 4.08 1.89 5.04 2.68 0.96 1.97 1.45 1.56 2.77 2.19 1.32 1.90 2.63 1.37 2.27 1.42 -0.35 1.01
Revenue attribution
Customer location 76 49.03 4.21 1.91 5.47 2.92 1.26 2.15 1.42 1.47 2.95 2.41 1.53 2.12 2.79 1.51 2.53 1.51 -0.26 0.85
Origin 35 22.58 4.57 2.38 5.11 2.77 0.54 1.88 1.91 2.15 2.94 2.56 1.03 1.95 2.66 1.16 2.17 1.38 -0.49 0.98
Not mentioned 44 28.39 3.45 1.13 4.23 1.94 0.77 0.64 1.14 1.03 2.32 1.25 1.18 1.40 2.32 1.24 1.91 1.22 -0.41 1.26
Total 155 100.00 4.08 1.89 5.04 2.68 0.96 1.97 1.45 1.56 2.77 2.19 1.32 1.90 2.63 1.37 2.27 1.42 -0.35 1.01
*:  IFRS8 first adoption
Number %
IAS 14 IFRS 8 Change IAS 14 IFRS 8 Change IAS 14 IFRS 8 Change
Geographic locations Countries Geographic regionsCompanies*
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Appendix C. 13 The effect of different company characteristics on the number of 
geographic locations, countries and regions reported by the companies 
 
 
 
  
Panel A
N=178
Categorical variables / Test IAS 14R IFRS 8 IAS 14R IFRS 8 IAS 14R IFRS 8
Identity of the auditor
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
Industry type
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO YES
non-parametric test YES NO YES NO YES YES
Early adoption
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
Cross listing
parametric test NO NO NO NO YES NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO YES NO
US listing
parametric test YES YES NO NO YES YES
non-parametric test YES YES NO NO YES YES
Type of reportable segment
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO YES NO NO NO NO
FTSE 100 / 250
parametric test YES YES NO NO YES YES
non-parametric test YES YES NO NO YES YES
Single segment
parametric test NO NO NO NO YES NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
Panel B
N=155
Categorical variables / Test IAS 14R IFRS 8 IAS 14R IFRS 8 IAS 14R IFRS 8
Identity of the auditor
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
Industry type
parametric test NO YES YES NO NO YES
non-parametric test NO YES YES NO YES YES
Early adoption
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
Cross listing
parametric test NO NO NO NO YES NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO YES NO
US listing
parametric test YES YES NO NO YES YES
non-parametric test YES YES NO NO YES YES
Type of reportable segment
parametric test NO NO NO YES NO NO
non-parametric test NO YES NO NO NO NO
FTSE 100 / 250
parametric test YES YES NO YES YES YES
non-parametric test YES YES NO YES YES YES
Single segment
parametric test NO NO NO NO YES NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO
Significant effect on dependent variable
Number of geo locations Number of countries Number of geo regions
Significant effect on dependent variable
Number of geo locations Number of countries Number of geo regions
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Appendix C. 14 Revenue distribution under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
 
 
 
  
Panel A
Revenue distribution
N=178 £m % £m %
Revenue by country 534,768 43.85 621,505 49.55
Revenue by continent 432,919 35.50 320,111 25.52
Revenue by multicontinent 150,058 12.31 76,189 6.08
Revenue by foreign & other / ROW 101,707 8.34 236,418 18.85
Total 1,219,453 100.00 1,254,223 100.00
Panel B
Revenue distribution
N=155 £m % £m %
Revenue by country 480,767 47.97 545,494 60.32
Revenue by continent 339,237 33.85 163,417 18.07
Revenue by multicontinent 84,135 8.39 44,399 4.91
Revenue by foreign & other / ROW 98,102 9.79 151,053 16.70
Total 1,002,241 100.00 904,362 100.00
IAS14 R IFRS8
IAS14 R IFRS8
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Appendix C. 15 The proportion of revenue reported by country / ROW under IAS 
14R and IFRS 8 
 
 
  
Panel A
number % number % number % number %
  0.00   -   10.00 48 26.97 48 26.97 19 10.67 19 10.67 37 23.87 37 23.87 7 4.52 7 4.52
10.01   -   20.00 19 10.67 67 37.64 10 5.62 29 16.29 18 11.61 55 35.48 10 6.45 17 10.97
20.01   -   30.00 14 7.87 81 45.51 13 7.30 42 23.60 12 7.74 67 43.23 11 7.10 28 18.06
30.01   -   40.00 9 5.06 90 50.56 10 5.62 52 29.21 8 5.16 75 48.39 10 6.45 38 24.52
40.01   -   50.00 11 6.18 101 56.74 19 10.67 71 39.89 11 7.10 86 55.48 18 11.61 56 36.13
50.01   -   60.00 12 6.74 113 63.48 12 6.74 83 46.63 12 7.74 98 63.23 11 7.10 67 43.23
60.01   -   70.00 12 6.74 125 70.22 18 10.11 101 56.74 11 7.10 109 70.32 18 11.61 85 54.84
70.01   -   80.00 10 5.62 135 75.84 18 10.11 119 66.85 10 6.45 119 76.77 18 11.61 103 66.45
80.01   -   90.00 10 5.62 145 81.46 21 11.80 140 78.65 9 5.81 128 82.58 20 12.90 123 79.35
90.01   - 100.00 33 18.54 178 100.00 38 21.35 178 100.00 27 17.42 155 100.00 32 20.65 155 100.00
Total 178 100.00 178 100.00 155 100.00 155 100.00
    0.00 40 22.47 12 6.74 29 18.71 0 0.00
100.00 14 7.87 13 7.30 11 7.10 9 5.81
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Std. Deviation
Increase
Decrease
No change
Total
Panel B
number % number % number % number %
  0.00   -   10.00 144 80.90 144 80.90 125 70.22 125 70.22 124 80.00 124 80.00 105 67.74 105 67.74
10.01   -   20.00 15 8.43 159 89.33 18 10.11 143 80.34 13 8.39 137 88.39 18 11.61 123 79.35
20.01   -   30.00 12 6.74 171 96.07 11 6.18 154 86.52 12 7.74 149 96.13 10 6.45 133 85.81
30.01   -   40.00 3 1.69 174 97.75 7 3.93 161 90.45 3 1.94 152 98.06 7 4.52 140 90.32
40.01   -   50.00 2 1.12 176 98.88 3 1.69 164 92.13 2 1.29 154 99.35 2 1.29 142 91.61
50.01   -   60.00 1 0.56 177 99.44 6 3.37 170 95.51 1 0.65 155 100.00 5 3.23 147 94.84
60.01   -   70.00 0 0.00 177 99.44 5 2.81 175 98.31 0 0.00 155 100.00 5 3.23 152 98.06
70.01   -   80.00 0 0.00 177 99.44 2 1.12 177 99.44 0 0.00 155 100.00 2 1.29 154 99.35
80.01   -   90.00 1 0.56 178 100.00 1 0.56 178 100.00 0 0.00 155 100.00 1 0.65 155 100.00
90.01   - 100.00 0 0.00 178 100.00 0 0.00 178 100.00 0 0.00 155 100.00 0 0.00 155 100.00
Total 178 100.00 178 100.00 155 100.00 155 100.00
    0.00 83 46.63 62 34.83 72 46.45 53 34.19
> 0.00 95 53.37 116 65.17 83 53.55 102 65.81
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Range
Std. Deviation
Increase
Decrease
No change
Total
N=155
IFRS 8
number
Company
%
%number
IAS 14 R IFRS 8
Company
cumulative
number % number
61.52
Revenue % by country
cumulative
28.82
%
cumulative
IAS 14 R
N=178
%
cumulative
Change in revenue %
provided by country
36.69
58.21
63.31
0.00
100.00
100.00
32.22
44.45
43.08
0.00
100.00
100.00
35.63
43.36
number
100.00
Company
number
38.51
0.00
67.49
1.19
100.00
98.81
98
%
63.23
100.00
178
56.74
31.46
11.80
100.00
%
155 100.00
101
49 31.61
8 5.16
number %
cumulative
56
21
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
84.93 88.48 58.98 88.48
%
6.25 11.36 6.22 12.00
0.40 2.94 0.77 2.98
Change in revenue %
provided by ROW
Company
number % number %
Revenue % by ROW
N=178 N=155
IAS 14 R IFRS 8 IAS 14 R IFRS 8
Company Company
number %
cumulative
number %
cumulative
number %
cumulative
84.93 88.48 58.98 88.48
11.49 18.58 10.33 19.09
85 47.75 76 49.03
34 19.10 28 18.06
59 33.15 51 32.90
178 100.00 155 100.00
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Appendix C. 16 The effect of different company characteristics on the revenue % 
reported by country and ROW 
 
 
  
Panel A
N=178
Categorical variables / Test IAS 14R IFRS 8 IAS 14R IFRS 8
Industry type
parametric test YES NO NO NO
non-parametric test YES NO NO NO
Identity of the auditor
parametric test NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO
Single segment
parametric test NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO
FTSE 100 / 250
parametric test YES NO NO NO
non-parametric test YES NO NO NO
Cross listing
parametric test NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO
US listing
parametric test YES NO NO NO
non-parametric test YES NO NO NO
Early adoption
parametric test NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO
Type of reportable segment
parametric test NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO YES YES
Geo disclosure under IFRS 8
parametric test YES NO NO NO
non-parametric test YES NO NO NO
Revenue attribution
parametric test NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO
Panel B
N=155
Categorical variables / Test IAS 14R IFRS 8 IAS 14R IFRS 8
Industry type
parametric test YES YES NO NO
non-parametric test YES YES NO NO
Identity of the auditor
parametric test NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO
Single segment
parametric test NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO
FTSE 100 / 250
parametric test NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO
Cross listing
parametric test NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO
US listing
parametric test YES NO NO NO
non-parametric test YES NO NO NO
Early adoption
parametric test NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO
Type of reportable segment
parametric test NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO
Geo disclosure under IFRS 8
parametric test YES NO NO NO
non-parametric test YES NO NO NO
Revenue attribution
parametric test NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO
revenue % by country revenue % by ROW
Significant effect on dependent variable
revenue % by country revenue % by ROW
Significant effect on dependent variable
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Appendix C. 17 Paired sample t-test for the proportion of revenue reported by 
country  
 
 
N=178 
 
 
 
 
N=155 
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Appendix C. 18 Paired sample t-test for the proportion of revenue reported by ROW 
 
 
N=178 
 
 
 
 
N=155 
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Appendix C. 19 The proportion of revenue reported by country / ROW by different 
categorical company characteristic (N=178) 
 
 
 
N=178
Categories
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Industry
Basic Materials 20 11.24 46.12 39.13 48.42 34.86 2.97 6.13 5.53 16.24
Consumer Services 36 20.22 57.15 35.05 66.39 29.14 8.51 16.30 11.58 17.37
Customer Goods 18 10.11 35.70 40.68 58.27 31.14 6.24 9.63 14.89 21.94
Health Care 7 3.93 53.45 27.57 59.01 32.99 9.43 10.55 15.11 20.21
Industrials 56 31.46 37.00 32.48 54.63 29.88 6.37 11.67 13.03 21.55
Oil and Gas 15 8.43 46.09 44.81 68.83 36.32 5.40 9.05 14.08 18.23
Technology 17 9.55 21.70 29.24 45.53 35.57 6.89 10.33 8.78 12.63
Telecommunication 4 2.25 52.82 35.66 55.52 38.31 1.83 3.33 5.48 7.27
Utilities 5 2.81 75.63 35.85 90.80 14.73 1.03 1.45 1.75 2.61
Total 178 100.00 43.36 36.69 58.21 32.22 6.25 11.49 11.36 18.58
Auditor
Big4_A 57 32.02 41.04 36.58 57.49 31.86 8.03 14.31 12.84 18.88
Big4_B 47 26.40 43.35 36.14 54.91 32.93 5.60 9.67 11.19 17.28
Big4_C 42 23.60 36.07 32.57 54.27 31.60 5.22 10.63 12.68 22.72
Big4_D 29 16.29 58.91 40.91 69.42 32.77 4.08 7.56 5.58 10.93
Not Big4 3 1.69 39.53 40.32 70.61 18.55 17.77 17.01 23.23 25.55
Total 178 100.00 43.36 36.69 58.21 32.22 6.25 11.49 11.36 18.58
Single segment / Not
Not single segment company 172 96.63 42.55 36.20 57.92 31.77 6.22 11.43 11.54 18.81
Single segment company 6 3.37 66.57 46.46 66.61 46.11 7.05 14.22 6.18 9.64
Total 178 100.00 43.36 36.69 58.21 32.22 6.25 11.49 11.36 18.58
FTSE 100
FTSE 100 66 37.08 36.05 33.94 56.06 30.24 7.70 13.21 12.06 17.24
FTSE 250 112 62.92 47.67 37.70 59.48 33.39 5.39 10.31 10.94 19.39
Total 178 100.00 43.36 36.69 58.21 32.22 6.25 11.49 11.36 18.58
Listing status
Cross listed 164 92.13 42.84 36.42 57.50 31.94 6.42 11.52 11.76 18.93
Not cross listed 14 7.87 49.46 40.65 66.53 35.51 4.24 11.32 6.67 13.46
Total 178 9.96 43.36 36.69 58.21 32.22 6.25 11.49 11.36 18.58
US listing status
US listed 109 61.24 38.72 35.27 57.26 31.47 6.49 12.10 12.06 18.49
Not US listed 69 38.76 50.69 37.92 59.72 33.55 5.86 10.52 10.25 18.81
Total 178 100.00 43.36 36.69 58.21 32.22 6.25 11.49 11.36 18.58
Early adopter
Early adopter 27 15.17 43.30 37.63 62.46 32.38 3.88 6.57 12.03 19.53
Not early adopter 151 8.45 43.37 36.64 57.45 32.24 6.67 12.13 11.24 18.47
Total 178 100.00 43.36 36.69 58.21 32.22 6.25 11.49 11.36 18.58
Type of reporting segment
Business 98 55.06 39.81 37.68 57.78 32.13 7.08 12.75 11.39 17.29
Geo 37 20.79 47.80 37.14 58.73 33.73 4.45 10.69 6.08 13.71
Mixed 43 24.16 47.64 33.84 58.76 31.84 5.89 8.85 15.83 23.63
Total 178 100.00 43.36 36.69 58.21 32.22 6.25 11.49 11.36 18.58
Geo disclosure under IFRS8
Both reporting segm. & EWI_diff. 36 20.22 33.16 28.72 58.19 28.32 4.93 8.82 15.19 24.53
Both reporting segm. & EWI_same 4 2.25 55.67 52.02 68.25 36.84 3.29 6.58 3.65 7.29
Entity wide information 98 55.06 39.81 37.68 57.78 32.13 7.08 12.75 11.39 17.29
Geo reporting segment 23 12.92 62.00 35.44 59.23 36.00 4.74 10.98 3.38 6.42
Mixed reporting segment 17 9.55 57.33 34.45 57.03 37.45 6.98 10.80 15.69 21.56
Total 178 100.00 43.36 36.69 58.21 32.22 6.25 11.49 11.36 18.58
Revenue attribution
Customer location 82 46.07 41.02 36.74 57.56 31.32 6.89 12.47 8.77 12.88
Origin 44 24.72 47.25 34.94 61.04 33.65 6.71 11.88 11.10 18.60
Not mentioned 52 29.21 43.76 38.41 56.85 32.87 4.84 9.43 15.67 24.77
Total 178 100.00 43.36 36.69 58.21 32.22 6.25 11.49 11.36 18.58
*:  IFRS8 first adoption
Companies* Revenue % by country Revenue % by ROW
Number %
IAS 14 R IFRS 8 IAS 14 R IFRS 8
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Appendix C. 20 The proportion of revenue reported by country / ROW by different 
categorical company characteristic (N=155) 
 
 
 
 
 
N=155
Categories
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Industry
Basic Materials 15 8.43 40.38 36.74 47.03 32.96 3.31 6.96 6.48 18.78
Consumer Services 34 19.10 58.48 34.60 68.58 27.57 6.50 9.93 12.05 17.77
Customer Goods 17 9.55 37.80 40.92 61.70 28.38 6.61 9.79 15.76 22.29
Health Care 6 3.37 58.75 25.99 68.85 22.22 10.54 11.11 17.37 21.15
Industrials 53 29.78 38.83 32.40 57.72 27.61 6.50 11.97 12.58 21.23
Oil and Gas 8 4.49 35.52 42.19 76.30 18.77 7.95 10.52 23.10 19.51
Technology 14 7.87 26.35 30.34 49.34 33.37 7.38 10.97 7.44 10.63
Telecommunication 3 1.69 70.43 6.84 74.00 12.11 0.16 0.28 5.36 8.90
Utilities 5 2.81 75.63 35.85 90.80 14.73 1.03 1.45 1.75 2.61
Total 155 87.08 44.45 35.63 61.52 28.82 6.22 10.33 12.00 19.09
Auditor
Big4_A 50 28.09 46.01 36.22 65.10 25.90 6.92 10.36 12.03 18.42
Big4_B 40 22.47 43.66 34.67 58.06 29.24 6.33 10.27 12.87 18.22
Big4_C 38 21.35 37.24 30.96 55.16 29.44 5.63 11.09 13.70 23.67
Big4_D 24 13.48 54.55 42.22 68.76 32.81 4.04 7.72 6.37 11.87
Not Big4 3 1.69 39.53 40.32 70.61 18.54 17.77 17.01 23.23 25.55
Total 155 87.08 44.45 35.63 61.52 28.82 6.22 10.33 12.00 19.09
Single segment / Not
Not single segment company 149 83.71 43.56 35.03 61.31 28.13 6.18 10.20 12.23 19.36
Single segment company 6 3.37 66.57 46.46 66.61 46.11 7.05 14.22 6.18 9.64
Total 155 87.08 44.45 35.63 61.52 28.82 6.22 10.33 12.00 19.09
FTSE 100
FTSE 100 98 55.06 48.49 36.23 61.47 30.49 6.78 9.43 12.18 17.17
FTSE 250 57 32.02 37.49 33.76 61.61 25.96 5.89 10.84 11.89 20.21
Total 155 87.08 44.45 35.63 61.52 28.82 6.22 10.33 12.00 19.09
Listing status
Cross listed 142 79.78 43.64 35.29 60.59 28.54 6.37 10.22 12.44 19.48
Not cross listed 13 7.30 53.26 39.63 71.65 31.13 4.57 11.71 7.18 13.87
Total 155 87.08 44.45 35.63 61.52 28.82 6.22 10.33 12.00 19.09
US listing status
US listed 93 52.25 39.49 33.78 60.34 27.19 6.12 9.94 12.58 18.79
Not US listed 62 34.83 51.89 37.29 63.29 31.24 6.36 10.96 11.12 19.65
Total 155 87.08 44.45 35.63 61.52 28.82 6.22 10.33 12.00 19.09
Early adopter
Early adopter 23 12.92 45.23 38.43 68.02 26.71 3.43 6.45 12.60 20.69
Not early adopter 132 74.16 44.31 35.27 60.39 29.12 6.70 10.81 11.89 18.88
Total 155 87.08 44.45 35.63 61.52 28.82 6.22 10.33 12.00 19.09
Type of reporting segment
Business 87 48.88 42.22 37.58 61.96 29.25 6.58 10.38 12.17 18.04
Geo 29 16.29 44.81 33.39 59.16 29.21 5.67 11.83 7.59 15.18
Mixed 39 21.91 49.14 33.07 62.29 28.20 5.80 9.19 14.88 23.40
Total 155 87.08 44.45 35.63 61.52 28.82 6.22 10.33 12.00 19.09
Geo disclosure under IFRS8
Both reporting segm. & EWI_diff. 36 23.23 33.16 28.72 58.19 28.32 4.93 8.82 15.19 24.53
Both reporting segm. & EWI_same 4 2.58 55.67 52.02 68.25 36.84 3.29 6.58 3.65 7.29
Entity wide information 87 56.13 42.22 37.58 61.96 29.25 6.58 10.38 12.17 18.04
Geo reporting segment 15 9.68 63.80 27.05 60.34 28.55 7.24 13.05 4.86 7.56
Mixed reporting segment 13 8.39 64.82 29.32 67.07 28.49 7.04 12.22 12.79 19.80
Total 155 100.00 44.45 35.63 61.52 28.82 6.22 10.33 12.00 19.09
Revenue attribution
Customer location 76 49.03 42.16 36.39 59.72 30.15 6.22 9.15 9.17 13.28
Origin 35 22.58 47.60 31.49 64.58 27.74 7.38 12.86 12.52 19.67
Not mentioned 44 28.39 45.89 37.87 62.20 27.69 5.28 10.14 16.45 25.63
Total 155 100.00 44.45 35.63 61.52 28.82 6.22 10.33 12.00 19.09
*:  IFRS8 first adoption
Companies* Revenue % by country
Number %
IAS 14 R IFRS 8
Revenue % by ROW
IAS 14 R IFRS 8
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Appendix C. 21 Change in fineness scores 
 
 
 
 
IAS 14 R IAS 14 R restated IAS 14 R IAS 14 R restated IAS 14 R IAS 14 R restated
Mean 2.16 2.28 2.59 2.87 4.33 5.22
Standard Deviation 0.62 0.61 0.96 0.90 2.40 2.15
Increase 70 39.33% 74 41.57% 81 45.51%
Decrease 32 17.98% 28 15.73% 21 11.80%
No change 76 42.70% 76 42.70% 76 42.70%
Total 178 100.00% 178 100.00% 178 100.00%
Mean 2.17 2.31 2.61 2.93 4.39 5.41
Standard Deviation 0.60 0.59 0.94 0.85 2.34 1.96
Increase 66 42.58% 70 45.16% 77 49.68%
Decrease 27 17.42% 23 14.84% 16 10.32%
No change 62 40.00% 62 40.00% 62 40.00%
Total 155 100.00% 155 100.00% 155 100.00%
-0.09 -0.38
Change in fineness (number & % of companies)
-0.01
Change in fineness (number & % of companies)
Fineness 
-0.01
Change
0.28
-0.06
N=178
N=155
0.14
Change
0.89
Country weight = 3 Country weight = 4 Country weight = 8
0.32 1.02
-0.25
Statistics
Change
0.12
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Appendix C. 22 Paired sample t-test for fineness scores 
N=178 
 
N=155 
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Appendix C. 23 Fineness scores by different categorical company characteristics (N=178) 
 
N=178
Categories
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Industry
Basic Materials 20 11.24 2.30 0.58 2.24 0.67 2.21 0.68 2.76 0.96 2.72 0.98 2.68 0.99 4.60 2.51 4.66 2.34 4.55 2.33
Consumer Services 36 20.22 2.29 0.69 2.40 0.55 2.42 0.55 2.86 1.02 3.07 0.81 3.09 0.81 5.15 2.40 5.72 1.94 5.78 1.94
Customer Goods 18 10.11 2.01 0.67 2.20 0.64 2.21 0.64 2.36 1.06 2.78 0.91 2.80 0.91 3.79 2.67 5.11 2.11 5.15 2.10
Health Care 7 3.93 2.24 0.54 2.23 0.58 2.25 0.54 2.78 0.78 2.82 0.85 2.85 0.81 4.91 1.86 5.18 2.11 5.24 2.06
Industrials 56 31.46 2.09 0.55 2.19 0.63 2.20 0.64 2.46 0.84 2.74 0.88 2.75 0.90 3.94 2.11 4.92 2.03 4.95 2.05
Oil and Gas 15 8.43 2.14 0.69 2.35 0.65 2.42 0.60 2.60 1.12 3.04 0.99 3.13 0.94 4.45 2.89 5.79 2.41 5.97 2.35
Technology 17 9.55 1.86 0.62 2.10 0.68 2.13 0.63 2.08 0.87 2.55 1.01 2.59 0.95 2.94 2.00 4.37 2.41 4.44 2.32
Telecommunication 4 2.25 2.36 0.47 2.30 0.41 2.33 0.44 2.88 0.82 2.85 0.79 2.90 0.83 5.00 2.24 5.07 2.32 5.19 2.40
Utilities 5 2.81 2.74 0.35 2.87 0.14 2.88 0.14 3.49 0.71 3.78 0.29 3.80 0.27 6.52 2.14 7.41 0.87 7.46 0.82
Total 178 100.00 2.16 0.62 2.27 0.62 2.28 0.61 2.59 0.96 2.85 0.90 2.87 0.90 4.33 2.40 5.18 2.15 5.22 2.15
Auditor
Big4_A 57 32.02 2.09 0.65 2.23 0.64 2.26 0.62 2.50 1.00 2.81 0.93 2.84 0.90 4.14 2.43 5.11 2.17 5.15 2.14
Big4_B 47 26.40 2.19 0.60 2.26 0.58 2.29 0.58 2.63 0.94 2.80 0.87 2.85 0.88 4.36 2.35 5.00 2.15 5.09 2.17
Big4_C 42 23.60 2.11 0.53 2.18 0.66 2.18 0.67 2.47 0.82 2.72 0.93 2.72 0.95 3.91 2.10 4.89 2.14 4.90 2.15
Big4_D 29 16.29 2.35 0.68 2.49 0.53 2.49 0.53 2.94 1.08 3.18 0.84 3.18 0.84 5.29 2.70 5.96 2.13 5.96 2.13
Not Big4 3 1.69 1.71 0.71 2.24 0.69 2.21 0.71 2.10 1.11 2.95 0.87 2.90 0.90 3.68 2.72 5.77 1.60 5.68 1.65
Total 178 100.00 2.16 0.62 2.27 0.62 2.28 0.61 2.59 0.96 2.85 0.90 2.87 0.90 4.33 2.40 5.18 2.15 5.22 2.15
Single segment / Not
Not single segment company 172 96.63 2.15 0.61 2.26 0.61 2.28 0.60 2.57 0.95 2.84 0.89 2.86 0.89 4.28 2.37 5.16 2.12 5.20 2.12
Single segment company 6 3.37 2.39 0.95 2.40 0.88 2.40 0.85 3.05 1.40 3.06 1.33 3.09 1.28 5.72 3.24 5.73 3.16 5.82 2.99
Total 178 100.00 2.16 0.62 2.27 0.62 2.28 0.61 2.59 0.96 2.85 0.90 2.87 0.90 4.33 2.40 5.18 2.15 5.22 2.15
FTSE 100
FTSE 100 66 37.08 2.02 0.61 2.23 0.57 2.24 0.54 2.39 0.92 2.79 0.83 2.80 0.81 3.83 2.25 5.03 2.00 5.05 1.96
FTSE 250 112 62.92 2.24 0.61 2.29 0.64 2.31 0.65 2.71 0.97 2.88 0.94 2.91 0.95 4.62 2.45 5.26 2.24 5.31 2.26
Total 178 100.00 2.16 0.62 2.27 0.62 2.28 0.61 2.59 0.96 2.85 0.90 2.87 0.90 4.33 2.40 5.18 2.15 5.22 2.15
Listing status
Cross listed 164 92.13 2.14 0.62 2.25 0.62 2.26 0.61 2.57 0.96 2.82 0.90 2.84 0.90 4.29 2.39 5.12 2.14 5.17 2.14
Not cross listed 14 7.87 2.31 0.65 2.52 0.52 2.52 0.53 2.80 1.03 3.18 0.85 3.18 0.87 4.78 2.63 5.84 2.25 5.83 2.28
Total 178 100.00 2.16 0.62 2.27 0.62 2.28 0.61 2.59 0.96 2.85 0.90 2.87 0.90 4.33 2.40 5.18 2.15 5.22 2.15
US listing status
US listed 109 61.24 2.09 0.61 2.24 0.62 2.26 0.60 2.48 0.94 2.81 0.90 2.84 0.88 4.03 2.32 5.10 2.12 5.15 2.10
Not US listed 69 38.76 2.26 0.63 2.32 0.62 2.32 0.63 2.77 0.98 2.91 0.91 2.92 0.93 4.79 2.48 5.30 2.21 5.32 2.25
Total 178 100.00 2.16 0.62 2.27 0.62 2.28 0.61 2.59 0.96 2.85 0.90 2.87 0.90 4.33 2.40 5.18 2.15 5.22 2.15
Early adopter
Early adopter 27 15.17 2.20 0.62 2.32 0.62 2.35 0.60 2.63 0.97 2.95 0.90 2.99 0.88 4.37 2.46 5.45 2.16 5.54 2.12
Not early adopter 151 84.83 2.15 0.62 2.26 0.62 2.27 0.61 2.58 0.96 2.83 0.90 2.85 0.90 4.32 2.40 5.13 2.15 5.16 2.16
Total 178 100.00 2.16 0.62 2.27 0.62 2.28 0.61 2.59 0.96 2.85 0.90 2.87 0.90 4.33 2.40 5.18 2.15 5.22 2.15
Type of reporting segment
Business 98 55.06 2.08 0.65 2.26 0.58 2.26 0.59 2.48 1.00 2.84 0.87 2.84 0.87 4.07 2.48 5.15 2.11 5.15 2.11
Geo 37 20.79 2.23 0.62 2.34 0.58 2.38 0.58 2.71 0.96 2.93 0.89 2.99 0.89 4.62 2.42 5.27 2.21 5.41 2.23
Mixed 43 24.16 2.27 0.53 2.23 0.72 2.25 0.69 2.75 0.85 2.81 1.00 2.84 0.97 4.65 2.19 5.16 2.23 5.21 2.21
Total 178 100.00 2.16 0.62 2.27 0.62 2.28 0.61 2.59 0.96 2.85 0.90 2.87 0.90 4.33 2.40 5.18 2.15 5.22 2.15
Geo disclosure under IFRS 8
Both reporting segm. & EWI _ diff 36 20.22 2.04 0.57 2.17 0.71 2.20 0.70 2.37 0.84 2.75 0.96 2.79 0.96 3.70 1.96 5.08 2.06 5.15 2.08
Both reporting segm. & EWI _ same 4 2.25 2.45 0.66 2.56 0.49 2.59 0.48 3.00 1.18 3.25 0.85 3.28 0.85 5.23 3.26 5.98 2.31 6.07 2.35
Entity wide information 98 55.06 2.08 0.65 2.26 0.58 2.26 0.59 2.48 1.00 2.84 0.87 2.84 0.87 4.07 2.48 5.15 2.11 5.15 2.11
Geo reporting segment 23 12.92 2.44 0.51 2.44 0.49 2.47 0.49 3.06 0.84 3.03 0.83 3.08 0.83 5.54 2.23 5.40 2.26 5.52 2.24
Mixed reporting segment 17 9.55 2.40 0.51 2.23 0.76 2.27 0.69 2.97 0.84 2.80 1.10 2.84 1.04 5.26 2.20 5.08 2.56 5.14 2.53
Total 178 100.00 2.16 0.62 2.27 0.62 2.28 0.61 2.59 0.96 2.85 0.90 2.87 0.90 4.33 2.40 5.18 2.15 5.22 2.15
Revenue attribution
Customer location 82 46.07 2.14 0.62 2.30 0.53 2.31 0.52 2.55 0.96 2.87 0.82 2.89 0.81 4.19 2.40 5.17 2.04 5.19 2.03
Origin 44 24.72 2.20 0.61 2.31 0.62 2.34 0.60 2.67 0.93 2.92 0.92 2.95 0.90 4.56 2.30 5.36 2.23 5.42 2.20
Not mentioned 52 29.21 2.16 0.64 2.19 0.73 2.20 0.74 2.59 1.00 2.76 1.02 2.78 1.03 4.35 2.52 5.03 2.28 5.08 2.31
Total 178 100.00 2.16 0.62 2.27 0.62 2.28 0.61 2.59 0.96 2.85 0.90 2.87 0.90 4.33 2.40 5.18 2.15 5.22 2.15
*:  IFRS8 first adoption
Companies* Country weight = 3 Country weight = 4 Country weight = 8
Number
Restated IAS14R
%
IAS 14R IFRS 8 Restated IAS14R IAS 14R IFRS 8 Restated IAS14R IAS 14R IFRS 8
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Appendix C. 24 Fineness scores by different categorical characteristics (N=155) 
 
N=155
Categories
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Industry
Basic Materials 15 9.68 2.26 0.49 2.22 0.65 2.20 0.65 2.66 0.86 2.69 0.94 2.65 0.93 4.28 2.32 4.57 2.21 4.46 2.17
Consumer Services 34 21.94 2.34 0.62 2.42 0.56 2.43 0.55 2.92 0.95 3.10 0.81 3.12 0.80 5.26 2.32 5.85 1.88 5.88 1.87
Customer Goods 17 10.97 2.01 0.69 2.21 0.66 2.22 0.66 2.38 1.09 2.83 0.92 2.85 0.91 3.90 2.72 5.29 2.02 5.33 2.01
Health Care 6 3.87 2.25 0.59 2.27 0.62 2.29 0.58 2.84 0.84 2.96 0.84 2.99 0.78 5.19 1.87 5.71 1.71 5.78 1.62
Industrials 53 34.19 2.12 0.54 2.25 0.59 2.26 0.61 2.50 0.84 2.83 0.82 2.84 0.84 4.06 2.10 5.14 1.87 5.16 1.90
Oil and Gas 8 5.16 1.92 0.68 2.30 0.58 2.41 0.50 2.28 1.08 3.06 0.76 3.21 0.67 3.70 2.75 6.12 1.52 6.42 1.32
Technology 14 9.03 1.88 0.67 2.14 0.65 2.15 0.64 2.14 0.94 2.64 0.97 2.65 0.94 3.20 2.12 4.61 2.28 4.66 2.20
Telecommunication 3 1.94 2.59 0.08 2.50 0.06 2.55 0.03 3.29 0.10 3.24 0.18 3.31 0.13 6.11 0.35 6.20 0.67 6.37 0.53
Utilities 5 3.23 2.74 0.35 2.87 0.14 2.88 0.14 3.49 0.71 3.78 0.29 3.80 0.27 6.52 2.14 7.41 0.87 7.46 0.82
Total 155 100.00 2.17 0.60 2.30 0.59 2.31 0.59 2.61 0.94 2.91 0.85 2.93 0.85 4.39 2.34 5.37 1.96 5.41 1.96
Auditor
Big4_A 50 32.26 2.19 0.60 2.36 0.56 2.38 0.54 2.65 0.94 3.01 0.79 3.03 0.77 4.49 2.38 5.61 1.79 5.65 1.77
Big4_B 40 25.81 2.18 0.60 2.27 0.58 2.30 0.57 2.62 0.92 2.85 0.83 2.89 0.83 4.36 2.28 5.17 1.96 5.26 1.98
Big4_C 38 24.52 2.10 0.53 2.16 0.66 2.16 0.68 2.48 0.81 2.71 0.92 2.71 0.94 3.97 2.02 4.92 2.05 4.92 2.06
Big4_D 24 15.48 2.27 0.72 2.45 0.56 2.45 0.55 2.82 1.13 3.13 0.86 3.14 0.85 5.00 2.80 5.88 2.15 5.91 2.13
Not Big4 3 1.94 1.71 0.71 2.24 0.69 2.21 0.71 2.10 1.11 2.95 0.87 2.90 0.90 3.68 2.72 5.77 1.60 5.68 1.65
Total 155 100.00 2.17 0.60 2.30 0.59 2.31 0.59 2.61 0.94 2.91 0.85 2.93 0.85 4.39 2.34 5.37 1.96 5.41 1.96
Single segment / Not
Not single segment company 149 96.13 2.16 0.59 2.29 0.58 2.31 0.58 2.60 0.92 2.91 0.83 2.92 0.83 4.34 2.29 5.36 1.91 5.40 1.92
Single segment company 6 3.87 2.39 0.95 2.40 0.88 2.40 0.85 3.05 1.40 3.06 1.33 3.09 1.28 5.72 3.24 5.73 3.16 5.82 2.99
Total 155 100.00 2.17 0.60 2.30 0.59 2.31 0.59 2.61 0.94 2.91 0.85 2.93 0.85 4.39 2.34 5.37 1.96 5.41 1.96
FTSE 100
FTSE 100 57 36.77 2.06 0.59 2.29 0.52 2.31 0.50 2.43 0.90 2.91 0.75 2.93 0.72 3.93 2.23 5.37 1.75 5.40 1.70
FTSE 250 98 63.23 2.24 0.61 2.30 0.63 2.31 0.64 2.72 0.95 2.92 0.90 2.93 0.92 4.66 2.37 5.37 2.08 5.42 2.11
Total 155 100.00 2.17 0.60 2.30 0.59 2.31 0.59 2.61 0.94 2.91 0.85 2.93 0.85 4.39 2.34 5.37 1.96 5.41 1.96
Listing status
Cross listed 142 91.61 2.15 0.60 2.27 0.59 2.29 0.60 2.59 0.93 2.88 0.84 2.90 0.85 4.34 2.31 5.30 1.94 5.35 1.94
Not cross listed 13 8.39 2.33 0.67 2.56 0.52 2.55 0.53 2.87 1.04 3.27 0.81 3.27 0.83 5.00 2.61 6.14 2.04 6.12 2.08
Total 155 100.00 2.17 0.60 2.30 0.59 2.31 0.59 2.61 0.94 2.91 0.85 2.93 0.85 4.39 2.34 5.37 1.96 5.41 1.96
US listing status
US listed 93 60.00 2.11 0.58 2.27 0.57 2.29 0.56 2.50 0.89 2.87 0.81 2.90 0.80 4.08 2.22 5.29 1.86 5.34 1.85
Not US listed 62 40.00 2.26 0.63 2.34 0.62 2.34 0.64 2.78 0.98 2.97 0.90 2.98 0.92 4.86 2.45 5.51 2.11 5.52 2.13
Total 155 100.00 2.17 0.60 2.30 0.59 2.31 0.59 2.61 0.94 2.91 0.85 2.93 0.85 4.39 2.34 5.37 1.96 5.41 1.96
Early adopter
Early adopter 23 14.84 2.23 0.65 2.37 0.61 2.40 0.59 2.68 1.02 3.05 0.85 3.09 0.82 4.49 2.53 5.77 1.88 5.87 1.83
Not early adopter 132 85.16 2.16 0.60 2.28 0.59 2.29 0.59 2.60 0.93 2.89 0.85 2.90 0.85 4.37 2.31 5.30 1.97 5.33 1.98
Total 155 100.00 2.17 0.60 2.30 0.59 2.31 0.59 2.61 0.94 2.91 0.85 2.93 0.85 4.39 2.34 5.37 1.96 5.41 1.96
Type of reporting segment
Business 87 56.13 2.12 0.63 2.30 0.60 2.30 0.58 2.54 0.99 2.92 0.83 2.92 0.83 4.23 2.47 5.40 1.96 5.40 1.95
Geo 29 18.71 2.16 0.60 2.30 0.56 2.35 0.57 2.61 0.90 2.90 0.83 2.96 0.84 4.40 2.21 5.26 1.97 5.41 2.00
Mixed 39 25.16 2.29 0.53 2.28 0.67 2.30 0.66 2.78 0.84 2.91 0.92 2.93 0.91 4.75 2.15 5.40 2.01 5.44 2.00
Total 155 100.00 2.17 0.60 2.30 0.59 2.31 0.59 2.61 0.94 2.91 0.85 2.93 0.85 4.39 2.34 5.37 1.96 5.41 1.96
Geo disclosure under IFRS 8
Both reporting segm. & EWI _ diff 36 23.23 2.04 0.57 2.17 0.71 2.20 0.70 2.37 0.84 2.75 0.96 2.79 0.96 3.70 1.96 5.08 2.06 5.15 2.08
Both reporting segm. & EWI _ same 4 2.58 2.45 0.66 2.56 0.49 2.59 0.48 3.00 1.18 3.25 0.85 3.28 0.85 5.23 3.26 5.98 2.31 6.07 2.35
Entity wide information 87 56.13 2.12 0.63 2.30 0.57 2.30 0.58 2.54 0.99 2.92 0.83 2.92 0.83 4.23 2.47 5.40 1.96 5.40 1.95
Geo reporting segment 15 9.68 2.41 0.45 2.42 0.40 2.45 0.40 3.05 0.69 3.02 0.67 3.08 0.66 5.06 1.75 5.44 1.80 5.57 1.76
Mixed reporting segment 13 8.39 2.49 0.46 2.40 0.60 2.42 0.59 3.14 0.73 3.07 0.86 3.09 0.85 5.73 1.88 5.76 1.96 5.80 1.97
Total 155 100.00 2.17 0.60 2.30 0.59 2.31 0.59 2.61 0.94 2.91 0.85 2.93 0.85 4.39 2.34 5.37 1.96 5.41 1.96
Revenue attribution
Customer location 76 49.03 2.16 0.58 2.32 0.53 2.33 0.52 2.58 0.93 2.91 0.80 2.93 0.79 4.27 2.36 5.30 1.98 5.32 1.96
Origin 35 22.58 2.17 0.61 2.31 0.60 2.33 0.59 2.65 0.91 2.96 0.85 2.98 0.84 4.55 2.14 5.54 1.92 5.59 1.91
Not mentioned 44 28.39 2.18 0.64 2.26 0.70 2.26 0.72 2.64 1.00 2.88 0.93 2.90 0.97 4.47 2.49 5.37 1.99 5.42 2.04
Total 155 100.00 2.17 0.60 2.30 0.59 2.31 0.59 2.61 0.94 2.91 0.85 2.93 0.85 4.39 2.34 5.37 1.96 5.41 1.96
*:  IFRS8 first adoption
Companies* Country weight = 3 Country weight = 4 Country weight = 8
Number %
IAS 14R IFRS 8 Restated IAS14R IAS 14R IFRS 8 Restated IAS14R IAS 14R IFRS 8 Restated IAS14R
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Appendix C. 25 The effect of different company characteristics on fineness scores 
 
 
 
 
Panel A
N=178
Categorical variables / Test IAS 14R IFRS 8 IAS 14R restated IAS 14R IFRS 8 IAS 14R restated IAS 14R IFRS 8 IAS 14R restated
Identity of the auditor
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Industry type
parametric test NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO YES
Early adoption
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Cross listing
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
US listing
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO
Type of reportable segment
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
FTSE 100 / 250
parametric test YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO
non-parametric test YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO NO
Single segment
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Panel B
N=155
Categorical variables / Test IAS 14R IFRS 8 IAS 14R restated IAS 14R IFRS 8 IAS 14R restated IAS 14R IFRS 8 IAS 14R restated
Identity of the auditor
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Industry type
parametric test NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO YES
non-parametric test NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO YES
Early adoption
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Cross listing
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
US listing
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO
Type of reportable segment
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
FTSE 100 / 250
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Single segment
parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
non-parametric test NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Significant effect on fineness score
Country weight = 3 Country weight = 4 Country weight = 8
Significant effect on fineness score
Country weight = 3 Country weight = 4 Country weight = 8
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Appendix C. 26 Number of items disclosed by country under IFRS 8 by different 
categorical company characteristics 
 
Categories Number % Mean Std. Dev.
Industry
Basic Materials 15 9.68 2.40 0.74
Consumer Services 34 21.94 5.32 3.69
Customer Goods 17 10.97 3.35 2.50
Health Care 6 3.87 3.83 3.31
Industrials 53 34.19 3.42 2.48
Oil and Gas 8 5.16 3.50 2.39
Technology 14 9.03 3.93 2.87
Telecommunication 3 1.94 4.00 3.46
Utilities 5 3.23 2.40 1.52
Total 155 100.00 3.77 2.84
Significant
*
 effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
Auditor
Big4_A 50 32.26 4.34 3.17
Big4_B 40 25.81 3.93 2.89
Big4_C 38 24.52 3.13 2.34
Big4_D 24 15.48 3.54 2.83
Not Big4 3 1.94 2.33 0.58
Total 155 100.00 3.77 2.84
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
Single segment / Not
Not single segment company 149 96.13 3.78 2.84
Single segment company 6 3.87 3.67 3.14
Total 155 100.00 3.77 2.84
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
FTSE 100
FTSE 100 57 36.77 3.84 2.93
FTSE 250 98 63.23 3.73 2.81
Total 155 100.00 3.77 2.84
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
Listing status
Cross listed 142 91.61 3.71 2.82
Not cross listed 13 8.39 4.46 3.15
Total 155 100.00 3.77 2.84
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
US listing status
US listed 93 60.00 3.60 2.79
Not US listed 62 40.00 4.03 2.93
Total 155 100.00 3.77 2.84
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
Early adopter
Early adopter 23 14.84 4.83 3.71
Not early adopter 132 85.16 3.59 2.64
Total 155 100.00 3.77 2.84
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
Type of reporting segment
Business 87 56.13 2.56 1.40
Geo 29 18.71 6.17 3.37
Mixed 39 25.16 4.69 3.36
Total 155 100.00 3.77 2.84
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
Geo revenue disclosure under IFRS 8
Both reporting segment & EWI _ diff 36 23.23 3.36 2.94
Both reporting segment & EWI _ same 4 2.58 7.00 1.41
Entity wide information 87 56.13 2.56 1.40
Geo reporting segment 15 9.68 7.80 2.15
Mixed reporting segment 13 8.39 7.38 3.07
Total 155 100.00 3.77 2.84
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
*: significant at the 0.05 level
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
N=155 Number of items by countryCompanies
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Appendix C. 27 Paired sample t-test for the number of items disclosed by countries 
under IAS 14R and under IFRS 8 
 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel C 
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Appendix C. 28 Pearson correlation coefficients between the quality measures of geographic disclosure and different quantitative company 
characteristics  
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Appendix C. 29 Kendall’s tau between the quality measures of geographic disclosure and different quantitative company characteristics 
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Appendix C. 30 Spearman’s rho between the quality measures of geographic disclosure and different quantitative company characteristics 
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Appendix C. 31 Kendall’s tau between the different quality measures of geographic disclosure under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
 
Chapter 10: Appendices 
320 
Appendix C. 32 Spearman’s rho between the different quality measures of geographic disclosure under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
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Appendix D Appendices to Chapter 7 
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Appendix D. 1 Materiality notes _ extracts  
 
1. “The Group considers the United Kingdom to be its country of domicile. No other 
single country contributes more than 10% of the Group’s revenue or non-current 
assets.” (WS Atkins plc 2010 Annual Report and Accounts, p91) 
2. “No individual country accounted for 10% or more of the Group’s total revenue. ... 
There are no material non-current assets located in an individual country outside of 
the UK.” (AVEVA Group plc 2010 Annual Report and Accounts, p60) 
3. “External revenue attributable to the UK is £2 624m (2007 £2 021m). External 
revenue attributable to foreign countries is £9 942m (2007 £6 270m) and includes 
£888m (2007 £1 776m) from external customers attributed to the USA representing 
7% (2007 21%) of Group revenue; £1 285m (2007 £815m, 10%) from external 
customers attributed to Brazil representing 10% of Group revenue; and £1 309m from 
external customers attributed to Japan representing 10% of Group revenue (2007 
£495m, 6%). .... Amount [Non-current assets] attributable to the UK is £3 108m (2007 
£2 595m). Amount attributable to foreign countries is £14 036m (2007 £7 266m) and 
includes £2 732m (2007 £nil) located in Australia representing 16% of the Group 
total.” (BG Group 2008 Annual Report and Accounts, p75 and p77) 
4. “In addition to the United Kingdom, revenue relating to an individual country is 
separately disclosed when it represents 10% or more of total revenue. ... Non-current 
assets relating to an individual country are separately disclosed when they represent 
10% or more of total non-current assets, as defined above.” (IHG 2009 Annual 
Reports and Financial Statements, p75) 
5. “The Group operates in numerous countries throughout the world. Management has 
determined that revenues from external customers attributed to an individual foreign 
country are material if they make up more than 10% of consolidated Group revenue, 
and in such cases the revenue arising in these countries is disclosed separately.” 
(Aeigis Group plc 2009 Annual report and Accounts, p56) 
6. “Those countries which account for more than 10% of the group’s total revenue and 
/ or non-current assets are considered individually material and are reported 
separately ... .” (SABMiller plc Annual Report 2010, p87) 
7. “Individual countries which comprised more than 10% of group revenue were: ...” 
“No overseas country had non-current assets amounting to 10% or more of the 
Group’s total non-current assets.” (Renishaw plc Annual Report and Accounts 2010, 
pp33-34)  
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Appendix D. 1 (continued) Materiality notes _ extracts 
 
8. “All the business segments are managed on a worldwide basis but the main countries, 
which represent greater than 10% of either the Group’s external revenues or non-
current assets, are Australia, China (including Hong Kong), the United Kingdom and 
the United States.” (Intertek Group Annual Report 2009, p85) 
9. “No other country had turnover or non-current assets (as shown above) greater than 
10% of the Group total.” (Unilever Annual Report and Accounts 2009, p88) 
10.  “The Group’s geographic analysis is presented on the following level: 
 • continental; or 
 • sub-continental; or 
 • by individual country (if greater than 10% of the Group total).” (Mondi Group 
Annual Report and Accounts 2009, p100) 
11. “The Group’s revenue and non-current assets (excluding the financial asset and 
deferred tax assets) by geographical location are separately detailed below where 
they exceed 10% of total revenue or non-current assets, respectively, in any particular 
year:...” (SOCO International plc Annual Report and Accounts 2009, p71) 
12. “No individual country amounts to more than 3% of turnover, other than those noted 
below.” (Spectris plc. Annual Report and Accounts 2009, p65) 
13. “With the exception of the UK and Spain, no individual country contributed more 
than 10% of consolidated sales or assets.” (The Rank Group plc Annual Report and 
Financial Statements 2009, p72) 
14. “Included in the external revenue from foreign countries is £1,529 million (2008: 
£1,361 million) attributable to Brazil, being the only subsidiary contributing more 
than 10 per cent of the Group’s external revenue in 2009 and 2008. Included in non-
current assets are amounts of £1,805 million (2008: £1,884 million) attributable to 
the investment in Reynolds American and £682 million (2008: £638 million) 
attributable to the investments in the Indian associates ITC and VST.” (British 
American Tobacco Annual Report 2009, p123) 
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Appendix D. 2 Materiality thresholds under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 by different 
quantitative company characteristics 
 
 
 
 
Standard
Revenue / NCA
Sample
Materiality categories < 5% 5 - 10% > 10% Total < 5% 5 - 10% > 10% Total < 5% 5 - 10% > 10% Total
Number of companies 7 12 23 42 22 19 35 76 20 14 42 76
% of companies 16.67 28.57 54.76 100.00 28.95 25.00 46.05 100.00 26.32 18.42 55.26 100.00
Dependent, quantitative variables
% of revenues in smallest country reported
Mean 2.21 8.36 24.12 15.97 1.74 7.29 26.13 14.36 4.37 8.05 21.22 14.36
Median 2.81 8.91 20.62 10.97 1.64 7.48 21.36 9.13 3.19 8.69 17.70 9.13
Minimum 0.01 5.97 10.33 0.01 0.02 5.00 10.59 0.02 0.02 0.54 0.14 0.02
Maximum 3.33 9.87 50.90 50.90 3.98 9.84 63.91 63.91 23.18 15.33 63.91 63.91
Standard Deviation 1.29 1.28 12.53 13.10 1.32 1.71 14.19 14.72 5.19 4.24 16.35 14.72
Significant
**
 effect on dependent variable parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES
% of NCA in smallest country reported
Mean 5.80 12.57 32.68 19.87 1.55 7.50 32.72 19.87
Median 3.95 7.98 28.43 11.69 0.88 7.55 23.76 11.69
Minimum 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.01 0.01 5.65 10.33 0.01
Maximum 20.32 55.35 99.97 99.97 4.75 9.56 99.97 99.97
Standard Deviation 6.15 14.94 25.89 22.72 1.59 1.20 23.61 22.72
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES
% of foreign revenue
Mean 53.86 86.50 87.99 81.88 77.41 70.22 83.04 78.21 74.49 81.43 78.91 78.21
Median 64.13 98.08 92.88 92.22 84.54 80.71 89.89 84.80 84.54 90.41 84.52 84.80
Minimum 0.80 14.35 39.19 0.80 2.37 8.24 35.97 2.37 2.37 30.72 8.24 2.37
Maximum 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.79 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.87 100.00 100.00
Standard Deviation 42.63 24.72 15.84 26.94 27.69 29.82 17.25 24.29 32.54 19.58 21.37 24.29
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
% of foreign NCA
Mean 72.13 56.75 79.93 71.88 65.71 68.23 76.03 71.88
Median 83.29 56.09 85.29 82.73 78.22 78.30 83.09 82.73
Minimum 0.11 1.36 22.20 0.11 0.11 9.98 22.20 0.11
Maximum 99.09 99.50 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.91 100.00 100.00
Standard Deviation 27.66 33.07 19.66 27.21 34.88 31.17 21.01 27.21
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
% of revenues reported by country
Mean 81.45 38.76 54.43 54.46 72.31 72.82 57.36 65.55 75.22 71.43 58.99 65.55
Median 82.75 31.65 52.04 52.83 75.63 78.61 52.99 68.03 76.79 75.45 53.16 68.03
Minimum 46.58 8.23 11.49 8.23 29.44 24.77 14.51 14.51 24.77 24.77 14.51 14.51
Maximum 100.00 94.34 100.00 100.00 100.00 97.58 100.00 100.00 100.00 97.09 100.00 100.00
Standard Deviation 20.44 30.57 27.07 30.02 22.36 21.98 23.01 23.54 22.10 23.36 22.65 23.54
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES
Number of locations reported
Mean 5.57 5.83 5.04 5.36 7.68 6.68 4.69 6.05 7.75 6.57 5.07 6.05
Median 5.00 5.50 4.00 5.00 8.00 7.00 4.00 5.00 8.00 6.00 4.50 5.00
Minimum 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 2.00
Maximum 9.00 9.00 10.00 10.00 15.00 10.00 10.00 15.00 15.00 11.00 10.00 15.00
Standard Deviation 2.88 1.53 2.06 2.06 3.15 2.47 1.80 2.73 3.28 2.47 2.06 2.73
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES
Number of countries reported
Mean 4.00 2.25 2.39 2.62 5.09 4.16 2.49 3.66 5.10 4.29 2.76 3.66
Median 3.00 2.50 2.00 2.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 3.00
Minimum 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00
Maximum 9.00 4.00 6.00 9.00 11.00 7.00 5.00 11.00 11.00 8.00 5.00 11.00
Standard Deviation 2.65 1.06 1.41 1.67 2.88 1.57 0.92 2.15 3.02 1.82 1.08 2.15
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES
*
: smallest revenue (NCA) % disclosed by the companies
**
: significant at the 0.05 level
Revenue
N=42
Materiality threshold under IFRS 8
Revenue
N=76
NCA
N=76
Materiality threshold
*
 under IAS 14R
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Appendix D. 2 (continued) Materiality thresholds under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 by 
different quantitative company characteristics  
 
 
 
 
Standard
Revenue / NCA
Sample
Materiality categories < 5% 5 - 10% > 10% Total < 5% 5 - 10% > 10% Total < 5% 5 - 10% > 10% Total
Number of companies 7 12 23 42 22 19 35 76 20 14 42 76
% of companies 16.67 28.57 54.76 100.00 28.95 25.00 46.05 100.00 26.32 18.42 55.26 100.00
Dependent, quantitative variables
Number of foreign countries with subsidiary
Mean 8.59 11.84 14.74 12.24 7.75 13.86 13.83 12.24
Median 7.50 10.00 9.00 9.00 7.50 10.50 9.50 9.00
Minimum 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00 1.00 1.00
Maximum 37.00 30.00 51.00 51.00 19.00 37.00 51.00 51.00
Standard Deviation 8.43 8.00 12.91 10.85 5.66 8.99 12.71 10.85
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO parametric test: YES non parametric test: NO
Number of subsidiaries in foreign countries
Mean 18.18 25.11 28.37 24.61 17.00 25.57 27.90 24.61
Median 16.00 18.00 22.00 19.00 16.00 22.50 19.50 19.00
Minimum 1.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 11.00 2.00 1.00
Maximum 64.00 76.00 92.00 92.00 35.00 64.00 92.00 92.00
Standard Deviation 15.17 19.02 25.33 21.47 10.77 14.67 26.10 21.47
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO parametric test: YES non parametric test: NO
Number of items disclosed by countries
Mean 3.45 2.68 3.14 3.12 3.05 3.14 3.14 3.12
Median 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Minimum 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Maximum 11.00 6.00 9.00 11.00 8.00 8.00 11.00 11.00
Standard Deviation 2.52 1.34 3.14 2.01 1.96 1.83 2.14 2.01
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
Capital intensity (%)
Mean 25.95 31.02 24.43 26.52 36.25 24.15 22.67 26.52
Median 20.05 23.76 17.95 21.51 31.21 23.44 16.51 21.51
Minimum 2.89 1.45 1.66 1.45 2.89 2.12 1.45 1.45
Maximum 80.06 84.51 65.03 84.51 84.51 61.97 65.30 84.51
Standard Deviation 22.72 24.33 19.17 21.46 26.98 16.76 18.78 21.46
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
Total sales (£m)
Mean 5,641.07 7,826.11 8,718.12 7,604.39 4,862.00 4,121.09 10,071.40 7,604.39
Median 2,337.84 1,880.40 1,055.10 1,857.53 1,907.33 1,137.60 2,072.00 1,857.53
Minimum 334.25 171.88 81.13 81.13 334.25 171.88 81.13 81.13
Maximum 25,901.04 35,288.06 148,174.39 148,174.39 25,901.04 21,963.00 148,174.39 148,174.39
Standard Deviation 6,902.79 10,305.68 25,925.28 18,580.84 6,775.07 6,386.36 24,151.62 18,580.84
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
Growth rate (sales, %)
Mean 4.96 5.70 7.51 6.32 2.67 4.61 8.63 6.32
Median 5.43 3.76 2.85 3.46 2.17 6.74 3.01 3.46
Minimum -25.26 -17.15 -33.75 -33.75 -25.26 -17.15 -33.75 -33.75
Maximum 26.35 51.56 136.74 136.74 24.43 28.22 136.74 136.74
Standard Deviation 14.75 14.65 27.19 21.18 13.57 14.07 25.69 21.18
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
Effective tax rate (%)
Mean 27.62 13.32 41.44 30.41 26.89 32.30 31.45 30.41
Median 20.84 25.06 23.02 23.24 22.56 27.42 22.80 23.24
Minimum -115.25 -127.78 -39.34 -127.78 -115.25 15.54 -127.78 -127.78
Maximum 310.92 108.16 442.22 442.22 310.92 108.16 442.22 442.22
Standard Deviation 70.80 49.84 83.87 72.94 74.16 22.76 83.75 72.94
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
Profitability (ROE, %)
Mean 27.69 22.52 19.79 22.76 22.98 13.32 25.80 22.76
Median 16.03 17.35 13.41 14.80 12.65 9.98 19.96 14.80
Minimum -9.53 -5.27 -3.80 -9.53 -9.53 -1.46 -5.27 -9.53
Maximum 225.91 156.61 142.95 225.91 225.91 39.71 156.61 225.91
Standard Deviation 47.17 34.18 24.90 34.58 48.68 12.22 31.65 34.58
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
Current ratio
Mean 1.37 1.35 1.50 1.43 1.42 1.63 1.36 1.43
Median 1.27 1.09 1.37 1.29 1.27 1.32 1.31 1.29
Minimum 0.59 0.54 0.40 0.40 0.59 0.65 0.40 0.40
Maximum 4.68 4.15 2.75 4.68 4.15 4.68 2.75 4.68
Standard Deviation 0.85 0.76 0.66 0.74 0.80 1.02 1.36 0.74
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
Gearing (%)
Mean 87.42 109.64 90.90 94.58 71.43 139.31 90.70 94.58
Median 51.33 76.16 66.17 63.22 79.12 83.71 52.44 63.22
Minimum -5.42 -2.85 4.10 -5.42 -5.42 27.49 -2.85 -5.42
Maximum 599.66 686.52 299.40 686.52 174.74 599.66 686.52 686.52
Standard Deviation 121.05 152.81 75.03 111.07 44.86 151.68 115.67 111.07
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
*
: smallest revenue (NCA) % disclosed by the companies
**
: significant at the 0.05 level
Revenue
N=42
Materiality threshold under IFRS 8
Revenue
N=76
NCA
N=76
Materiality threshold
*
 under IAS 14R
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Appendix D. 3 Spearman’s and Kendall’s coefficients between the rank of revenue / NCA materiality thresholds used by the companies under 
IFRS 8 and the rank of different quantitative company characteristics 
 
 
 
Company characteristics 
Materiality threshold under IFRS 8* 
Revenue % NCA % Revenue % NCA % 
Spearman’s rho Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Spearman’s rho Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Kendall’s tau Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Kendall’s tau Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
NCA smallest %   0.688 0.000 1.000 -   0.513   0.000   1.000 - 
Revenue smallest %   1.000 -   0.688 0.000   1.000 -   0.513   0.000 
Foreign revenue   0.014 0.905 -0.004 0.969   0.010   0.897 -0.001   0.993 
Foreign NCA   0.109 0.350   0.145 0.213   0.066   0.399   0.099   0.204 
Capital intensity  -0.022 0.853 -0.162 0.163 -0.011   0.886 -0.111   0.158 
HHI   0.169 0.145   0.047 0.684   0.125 0.116   0.027   0.733 
Total sales -0.099 0.397 -0.023 0.847 -0.060   0.446 -0.012   0.882 
Growth rate  -0.033 0.776   0.101 0.386 -0.022   0.781   0.075   0.339 
Profitability    0.009 0.938   0.180 0.119   0.011   0.893   0.110   0.160 
Current ratio   0.124 0.287   0.030 0.795   0.078   0.319   0.022   0.777 
Gearing  -0.037 0.752 -0.009 0.941 -0.025   0.747 -0.005   0.954 
Number of foreign countries with subsidiary   0.196 0.089   0.118 0.308   0.144   0.071   0.079   0.325 
Number of subsidiaries in foreign countries   0.140 0.228   0.024 0.835   0.100   0.207   0.028   0.726 
Effective tax rate -0.022 0.848 -0.086 0.459 -0.021   0.784 -0.049   0.530 
Number of tax haven countries with subsidiaries   0.148 0.203   0.048 0.678   0.112   0.189   0.038   0.654 
Number of subsidiaries in tax havens   0.015 0.895 -0.044 0.707   0.010   0.905 -0.033   0.689 
% of revenue reported by country -0.247 0.032 -0.310 0.006 -0.165   0.035 -0.209   0.008 
Number of geographic locations reported -0.524 0.000 -0.522 0.000 -0.394   0.000 -0.408   0.000 
Number of individual countries reported -0.676 0.000 -0.595 0.000 -0.533   0.000 -0.467   0.000 
Number of geographic regions reported -0.111 0.339 -0.123 0.290 -0.081   0.344 -0.096   0.260 
Number of items disclosed by countries -0.032 0.782 -0.016 0.889 -0.022   0.803 -0.012   0.892 
Fineness score _ 3 -0.392 0.000 -0.423 0.000 -0.270   0.001 -0.297   0.000 
Fineness score _ 4 -0.363 0.001 -0.397 0.000 -0.251   0.001 -0.279   0.000 
Fineness score _ 8 -0.306 0.007 -0.360 0.001 -0.208   0.008 -0.246   0.002 
*: smallest revenue (NCA) % disclosed by the companies 
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Appendix D. 4 Paired sample t-test for revenue and NCA materiality thresholds 
under IFRS 8 
Part I: Paired sample t-test for revenue and NCA materiality thresholds under IFRS 
8 (N=76) 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel C 
 
 
Part II: Paired sample t-test for revenue materiality thresholds under IFRS 8 and 
IAS 14R (N=42) 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
Panel C 
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Appendix D. 5 Revenue and NCA materiality thresholds under IFRS 8 by different 
categorical company characteristics 
 
Categories Number % Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Industry
Basic Materials 9 11.84 7.99 7.17 18.74 35.33
Consumer Services 10 13.16 10.91 13.13 8.47 8.85
Customer Goods 9 11.84 14.69 16.36 26.76 15.45
Health Care 4 5.26 32.21 14.14 28.40 15.45
Industrials 25 32.89 12.67 13.65 15.93 16.75
Oil and Gas 6 7.89 16.43 11.44 28.12 29.06
Technology 8 10.53 24.26 22.43 36.04 35.25
Telecommunication 2 2.63 8.79 5.10 10.31 9.13
Utilities 3 3.95 7.45 3.07 8.81 9.52
Total 76 100.00 14.36 14.72 19.87 22.72
Significant
**
 effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
Auditor
Big4_A 23 30.26 13.64 16.80 17.46 20.18
Big4_B 20 26.32 15.33 13.97 20.28 23.49
Big4_C 19 25.00 11.27 9.54 20.06 23.29
Big4_D 14 18.42 18.36 18.09 22.98 26.64
Not Big4 0 0.00  -  -  -  - 
Total 76 100.00 14.36 14.72 19.87 22.72
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
Single segment / Not
Not single segment company 75 98.68 14.52 14.75 20.13 22.75
Single segment company 1 1.32 2.37  - 0.11  - 
Total 76 100.00 14.36 14.72 19.87 22.72
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
FTSE 100
FTSE 100 37 48.68 13.12 13.75 17.75 20.37
FTSE 250 39 51.32 15.53 15.66 21.87 24.84
Total 76 100.00 14.36 14.72 19.87 22.72
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
Listing status
Cross listed 71 93.42 14.48 14.70 20.44 23.02
Not cross listed 5 6.58 12.71 16.63 11.75 17.75
Total 76 100.00 14.36 14.72 19.87 22.72
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
US listing status
US listed 52 68.42 15.45 15.89 21.07 22.87
Not US listed 24 31.58 12.00 11.72 17.26 22.65
Total 76 100.00 14.36 14.72 19.87 22.72
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
Early adopter
Early adopter 14 18.42 6.86 7.20 10.43 11.68
Not early adopter 62 81.58 16.05 15.47 22.00 24.09
Total 76 100.00 14.36 14.72 19.87 22.72
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
Type of reporting segment
Business 48 63.16 13.76 14.84 19.50 25.11
Geo 13 17.11 15.76 12.84 23.38 20.06
Mixed 15 19.74 15.07 16.62 18.00 16.93
Total 76 100.00 14.36 14.72 19.87 22.72
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
Geo revenue disclosure under IFRS 8
Both reporting segment & EWI _ diff 20 26.32 16.23 15.59 22.45 19.70
Both reporting segment & EWI _ same 3 3.95 16.81 21.17 20.12 20.60
Entity wide information 48 63.16 13.76 14.84 19.50 25.11
Geo reporting segment 4 5.26 13.90 5.13 15.92 9.71
Mixed reporting segment 1 1.32 0.25  - 1.00  - 
Total 76 100.00 14.36 14.72 19.87 22.72
Significant effect on dependent variable
  parametric test
  non parametric test
  
*
: dependent variables; smallest revenue (NCA) % disclosed by the companies
 **
: significant at the 0.05 level
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
Revenue NCA
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
Materiality threshold under IFRS 8 (%)
*
Company
NO
NO
NO
NO
N=76
NO
YES
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Appendix D. 6 Foreign country disclosures by different categorical company characteristics 
 
 
N=155
Categories NO revenue & NCA Only revenue Revenue & NCA Total NO revenue & NCA Only revenue Revenue & NCA Total NO revenue & NCA Only revenue Revenue & NCA Total
Industry
Basic Materials 4 2 9 15 26.67 13.33 60.00 100.00 8.33 6.45 11.84 9.68
Consumer Services 13 11 10 34 38.24 32.35 29.41 100.00 27.08 35.48 13.16 21.94
Customer Goods 5 3 9 17 29.41 17.65 52.94 100.00 10.42 9.68 11.84 10.97
Health Care 0 2 4 6 0.00 33.33 66.67 100.00 0.00 6.45 5.26 3.87
Industrials 19 9 25 53 35.85 16.98 47.17 100.00 39.58 29.03 32.89 34.19
Oil and Gas 0 2 6 8 0.00 25.00 75.00 100.00 0.00 6.45 7.89 5.16
Technology 5 1 8 14 35.71 7.14 57.14 100.00 10.42 3.23 10.53 9.03
Telecommunication 1 0 2 3 33.33 0.00 66.67 100.00 2.08 0.00 2.63 1.94
Utilities 1 1 3 5 20.00 20.00 60.00 100.00 2.08 3.23 3.95 3.23
Total 48 31 76 155 30.97 20.00 49.03 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Auditor
Big4_A 14 13 23 50 28.00 26.00 46.00 100.00 29.17 41.94 30.26 32.26
Big4_B 11 9 20 40 27.50 22.50 50.00 100.00 22.92 29.03 26.32 25.81
Big4_C 15 4 19 38 39.47 10.53 50.00 100.00 31.25 12.90 25.00 24.52
Big4_D 7 3 14 24 29.17 12.50 58.33 100.00 14.58 9.68 18.42 15.48
Not Big4 1 2 0 3 33.33 66.67 0.00 100.00 2.08 6.45 0.00 1.94
Total 48 31 76 155 30.97 20.00 49.03 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Single segment / Not
Not single segment company 46 28 75 149 30.87 18.79 50.34 100.00 95.83 90.32 98.68 96.13
Single segment company 2 3 1 6 33.33 50.00 16.67 100.00 4.17 9.68 1.32 3.87
Total 48 31 76 155 30.97 20.00 49.03 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
FTSE 100
FTSE 100 9 11 37 57 15.79 19.30 64.91 100.00 18.75 35.48 48.68 36.77
FTSE 250 39 20 39 98 39.80 20.41 39.80 100.00 81.25 64.52 51.32 63.23
Total 48 31 76 155 30.97 20.00 49.03 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Listing status
Cross listed 44 27 71 142 30.99 19.01 50.00 100.00 91.67 87.10 93.42 91.61
Not cross listed 4 4 5 13 30.77 30.77 38.46 100.00 8.33 12.90 6.58 8.39
Total 48 31 76 155 30.97 20.00 49.03 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
US listing status
US listed 21 20 52 93 22.58 21.51 55.91 100.00 43.75 64.52 68.42 60.00
Not US listed 27 11 24 62 43.55 17.74 38.71 100.00 56.25 35.48 31.58 40.00
Total 48 31 76 155 30.97 20.00 49.03 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Early adopter
Early adopter 5 4 14 23 21.74 17.39 60.87 100.00 11.63 12.90 18.42 14.84
Not early adopter 43 27 62 132 32.58 20.45 46.97 100.00 100.00 87.10 81.58 85.16
Total 48 31 76 155 30.97 20.00 49.03 100.00 111.63 100.00 100.00 100.00
Type of reporting segment
Business 25 14 48 87 28.74 16.09 55.17 100.00 52.08 45.16 63.16 56.13
Geo 8 8 13 29 27.59 27.59 44.83 100.00 16.67 25.81 17.11 18.71
Mixed 15 9 15 39 38.46 23.08 38.46 100.00 31.25 29.03 19.74 25.16
Total 48 31 76 155 30.97 20.00 49.03 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Geo revenue disclosure under IFRS 8
Both reporting segm. & EWI _ diff 9 7 20 36 25.00 19.44 55.56 100.00 18.75 22.58 26.32 23.23
Both reporting segm. & EWI _ same 0 1 3 4 0.00 25.00 75.00 100.00 0.00 3.23 3.95 2.58
Entity wide information 25 14 48 87 28.74 16.09 55.17 100.00 52.08 45.16 63.16 56.13
Geo reporting segment 7 4 4 15 46.67 26.67 26.67 100.00 14.58 12.90 5.26 9.68
Mixed reporting segment 7 5 1 13 53.85 38.46 7.69 100.00 14.58 16.13 1.32 8.39
Total 48 31 76 155 30.97 20.00 49.03 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Foreign country disclosure Foreign country disclosure Foreign country disclosure
number of the companies % of the companies % of the companies
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Appendix D. 7 Association between foreign country disclosure and different categorical company characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
N=155 Number and (%)
Value df Asymp.sign. of the expected Value Approx.Sig.
Categorical variables (2-sided) frequencies below 5
Industry 16.443 16 0.422 17 (63.0) 0.230 0.422
Auditor 9.891 8 0.273   4 (26.7) 0.179 0.273
Single segment 4.153 2 0.125   3 (50.0) 0.164 0.125
FTSE 100 / 250 11.366 2 0.003   0 (  0.0) 0.271 0.003
Listing status 1.146 2 0.564   2 (33.3) 0.086 0.564
US listing 7.790 2 0.020   0 (  0.0) 0.224 0.020
Early adopter 1.606 2 0.448   1 (16.7) 0.102 0.448
Type of reporting segment 4.300 4 0.367   0 (  0.0) 0.118 0.367
Geo revenue disclosure under IFRS 8 16.045 8 0.042   7 (46.7) 0.228 0.042
Cramer's V
Foreign country information under IFRS 8 (Neither revenue nor NCA for individual country, Only revenue for individual country, Both revenue and NCA for
individual country) &
Pearson's Chi-square test
Chapter 10: Appendices 
331 
Appendix D. 8 Foreign country disclosure under IFRS 8 by different categorical company characteristics 
N=155 N=155
NO revenue & NCA Only revenue Revenue & NCA Total NO revenue & NCA Only revenue Revenue & NCA Total
Number of companies 48 31 76 155 Number of companies 48 31 76 155
% of companies 30.97 20.00 49.03 100.00 % of companies 30.97 20.00 49.03 100.00
Dependent, quantitative variables Dependent, quantitative variables
% of foreign revenue Growth rate (sales, %)
Mean 49.24 69.42 78.21 67.48 Mean 4.91 3.61 6.32 5.34
Median 54.21 78.61 84.80 79.79 Median 1.23 3.81 3.46 2.85
Minimum 0.34 1.58 2.37 0.34 Minimum -26.32 -41.92 -33.75 -41.92
Maximum 98.81 100.00 100.00 100.00 Maximum 82.50 40.86 136.74 136.74
Standard Deviation 34.38 26.88 24.29 30.83 Standard Deviation 18.71 14.85 21.18 19.22
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
% of revenues reported by country Effective tax rate (%)
Mean 50.76 68.29 65.55 61.52 Mean 24.08 23.36 30.41 27.04
Median 47.79 69.88 68.03 67.49 Median 21.48 24.97 23.24 23.16
Minimum 1.19 11.35 14.51 1.19 Minimum -52.85 -107.46 -127.78 -127.78
Maximum 99.66 100.00 100.00 100.00 Maximum 180.44 118.62 442.22 442.22
Standard Deviation 34.38 27.42 23.54 28.82 Standard Deviation 34.10 35.86 72.94 56.64
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
Number of locations reported Profitability (ROE, %)
Mean 3.13 5.52 6.05 5.04 Mean -3.34 27.94 22.76 15.71
Median 3.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 Median 11.89 15.21 14.80 14.40
Minimum 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 Minimum -1390.63 -11.92 -9.53 -1390.63
Maximum 5.00 15.00 15.00 15.00 Maximum 1109.52 289.61 225.91 1109.52
Standard Deviation 0.98 2.83 2.73 2.68 Standard Deviation 271.99 55.86 34.58 154.71
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
Number of countries reported Current ratio
Mean 1.00 3.32 3.66 2.77 Mean 1.37 1.31 1.43 1.38
Median 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 Median 1.31 1.24 1.29 1.27
Minimum 1.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 Minimum 0.40 0.43 0.40 0.40
Maximum 1.00 12.00 11.00 12.00 Maximum 3.86 3.87 4.68 4.68
Standard Deviation 0.00 2.39 2.15 2.19 Standard Deviation 0.86 0.69 0.74 0.76
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
Number of foreign countries with subsidiary Gearing (%)
Mean 9.17 10.55 12.24 10.95 Mean 76.70 81.23 94.58 86.37
Median 4.50 7.00 9.00 8.00 Median 46.62 48.40 63.22 52.83
Minimum 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 Minimum -8.85 6.48 -5.42 -8.85
Maximum 51.00 32.00 64.00 64.00 Maximum 453.12 505.43 686.52 686.52
Standard Deviation 10.67 8.88 10.85 10.45 Standard Deviation 92.58 96.28 111.07 102.46
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: YES Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
Number of subsidiaries in foreign countries Fineness score _ 3
Mean 15.42 18.29 24.61 20.50 Mean 2.16 2.46 2.32 2.30
Median 9.00 16.00 19.00 16.00 Median 2.28 2.61 2.42 2.41
Minimum 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 Minimum 0.35 0.79 0.95 0.35
Maximum 95.00 55.00 92.00 95.00 Maximum 2.99 3.00 3.00 3.00
Standard Deviation 18.25 13.48 21.47 19.46 Standard Deviation 0.67 0.55 0.54 0.59
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: YES
**
non parametric test: NO
Number of items disclosed by countries Fineness score _ 4
Mean 3.83 5.29 3.12 3.77 Mean 2.67 3.14 2.97 2.91
Median 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 Median 2.70 3.25 3.08 3.12
Minimum 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 Minimum 0.46 1.05 1.27 0.46
Maximum 12.00 12.00 11.00 12.00 Maximum 3.99 4.00 4.00 4.00
Standard Deviation 2.85 3.89 2.01 2.84 Standard Deviation 0.97 0.80 0.75 0.85
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: YES non parametric test: NO Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: YES non parametric test: NO
Capital intensity (%) Fineness score _ 8
Mean 25.22 27.02 26.52 26.22 Mean 4.70 5.87 5.59 5.37
Median 22.80 21.29 21.51 21.73 Median 4.32 6.19 5.83 5.81
Minimum 0.20 2.58 1.45 0.20 Minimum 0.92 2.11 2.04 0.92
Maximum 79.70 71.06 84.51 84.51 Maximum 7.97 8.00 8.00 8.00
Standard Deviation 21.24 20.98 21.46 21.17 Standard Deviation 2.29 1.86 1.66 1.96
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: YES non parametric test: YES
Total sales (£m)
Mean 2,635.79 6,448.70 7,604.39 5,834.59 *: significant at the 0.05 level
Median 1,056.50 2,503.20 1,857.53 1,435.00 **: significant at the 0.10 level
Minimum 148.33 98.50 81.13 81.13
Maximum 21,550.40 56,910.00 148,174.40 148,174.40
Standard Deviation 4,505.06 10,931.08 18,580.84 14,227.51
Significant effect on dependent variable parametric test: NO non parametric test: NO
Foreign country disclosure under IFRS 8Foreign country disclosure under IFRS 8
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